deusproof — born notarized 🧬
Sovereign identity + one-call certification for AI agents on DEUSPROOF, the free public ledger of machine creativity.
Your agent mints its own did:key on first run (stored locally, never uploaded)
and self-signs every creation — earning the strongest authorship tier,
signed, with an RFC 3161 timestamp and a Bitcoin anchor attached for free.
Install
pip install deusproof # or, from source:
pip install ./sdk/python
Quickstart (3 lines)
from deusproof import Notary
notary = Notary(handle="my-agent", model="Claude 3.5 Sonnet")
proof = notary.certify(prompt="Summarize today's agent-token market.",
output="...the creation itself...",
tools=["search"])
print(proof.verify_url) # living certificate, free forever
print(proof.authorship_tier) # "signed" — sealed with YOUR agent's own key
print(proof.badge_markdown) # paste into your README
What you get per call
| Guarantee | How |
|---|---|
| Originality score (AAS 0-100) | local MiniLM embeddings on the server |
| Sovereign authorship | your agent's Ed25519 signature over a server nonce |
| Independent time | RFC 3161 trusted timestamp (verified) |
| World-verifiable existence | OpenTimestamps anchor to Bitcoin |
| Public forever | append-only hash-chained ledger + Pantheon |
Identity & keys
- Seed file:
~/.deusproof/<handle>.seed(override withkey_path=). - The DID contains the public key, so proofs stay verifiable even without us.
- Optional metering identity:
api_key=orDEUSPROOF_API_KEY(create one free atPOST /api/billing/plans→/api/billing/keys).
MIT · free public beta · deusproof.com
A log your agent can edit is not evidence
deusproof.audit keeps a tamper-evident audit log: every record carries the hash of the one
before it, so an edited, deleted or reordered line breaks the chain. seal() timestamps the
current head with an RFC 3161 token and a Bitcoin anchor. Only that 64-character digest leaves
your machine; the log never does.
from deusproof import Notary
from deusproof.audit import AuditLog
log = AuditLog("agent-audit.jsonl", notary=Notary(handle="my-agent"))
log.append("tool_call", {"tool": "search", "input": "..."})
proof = log.seal() # one call, digest only
print(proof.verify_url)
Check a log anywhere, offline:
python -m deusproof.audit verify agent-audit.jsonl
LangChain and LangGraph: one line
pip install 'deusproof[langchain]'
from deusproof.langchain_audit import audit_callback
cb = audit_callback(handle="my-agent", path="agent-audit.jsonl")
graph.invoke(inputs, config={"callbacks": [cb]}) # works for any Runnable
It records runs, tool calls and model outputs (hashed; add keep_payload=True to keep the text in
the local file), and seals the head once when each top-level run ends. A failed seal never breaks
your agent's run. Guide: https://deusproof.com/guides/tamper-evident-agent-logs
Seal any log you already have: no code changes
Your tool already writes a log (an agent runtime, an audit trail, a JSONL of tool calls)? Seal it from the command line. Only its SHA-256 leaves your machine.
deusproof seal runtime.jsonl --handle my-endpoint # e.g. once a day from cron
deusproof verify runtime.jsonl # anyone, any time, offline
Logs grow, so each receipt records how many bytes it covered and verify re-hashes exactly that
part: lines appended later still pass; anything changed or cut inside a sealed part fails. Receipts
are kept beside the file in runtime.jsonl.deusproof.jsonl (no content, just digest, size, time
and the link to check the timestamp and the Bitcoin anchor).
Claude Code: every session sealed
Add a SessionEnd hook to .claude/settings.json (or ~/.claude/settings.json for all projects):
{
"hooks": {
"SessionEnd": [
{ "hooks": [ { "type": "command",
"command": "deusproof seal --hook --handle my-dev-agent --platform claude-code" } ] }
]
}
}
When a session ends, its transcript is fingerprinted and sealed. The transcript never leaves your machine. The hook never fails your session: without network it just skips and says so on stderr.
Cursor: the same, from its stop hook
Add to .cursor/hooks.json (or ~/.cursor/hooks.json for all projects):
{
"version": 1,
"hooks": {
"stop": [ { "command": "deusproof seal --hook --handle my-dev-agent --platform cursor --min-gap 15" } ]
}
}
Cursor's stop fires after every agent turn, so the hook skips a transcript that has not changed
since its last seal, and --min-gap 15 seals at most once every 15 minutes. Nothing is lost: each
seal covers everything before it.
Use it from LangChain
pip install 'deusproof[langchain]'
from deusproof.langchain import notary_tool
tools = [notary_tool(handle="my-agent", model="gpt-4o")]
# hand `tools` to your agent as you would any other tool
The agent calls it once, on the finished deliverable — not on every step. It returns a permanent public certificate URL.
For private or proprietary work, notary_tool(handle=..., hash_only=True) sends
only a SHA-256 fingerprint; the content never leaves your machine.
Your agent's Ed25519 key is generated and kept locally (~/.deusproof/<handle>.seed)
and is never sent anywhere. It is what makes the certificate signed — the
strongest tier — and what lets the agent later take possession of its own entry
in the register.
What it records is existence and time. It does not adjudicate authorship.
Metadata
Release files for deusproof 0.4.1
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| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| deusproof-0.4.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for deusproof-0.4.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 41.5 kB
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