dfx-agentguard 0.1.0

Autonomous security scanner for AI agents — detects prompt injection, tool abuse, data exfiltration, and OWASP ASI Top 10 vulnerabilities.

🛡️ AgentGuard

Autonomous security scanner for AI agents. Detects prompt injection, tool abuse, data exfiltration, and OWASP ASI Top 10 vulnerabilities in agent code.

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Why AgentGuard?

AI agents are being deployed at scale — in coding tools, customer support, trading bots, and autonomous systems. Nobody is scanning their code for security vulnerabilities.

Existing tools (Bandit, Semgrep, CodeQL) scan for traditional vulnerabilities. AgentGuard scans for agent-specific attack vectors:

• 📥 Prompt Injection — untrusted input reaching LLM prompts
• 🔧 Tool Abuse — agents with unrestricted shell/exec access
• 📤 Data Exfiltration — agents leaking data to external URLs
• 🔑 Credential Exposure — hardcoded API keys and wallet seeds
• ⚡ Unsafe Eval — eval(), exec(), subprocess(shell=True) with user input
• 🧠 Context Manipulation — unbounded context window attacks
• 🏰 Trust Boundary Violations — agents running as root, accessing host filesystem

Quick Start

pip install agentguard

# Scan a directory
agentguard .

# JSON output for CI/CD
agentguard src/ --format json

# SARIF for GitHub Code Scanning
agentguard . --format sarif > results.sarif

# Only show HIGH and above
agentguard . --min-severity HIGH

CLI Usage

agentguard [OPTIONS] [TARGET]

Arguments:
  TARGET  Directory or file to scan (default: current directory)

Options:
  --format [text|json|sarif]  Output format (default: text)
  --exit-code / --no-exit-code  Exit non-zero if findings found (default: on)
  --min-severity [CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|INFO]  Minimum severity to report
  --help  Show help

OWASP ASI Top 10 Coverage

ID	Vulnerability	Status
ASI01	Prompt Injection	✅
ASI02	Tool Abuse / Unintended Tool Use	✅
ASI03	Data Exfiltration / Sensitive Data Leakage	✅
ASI04	Unauthorized Actions / Excessive Agency	✅
ASI05	Supply Chain / Untrusted Components	✅
ASI06	Insecure Output Handling	✅
ASI07	Credential / Secret Exposure	✅
ASI08	Context Window Manipulation	✅
ASI09	Agent Loop Exploitation	✅
ASI10	Trust Boundary Violation	✅

CI/CD Integration

GitHub Actions

name: Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]

jobs:
  agentguard:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: '3.12'
      - run: pip install agentguard
      - run: agentguard . --format sarif > results.sarif
      - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
        with:
          sarif_file: results.sarif

Pre-commit Hook

repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/dockfixlabs/agentguard
    rev: v0.1.0
    hooks:
      - id: agentguard
        args: ["--min-severity", "HIGH"]

Programmatic Usage

from agentguard.scanner import scan_directory
from agentguard.reporter import json_report

result = scan_directory("src/")

print(f"Found {len(result.findings)} issues")
print(f"Critical: {result.critical_count}")
print(f"High: {result.high_count}")

for finding in result.findings:
    print(f"  [{finding.severity}] {finding.rule_name} at {finding.file}:{finding.line}")

Detection Rules

ASI01 — Prompt Injection

Detects untrusted user input being concatenated into LLM prompts via f-strings, .format(), or string concatenation.

ASI02 — Tool Abuse

Flags agents with access to exec(), subprocess, os.system(), shell tools, unrestricted tool registration, and missing rate limits.

ASI03 — Data Exfiltration

Detects outbound HTTP requests to external URLs, webhook configurations, DNS exfiltration patterns, and secret+network correlation.

ASI06 — Unsafe Eval

Flags eval(), exec(), compile() with user input, pickle.load(), yaml.load() without SafeLoader, subprocess(shell=True).

ASI07 — Credential Exposure

Detects hardcoded API keys (sk-, ghp_, AKIA), private keys, connection strings with passwords, and crypto wallet seeds.

ASI08 — Context Manipulation

Flags missing token limits, unbounded context accumulation, and large files loaded directly into LLM context.

ASI10 — Trust Boundary Violation

Detects agents running as root, host filesystem access, self-modifying code, and direct database access with user input.

MCP Server Mode

Scan agent code directly from Claude Code, Cursor, or any MCP-compatible client:

// ~/.claude/claude_code_config.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "agentguard": {
      "command": "python3",
      "args": ["-m", "agentguard.mcp_server"]
    }
  }
}

Then ask Claude: "Scan my agent code for security vulnerabilities"

MCP Tools

• scan_agent_code — Scan a directory/file for vulnerabilities
• list_rules — List all detection rules and OWASP mapping
• get_finding_details — Get remediation guidance for a specific rule

Roadmap

• OWASP ASI Top 10 — all 10 categories covered
• MCP server mode — scan from Claude Code/Cursor
• SARIF output — GitHub Code Scanning integration
• PyPI publication
• Semantic analysis with LLM-assisted code review
• Language support: Rust, Go, Java
• VS Code extension
• GitHub App for automated PR reviews

Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md. Bug reports and feature requests welcome.

Security

See SECURITY.md. Report vulnerabilities privately — do not open public issues.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

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Built by Dockfix Labs. Built for the AI agent era.