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conda-sigstore

conda-sigstore creates and verifies Sigstore attestations for conda packages. It can also audit installed environments and, when explicitly enabled, reject a package before extraction when acceptable evidence is unavailable or invalid.

The project is alpha software, distributed through PyPI and the personal jezdez channel on Anaconda.org. The opt-in install integration requires the unreleased package-verifier API in conda/conda#16518, and draft transport and source-evidence formats may still change incompatibly.

What it does

  • Verify a package against a local or remote Sigstore bundle.
  • Create a signed CEP 27 publication statement.
  • Audit installed packages for publication, provenance, and recipe source evidence.
  • Require valid CEP 27 evidence before conda extracts a package.
  • Read the draft repodata-advertised immutable .sigs.<sha256> transport and, separately, Prefix.dev's current .v0.sigs convention.

The draft transport follows conda/ceps#142 at commit 241d1cf43f4db5af484be59ad0b840a1b9e5d616. Current conda PackageRecord objects do not preserve its attestations_sha256 field, so real solver, install, and installed-environment audit flows require a corresponding conda change before they can select the draft transport.

Install

conda-sigstore requires Python 3.11 or newer. Install it in the Python environment that owns the conda executable.

For a standard conda installation, activate base and install 0.1.2 from the personal jezdez channel, with dependencies from conda-forge:

conda activate base
conda install --override-channels -c jezdez -c conda-forge "conda-sigstore=0.1.2"

The installation guide also documents PyPI installation, the source preview, and the separate requirements for install enforcement.

Commands

conda sigstore attest PACKAGE --target-channel URL [--output PATH]
conda sigstore verify ARTIFACT --bundle PATH_OR_URL [--channel URL] \
  [--cert-identity IDENTITY --cert-oidc-issuer URL] [--json]
conda sigstore audit [-n ENV | -p PREFIX] [--sources] [--prefix-sidecars] [--json]

Choose the path that matches your task:

Security boundary

A successful result proves that Sigstore verified the bundle and that its CEP 27 statement binds the package filename and SHA-256. It reports the authenticated signer and can compare an included target-channel claim.

It does not prove that the signer was authorized to publish to that channel, that the package was built safely, or that its contents are benign.

Read the security model and report vulnerabilities according to the security policy.

Development

pixi run --locked -e dev check
pixi run --locked -e test test
pixi run --locked -e test bench
pixi run --locked -e docs docs

See the contribution guide for the full development and release workflow. conda-sigstore is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause License.

Metadata

Release files for conda-sigstore 0.1.3

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for conda-sigstore 0.1.3
File Size Uploaded Provenance Actions
conda_sigstore-0.1.3.tar.gz 128.6 kB With provenance Details for conda_sigstore-0.1.3.tar.gz

Built distribution (wheel)

Table of built distributions (wheels) for conda-sigstore 0.1.3
File Interpreter ABI Platform Actions
conda_sigstore-0.1.3-py3-none-any.whl Python 3 none any Details for conda_sigstore-0.1.3-py3-none-any.whl

Total release size: 171.9 kB

Release files / conda_sigstore-0.1.3.tar.gz

Download URL conda_sigstore-0.1.3.tar.gz
Size 128.6 kB
Tags Source
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
64d8b6c95de21125daddb0b4a00256ef708f1ca5c5bb774e6bbb9dd2e1a8fadb
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
763798daf03d74d14ce42e9c0e7623723f543419a1bcc2ddbd6d4563f8e04a61
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / conda_sigstore-0.1.3-py3-none-any.whl

Download URL conda_sigstore-0.1.3-py3-none-any.whl
Size 43.4 kB
Tags Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
65c4669090be7cc5255512e1a5bb7036b690d23ccce86434a35a938bb6bb9dce
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
59c6773361436be4dfe698c389e01dd2f2c96d46d55505207326896476a08bec
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

Security for conda-sigstore 0.1.3

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

Full provenance

Both files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.

Select from 2 files

Attestation for conda_sigstore-0.1.3.tar.gz

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

A note on package security

PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.

To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.

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