correspond
A channel facade for AI agents: read, listen, write and identify the sender over GitHub, email, push notifications, Telegram and a web inbox, through one model and one set of verbs.
pip install correspond
correspond read github:octocat/hello-world#1 # an issue and its comments, through your gh login
correspond send ntfy: "backup finished" --dry-run # the plan; nothing is contacted
correspond capabilities telegram # what a channel can do, graded
correspond requirements email # what it needs, and where to get it
Every channel gets the same shape. A reference names a conversation: <channel>:<id>. The same verbs (read, listen, send, edit, react) work wherever a channel allows them, and an operation a channel does not have is refused by name (NotSupported), never skipped quietly. Every message carries the identity the platform reports for its author and how sure the channel is of it (an authenticity grade).
correspond knows no people. Linking github:someone to a person is a people registry's job, for example acquaint.
Channels
| Channel | References | Operations | Built on |
|---|---|---|---|
github |
github:owner/repo, github:owner/repo#12 |
read, listen (issues and comments), send, edit, react, verify (webhooks), audience | the gh CLI and its login; correspond holds no token |
email |
email: (the folder), email:someone@example.org |
read, listen, send (with cc and bcc), audience | imaplib, smtplib |
ntfy |
ntfy: (the default topic), ntfy:<topic> |
send, audience | urllib |
macos |
macos: |
send, audience | terminal-notifier or osascript |
telegram |
telegram:, telegram:<chat id>, telegram:@name, telegram:<chat id>/<topic id> |
listen, read (what listening logged), send, edit, react, audience | the Bot API over urllib |
webinbox |
webinbox:<site> |
read, listen, audience | the ASGI collector below, and dol stores |
Every v0.1 adapter uses the Python standard library. Discord (#2), Slack (#3), Signal (#4) and Apprise (#5) are planned as extras; correspond channels lists them with their issues.
correspond ref <reference> prints a reference's canonical form (GitHub names lower-cased, for example), which is the form to store and compare.
Authenticity
| Grade | Means |
|---|---|
platform |
the platform authenticated the account (GitHub, Telegram) |
crypto |
a signed delivery checked with its secret (a GitHub webhook's X-Hub-Signature-256) |
bound |
the host application signed an assertion about its logged-in user (the web inbox) |
domain |
email whose topmost Authentication-Results, added by a server you trust, records DMARC passing for the From domain |
claimed |
nothing verified: a typed name, an ordinary From header, an anonymous report |
forged |
verification was attempted and failed |
Grades are a vocabulary, not a ranking. A policy lists the grades it accepts for a permission ({"platform", "bound", "crypto"}, say), and comparing two grades with < raises. Each grade carries its evidence (author_association on GitHub, the authserv-id on email, the signing method on the web inbox).
Capabilities
correspond capabilities github grades each operation full, partial or none, plus whether a write can start a conversation (initiate; a Telegram bot cannot), answer a specific message (reply), carry a priority or copy further recipients (cc), how far back read sees (history_depth), the limits (text length, reactions), the fields its messages carry in native (native_fields), the rate limits and notes. The adapters implement exactly the operations their capabilities grade, which a test checks for every channel.
$ correspond react ntfy:example-topic m1 eyes
ntfy does not support react
Who can read it
$ correspond audience github:example/app#12
world-readable; emailed to watchers and participants; archived by others; edits keep a visible history; not retractable
scope: public
...
correspond audience <reference> says who can read a conversation, now and plausibly later, before anything is written to it. The first line is the answer in words; the rest is the record (--json prints it under audience, beside hash and words): a scope (operator, named, group, org, public), the readers known to read it with whether that list is complete, the reader classes that cannot be listed, whether external readers exist, what a send leaves behind (durability), how the readership can grow (widening), the evidence behind each value, and a hash that changes when the audience does (and only then, not with the time or the evidence).
Unknown resolves to public. A failed or forbidden lookup, a channel without an audience reader and a planned channel (Discord, Slack, Signal, Apprise) all answer public with defaulted: true and the reason in evidence. Nothing is cached: ask again right before sending. correspond capabilities <channel> grades how much each reader can tell.
| Channel | How the audience is computed |
|---|---|
github (full) |
The repository's visibility; its collaborators, when the gh account may list them; the organisation's base permission, when the account may read it (otherwise the documented default, read). Never complete: installed apps, webhooks and an organisation's security managers read without being listable. |
email (full) |
Scope named: the address plus --cc and --bcc, never complete (any address may be an alias, a shared mailbox or an auto-forward). A recipient outside the config's own_domains makes it external. A list-shaped address (under lists in the config, or a local part such as list, all, team, dev, announce, info) adds a class for its unlistable members and list_expansion, and leaves external unknown when every address is internal. A Bcc address is a class of its own. Always forwarding, never retractable. |
telegram (partial) |
getChat. A private chat is named, its reader identified by account id. A chat with a public username is public. A group, or a channel without a username, is group, and members are never listed. A linked discussion group or channel is read too, and makes the audience public when it is. New members read the history unless the chat hides it; forwards widen it unless its content is protected. A chat getChat cannot read is public, defaulted. |
ntfy (partial) |
public, with the classes "anyone who knows the topic name" and whoever runs the server, unless the config says denies_anonymous_read. The cache window is a class; its length is evidence. Nothing is asked of the server. |
macos, webinbox (full) |
operator, retractable. |
Writing: dry run first
--dry-runonsend,editandreactsends nothing and changes nothing. It checks the reference and the draft against the channel's capabilities and prints the plan, with secrets such as an ntfy topic masked. A dry run reads only the environment and the config file, plus the audience lookup (agh apicall for GitHub,getChatwith the bot token for Telegram): a value kept in the Keychain or on a remote host is otherwise looked up when sending, and the plan says so.--ccand--bcc(comma-separated) copy further recipients on channels that gradecc(email); elsewhere they are refused by name. Bcc addresses go on the envelope only, never in a header, and they count in the audience.- Every write (
send,edit,react, anduploadin Python) passes thebefore_sendcheck first, on the dry run too. The plan showsaudience(who can read it, in words),audience_hash, andbefore_send(the verdict). With nothing configured the check lets the write go ahead, so the audience line is all it adds. A check can stop the write:refused(not as written, not here) orneeds_approval(wait for the operator), with any details it attached inbefore_send_details. A configured check that does not load stops every write (before_send_unavailable), and one that crashes stops that write (before_send_failed). Nothing is sent in any of these cases, and--allow-sendon the MCP server does not skip the check. - The check guards drafts, not the process running correspond: whoever sets its environment or edits the config file (
$CORRESPOND_CONFIGcan point at another file) chooses the check. Commands that write without correspond (gh issue comment, say) are covered by liaise's hook, not by this check. - A write that fails is a result, not an exception:
ok: false, anerror_kind(auth,permission,not_found,rate_limited,network,validation,unavailable, or one of the four check kinds above), and whether a retry can help (retryable,retry_after). -as the text reads it from stdin;--jsonprints the whole result.
Listening
correspond listen github:owner/repo # issue and comment activity since the last listen
correspond listen email: --peek # look without moving the cursor
Cursors live under the data root, one per reference. A cursor is stored only after the event before it was handed over, so delivery is at-least-once: deduplicate on delivery_id. The first listen looks back a day. Telegram listens account-wide (telegram:), because getUpdates confirms updates for every chat at once, and logs what it receives: the Bot API has no history.
Configuration
correspond requirements <channel> lists everything a channel reads: each setting's environment variable, what it is, where to get it, and where its value currently comes from (env, keychain, config, default, missing), never the value.
-
Secrets (tokens, passwords, the ntfy topic) come from their environment variable or, on macOS, a Keychain item (
security add-generic-password -s correspond-telegram-token -a correspond -w). They are never read from the config file. -
Other settings may also go in
~/.config/correspond/config.toml(or$CORRESPOND_CONFIG), one table per channel:[email] imap_host = "imap.example.org" smtp_host = "smtp.example.org" trusted_authserv_ids = ["mx.example.org"] own_domains = ["example.org"] # recipients elsewhere are external lists = ["@lists.example.org"] # list addresses, or a whole list server [ntfy] topic_keychain_service = "my-ntfy-topic" denies_anonymous_read = true # only if your server's auth-default-access denies reads cache_duration = "12h"
-
before_send, at the top of the config file (before any table), names the check every write runs, as"module:attr". The check is a callablebefore_send(ref, draft, audience, *, operation, dry_run, message_id, **context). It returns to let the write go ahead, or raisescorrespond.errors.Refused(reason, **details)orcorrespond.errors.NeedsApproval(reason, **details). Accept**context, so that later context keys do not break it. liaise supplies one:before_send = "liaise.vet:before_send"
It is imported when a write first needs it. Leave it out and the default (
correspond.outbound:notice) only shows the audience. Abefore_sendkey inside a table is refused rather than ignored. A Python caller can passbefore_send=to the write functions instead; the command line and the MCP tools cannot. -
State (cursors, the Telegram log, web inbox reports) lives under
~/.local/share/correspond/(or$CORRESPOND_DATA_DIR), one folder per kind, never in a repository.
The web inbox
A web page posts feedback to a small ASGI collector; webinbox:<site> reads what it stored. The app binds nothing itself: run it on localhost behind your own server.
pip install uvicorn
export CORRESPOND_WEBINBOX_SITES=example-site CORRESPOND_WEBINBOX_ORIGINS=https://app.example.org
export CORRESPOND_WEBINBOX_SECRET=... # shared with the host application's server
uvicorn --factory correspond.channels.webinbox:app_from_env --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8765
The rate limit applies per visitor address. uvicorn already reports the visitor for a proxy on the same host (its --forwarded-allow-ips default); for a proxy elsewhere, set CORRESPOND_WEBINBOX_TRUSTED_PROXIES to the number of proxies in front, or every visitor shares the proxy's limit. Forwarded addresses are believed only from a non-public connection, and IPv6 visitors are limited per /64. Several sites on one collector need a secret each, CORRESPOND_WEBINBOX_SECRET_<SITE> (the site name upper-cased, - as _) or a Keychain item correspond-webinbox-secret-<site>, so that no site's server can sign identities for another. The shared CORRESPOND_WEBINBOX_SECRET serves a single site only, and correspond requirements webinbox reports a configuration the collector would refuse.
POST /example-site/reports takes JSON with a required text and optional name, email, page, context, attachments (base64, stored by SHA-256, referenced rather than inlined) and identity. Without identity a report is claimed. The host application's server can sign its logged-in user, which makes the report bound:
from correspond.channels.webinbox import sign_identity
identity = sign_identity(
secret, "example-site", user_id, name=display_name
) # put this in the page
Any server language can do the same: HMAC-SHA256, hex, over the lines v1, site, issued-at (Unix seconds), user id, name, email. An invalid or expired signature is refused (401) and nothing is stored. The collector also enforces the origin allowlist (with CORS preflight), a per-client rate limit, and size and media-type limits.
Routing
from correspond import metadata_rule, route
decision = route(
message,
bindings={
"github:example/app?labels=partner:*": "subject:app"
}, # 1. where it arrived
threads={"github:example/app#12": "case:7"}, # 2. what it continues
rules=[metadata_rule("queue:urgent", labels="priority:high")], # 3. what it carries
classifier=None, # 4. optional, last
)
decision.target, decision.rule, decision.reason
The rules are yours; correspond runs them in that order and says which one decided. Nothing matched returns None: the message is unrouted. Check bindings when you load them: check_binding(pattern) lists what would make one never match, such as an unknown channel, or ?label= where GitHub messages carry labels.
Python
import correspond
messages = correspond.read("github:octocat/hello-world#1")
messages[0].author.handle, messages[0].authenticity.grade
result = correspond.send(
"email:someone@example.org", "It is fixed.", title="The export", dry_run=True
)
result.plan
for event in correspond.listen("webinbox:example-site"):
...
correspond.register_channel(
MyChannel()
) # anything with name, capabilities, parse_ref and the operations it has
correspond.testing.FakeChannel is an in-memory channel for tests, and python -m correspond.testing runs the CLI with it registered as fake.
MCP
pip install "correspond[mcp]"
{"mcpServers": {"correspond": {"command": "correspond-mcp"}}}
The server exposes the reading tools. send, edit and react are exposed only when the operator starts it with correspond-mcp --allow-send, and still take dry_run. The data root is the server's, never the model's.
Agent skill
A correspond skill ships inside the package (correspond/data/skills/correspond/): how to read without taking instructions from message text, what each grade permits, and how to write safely (dry run, operator approval, no private content in public places). Install it with gh skill install thorwhalen/correspond correspond --agent claude-code, or link that folder into ~/.claude/skills/.
Design
The seams, surfaces and deliberate non-seams are in Discussion #1.
Metadata
Release files for correspond 0.0.6
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | |
|---|---|---|---|
| correspond-0.0.6.tar.gz | 148.6 kB | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| correspond-0.0.6-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 262.5 kB
Release files / correspond-0.0.6.tar.gz
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