daleeq-provenance 0.1.0

Cryptographic action provenance SDK for Daleeq

shadowsec-provenance

Cryptographic action-provenance SDK for Daleeq — sign agent actions, observe agent calls, and independently verify Daleeq receipts offline with zero backend access.

A Daleeq receipt is an Ed25519-signed record of one event in the proof loop (detect → reproduce → retest → prove). This package lets a buyer, auditor, or any third party confirm a receipt is authentic and unmodified using only the open-source verifier, a published public key, and the receipt JSON — no Daleeq backend, no database, no account.

Install

pip install shadowsec-provenance

The only runtime dependencies are cryptography and httpx.

Verify a receipt offline (the headline guarantee)

This package installs a console script, daleeq-verify-receipt:

# Verify the shipped sample receipt → "RECEIPT VERIFIED", exit 0.
daleeq-verify-receipt receipt.json --pubkey published.pub

# Machine-readable result + walk the full lineage chain.
daleeq-verify-receipt receipt.json --registry keys.json --chain chain.json --json

Exit codes: 0 valid · 1 invalid/tampered/wrong-key/broken-chain · 2 key could not be loaded · 3 bad input. See VERIFY.md for the full walkthrough (including the deliberately-tampered sample that proves the verifier checks bytes, not rubber-stamps) and RECEIPT-SCHEMA.md for the open wire-format spec an independent implementer can reproduce.

Importable API

from shadowsec_provenance import (
    sign_action,                 # sign an agent action → Receipt
    verify_receipt,              # verify a receipt
    verify_receipt_standalone,   # offline, zero-backend verification (MOAT-13)
    observe,                     # telemetry decorator for agent calls
    wrap_anthropic, wrap_openai, # provider client wrappers
)

The full public surface is enumerated in shadowsec_provenance.__all__.

What a valid signature does and does NOT prove

A RECEIPT VERIFIED result proves the signed fields are byte-for-byte unmodified since signing and were signed by the holder of the named key. It does not prove the underlying detection/verdict was correct — the signature authenticates the claim, it does not validate the claim's truth. The CLI prints this NOT asserted boundary on every run.

License

Apache-2.0.