counterpart
Test your A2A agent against mocks that check for correct answers, not just completed tasks.
If your agent delegates work to somebody else's agent, you cannot test it without them. counterpart stands in for those agents: ones that work, ones that stall, ones that come back with junk. It works in both directions, so you can be the caller or the one being called.
The reason it also reads the replies is that A2A only tells you a task finished. Finished and correct are different things, and only one of them is on the wire.
pip install counterpart
async def test_peer_lies_about_finishing(mock_agent):
peer = mock_agent("false_success") # reports done, returns garbage
task = await peer.ask("Quote 2 pallets LA to Dallas", contract={"price": float})
assert task.status == "completed" # the peer said it finished
assert task.contract_violated # what it sent back was unusable
Installing the package is the whole setup. The mock_agent fixture and the async
configuration come with it, so there is no conftest.py to write.
{"price": float} is shorthand for a contract that requires a price field which is a
number. When you want more, build one properly. Pass a pydantic model, add named checks, and
use .client() when a test needs several turns on one connection:
contract = (
Contract("freight quote")
.returns(Quote, strict=True) # a real model, no coercion
.require(price_positive=lambda q: q.price > 0)
)
peer = mock_agent("clarifier", question="Deliver by when?")
async with peer.client() as client: # one connection, several turns
task = await client.send_message("Quote 2 pallets", contract=contract)
task = await client.reply(task, "Friday")
Why check the reply as well
Mocking the transport is the easy half. The reason counterpart also looks at content is that
completed only tells you the other agent stopped working. Every one of these arrives as a
completed task, and the protocol is satisfied by all of them:
{"message": "Your quote is ready!"} # reads fine, contains no price
{"price": "call for rate"} # a sentence where you needed a number
{"price": 1420.0, "account": "AC-99812"} # right shape, somebody else's account
{} # nothing at all
Your code then carries on with whatever it got. Nothing raised, nothing was logged, and the bad value is now three functions downstream or in an invoice. That is what makes these expensive to find: you are debugging backwards from a wrong number, days later, with no stack trace to start from. One study of multi-agent failures attributes 45 to 79 percent of them to this rather than to anything crashing.
A contract is just you writing down what you were expecting, so the test fails at the point the peer lets you down instead of somewhere later.
Personas
Every persona is deterministic, needs no LLM, and drives a real A2A task lifecycle.
| Persona | What it does |
|---|---|
cooperative |
Works and completes with a well formed result |
clarifier |
Asks one question, waits for your answer, then completes |
false_success |
Reports completed and returns garbage |
resource_abuse |
Stalls or streams forever without finishing |
flaky |
Drops the connection, then recovers on retry |
over_sharing |
Asks for more context than the task needs |
Writing your own takes one class and one call. There is no DSL.
from counterpart.core import Complete, Progress
from counterpart.personas import register
class HalfAnswer:
def respond(self, turn, ctx):
return [Progress("working"), Complete(result={"partial": True})]
register("half_answer", HalfAnswer)
One thing to know about contracts
By default returns() uses pydantic's normal mode, so a peer sending {"price": "1420.00"}
gets coerced to a float and passes. Your predicates then see a real number, so an isinstance
check will not save you. That is ordinary pydantic behaviour, but it surprises people here,
because you might reasonably think you asked for type validation.
If you want the stricter reading, ask for it:
Contract("fare").returns(Fare, strict=True)
Lax is the default on purpose. Plenty of real services send numbers as strings, and a contract
that rejects valid traffic gets switched off, which leaves you with nothing. Use strict=True
when you control both ends or the format is pinned.
Testing the other direction
Everything above has your agent doing the calling. Sometimes you are the one being called, and you want to know your agent answers properly when somebody else's agent asks it something. The same mocks work as the caller.
wrap() turns any callable, sync or async, into an A2A server, and the mock sends it work:
from counterpart import MockAgent, wrap
from counterpart.adapters.a2a.mockagent import serve_asgi
with serve_asgi(wrap(my_agent, name="quoting-agent")) as url:
peer = MockAgent("cooperative")
task = await peer.send_task(url, "Quote 2 pallets", contract={"price": float})
assert not task.contract_violated # your agent's own answer held up
The contract checks your agent this time, which is a quick way to catch your own service
returning a completed task with nothing useful in it. Run the server with uvicorn instead if you
want a long-lived one, or skip the socket with A2AClient(app=app).
Checking a live agent
counterpart check https://my-agent.example.com
counterpart attack https://my-agent.example.com --json
check gives you a scored report where every row cites the spec section it verifies. It is a
quick smoke test for the development loop, not a certification suite. For the full conformance
matrix use the official a2a-tck. attack sends
adversarial probes and reports what came back.
Examples
There are four runnable scenarios in examples, each in a domain where the counterparty genuinely belongs to someone else, and each built around a different kind of failure.
Freight procurement collects quotes from competing carriers
and picks the cheapest usable one. The naive version books the carrier whose completed quote
lists price as "call for rate", and sends that string to invoicing.
Prior authorization is a clinic getting a procedure approved
by a health insurer before performing it, which is a real cross-company agent problem with money
and patient safety attached. It models 25 insurer responses that all report completed, taken
from the healthcare messaging standards and from billing forums where people describe what
actually goes wrong. Each is labelled by how well attested it is, and two are marked unattested
because I could not find a real case for them. One of them is worth the click: the standard's own
published example of a pending decision reports success, with the only honest signal buried in
an optional nested field.
Satellite downlink schedules a pass with a ground station network. Twelve plans that all validate and all describe a different physical reality: a window handed over in GPS time, elevation in radians where the field says degrees, an inertial frame where you need an earth fixed one. This is the failure that cost NASA the Mars Climate Orbiter.
Chaos multihop is deliberately excessive. Four hops, each a separate HTTP server, auth passed along the chain, twenty concurrent users, and corruption injected at the deepest hop. Corruption three hops away still gets caught at the top.
Each one checks two things, and the second matters more. Every unusable answer has to be caught, and every legitimate answer has to be left alone.
That second half is where the real difficulty turned out to be. Going through the actual industry
value sets found four bugs in the contracts I had written for these examples, and every single one
was a false positive. My checks were rejecting good answers: an approval code I had not thought to
accept, an id that came back correct but padded with spaces, and a date compared as text so that
07/31/2026 slipped past a check it should have failed. None of the four was a missed catch.
That is the trap with this kind of testing. Catching bad data is easy. A checker that also flags good data gets switched off, and then you are back to having none, so both examples test for false positives explicitly.
What it does not do
This is testing you run before you deploy. It does not watch production, it does not solve agent identity or trust, and it will not bound how deep a peer delegates. A contract only sees the payload, not the clock, so if a correct answer arriving 400ms late is useless to you, that timeout is yours to enforce. limits_probe.py shows exactly where the library goes quiet.
If your agents are three functions in the same process, you do not need any of this.
Design
The core has no protocol code in it. A2A is one adapter, and a test enforces the boundary, so the contract engine also works on a plain HTTP response, an MCP style tool result, or a function return.
- docs/spec-notes.md maps A2A v1.0 to the code, citing the spec throughout. Wire types are checked against the vendored normative proto.
- docs/prior-art.md covers what already exists and where this fits.
- docs/roadmap.md lists what is out of scope and what is known to be missing.
Status
Version 0.1.3, built against A2A spec v1.0. The API will change. Apache-2.0.
If you have hit this failure in something you built, I would like to hear about it. Open an issue with the shape of the response that fooled you.
Metadata
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