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consiliency-spec

A deterministic, machine-checkable way to certify "does the code match the intent?" — and keep that answer trustworthy as both the code and the intent change over time.

Every software project has two things: a blueprint (what it's supposed to be — the intent, the rules, the must/must-never) and the actual building (the real code). Normally nobody can prove the building matches the blueprint; people eyeball it, or trust an AI's opinion, which can be confidently wrong.

consiliency-spec is the open engine for that proof: feed it the blueprint and the real code and it issues a certificate — these match, or here is exactly where they diverge — with mathematical certainty, not an AI's guess. AIs may propose changes; only the deterministic engine certifies. And it stays honest as things change: rename or move code and it sees "same thing, relocated", not "deleted + re-added".

This repository is the neutral engine and its contracts. It is source-disclosure of the canon engine surface, digest-pinned in consiliency-spec.public-manifest.json.


Core principles

  • Deterministic, never LLM-graded. The projection P and the checker N are pure code. The certificate is reproducible byte-for-byte; an LLM is never in the grading path.
  • Two authoritative sources. The desired state (a semantic graph S = intent) and the realized state (E(C) = facts extracted from the source). Everything else — renderings, reports, payloads — is a disposable projection, regenerable and never authoritative.
  • Honest about uncertainty. A check the extractor cannot observe returns unknown; a check the engine cannot ask returns unsupported. Neither is ever silently turned into pass. An empty run is not_applicable, never green.
  • Identity survives change. Refactor-tolerance comes from a correspondence map: logical identity is tracked across rename/move/split/merge, with a lifecycle enum.
  • Content-addressed everything. One canonical serialization, one hash domain scheme, byte-identical across languages (Python ↔ TypeScript).

What's in this repository

Component What it is Key guarantee
canon/ Canonical serialization + content-addressing (SHA-256; canon v2 — NFC at the ingestion boundary, not in the hash). Includes the Rust core (canon/core/) and the dependency-free TypeScript and Python ports. Python and TypeScript produce byte-identical bytes + digests.
idmodel/ Two-tier identity (logical key + occurrence) + the correspondence map schema. Logical identity tracked across rename/move/split/merge.
spec-graph/ The desired-state semantic metamodel schema (the blueprint format). Open versioned kind system; per-node content-addressed.
spec-parity/ The formal parity contract: SEMANTICS.md + schemas (kind-alignment, result-state, waiver, run-descriptor, E(C), reproducibility attestation, certificate (schema "2"), portal-payload, permitted-freedom). A reviewer can implement P/N from it directly; result states + closed-world prohibitions + waiver lifecycle are pinned; projection algorithm spec-engine-projection:v4.
spec-engine/authority/ The authority-event schema for the deterministic projection/checker boundary. Certificate byte-reproducible.

The five parity dimensions: completeness, soundness, closure, prohibition, revision-alignment.

Reference certificate verifier (0.5.1) — additive

0.5.1 adds consiliency_spec.verify_certificate (see "Verify a certificate" below), its verify extra and a public certificate test vector. Nothing else changes: every certificate, payload and ec_digest from 0.5.0 keeps its bytes and verifies unchanged.

Projection v4 (0.5.0) — breaking

Since 0.5.0 the certificate is still schema_version "2", but the projection algorithm is spec-engine-projection:v4 (SEMANTICS.md §9.2), so every certificate and payload digest differs from 0.4.0. The reference engine validates the desired graph S with the full spec-graph rule set at every entry (§0): every operation declares a signature, and a decomposes_to edge descends to a strictly lower level. Under the default closure, a prohibition no in-scope node is governed by is reported unknown (prohibition_outside_default_closure) instead of dropping out. The canon ports track canon-core 0.4.0: a bare JSON integer must lie within ±(2^53 − 1), anything larger is a $int tag. See CHANGELOG.md for the full BREAKING CHANGES list and the migration steps.

Certificate contract 2 (0.4.0) — breaking

Since 0.4.0 every certificate is schema_version "2", so every certificate digest differs from 0.3.0. A certificate pins spec_authority (grounded or draft) and optionally authority_ref; desired_graph_digest is the normalized spec-graph digest; ec_reproducible is required and measured. A verifier binds a candidate graph S with the four steps in SEMANTICS.md §9 (entry check, graph digest, revision digest, authority), and a delivery refuses a draft certificate unless the consumer opts in explicitly (§12.6). Coming from 0.3.0, apply the 0.4.0 migration in CHANGELOG.md before the 0.5.0 one.


Packages

This repository is the source for two packages:

  • npm: @consiliency/spec
  • PyPI: consiliency-spec

The packages are an extraction of the existing canon bytes, not a reimplementation: canon-core v2's Rust core, the dependency-free TypeScript and Python ports, vectors, conformance checks, and public schemas are digest-pinned in consiliency-spec.public-manifest.json. CI hard-fails if the package artifacts drift from those source bytes.

The enforcing JavaScript surface is the pure TypeScript v2 port in canon/ts/canon.ts. The WASM binding is a cross-language parity artifact only; see canon/conformance/wasm_surrogate_finding.mjs for the documented lone-surrogate boundary finding.

Packages are published to npm and PyPI by the maintainer via Trusted Publishing when a GitHub Release is created in this repository. A version is available only once its release has been published; check the registry for the versions that exist.

Use it

Python (consiliency-spec has no runtime dependencies; it needs Python 3.10 or later):

pip install consiliency-spec

The consiliency_spec module is a thin reader over the digest-pinned public files:

import hashlib
import consiliency_spec

consiliency_spec.__version__                  # the package version, e.g. "0.5.1"

# The manifest: {"schema_version", "package", "source", "public_files": [{"path", "sha256"}, ...]}
manifest = consiliency_spec.load_manifest()

# Every public file path the manifest pins (repo-relative), e.g. "spec-parity/SEMANTICS.md"
paths = consiliency_spec.list_public_files()

# The exact bytes of one public file. A path the manifest does not list raises ValueError.
data = consiliency_spec.read_public_bytes("spec-parity/schemas/certificate.schema.json")
pinned = {f["path"]: f["sha256"] for f in manifest["public_files"]}
assert hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest() == pinned["spec-parity/schemas/certificate.schema.json"]

# A JSON schema by name, with or without the ".schema.json" suffix. An unknown name raises ValueError.
certificate_schema = consiliency_spec.load_schema("certificate")   # spec-parity/schemas/certificate.schema.json
spec_graph_schema = consiliency_spec.load_schema("spec-graph")     # spec-graph/schema/spec-graph.schema.json

read_public_text(path) and load_json(path) are the text and parsed-JSON forms of read_public_bytes(path). To validate a certificate, feed load_schema("certificate") to any JSON Schema 2020-12 validator (for example jsonschema); to bind it to a desired-state graph, follow the verifier procedure in SEMANTICS.md §9, or call verify_certificate (below), which implements it.

npm: npm install @consiliency/spec ships the same public files. Import them through the package's exports map, for example @consiliency/spec/manifest.json (the manifest), @consiliency/spec/schemas/certificate.schema.json (any spec-parity/schemas/* file) and @consiliency/spec/canon/ts/canon.ts (the TypeScript canon port).

Verify a certificate

consiliency_spec.verify_certificate (new in 0.5.1) is the reference verifier for a parity certificate (SEMANTICS.md §9). It re-derives everything the certificate pins that you can recompute, using only what this package ships: the bundled canon v2 port, the spec-graph and idmodel reference modules (consiliency_spec/_bundle/) and the public schemas. It never re-grades.

pip install "consiliency-spec[verify]"   # jsonschema (always required) and unicodedata2==16.0.0 (to bind S)
from pathlib import Path
from consiliency_spec import verify_certificate

result = verify_certificate(
    Path("spec-certificate.json").read_bytes(),               # JSON text or bytes: parsed strictly
    desired_graph=Path("spec.graph.json").read_bytes(),      # S': the binding procedure of §9
    ec=Path("ec.json").read_bytes(),                         # E(C): ec_digest
    payload=Path("spec-portal-payload.json").read_bytes(),   # optional: the portal payload
    # finding_set=...                                        # optional: the finding set at findings_ref
    # require_authoritative=True                             # also fail unless the certificate may gate
)
result.valid            # no check failed
result.bound            # S' is valid and binds: desired_graph_digest, spec_revision_digest, spec_authority
                        #   (reported on its own, whatever the other checks say)
result.authoritative    # valid, bound, E(C) supplied and matching ec_digest, spec_authority ==
                        #   "grounded" and ec_reproducible is True
result.advisory         # ec_reproducible is not true: the certificate must not gate
for check in result.checks:
    print(check.name, check.status, check.reason)   # status: "pass" | "fail"

What it checks:

  • The record. The certificate decodes under canon's strict number rules, its field set matches certificate.schema.json (schema_version "2", spec_authority and ec_reproducible present and well-typed), canon_version is v2, and the canon certificate-profile digest recomputes (the non-hashed locator envelope is excluded). Its overall_result_state must be the §6.4 aggregation of its own dimension_results, and a dimension is not_applicable exactly when it evaluated no check (§6.3), so a re-hashed pass over failing dimensions is refused.
  • The binding pair. Given desired_graph=S', it runs the four steps of §9: S' passes the full spec-graph rule set; spec_graph.graph_digest(S') equals desired_graph_digest; spec_revision_digest recomputes from S''s spec_revision_id ("" when absent) and that digest; and is_authoritative(S') agrees with spec_authority. A draft graph never binds to its ratified twin's certificate, and changing only spec_revision_id is caught.
  • Everything else you supply. ec_digest from E(C); from the finding set, its JSON Schema (result-state.schema.json), finding_set_id, findings_ref, the copied overall_result_state / dimension_results, every finding_id, and each dimension's state against the rollup of its findings; the payload's digest and every field it copies from the certificate, after validating it against portal-payload.schema.json. With the finding set, the payload must be exactly the §12 projection of (certificate, finding set); without it, its finding_summaries must be one per finding the certificate lists, titled by code, and roll up to each dimension's state. require_authoritative=True needs both desired_graph and ec.

What valid does not prove is origin. Anyone can edit a certificate and re-hash it, which yields a different certificate that is consistent with itself. The digest is the certificate's identity (§9): compare result.digest with a digest you obtained from a channel you trust, or resolve authority_ref against the authority ledger (§13), which this verifier does not do. A re-hash cannot defeat the bindings to inputs you hold yourself: S', E(C), the finding set and the payload.

Numbers are never trusted. A fraction or exponent spelling (2.0, 2e0), a bare -0, NaN/Infinity and an integer beyond ±(2^53 − 1) are rejected exactly as canon-core 0.4.0 rejects them, and so is a duplicated key. Pass inputs as text or bytes: a parsed dict can no longer show that 2 was spelled 2.0. Bad input never raises; it is a failed check with a reason. Only misuse raises: TypeError for an argument of the wrong type, and VerifierUnavailable when the environment cannot run a check (jsonschema missing; unicodedata2 missing or not Unicode 16.0 when desired_graph is given; or a bundled module, schema or vocabulary file whose bytes do not match the package manifest). The verdict never depends on what is installed: every check you asked for runs, or the call raises. The verifier is Python only; the npm package does not ship one.

A worked example ships in test-vectors/certificate/: a certificate with the desired graph, E(C), finding set and portal payload it binds to, plus tampered copies (a flipped verdict, a forged finding summary) that must fail. scripts/check_certificate_vectors.sh (part of the release gate) runs the verifier over it.

canon-core relationship

Runtime consumers that need a compiled core use the separately published @consiliency/canon-core (npm) and consiliency-canon-core (PyPI) packages. This repository discloses the canon-core Rust source (canon/core/**) for independent verification; it does not change or republish those runtime packages.


Conformance

Every push and PR to main runs one gate in CI, scripts/consiliency-spec/check_release.sh, and the publish workflow runs the same gate before any upload. Run it locally with:

bash scripts/consiliency-spec/check_release.sh

It runs four self-contained gates:

  • canon/conformance/check.sh: Python and TypeScript canon v2 conformance against the pinned vectors, ingest-boundary NFC under the pinned Unicode 16.0 DB, the vector corpus regenerated by gen_vectors.py --check, and Python <-> TypeScript byte-identity.
  • canon/conformance/check_xg4_canon_core.sh (XG4): the Rust core tests, then the BUILT PyO3 and WASM bindings checked byte-identical to the reference ports, including the engine boundary vectors and the vendored cross-repo consumer corpus.
  • scripts/check_outside_agent_vectors.sh: the outside-agent schemas, conformance vectors and reference router.
  • scripts/check_certificate_vectors.sh (since 0.5.1): the reference certificate verifier over test-vectors/certificate/. It needs the verify extra's dependencies; check.sh installs unicodedata2==16.0.0 first.

The authority-event contract vectors are not run here. They are checked in the private source repository, which vendors the authority contract; this repository ships only spec-engine/authority/authority-event.schema.json.


License

Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 — see LICENSE and NOTICE.

Apache-2.0 is a permissive license with an explicit patent grant. It grants no trademark rights: "Consiliency" is retained as a name/brand even though the source is public.

Contributing

This project is not accepting external contributions yet. Issues may be opened for discussion, but pull requests from outside the maintainer are not being merged at this time. A contribution policy (DCO or CLA) will be published if and when contributions are opened.

Security

Please report security issues privately to the maintainer rather than opening a public issue.

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