csd-intent
Cross-runtime audit tool for CSD intent specifications. Validates intent.yaml
against CSD-INTENT-01 and confirms every
runner-bound claim is attested by at least one test marker across any test runner -
pytest, vitest, Playwright, Jest, or anything that uses the standard intent()
/ @intent() marker shape.
This tool is standalone. It does not run inside your project's test suite; it is invoked separately (CLI, CI step, or pre-commit hook).
Why it exists
pytest-intent, vitest-intent, and playwright-intent provide the test-side
marker helpers - they let a test declare which intent claim it attests. They
deliberately know nothing about other runtimes, schema validation, or whether a
claim is unattested.
csd-intent owns the cross-runtime auditing: it walks every test file in the
project (Python via AST, TS/JS via regex), reads intent.yaml, and answers:
- Schema - does every claim match CSD-INTENT-01?
- Orphan - does every test marker reference a real claim?
- Coverage - does every active claim have an attesting test or a current
llmreview?
Install
# From PyPI:
pip install csd-intent
# Local dev against a csd-library checkout:
pip install -e path/to/csd-library/csd-intent
Use
# Audit the current directory (expects intent.yaml at the root):
csd-intent
# Audit a specific project:
csd-intent /path/to/project
# Audit but tolerate unattested claims (the "intent before test" workflow):
csd-intent --fail-on schema
# Constrain the scan to specific directories:
csd-intent --tests-dir backend/tests --tests-dir frontend/src --tests-dir e2e
# Quiet summary only:
csd-intent --quiet
# The same audit as one JSON object on stdout, for a script or a dashboard:
csd-intent --json
Exit code is 0 on a clean audit, 1 when any violation falls into the
configured --fail-on set (any by default).
Output
intent.yaml (/path/to/project/intent.yaml): 24 claims, 2 violation(s).
UNATTESTED (2):
[unattested] INT-SB-018: no @intent / intent() marker references this claim
[unattested] INT-SB-029: no @intent / intent() marker references this claim
JSON output
--json prints the same audit as one JSON object on stdout and nothing else. The
exit code still follows --fail-on, so one run both records the summary and gates
on it.
{
"generated_at": "2026-09-22T09:41:07Z",
"claims": 24,
"attested": 20,
"unattested": 2,
"draft": 1,
"active": 22,
"deprecated": 1,
"violations": 2,
"requirements_traced": 17,
"clean": false,
"projects": [
{
"intent_path": "/path/to/project/intent.yaml",
"claims": 24,
"attested": 20,
"unattested": 2,
"draft": 1,
"active": 22,
"deprecated": 1,
"violations": 2,
"requirements_traced": 17,
"clean": false,
"claims_by_id": {
"INT-SB-001": {
"status": "active",
"attested": true,
"scope": "unit",
"derived_from": ["REQ-003"]
}
}
}
]
}
| Key | Meaning |
|---|---|
claims |
claims declared in intent.yaml |
attested |
claims with a valid marker or a current PASS review |
unattested |
claims the report lists under UNATTESTED: active and lacking a valid attestation |
draft, active, deprecated |
claims by status |
violations |
violations of every kind: the report's "N violation(s)" |
requirements_traced |
distinct ids across every claim's derived_from annotation |
clean |
true when there is no violation of any kind |
generated_at |
when the audit ran, ISO-8601 UTC |
projects |
one entry per audited project, root first, with its intent_path, its own counts, and its claims_by_id |
claims_by_id |
in each projects[] entry: that project's claims by id, each with status, attested, scope, and derived_from |
Unattested draft and deprecated claims are excluded from the coverage gate, so
those two counts do not sum to claims. A tree of nested projects sums its counts into
the top-level keys and keeps requirements_traced distinct across projects; a claim id
is scoped to the project that declares it, so an id two projects both declare is
reported under each.
What it scans
- Python: any file matching
test_*.pyor*_test.py, walked via AST for@intent("INT-...")decorators on functions starting withtest_. - JS/TS: any file matching
*.test.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,mts,cts}or*.spec.{ts,...}, scanned by regex forintent('INT-...', 'name', fn)calls (single-ID and array-of-IDs forms both supported). - Excluded directories:
node_modules,.venv,venv,dist,build,.git,__pycache__,.pytest_cache,.mypy_cache,.ruff_cache,.tox.
CSD-INTENT-01 conformance
The schema check validates each claim against the canonical fields per CSD-INTENT-01 §4.1:
INT-NNN:
version: 1.0.0
status: active # draft | active | deprecated
statement: "..." # >= 10 chars, RFC 2119 language
rationale: "..." # optional but recommended
test:
scope: integration # unit | integration | e2e | llm
component: SwitchFlow
type: behavior # invariant | behavior | contract
criticality: critical # critical | high | medium | low
The scope can also be declared as a top-level scope field.
Repository review
An llm claim carries only its latest verdict and reviewed commit:
review:
commit: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
verdict: PASS
The commit is a full lowercase Git object ID naming the revision the reviewer read. A new review replaces this mapping; Git preserves its history. Reasons and findings belong to the reviewer's PR or delivery record.
An active llm claim requires a current PASS. The auditor compares repository
content with the reviewed commit. It excludes review and status fields from
specification comparisons, so recording a review and activating a claim preserve
freshness. Other content changes make the review stale, including unrelated
files. Working-tree reads include untracked files that Git does not ignore.
Missing, failed, stale and unreadable reviews are unattested; markers on llm
claims are mismarked. CI checks the record without invoking a model.
The public read_review helper accepts a working tree or an explicit pinned
commit. JSON summaries expose state, a derived freshness reason, commit
and verdict for each llm claim.
Duplicate keys are refused
intent.yaml is parsed with a loader that raises on a repeated key rather than
resolving it last-wins. A claim id reused by accident would otherwise delete the
earlier claim before any check could see it - and every marker written for that
claim would silently start attesting the survivor, with the audit still printing
CLEAN. The duplicate is reported as a schema violation naming both lines:
SCHEMA (1):
[schema] intent.yaml: duplicate key `INT-GATE-006` (first declared on line 42,
declared again on line 187); YAML would silently keep only the last one
Merge keys still work: <<: *base plus an explicit override is not a duplicate.
License
MIT.
Metadata
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