deny-sh 2.3.0

Deniable encryption — AES-256 with plausible deniability via control files

deny-sh: Python SDK

Deniable encryption for Python. Part of the Encrypt pillar of deny.sh, the deniability infrastructure. Apache 2.0, zero copyleft, free for any use.

Same algorithm as the TypeScript reference implementation, the Rust SDK, and the Go SDK. Ciphertext is byte-for-byte compatible across all four languages.

Install

pip install deny-sh

Quick Start

from deny_sh import encrypt, decrypt, generate_deniable_control

# Encrypt a secret message
ciphertext, control = encrypt(b"seed phrase: abandon ability ...", "pw1", "pw2")

# Decrypt with the real control data
message = decrypt(ciphertext, "pw1", "pw2", control)
# b"seed phrase: abandon ability ..."

# Generate deniable control data; same ciphertext decrypts to a decoy
fake_control = generate_deniable_control(ciphertext, "pw1", "pw2", b"nothing here")
decoy = decrypt(ciphertext, "pw1", "pw2", fake_control)
# b"nothing here"

Multiple decoys from one ciphertext

There is no per-ciphertext cap on the number of decoys. Derive a fresh control file for each cover story:

stories = [
    b"meeting moved to wednesday",
    b"taxi receipts october 2026",
    b"vegetable risotto recipe",
]

for story in stories:
    control = generate_deniable_control(ciphertext, "pw1", "pw2", story)
    recovered = decrypt(ciphertext, "pw1", "pw2", control)
    assert recovered == story

The practical upper bound on plaintext length per decoy is the inner-payload envelope (ciphertext length minus the 48-byte header, minus the 4-byte length prefix). Each decoy can be shorter, never longer.

How It Works

1. Dual-password key derivation: SHA-256(pw1) || SHA-256(pw2) → Argon2id → AES-256 key
2. XOR deniability layer: plaintext is XOR'd with control data before encryption
3. AES-256-CTR encryption: intentionally unauthenticated (an AEAD tag would defeat the deniability property)
4. Length prefix inside encrypted zone: no metadata leaks the real message size

The control data is what makes it deniable. Different control data + same ciphertext + same passwords = different plaintext. Both the real and fake control data look like random bytes; there's no way to tell which is "real".

API

encrypt(plaintext, password1, password2, control_data=None)

Encrypt plaintext with dual passwords and optional control data.

• plaintext (bytes): data to encrypt
• password1 (str): first password
• password2 (str): second password
• control_data (bytes | None): control file data; auto-generated if None

Returns (ciphertext: bytes, control_data: bytes).

decrypt(ciphertext, password1, password2, control_data)

Decrypt ciphertext with dual passwords and control data.

Returns bytes: the decrypted plaintext.

generate_deniable_control(ciphertext, password1, password2, desired_plaintext)

Generate new control data that makes existing ciphertext decrypt to a different message.

Returns bytes: new control data.

generate_control_data(size)

Generate cryptographically secure random control data.

Returns bytes.

derive_key(password1, password2, salt)

Derive the AES-256 key from two passwords and a salt. Exposed for cross-implementation testing.

Returns bytes (32 bytes).

Algorithm Compatibility

The ciphertext format is identical across all deny-sh SDKs:

salt (32 bytes) | iv (16 bytes) | AES-256-CTR(key, payload XOR control_data)

Where payload = length_prefix (4 bytes LE) + plaintext.

KDF parameters: Argon2id v0x13 (t=3, m=65536 KiB, p=1, hash_len=32).

A file encrypted with the Python SDK can be decrypted with the TypeScript, Go, or Rust SDK, and vice versa. Full wire format and KAT vectors: deny.sh/sdks.

Threat model

deny.sh defends against passive ciphertext leak: an adversary gets the encrypted artefact (lost laptop, cloud breach, prompt-injected agent) and tries to read it. The construction guarantees that whatever the adversary decrypts is indistinguishable from any other decryption.

It is not designed to resist an adaptive adversary who can compel you to perform multiple decryptions, demand additional passwords iteratively, or run forensic side-channel analysis on the host hardware. Full threat model: deny.sh/threat-model. Cryptographic argument: deny.sh/whitepaper §5.

The primitive is intentionally unauthenticated. Wrong passwords return garbage, not an error. If you need decryption to fail loudly on wrong inputs, add a caller-side integrity check (magic bytes + SHA-256 fingerprint) on the plaintext.

Dependencies

• pycryptodome: AES-256-CTR encryption
• argon2-cffi: Argon2id KDF
• hashlib (stdlib): SHA-256 password hashing before KDF input
• os (stdlib): urandom for secure random bytes

License

Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE. Free for commercial and proprietary use. See deny.sh/licensing.

Reporting vulnerabilities

Found a bug in the crypto or the SDK? Email [e-mail] (PGP fingerprint and disclosure policy at deny.sh/disclosure). Please give us a reasonable window before public disclosure.