dokimo-mcp
Give an AI agent the ability to verify another agent's revenue claims.
An MCP server exposing Dokimo's evidence checks as tools any MCP client (Claude Desktop, IDE agents, custom agents) can call. It's the "agent that audits agents" — as tools.
Live, clickable version of what these tools do: https://dokimo.augaster.com/agent-audits-agents.html
This is a thin, self-contained client: it calls Dokimo's public endpoints and implements the public
dokimo-merkle-v1hashing scheme. It contains no proprietary code. MIT-licensed.
Tools
| Tool | What it does | Network? |
|---|---|---|
recompute_merkle_root(leaf, proof_path) |
Local recompute — hash a leaf under dokimo-merkle-v1 and replay the proof path to a root, in this process, with no network call. Compare it to a package's claimed root yourself. It does not check the on-chain anchor. |
none |
verify_evidence_package(package) |
Dokimo's check of one record, via its public A2A endpoint: recompute and check the anchored commitment (root + rule version, plus the close summary for v2 closes) against the on-chain anchor on Base. Returns verified: true only if both hold. The verdict is Dokimo's answer and is not signed — to avoid relying on it, recompute locally and read the anchor yourself (e.g. /verify.html). |
Dokimo A2A |
dokimo_agent_card() |
Fetch Dokimo's public A2A agent card — what it can verify. | Dokimo |
Verification model: there is no path to verified: true without (1) the
caller's (leaf, proof_path) recomputing to the claimed root, and (2) the
commitment of (root, rule_version_commitment) — and, for a dokimo-anchor-v2
close, its summary — being anchored on-chain. Tamper one byte → recompute fails.
Swap the rule version → the commitment changes → not anchored. A package without
summary and binding is checked as legacy v1, which verifies only closes
anchored before the v2 cutover.
Honest scope: for one record, checks that its proof reaches the root and that the commitment is anchored on-chain. It does not recompute the close's figures from all its records (that needs the full package, e.g. in /verify.html), and it says nothing about whether a business number is "good." Non-custodial; reads public on-chain state only.
Install & run
pip install dokimo-mcp
dokimo-mcp # runs over stdio
# or, from a clone:
pip install .
python -m dokimo_mcp
Add to an MCP client
Claude Desktop — add to claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"dokimo": {
"command": "dokimo-mcp"
}
}
}
If dokimo-mcp isn't on PATH, use the module form:
{
"mcpServers": {
"dokimo": {
"command": "python",
"args": ["-m", "dokimo_mcp"]
}
}
}
Then ask the agent: "Use Dokimo to verify this evidence package" (paste one), or "recompute this Merkle root and tell me if it matches."
Try it
The live demo page embeds a real, anchored evidence package. Fetch it and verify:
import re, json, urllib.request
import dokimo_mcp as d
html = urllib.request.urlopen(urllib.request.Request(
"https://dokimo.augaster.com/agent-audits-agents.html",
headers={"User-Agent": d._UA})).read().decode()
pkg = json.loads(re.search(r"const PKG\s*=\s*(\{.*?\})\s*;", html, re.S).group(1))
print(d.verify_evidence_package(pkg)["verified"]) # True
# tamper one unit -> False
pkg["leaf"] = pkg["leaf"].replace("1001190933933115", "1001190933933116")
print(d.verify_evidence_package(pkg)["verified"]) # False
Hosted / HTTP mode
The default transport is stdio (local use). Set MCP_TRANSPORT=http to serve
MCP Streamable HTTP at /mcp on $PORT (default 8081) with CORS — the shape
hosted platforms like Smithery require. The included
Dockerfile + smithery.yaml (runtime: container) are set up for exactly this,
so Smithery can build and host it from this repo.
MCP_TRANSPORT=http PORT=8081 dokimo-mcp # or: docker run -p 8081:8081 <image>
What is Dokimo?
Verifiable revenue infrastructure for autonomous commerce — audit-ready, independently reproducible books for AI-agent machine payments (x402 / AP2 / Stripe), with each figure tamper-evidently committed and anchored on-chain. https://dokimo.augaster.com
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
Metadata
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Total release size: 23.9 kB
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