csoai-evidence-fabric
Apache-2.0 code. The csoai.evidence-event/0.1 schema and its field mappings are CC0-1.0.
One evidence event says what a public surface declared, what was observed, which state that leaves, and the limits of the read. It is evidence, not a verdict. This package renders the same event into the carriers security and observability tools already read, and verifies a signed batch offline.
pip install csoai-evidence-fabric # Python >= 3.9; add [validate] for jsonschema checks
csoai-evidence validate EVENTS.jsonl
csoai-evidence render ocsf EVENTS.jsonl > findings.ocsf.jsonl # OCSF 1.9.0 Detection Finding (class 2004)
csoai-evidence render otel EVENTS.jsonl > evaluation.otlp.json # OTel event gen_ai.evaluation.result
csoai-evidence render sarif EVENTS.jsonl > evidence.sarif # SARIF 2.1.0
csoai-evidence render intoto EVENTS.jsonl > statements.jsonl # in-toto Statement v1
csoai-evidence render ecs-hec EVENTS.jsonl > hec.ndjson # ECS document in HEC NDJSON
csoai-evidence render w3c-acr01 EVENTS.jsonl > report.json # W3C Agent Conformance Reporting v0.1 (Community Group text)
csoai-evidence ingest sarif REPORT.sarif --read-at <UTC> > events.jsonl # third-party SARIF as the declared side
csoai-evidence ingest garak REPORT.jsonl ... # garak report recount (garak holds the method)
csoai-evidence verify batch.json batch.signed.json events.jsonl --did did.json --tamper-control
did.json is a saved copy of https://csoai.org/.well-known/did.json. Pin it; do not fetch it at verification time.
States, never grades
stateis one of CONSISTENT, DIVERGENT, PARTIAL, UNMEASURED, UNCHECKABLE, NOT_DISCRIMINATING. There is no pass state and no score.- UNMEASURED and UNCHECKABLE never carry a number. Every renderer refuses an event that breaks this.
- A CONSISTENT event must carry a negative control that was actually run.
event_id=sha256:+ sha256 of the RFC 8785 (JCS) bytes of the event withoutevent_id,signatureandanchors. A correction is a new event whosesupersedesnames the old id.
Carrier choices
- OCSF: Detection Finding (2004), never Compliance Finding (2003);
severity_idis always 1 (Informational). A measured value goes underunmapped, neverconfidence_scoreorrisk_score. - OTel:
gen_ai.evaluation.score.valueis absent unless a number was measured. - SARIF:
kindcarries the state (pass / fail / open / review / notApplicable);levelisnoneunlesskindisfail. - ECS:
event.categoryisconfiguration; UNMEASURED maps toevent.outcome: unknown;event.risk_scoreis never emitted. - in-toto: predicate type
https://councilof.ai/spec/evidence-event/v0.1; the DSSE envelope is emitted unsigned (the batch signature covers the events).
What a VALID verification shows
verify checks the Ed25519 signature of did:web:csoai.org#board-attestation-1 over the batch record and the sha256 of the events file, and with --tamper-control it also proves that three one-byte edits are rejected. VALID reports signature consistency under the supplied key and the covered event bytes. It does not independently authenticate the issuer or show that any claim inside is true.
Not measured. Live ingestion into a SIEM, collector or tenant was not run. Each carrier output is checked only against that carrier's published schema or registry, pinned in vendor/.
Install notes and the other connectors: https://councilof.ai/connect/
SAFE freeze signature consumer (version 2)
The version 0.1.1 source adds an external consumer for the retained SAFE pack. It leaves the original 37-file pack unchanged and does not run its bundled verifier.
csoai-evidence verify-safe-freeze FREEZE.json --signed FREEZE.signed.json --did did.json
This command supports the retained csoai.safe-evidence-pack/0.1 freeze and its csoai.signed-run/0.1 / csoai.signed-artifact/0.1 envelope. It binds the supported signer in the signed payload to one full DID verification-method ID, its controller and assertion authorization, then verifies the Ed25519 signature over the payload and exact freeze bytes. Unsupported families and ambiguous methods are rejected.
The JSON result keeps signature_valid separate from issuer_authenticated, which remains null. A positive result is SELF_CONSISTENT_UNAUTHENTICATED_KEY: it proves consistency under the supplied public key, not the issuer's identity or the truth of a claim. No network DID resolution occurs. Authenticate or pin the key independently for any stronger trust conclusion.
Exit codes are 0 for supplied-key consistency, 1 for rejected inputs/signatures, 2 for usage or unavailable required inputs, and 3 for absent signature/DID or unavailable cryptography. Missing evidence remains null, never a valid signature. This command checks only the freeze signature; it does not check the pack's sums, event schemas, derivations, Bitcoin OTS, admission or certification.
Metadata
Release files for csoai-evidence-fabric 0.1.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1.tar.gz | 87.5 kB | With provenance | Details for csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 186.4 kB
Release files / csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 87.5 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
a41d15798a6aa56a50c02339e9879d3b1eba848c588461001be17ce027a104ae
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
8af81e5bc349c1ae02992fec4b58a62ff11f7f3e6c22069e974b9b1d283fdda7
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 29, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 98.9 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
3083b4e691e314d8165382924a9d891e0e73c93928427316aa251bfd0c02ccf8
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
25d2a372d2acdfa7f3f6a4ccbb8ad303a54f41b40d3c5de9df17fabecb97b3a7
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 29, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for csoai-evidence-fabric 0.1.1
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
Both files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for csoai_evidence_fabric-0.1.1.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 29, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.