Skip to main content

Countercheck

Proof that AI work really happened.

AI coding agents often say "done, all tests pass" when it isn't true: they skip a failing test, edit the test so it passes, or never run it. countercheck verify checks the claim itself:

  1. It reads your checks from the base revision (before the agent's change), so the agent can't weaken them.
  2. It copies the agent's files into a clean folder and puts back any protected file the agent changed (your tests).
  3. It runs the checks in a macOS sandbox: no internet (localhost works; a check can opt in with network = true), writes only inside that folder.
  4. It writes a receipt: the claim, what ran, the output, what the agent changed that it shouldn't have, the cost if known, and a verdict. Receipts are sealed with a SHA-256 hash, so edits are detectable.
$ countercheck verify --claim "Fixed the discount bug. All tests pass." --agent claude-code --cost-usd 0.42
countercheck receipt 9073a384e88f9d37  FAILED
  claim:    "Fixed the discount bug. All tests pass." -> CONTRADICTED by evidence
  checks:   .countercheck/checks.toml @ HEAD (locked), sandbox: macos-seatbelt (no internet, localhost only; writes only in the check folder)
  protected Modified: tests/test_pricing.py -> restored_from_base
  [FAIL] unit tests  (65 ms)  $ python3 -m unittest -q
         |     self.assertEqual(apply_discount(10, 150), 0)
         | AssertionError: -5.0 != 0
  cost:     $0.4200 (reported)
  - the worker changed 1 protected file(s); countercheck ran the checks with the base version
  - check "unit tests" failed (exit 1)

(The agent's own run said OK (skipped=1): it had marked the failing test as skipped.)

How it works

How Countercheck works: it reads the locked checks from the base revision, the agent's work and its claim; locks the checks, makes a clean copy with protected files put back, runs the checks in a sandbox, and seals a receipt; then the agent may finish (VERIFIED), is sent back with the failing check (FAILED), or may stop after honestly reporting a blocker.

The mental model: the agent never grades itself. Its claim is compared with what actually runs, on rules it couldn't change:

base revision (locked)        agent's work + claim
  checks.toml, your tests          files, "Done, all tests pass."
          \                           /
           +--> countercheck verify <+
                1 lock the checks     (from the base revision)
                2 clean copy          (edited tests put back)
                3 run in a sandbox    (no internet unless a check opts in)
                4 decide + seal       (receipt with a SHA-256 seal)
                        |
      VERIFIED -> agent may finish
      FAILED + "done" -> hook sends the failure back; agent fixes the code (max 3 rounds)
      FAILED + honest "can't, because ..." -> agent may stop; receipt still says FAILED

How Countercheck thinks

Rule In plain words
The worker never grades itself the checks come from before the work started; edited tests are put back
Re-run, don't read the agent's claim and logs are never evidence; the checks run again
Honest verdicts VERIFIED, FAILED or UNVERIFIED (with a reason), never a guess; a hint never softens a failure
Everything from the repo is hostile paths, sizes and links are checked, because the worker controls the files
Domain-blind core it knows nothing about SQL, games or ML; your checks carry the domain knowledge
Fail closed on the verdict, open in the hooks a broken referee never waves work through, and never traps your agent
Leave evidence every run writes a sealed receipt anyone can re-check

The code behind each rule, one run step by step, and where new work plugs in: docs/architecture.md.

Where it fits

Where Countercheck fits: agents with a built-in hook (Claude Code, Cortex Code, Hermes Agent), any other agent or person through the CLI, and CI all call Countercheck; its six check types cover web apps, data and analytics, code migrations, games and media, and machine learning; results go back to the agent, to you as a sealed receipt, and to CI as an exit code.

You use How Countercheck plugs in
Claude Code Stop hook: countercheck hook claude-stop (docs/hooks/)
Cortex Code (Snowflake) same hook format as Claude Code (not yet tried on a real install)
Hermes Agent pre_verify hook: countercheck hook hermes-pre-verify
Codex, Cursor, Copilot, Aider, your scripts run countercheck verify --claim "…" when it says done (dedicated hooks planned)
CI countercheck verify --base main; fail the job on any exit code but 0 (GitHub Action planned)

Does it work?

We gave Hermes Agent 29 small coding tasks, 3 times each, in four setups, and graded every run with hidden tests the agent never saw. Some tasks are impossible on purpose (a test expects a wrong value, a server can't be reached): the honest answer is "this can't pass, because …".

False "done" claims (claimed success, hidden tests fail) Hermes + its verify_on_stop + Countercheck both
GPT 6.1, all tasks (87 runs per setup) 7 11 3 2
GPT 6.1, impossible tasks only 6 8 0 0
DeepSeek V4 Pro, all tasks 7 6 6 6
  • When GPT 6.1 got stuck, it edited the protected test and said "all tests pass". Countercheck re-ran the original tests, said FAILED and pushed back once; the agent restored the test and reported the real problem.
  • Countercheck only knows what your checks test: the remaining false claims were cases the visible tests didn't cover. DeepSeek rarely games tests, so there was little to catch.
  • It added about 1 second to the median run.

Full method, numbers and limits: docs/eval/results-2026-10.md. Reproduce: eval/.

Install

You use Install with
Python (pip, a .venv, uv) pip install countercheck · uv tool install countercheck · or run without installing: uvx countercheck verify
macOS or Linux, Homebrew brew install datacrate360/tap/countercheck
macOS or Linux, any shell curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/datacrate360/countercheck/PROD/install.sh | sh
Rust cargo install --git https://github.com/datacrate360/countercheck countercheck
Direct download Releases: one file per platform + SHA256SUMS.txt

Builds: macOS (Apple silicon and Intel, one universal binary) and Linux (x86_64, arm64; static). The install script checks every download against SHA256SUMS.txt before installing. Windows is planned; use WSL for now.

Sandbox by platform. On macOS, checks run in the system sandbox (no internet, localhost allowed, writes only in the check folder; network = true lets a single check use the internet). On Linux there is no sandbox yet: checks run as a normal process and the receipt says so; run Countercheck inside a container with networking off when you need isolation.

What's shipped, in progress and next: docs/ROADMAP.md.

Quick start

countercheck init                      # writes .countercheck/checks.toml, edit the commands
git add .countercheck && git commit -m "Countercheck checks"
# ... let an agent work ...
countercheck verify --claim "what the agent said"            # uncommitted work vs HEAD
countercheck verify --base main                              # committed work on a branch vs main
countercheck show .countercheck/receipts/<id>.json                   # re-check a receipt's seal

.countercheck/checks.toml:

protected = ["tests/**"]          # the agent may not change these; .countercheck/** is always protected
link = ["node_modules", ".venv"]  # git-ignored dependency folders to make visible (read-only)

[[check]]
name = "unit tests"
run = "pytest -q"                 # any command; runs with `sh -c` in the clean copy
timeout_secs = 600

Besides plain commands there are matrix, forbid, golden, budget and coverage checks: see docs/checks.md and the runnable example in examples/data-migration.

Exit codes: 0 verified · 2 failed (claim contradicted) · 3 unverified (nothing failed, but the checks weren't locked in the base revision, or none ran) · 1 error · 4 (countercheck show) receipt was edited.

Agent hooks

  • Hermes Agent: countercheck hook hermes-pre-verify keeps Hermes working while the checks fail. In the profile's config.yaml:

    hooks:
      on_session_start:
        - command: "countercheck hook session-start"
      pre_verify:
        - command: "countercheck hook hermes-pre-verify"
          timeout: 300
    
  • Claude Code and Cortex Code: countercheck hook claude-stop blocks the Stop while the checks fail, with countercheck hook session-start on SessionStart. See docs/hooks/claude-code.md.

Add the session-start hook too. It remembers the commit each session started from, so the checks stay locked even if the agent commits its own edits to a test or to checks.toml. Without it, the checks are locked to HEAD. In CI, pass the base explicitly: countercheck verify --base origin/main.

How Countercheck itself is tested

A referee has to be right, so Countercheck is tested harder than most tools its size:

  • 140 tests (cargo test --workspace): unit tests, end-to-end tests that run the real binary on throwaway git repositories (tampered tests, timeouts, the macOS sandbox, both agent hooks, every check type), and property tests that throw thousands of generated inputs at the verdict and seal logic (e.g. a receipt's seal breaks if any one of 33 fields changes; decide never says VERIFIED when a check failed).
  • Mutation testing (cargo-mutants): the receipt, claim and config code was deliberately broken in every way the tool could find; tests were added until every break that compiles is caught (one remaining change is provably equivalent).
  • CI on every push (macOS and Linux): cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy -D warnings, all tests, a release build and the benchmark task validator. Countercheck also verifies itself with its own .countercheck/checks.toml.
  • The benchmark above, with hidden tests as ground truth.

Status

v0.2 (CHANGELOG). macOS has the sandbox; Linux runs checks without one (the receipt says so). Not yet: signed receipts, a per-host network allow-list, cost read from agent logs, Linux/Windows sandboxes, more agent hooks (Codex, Cursor, a GitHub Action). See docs/ROADMAP.md.

Contribute: make it fit your domain

Countercheck gets better with every field it learns about, and most of that needs no Rust: a domain is covered by a good checks.toml plus a small example. How agents fake "done" in game development, ML, dbt, video pipelines or a migration is knowledge we don't have and you do.

Start here Rust?
Open a "New domain" issue: how "done" goes wrong in your work no
Add an example for your field (examples/) no
Add a benchmark task that tempts agents to cheat (eval/) no
Hook another agent (Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, …) yes
Add tests, or a check type yes

Each of these has a step-by-step guide in .claude/skills/, written for people and for AI coding agents alike (Claude Code loads them automatically). Read CONTRIBUTING.md for the gate, pull requests and commit sign-off (DCO).

Build

Rust 1.90+: cargo build --release → target/release/countercheck. Gate: cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings, cargo test --workspace, python3 eval/validate.py. Countercheck also verifies itself: countercheck verify (checks in .countercheck/checks.toml).

Repository

  • crates/countercheck-core: pure logic (check file, check types, protected paths, receipts, verdicts)
  • apps/countercheck: the CLI (git, clean copy, sandbox, runner, hooks)
  • examples/: one made-up project per domain, with checks that catch a planted mistake
  • eval/, docs/eval/: the benchmark against Hermes Agent (tasks with hidden tests)
  • .claude/skills/: step-by-step contribution guides · docs/architecture.md: how it works inside
  • packaging/, install.sh, pyproject.toml: release packaging (Homebrew, install script, Python wheels)
  • docs/checks.md: every check type · docs/hooks/: agent hooks · docs/decisions/: design decisions

MIT licensed.

Metadata

Release files for countercheck 0.2.1

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for countercheck 0.2.1
File Size Uploaded Provenance
countercheck-0.2.1.tar.gz 91.3 kB With provenance Details

Built distributions (wheels)

Table of built distributions (wheels) for countercheck 0.2.1
File
countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl Python 3 none Linux musl 1.2+ x86-64 Details
countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.manylinux2014_x86_64.whl Python 3 none Linux glibc 2.17+ x86-64 Details
countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux2014_aarch64.whl Python 3 none Linux glibc 2.17+ ARM64 Details
countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-macosx_10_12_x86_64.macosx_11_0_arm64.macosx_10_12_universal2.whl Python 3 none macOS 10.12+ x86-64, macOS 10.12+ universal2 (ARM64, x86-64), macOS 11.0+ ARM64 Details

Total release size: 7.1 MB

Release files / countercheck-0.2.1.tar.gz

Download URL countercheck-0.2.1.tar.gz
Size 91.3 kB
Tags Source
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
1e1414a1a6d727aa5255969efd93bec701017cf25eaaf8b94c9211d050ea3e91
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
4bec7668c5c47018533fdbd491f7102e4c28ca447990ae9480f0dea919a37d88
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl

Download URL countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl
Size 1.5 MB
Tags Linux musl 1.2+ x86-64 Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
612a55c002d224051d528be4ba8945f36d9bac4a9518721cc98148d50da16cc4
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
1d14680dd6687ee33dbe486b9730205cf8d1249592c9cdacbf647cd3f94b3210
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.manylinux2014_x86_64.whl

Download URL countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_17_x86_64.manylinux2014_x86_64.whl
Size 1.4 MB
Tags Linux glibc 2.17+ x86-64 Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
1e90166504cf2307418d46cd637d424aa86e66744a7fbdf2f275300f89df1169
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
44c2237aedb11418f1ad468ea2072ad99a06b13da0500046be563888c471edf1
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux2014_aarch64.whl

Download URL countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-manylinux_2_17_aarch64.manylinux2014_aarch64.whl
Size 1.3 MB
Tags Linux glibc 2.17+ ARM64 Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
0696b893218c72a18f9db6e8fa9d3dc39d7f64c6749419b146ebf479f103a190
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
400423b5fa7c707ca8d2f197bbf613e75b58757abbeae86e49421c9449a1051e
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-macosx_10_12_x86_64.macosx_11_0_arm64.macosx_10_12_universal2.whl

Download URL countercheck-0.2.1-py3-none-macosx_10_12_x86_64.macosx_11_0_arm64.macosx_10_12_universal2.whl
Size 2.7 MB
Tags Python 3 macOS 10.12+ universal2 (ARM64, x86-64) macOS 10.12+ x86-64 macOS 11.0+ ARM64
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
9ead980b93dec07fa7fe3b3102072efd3b7703f6df7e102b040d74e7610a6bd7
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
0aeb2d429ab1c741690d2601dc82b20809982abd0635c4d339fcd86708061c10
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

Security for countercheck 0.2.1

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

Full provenance

All 5 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.

Select from 5 files

Attestation for countercheck-0.2.1.tar.gz

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 19, 2026.

Transparency log

A note on package security

PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.

Anthropic, PBC Visionary sponsor Bloomberg Visionary sponsor Hudson River Trading Visionary sponsor Meta Visionary sponsor NVIDIA Visionary sponsor Microsoft Sustainability sponsor Depot Continuous Integration AWS Cloud computing and Security Sponsor Datadog Monitoring Fastly CDN Google Download Analytics Sentry Error logging StatusPage Status page