Conning
A control room for your agent's test machines. Your agent (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor...) stays on your own laptop. Conning holds the keys to your lab VMs and gives the agent four lean tools to run commands and move files there. The agent never sees a password, and you approve anything risky.
Status: pre-alpha (M2 done). Running commands, long jobs, remote file reads and transfers work over OpenSSH, with pinned host keys, password or key auth, approvals and leases. You can approve in the agent client, in
conn watchor withconn approve;conn doctorchecks your setup. Long jobs run detached on Linux, macOS and Windows targets, andconn mcp installsets up claude, codex, cursor, opencode or pi. See docs/design.md for every decision so far.
Why
Putting an agent harness inside every CLI on every remote machine is redundant. Developers already have a capable agent on their own machine. What's missing is a safe, token-lean way for that agent to reach the machines it tests on:
- No secrets in context. Targets hold references to the OS keychain,
op://or ssh-agent. Secrets are resolved inside Conning at the last moment and never returned by any tool. - Lean results. Exit code first, output capped at 8 KB by default (the agent may ask for more, up to a ceiling), with a handle to page the rest. Fan-out to many targets collapses identical results.
- Guardrails in code, not in the prompt. Each target has a mode (
observe,ask,lease). Commands outside the allowlist wait for your approval; "always allow" remembers two words, sosystemctl statusnever lets throughsystemctl stop. - Plain OpenSSH underneath. Linux and Windows (OpenSSH + PowerShell 7), pinned host keys, forwarding forced off.
Install
uv tool install conning # or: pipx install conning
conn mcp install claude # or codex, cursor, opencode, pi: adds the server and denies raw ssh/scp
The MCP server needs no install at all:
claude mcp add conning -- uvx conning mcp
Or run the server in Docker
docker run -i --rm --network host \
-v ~/.config/conning:/conning \
-v "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK":/ssh-agent -e SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/ssh-agent \
ghcr.io/eranyonai/conning:latest
The image carries Python, the OpenSSH client and Conning, and nothing else. Targets, pinned host
keys and job output live on the /conning volume, and conn runs as that folder's owner, so files it
writes there stay yours on the host. On Docker Desktop for Mac, forward the agent with
-v /run/host-services/ssh-auth.sock:/ssh-agent instead. Two things stay on your machine (D46):
- Approving.
conn add,conn approve,conn leaseandconn allowneed your terminal. Install the CLI on the host and point it at the same folder:CONNING_HOME=~/.config/conning conn approve a:1. Approving in the agent client works from the container as usual. - Secrets. The OS keychain is not reachable from a container, so use
env:orop://references, or forward your ssh-agent as above and use a key.docker run --rm ... conning doctorchecks the rest.
Targets on a lab LAN or VPN need --network host (Linux) or a route the container can use.
The agent's four tools
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
targets(filter?, check?) |
One line per target: name, OS, shell, user, tags, mode. Never a host or secret. |
run(target, cmd | argv, wait=30, max_bytes=8192, ...) |
Runs on one target, a list or tag:<tag>. Exit code first. Still running after wait seconds: returns a job id (wait=0 is async). |
read(id, wait?, range?, grep?, signal?) |
Long-polls a job for new lines, pages a saved output, or reads a remote file. |
transfer(source, dest) |
Copies files between local:<path> and <target>:<path>, checked by sha256. |
Agents without MCP can use the same commands through the conn CLI; the output is identical.
For agents: CLI reference
This block is generated by conn help --markdown, so you don't need to call --help. A test keeps it
in sync with the code.
conn targets [--check] [filter]
List targets: name, OS, shell, user, tags, mode. Never hosts or secrets.
conn run [--wait WAIT] [--timeout TIMEOUT] [--cwd CWD] [--shell]
[--max-bytes MAX_BYTES] [--grep GREP]
target [argv ...]
Run a command on one target, a list, or tag:<tag>. Exit code first.
conn read [--wait WAIT] [--range RANGE] [--grep GREP] [--signal {INT,TERM,KILL}]
[--max-bytes MAX_BYTES]
id
Page a job (new lines only), a saved output, an approval, or a remote file.
conn transfer source dest
Copy files: local:<path> to <target>:<path>, or back. sha256 checked.
conn add [--host HOST] [--user USER] [--like TARGET] [--port PORT]
[--auth {ssh-agent,key,password}] [--secret SECRET] [--key KEY]
[--os {linux,windows,darwin}] [--mode {observe,ask,lease}] [--tag TAG] [--retry]
name
Add a target. Without a terminal it is saved as pending until a human approves it.
conn approve [--always] what
Human only: make a pending target live, or allow a pending command a:<id>.
conn import [--match MATCH]
Import hosts from ~/.ssh/config as pending targets (unsafe options dropped).
conn rm name
Remove a target and its pinned host key.
conn test name
Probe a target: reachability, OS, shell, pinned host key.
conn lease [--minutes MINUTES] name
Human only: give a target a full shell for a time box (1-60 minutes).
conn allow target [words ...]
Human only: let a command run without asking (no words: list the rules).
conn deny target words [words ...]
Remove an allow rule, so the command asks again.
conn watch [--history HISTORY] [--no-prompt]
Live control room: every command on every target, job output, approval prompts.
conn doctor
Check this machine's setup: config and state dirs, ssh, keychain, targets.
conn mcp [--approve-in-client | --no-approve-in-client] <serve|install> ...
Run the MCP server on stdio, or install it into an agent client.
conn help [--markdown]
Show this help; --markdown prints the block cached in README.md.
A target is one login on one machine. To use the same machine as another user, add it again:
conn add lab-tester --like lab --user tester copies the host, port, OS and tags and asks for the new
user's password. conn targets shows which user each target uses.
A target you add with conn add from an agent session is saved as pending. It does nothing until
the human runs conn approve <name>, which shows the host, the pinned host-key fingerprint and where
the secret comes from.
A command outside a target's allowlist returns status=pending_approval id=a:<id>, and a desktop
notification tells the human. They answer in one of three places (allow once, always allow its first
two words, or deny), and the agent picks up the result with read a:<id>:
- In the agent client: any MCP client that supports elicitation shows the question before the
command is queued, and an approved command runs in the same call. Clients without it fall back to
the two below. If a client would answer such prompts by itself instead of asking you, run the server
as
conn mcp --no-approve-in-client. - In
conn watch, which also shows every command and its output as it happens. - With
conn approve a:<id>in any terminal. When you runconn runyourself at a terminal, it just asks you there and prints the result.
Read-only commands such as uname, hostname, df, ps, ls, ip addr, systemctl status and
journalctl run without asking on every target; each is checked so its changing forms (hostname x,
ip addr add) still ask, and safe = false in a target's entry turns the list off.
conn allow <target> make test lets another command run without asking from then on; conn deny
takes it back. Every command, answer and rule change lands in a hash-chained audit log, and
conn doctor checks your setup when something doesn't work.
Safety model
| Mode | What the agent can do | Default for |
|---|---|---|
observe |
The built-in read-only list and allowlisted commands only; everything else is refused. | targets tagged shared or prod |
ask |
The built-in read-only list and allowlisted commands run; anything else waits for your approval. | new lab targets |
lease |
Any command, for a time box you grant (15 min default, 60 max). | never by default |
- No tool returns a secret, adds a live target or changes policy.
- Secrets travel over stdin or the SSH channel's env, never argv. Output is redacted before it is saved.
- Remote output is marked untrusted. Shell wrappers (
sh -c,python -c,sudo...) and shell syntax (;,|,$(...)) always ask. conn mcp installalso denies the agent rawssh/scp, so it can't go around Conning (pi has no permission rules, so there it only adds the server).- The audit log is hash-chained. It runs as your user, so it is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof.
Development
uv sync
uv run pytest --cov=conning # CI requires 95% coverage on Linux
uv run ruff check && uv run ruff format --check
After changing the CLI, refresh the README block with uv run conn help --markdown.
Docs
- docs/design.md: the design and every decision, with its status.
- docs/build-log.html: how the design came together, as a blog post.
License
Metadata
Release files for conning 0.3.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | |
|---|---|---|---|
| conning-0.3.0.tar.gz | 197.3 kB | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| conning-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 257.5 kB
Release files / conning-0.3.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | conning-0.3.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 197.3 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Transparency logRelease files / conning-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl
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| Size | 60.2 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
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PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 15, 2026.
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