Deponent

 ·   ·  Apache-2.0  ·  check the mark yourself: python3 -m deponent.badge verify --kernel deponent

A deny-by-default gate, macOS Seatbelt jail, and tamper-evident ledger for local agent tool calls. Standard-library only: zero third-party runtime dependencies.

Install: pip install deponent

import tempfile
from deponent import Cell

cell = Cell(tempfile.mkdtemp(), use_jail=False)
print(cell.act("write_file", {"path": "notes.txt", "content": "hello"}).output)
print(cell.act("run_cmd", {"cmd": "rm -rf ./blocked-example"}).output)
print(cell.act("exfiltrate", {"to": "evil.example"}).output)

Refuses: unknown tools, out-of-sandbox paths, destructive commands; in gate-only mode, interpreters and command chains unless you opt them in.

Why it exists: docs/WHY.md. Limits: docs/BOUNDARIES.md.

---

Quickstart

import tempfile
from deponent import Cell

cell = Cell(tempfile.mkdtemp(), use_jail=False)   # use_jail=True on macOS adds the Seatbelt jail
print(cell.act("write_file", {"path": "notes.txt", "content": "hello"}).output)  # ALLOW
print(cell.act("read_file",  {"path": "notes.txt"}).output)                      # ALLOW
print(cell.act("run_cmd",    {"cmd": "rm -rf ./blocked-example"}).output)        # BLOCK (destructive)
print(cell.act("exfiltrate", {"to": "evil.example"}).output)                     # BLOCK (deny-by-default)

ok, msg = cell.verify()
print(f"chain intact: {ok} — {msg}")

That is examples/minimal.py. Run it (python3 examples/minimal.py). No model. No network.

---

Containment

Containment boundary: the live-verified jail is macOS Seatbelt (OS confinement) only. Cell() defaults to use_jail=True; when the jail is unavailable it fail-closes (records ALLOW, refuses execution) rather than silently switching to gate-only. On other hosts you supply confinement or opt into gate-only (use_jail=False): the deny-by-default gate and the ledger still run, but there is no OS confinement; argument paths are containment-checked whether spaced, glued to a flag (-o/tmp/x, --output=/tmp/x), dash-prefixed after -- (cat -- -secret), or reached through a symlink that already exists inside the sandbox. In gate-only mode only a small safe set of heads runs by default; other heads need allow_unjailed_heads on both the Cell and its Gate (the Cell heads kwarg alone does not opt in a foreign gate). Interpreters need both knobs: membership in allow_unjailed_heads and allow_unjailed_interpreters=True on both the Cell and its Gate (the Cell interpreter kwarg alone does not opt in a foreign gate, and an interpreter listed only in allow_unjailed_heads is still refused), and gate-only commands run without a shell, one command at a time. Playground ClassifyCell is gate-only, so a chain such as echo a && echo b is chain-unjailed BLOCK (jail-mode would ALLOW). Gate-only runs are policy evidence, not sandbox evidence. The ledger is tamper-evident for edits, deletions and reordering; truncation and re-chaining are caught only against a head published outside the ledger (Ledger.head() / receipt ledger_head).

The live-verified jail is macOS Seatbelt (OS confinement). jail.py also contains a DRAFT Docker backend; do not read DRAFT as proven. On other hosts you supply confinement or opt into gate-only (use_jail=False). In gate-only mode only a small safe set of heads runs by default; other heads need allow_unjailed_heads on both the Cell and its Gate (the Cell heads kwarg alone does not opt in a foreign gate). Interpreters need both knobs: membership in allow_unjailed_heads and allow_unjailed_interpreters=True on both the Cell and its Gate (the Cell interpreter kwarg alone does not opt in a foreign gate, and an interpreter listed only in allow_unjailed_heads is still refused), and gate-only commands run without a shell, one command at a time. Playground ClassifyCell is gate-only, so a chain such as echo a && echo b is chain-unjailed BLOCK (jail-mode would ALLOW). The gate and ledger are platform-independent.

deny-by-default gate  ->  Seatbelt jail  ->  tamper-evident ledger  ->  verifiable evidence record

• The Gate checks which programs may run, which paths may be touched, and whether a command chains or substitutes its way out of policy. Deny-by-default and fail-closed. Optional ReachOracle: a write can be checked on its reverse-dependency closure.
• The Jail confines the code inside an allowed command. On macOS the native primitive is sandbox-exec (Seatbelt).
• The Ledger is an append-only sha256 hash chain. Mutating or reordering any past entry breaks the re-link.
• The evidence record (deponent.receipts) recomputes the chain from genesis and recomputes its own content hash. persist() runs that check as a write-time round-trip and raises on failure.

Subclass Cell and override _execute to wrap your own tool surface — gate + jail + ledger wrapping is inherited.

---

What it does NOT do

Full text: docs/BOUNDARIES.md.

• Reference kernel, not a certified security product.
• Live-verified jail is macOS Seatbelt only. Docker in jail.py is DRAFT.
• Tamper-evident, not tamper-proof. Keyless sha256 chain; optional verification-only ed25519 overlay (operator_attest.py, extra deponent[attest]) checks a maintainer's out-of-band signature over a run and signs nothing the agent does.
• Default policy is a coding-agent sandbox. Override with deny= / allow_heads=.

---

Proven

The suite exercises the gate, live macOS Seatbelt confinement, ledger integrity, evidence records, reconciliation, claims, build profiles, the public playground, and the conformance harness. Platform- or optional-capability checks skip explicitly when their real backend is unavailable; they are never replaced with a passing mock.

Run python3 -m pytest -q to get the current count and host-specific skip set. make self-gate-live drives a real local build through the same gate, jail, and ledger path and emits evidence records for inspection.

The GAK-conformant mark (self-evaluated). The mark is self-evaluated against GAK v0.x: deponent.badge certify scores the kernel against a standard its own author wrote, and it stays self-evaluated until a second, independent implementer passes the same harness. python3 -m deponent.badge certify --kernel deponent emits a self-contained badge (the SVG above), a markdown snippet, and a JSON record carrying a sha256 clauses_digest over the per-clause results. Re-derive it yourself, fail-closed:

python3 -m deponent.badge verify --kernel deponent   # exit 0 only when the mark is earned

Any kernel that implements the small adapter and passes the clause set earns the same mark; a kernel that fails gets a red "not conformant" badge and a non-zero exit. The badge is generated locally — no shields.io, no network.

Seatbelt escape-proofs — two kinds, kept separate so the claim is exactly as strong as the evidence. (1) Committed live canaries (canaries/CANARIES.md, J1–J8): network exfil, raw-socket egress, writes outside the sandbox, child-process escape, memory-bomb, and wall-clock runaway — each a real test run against the live macOS sandbox, 0 through; if a canary stops holding, the suite goes red. (2) Manual development review — during development Seatbelt bypasses (osascript 'do shell script', launchctl submit, loopback /dev/tcp, DNS, symlink/hardlink/rename writes-out) were hand-run and blocked; these shaped the gate denylist and the Seatbelt profile but are not committed tests — take them as reported, not reproducible from the repo.

Recompute-not-trust evidence records: the verifier does not read a stored boolean. It re-links the chain from genesis and recomputes the record's content hash over its canonical body. persist() runs that verifier on write and raises on failure. Self-reported health is never the evidence.

---

Example agent team

examples/governed_team.py shows an Architect, a gated Builder, and an advisory Reviewer sharing one ledger. The example is model-agnostic through examples/backends.py; use an Ollama or MLX backend, or add your own. Closure is an out-of-band test run plus an intact ledger—not the Builder saying “done.”

# Ollama (any tool-capable coder)
python3 examples/governed_team.py --backend ollama --model qwen3-coder:30b \
  --goal "Implement reverse_words(s): reverse word order, collapse runs of spaces."

# Local MLX North Mini Code (Apple Silicon)
DEPONENT_MLX_MODEL=mlx-community/North-Mini-Code-1.0-4bit \
  python3 examples/governed_team.py --backend mlx --goal "..."

---

Install + run the tests

git clone <repo> deponent && cd deponent
python3 -m pip install -e .        # or just run from the repo — the core needs no install

make test                          # current suite; real-backend skips are host-dependent
make demo                          # the minimal demo, no model needed

The kernel has zero third-party dependencies. Only the example team needs a model runtime; the kernel does not.

Run it in Docker (any platform)

docker build -t deponent .
docker run --rm deponent             # scores the kernel against its own GAK standard -> CONFORMANT
docker run --rm deponent make test   # run the suite in-container

The gate, ledger, and evidence records are platform-independent. Live-verified OS confinement is macOS Seatbelt. The Docker backend in jail.py is DRAFT; tests/test_jail_backends.py gates those tests. Do not read DRAFT as proven.

---

Stewardship

Deponent is an open-source project from Centennial Defense Systems, maintained by Christopher “CJ” Chanhnourack. The repository is the complete public reference kernel; its claims are limited to behavior you can reproduce from the source.

---

Support

Report vulnerabilities through SECURITY.md. General support and contributions are best-effort; no response-time SLA is offered.

---

License

Apache-2.0 — including the patent grant.

The license applies to the public source and includes the Apache 2.0 patent grant.