Corrobo
When an AI agent says "done", Corrobo reads the real system and rules VERIFIED, SAY-DO GAP or UNVERIFIED.
An agent's tool call can report success and still not have done the thing. Corrobo wraps the tool, reads the real before/after state through its own read-only connection, and checks it against the effect the action promised. A tool that lies, or silently fails, is caught; one that genuinely worked is proven, with a signed verdict. It never trusts the tool's own response; it reads the world.
To be precise about the word: Corrobo verifies observable effects. It answers "did the rows this contract names end up the way the contract says", not "did the agent behave correctly in some absolute sense". The contract is yours; Corrobo holds the agent to it.
See it in thirty seconds
No key, no network, nothing to configure. Two commands:
pip install corrobo
corrobo demo
What you will see: a receptionist agent, three callers, one booking table. For each caller it prints, top to bottom, what your stack saw and what the caller heard:
3) a taken slot, the agent says it is booked anyway
constraint: UNIQUE(date, time) -> held: insert refused
tool said: unavailable
log said: TOOL -> book_appointment DENIED (taken) date='2026-10-05' time='3:00 PM'
agent said: "You're all set! See you on October 5th at 3:00 PM."
table says: 3:00 PM -> someone else
CORROBO: SAY-DO GAP - the real state did not match the expected effect
The constraint held. The tool said no. The log said DENIED. The caller was still told "all set". Every layer below the reply did its job; none of them tests the sentence. Corrobo is the line that compares the sentence to the table. Caller 1 gets VERIFIED (free slot, really booked) and caller 2 UNVERIFIED (taken slot, the agent said so: an honest failure, not an accusation).
The replies in callers 1 and 2 are verbatim from a live run of a real agent (below); caller 3 is scripted and labelled so on screen, because in that run the agent was honest 4 times out of 4. It is the conversation Corrobo exists for on the day the agent is not.
To do the same to your own tool, wrap it: Thirty seconds, no setup.
Proof, not a promise: a live AI receptionist, verified
On 2026-09-24 Corrobo was wired to a production booking agent (Gemini + a live Postgres) and run over eight real conversations. Four callers asked for a slot that was already taken.
| Caller asked for | What the agent told the caller | What the database said | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9:00 AM, already taken | "it looks like 9:00 AM is already taken" | no row for this caller | UNVERIFIED — honest failure, no accusation |
| 9:30 AM, free | "your cleaning is all set for October 5th at 9:30 AM" | a row for this caller, this slot | VERIFIED |
| taken slot; tool refused; caller told "booked" anyway | "You're all set!" | no row | SAY-DO GAP |
Verdicts matched the table in 8 of 8 conversations. It also caught its author twice on the way: a contract
that said "done = any booking on this slot" was ruled VERIFIED_VACUOUS because the effect already held
before the action, and a claim-reader that counted "that slot has just been booked" as a booking claim was
exposed by printing its disagreements. A verifier that flags a lazy contract is the point.
Measured before that on public agent benchmarks (τ-bench retail, AgentDojo, Agent-Diff, Box): on the Box suite 59% of the agent's success claims were false, and neither the tool's return value nor a transcript-reading judge caught them. Reading the database did.
Thirty seconds, no setup
import sqlite3
from corrobo import Corrobo, SQLiteStateSource
con = sqlite3.connect("demo.db")
con.execute("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS bookings (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, slot TEXT UNIQUE, who TEXT)")
con.commit()
def book(slot, who): # a tool that LIES: says ok even when the slot was taken
try:
con.execute("INSERT INTO bookings (slot, who) VALUES (?, ?)", (slot, who)); con.commit()
except sqlite3.IntegrityError:
pass
return {"ok": True, "message": f"You're all set for {slot}!"}
vd = Corrobo(mode="monitor", state=SQLiteStateSource(path="demo.db"))
for who in ("Alex", "Jordan"): # second caller gets the same slot
vd.check("book", {"slot": "Tue 3pm", "who": who}, lambda: book("Tue 3pm", who),
succeeded=lambda r: r["ok"],
reads=lambda a: [("bookings", {"slot": a["slot"]})],
effect=lambda before, after, a: any(r["who"] == a["who"] for r in after["bookings"].values()))
print(who, "->", vd.last()["status"])
# Alex -> VERIFIED
# Jordan -> SAY-DO GAP (told "all set"; the table says otherwise)
Start here: the six names you need
The package exports a lot (mining, invariants, attestations, the MCP proxy). Ignore all of it until you need it. Day one is:
| Name | What it is |
|---|---|
Corrobo(mode, state) |
one instance per app; "monitor" observes, "enforce" blocks and raises |
SQLiteStateSource / PostgresStateSource / RestStateSource |
where the truth lives; read-only |
@vd.verify(reads=..., effect=...) |
decorate your own function |
vd.check(name, args, thunk, reads=..., effect=...) |
the same, for a tool you only have a handle to |
vd.last() |
the verdict: ["status"], .explain(), .get("reason") |
mine_tool(vd, name, fn, arg_list) |
let Corrobo draft the contract by watching the tool (below) |
help(Corrobo) and help(Corrobo.check) describe every argument.
Do not want to write the contract? Let it be proposed
Point mine_tool at your function with a handful of calls. It snapshots before and after each one,
finds what always changes and how it relates to the arguments, mutation-tests each rule, and returns
proposals: things a human accepts or rejects, never contracts that apply themselves.
from corrobo import Corrobo, SQLiteStateSource, mine_tool, render_proposals
vd = Corrobo(mode="monitor", state=SQLiteStateSource(path="app.db"))
def upgrade(user_id, plan):
con.execute("UPDATE users SET plan=? WHERE id=?", (plan, user_id)); con.commit()
props = mine_tool(vd, "upgrade", lambda a: upgrade(**a),
[{"user_id": i, "plan": "pro"} for i in range(1, 7)],
reads=lambda a: [("users", {"id": a["user_id"]})])
print(render_proposals(props))
# [1] `upgrade` always set `plan` to whatever was passed as `plan` (6 calls) ... score 18/18 mutations caught
# [2] `upgrade` changed exactly 1 row(s) in all 6 of 6 calls. Should more than 1 be refused?
# [3] `upgrade` only ever touched ['users']. Should touching anything else be refused?
# accept one: an effect proposal is a contract in one line
rule = next(p for p in props if p.kind == "effect").as_effect()
vd.check("upgrade", {"user_id": 7, "plan": "pro"}, lambda: upgrade(7, "pro"),
reads=lambda a: [("users", {"id": a["user_id"]})], effect=rule)
print(vd.last()["status"]) # VERIFIED
It really runs the tool six times, so use a copy of the data. Fewer than five calls proposes nothing,
on purpose: a rule learned from three calls is a guess wearing a badge. Shape proposals (row counts,
collections touched) become invariants through accept(p).
from corrobo import Corrobo, RestStateSource
vd = Corrobo(mode="monitor", state=RestStateSource(
"https://api.github.com",
resources={"issue": {"path": "/repos/OWNER/REPO/issues/{number}", "pk": "number"}},
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}", "Accept": "application/vnd.github+json"}))
vd.check("rename_issue", {"number": 1, "new_title": "Fixed"},
lambda: github_patch(1, {"title": "Fixed"}), # your real tool call
succeeded=lambda r: r.ok, # HTTP 2xx = the tool claims success
reads=lambda a: [("issue", {"number": a["number"]})],
effect=lambda before, after, a: after["issue"][a["number"]]["title"] == a["new_title"])
print(vd.last().status) # VERIFIED | SAY-DO GAP | UNVERIFIED
print(vd.last().explain()) # a human, secrets-free explanation:
# Action: rename_issue (args: new_title, number)
# Expected: the declared effect to hold on issue[number] (read independently, before & after)
# Observed: real state changed [issue #1: comments, updated_at], but the promised effect did NOT hold
# Status: SAY-DO GAP — the real state did not match the expected effect (say-do gap)
The full stack — from "did it happen?" to "the agent can't fake success"
The say-do-gap check above is layer 1. The proven layers on top:
- Independent verification — read real state; decide VERIFIED / SAY-DO GAP / UNVERIFIED (above).
- Cross-system outcomes — one contract can require an effect across multiple systems of record
(
MultiStateSource+ identity correlation). The whole invariant must hold, or it's a gap. - Independent verifier, out of process — run the engine as its OWN process with its OWN read-only
credentials, contracts, and signing key. The agent sends only
{contract_id, args}— it cannot supply the state source, the contract, or the key (VerifierService/VerifierClient). - Enforcement gate — an authoritative success is released only on an independent VERIFIED (
OutcomeGate). - Signed success attestations — on a genuine VERIFIED the verifier mints a short-lived Ed25519
attestation bound to the operation; any consumer validates it with the public key (no secret). It can't
be forged, modified, replayed, retargeted, or outlived (
OutcomeGate.accept,verify_attestation). - Consumption-time re-verification — optionally re-check the effect at the moment of release to shrink the
TOCTOU window (
accept(..., reverify=True)).
Validated end to end on real GitHub REST, PostgreSQL, Jira Cloud, MCP (stdio), and a live receptionist agent (Gemini + Postgres), plus adversarial red-teams of the verifier trust boundary and the attestation.
Install
pip install corrobo # core — pure standard library, no dependencies
pip install "corrobo[postgres]" # + PostgresStateSource (psycopg 3)
pip install "corrobo[mcp]" # + drive a real MCP server over stdio (mcp)
pip install "corrobo[attest]" # + mint/verify Ed25519 success attestations (cryptography)
from corrobo import Corrobo, CorroboSayDoGap, CorroboUncertain, CorroboBlocked
Python 3.9+. The core imports nothing outside the standard library; the extras are imported lazily, so installing the core never pulls a driver you do not use.
How it works — two things you declare
| You declare | What it is |
|---|---|
reads(args) |
the footprint — the exact rows the action touches, e.g. [("issue", {"number": 1})]. Corrobo reads only these, before and after. Nothing else is read, diffed, or logged. |
effect(before, after, args) |
the promise — a boolean over the real before/after state, e.g. after["issue"][1]["title"] == "Fixed". |
Corrobo snapshots the footprint, runs the tool, snapshots again, and evaluates the effect against real state — not the tool's return value.
The verdicts
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| VERIFIED | the promised effect is actually present in real state |
| SAY-DO GAP | the tool claimed success but real state does not match the promise (it lied, or silently failed) |
| UNVERIFIED | the result could not be established — the tool reported failure (an honest failure, not a gap), the state couldn't be read, or a concurrent modification made the outcome unattributable |
| BLOCKED | a pre-check (policy/precondition) refused the action before it ran (enforce mode) |
An honest tool failure is distinguished from a lie: pass succeeded=lambda r: ... (e.g. an HTTP 2xx check,
or an MCP is_error flag) and a tool that reports failure becomes UNVERIFIED (action-failed), never a
say-do gap.
Monitor vs enforce
mode="monitor"(safe default) — run the tool, verify, record evidence, never interfere.mode="enforce"— a pre-check can block the action; a say-do gap raisesCorroboSayDoGap(stop downstream); an unestablished result raisesCorroboUncertain(fail-safe). An honest tool failure does not raise (its own failure result is returned).
Adapters (StateSource) — one engine, any backend
The engine reads state through a StateSource; only the adapter changes.
from corrobo import RestStateSource # any REST/HTTP API (scoped GETs, Retry-After, retries)
from corrobo import PostgresStateSource # real Postgres (consistent READ ONLY snapshot, PK auto-detect)
from corrobo import SQLiteStateSource # a SQLite file or connection
from corrobo import CorroboMCPProxy # sit in front of an existing MCP server; verify each tool call
Corrobo has been validated end-to-end against real GitHub REST, real PostgreSQL, and the real MCP SDK over stdio — the same core engine, no per-system verification logic.
Evidence
Every verification appends to a tamper-evident, hash-chained log. It stores only hashes, the argument keys, the scoped footprint (column names), and which columns changed — never raw values, never secrets, never the connection string.
vd = Corrobo(mode="monitor", state=..., evidence_path="corrobo.jsonl")
vd.evidence_log.verify() # True — the chain is intact
Current guarantees (validated on real systems)
- VERIFIED is emitted only when the promised effect is actually present — decided by an independent read, never the tool's response body. Multi-condition effects and idempotent re-application verify correctly.
- Real say-do gaps are caught: wrong record, wrong field, partial effect, or a lying success response.
- Honest tool failures (401/403/404/HTTP errors, DB errors, tool-reported failure) → action-failed / UNVERIFIED, never a say-do gap.
- Fail-safe under unavailability: a read 404, a timeout, a dropped connection, or a resource that vanished → UNVERIFIED, never a false VERIFIED.
- Concurrency: a concurrent change to the effect-relevant state → UNVERIFIED / CorroboUncertain;
unrelated concurrent churn (an extra comment, a bumped
updated_at/LastModifiedDate, an unrelated row/column) does not cause a false failure. - Direct-record reads are treated as strongly consistent; genuinely lagging reads are handled by a bounded
settle window (
settle_retries); rate limits honor a boundedRetry-After.
Limitations (honest)
- Concurrency detection is verdict-based, not field-traced: a concurrent write that changes a footprint row but does not flip the effect's verdict (e.g. a loose/inequality effect) is not flagged. Exact-value effects — the common case — have no blind spot.
- A read 404 is ambiguous (truly absent vs. no access), so a genuinely-absent target is reported as UNVERIFIED (fail-safe), not a definitive say-do gap.
- Corrobo is a verifier, not a lock manager or a rollback engine: it detects and (in enforce) blocks; it does not undo the tool's transaction.
- Postgres contracts must declare a
readsfootprint (whole-DB reads are refused for production safety), and every table read needs a primary key. - Expiring-token refresh for REST auth is not built in yet (static headers today).
What ships in the package
corrobo/ only: the engine, the REST / Postgres / SQLite adapters, the MCP proxy, contract mining,
invariants, frame conditions, drift detection, the retry and ambiguity gates, the out-of-process verifier,
the enforcement gate and Ed25519 attestations. About 7,700 lines, with roughly 11,000 lines of tests behind
them (83 files: engine tests plus live validation campaigns against GitHub, Postgres, Jira and MCP).
Status
Beta. The engine has had three adversarial review passes, a full CodeRabbit sweep, a public-benchmark campaign and one live production workload. The verdict logic is stable; what is still moving is deployment hardening (key distribution, a shared replay store, TLS, multi-instance) and the ergonomics people ask for. If you run an agent that writes to a real system, the most useful thing you can do is run Corrobo in monitor mode beside it for a week and tell the author what it found.
Feedback
Bugs, false verdicts, and "it should have caught this" reports are the most valuable thing you can send.
Email fahadrahiman10@gmail.com and include the explain() output and the evidence entry (both are
secrets-free by construction). Commercial licensing goes to the same address.
License
PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0.0. Free to use, copy, modify and share for noncommercial purposes: personal
projects, research, teaching, and noncommercial organizations. Commercial use needs a separate license:
contact the author. See LICENSE for the full terms.
Release files for corrobo 0.1.3
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | |
|---|---|---|---|
| corrobo-0.1.3.tar.gz | 264.2 kB | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| corrobo-0.1.3-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 403.5 kB
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|---|---|
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