container-image-hash
Hash a Docker build context using git hash-object and .dockerignore filtering,
and optionally emit a reproducible Docker image tag.
The base version comes from Cargo.toml when present, otherwise from the nearest
reachable vX.Y.Z git tag.
Development
This project uses uv for development. To set up the
environment, run uv sync. Tests and checks can be run with:
uv run ruff check
uv run ruff format --check
uv run ty check
uv run pytest
Usage
container-image-hash # print the build context hash
container-image-hash --details # print hashes for the root context and included files/directories
container-image-hash --tag # print a Docker tag in the form <base-version>-<hash>
Metadata
Release files for container-image-hash 0.1.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| container_image_hash-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for container_image_hash-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Release files / container_image_hash-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | container_image_hash-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 5.4 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
034e785a150ac5968562bb47115a8f40cb64ae1c33d3bfc872dc03c090e5461e
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
a7896b46aa03efb9ff9b875bce3c32818ec85d0b4bcd080e5d4f316ee3208d99
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
uv/0.12.12 {"installer":{"name":"uv","version":"0.12.12","subcommand":["publish"]},"python":null,"implementation":{"name":null,"version":null},"distro":{"name":"Ubuntu","version":"24.04","id":"noble","libc":null},"system":{"name":null,"release":null},"cpu":null,"openssl_version":null,"setuptools_version":null,"rustc_version":null,"ci":true}
|
Security for container-image-hash 0.1.1
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