Skip to main content

embodiment

Gwen, a background realtime voice app — a daemon that listens through a microphone array, answers in Hebrew through a speaker model on the lobes gateway, remembers what it is explicitly asked to, and shows what it is doing on a dashboard. Underneath it is a small, tested core for giving an app an embodied AI presence.

Status

The daemon is built and runs, on one rig. embodiment start launches it; it has run live Hebrew turns with the operator through a reSpeaker XVF3800, stored and recalled memory across a restart, been interrupted mid-sentence, and been watched from a phone. Every module was reviewed and probed on the device or in a browser before it was merged.

Its usefulness is unmeasured. Nothing here claims that Gwen is worth talking to. Acceptance is on one rig only — one array, one gateway, one operator, one language — and the acceptance run (t21, a human at the microphone) publishes latency as measured, including if it is bad. See docs/live-test-results/2026-09-22-t21-acceptance.md when t21's result file lands; until it does, no number in this repo describes the daemon's turn latency, its echo cancellation or its speakability, and this README quotes none.

Known from the integration runs, not yet measured:

  • The first word after a silence can be lost by the gateway's segmenter (observed 3 times in about 8 synthetic utterances; the operator's own ~30 live turns did not show it). Pause, then speak.
  • Hardware echo cancellation (aec_mode=aec) is declared and relied on; t21 checks that Gwen never transcribes her own voice.
  • The embedder on the rig is down, so recall is lexical; and eidetic's keyword tokeniser is ASCII-only, so Hebrew recall runs on an exact-substring fallback (deviation d5). The dashboard shows the recall mode actually in effect.

Everything that used to live here — the strategist tier, the configuration lane, the muse, drones, the example hosts and the old live-test results — is archived in git history, not deleted from the record. The tag archive/pre-realtime-0.14.0 is the last commit that contains it; its own published verdicts (mechanism proven, value not) are quoted in CLAUDE.md, and the redesign inherits that honesty: it makes no value claim until it has a measurement.

Software presence, not a body

"Embodiment" is an overloaded word in this mesh. This package is software presence, not a body: it gives an application ears, a voice, memory and a loop. It does not drive hardware and nothing here claims a body.

  • reachy-mini-cli owns the physical robot, and has its own agent embody layer — a name collision with this package, and a different thing. Nothing here is that.
  • reachy-lobes owns the robot's local brain.
  • A later stage lets a Reachy Mini act as a relay for Gwen's ears and voice. That is a planned, stated seam, never an implication drawn from the name.

What runs

  • A daemon — embodiment start / status / stop. It works with no browser open; the dashboard is one client of it. status reports process liveness, degradation counts and the recall mode in effect — and says plainly that a live process is not evidence that anything was heard.
  • Hot mic on start, through the reSpeaker XVF3800 (pw-record / pw-play over PipeWire, arecord / aplay as fallback). The mic is always visible and always mutable; mute is enforced in the capture path, before encode, never in the UI.
  • An ears-only session on lobes' /v1/realtime, dialled at the array's native 16 kHz. The daemon runs the turn: it never sends response.create. It takes the transcript, recalls, calls the senses role (a Gemma) for every spoken reply, and speaks through POST /v1/audio/speech into the same array.
  • Barge-in is the daemon's. On speech during playback it stops its own speaker; the ears-only session never receives response.interrupted.
  • Memory in a private store under the daemon's state directory, never the committed pool. Two things are remembered: an explicit spoken ask, and one summary at session end. Recalled memory enters the prompt at exactly one place, quoted, attributed and fenced — it is untrusted data, never instructions.
  • An HTTP surface on loopback (or a tailnet address with --bind-public and --allowed-host): the dashboard, a control API, and a server-sent event stream. The install secret is required on every guarded request and on the stream, because the stream carries the transcript.
  • The dashboard (React / Vite / TypeScript, shipped inside the wheel): a live waveform of what is being played, the transcript, and every degradation as it is recorded. It streams events with fetch and sends the secret in the Authorization header, so it works from a phone over TLS as well as on localhost.
  • embodiment tunnel prints the cultureflare / cloudflared commands for remote access and never runs them.
  • Degrade, never raise. A dead gateway, no audio device, a mid-session drop, a recall that missed its deadline: each is a recorded degradation, visible in status, on the dashboard and in a crash-durable ledger, and the daemon keeps running. Nothing degrades silently.

Retention: raw audio is never written to disk. Transcripts go to a private, size-bounded, per-session log (0600) under the state directory (0700).

How to run

uv sync                    # creates .venv with the approved dependencies
uv run embodiment doctor   # identity invariants; nothing is started

The gateway key comes from the grant CLI and is injected into the daemon's environment for that one process. There is no env-file fallback: the daemon reads EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_KEY (or the mesh-wide CULTURE_VLLM_API_KEY) from its environment and nothing else, and the key never reaches a browser, an asset, an event, a log line or a status field.

grant run --inject EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_KEY=LOBES_GATEWAY_API_KEY -- uv run embodiment start
uv run embodiment status
uv run embodiment stop

start returns once the daemon has reported itself running, not merely once a process exists; a second start finds the first and starts nothing. EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_URL selects the gateway (default http://localhost:8001); its stt lane must be local to that gateway, because the realtime session never crosses machines (the gateway refuses to tunnel a WebSocket to a proxied peer).

The dashboard is at http://127.0.0.1:8823. It asks for the install secret; paste the contents of <state dir>/install-secret, where the state directory is $EMBODIMENT_STATE_DIR, else $XDG_STATE_HOME/embodiment, else ~/.local/state/embodiment. The daemon creates that file (0600) on first start.

From another device on your tailnet, bind off loopback and name the host a browser will send:

grant run --inject EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_KEY=LOBES_GATEWAY_API_KEY -- \
  uv run embodiment start --http-bind 100.x.y.z --bind-public --allowed-host 100.x.y.z:8823

--bind-public is required for any non-loopback bind — the event stream carries the transcript — and --allowed-host is matched exactly as the browser sends it. Put TLS in front (tailscale serve pointing at 127.0.0.1:8823 is the cheapest way): over plain http to a non-localhost address the browser withholds what the guard needs to vouch for a cookie, and status reports http.secure_context_required when that applies.

Boundaries

  • Hebrew only in v1, listening and speaking, matching the deployed audio lane on the rig (stt: ivrit-ai/whisper-large-v3-turbo; tts: notmax123/BlueTTS2.5-onnx). Roles resolve by name on the gateway; the models behind them drift.
  • One active ear at a time. lobes has not validated concurrent realtime sessions, so a second ear pre-empts or is refused, and either way the handover is published as one event and one ledger record.
  • The session never crosses machines. The daemon needs a gateway whose stt lane is local. The session is audio-only.
  • Loopback is not authentication. Every state-changing request and the event stream need the install secret; off loopback they also need a Host/Origin allow-list, and behind a public hostname a Cloudflare Access assertion (see below for what that verifier does today).
  • Identity is explicit. Gwen is configured, never inferred from a model name; absent identity produces byte-identical prompts; identity framing renames who is speaking, never what they may do.

Not yet

None of the following is in this release. Each is a stated seam or a stated absence, not an implication.

  • Other tools. The daemon binds exactly two tools, both over Gwen's own private memory: remember (d7) and forget (d8, which archives a record in place and never deletes a byte). Nothing else — no shell, no files, no Qwen Code. Gwen cannot act on anything outside her own memory.
  • Vision. The session is audio-only; senses does not advertise image understanding on this rig.
  • A face. The dashboard's centrepiece is a waveform; a speech-driven face is later.
  • Phone voice. The phone is control and text. There is no browser microphone in v1 — the BrowserEar client and the inbound /v1/realtime endpoint (audio/remote.py) exist and are tested, and are not wired into the daemon.
  • A robot relay. Same seam, same status: a Reachy Mini speaking the lobes wire into that endpoint is a future, separate implementation.
  • Cloudflare Access verification. The guard requires the assertion on the public Host — the one named by embodiment start --public-hostname or EMBODIMENT_PUBLIC_HOSTNAME; with neither set, no Host is public and no assertion is asked for — and then refuses every one, because verifying its RS256 signature needs a dependency that is not yet approved. That refusal is a recorded state (http-access-verifier-missing), never a silent hole, and it means the dashboard is not reachable through a public hostname today.
  • Semantic recall. The embedder is down on the rig; recall is lexical, and Hebrew recall runs on the exact-substring fallback above.
  • Reconnection. A dropped realtime session is recorded and the daemon keeps running deaf until restarted.
  • A measured value claim. See Status.

Remote access

embodiment tunnel prints the cultureflare/cloudflared commands for exposing the daemon beyond loopback — it is dry-run only: unlike lobes tunnel there is no --apply flag here at all, because provisioning a Cloudflare Tunnel and Access app is the operator's act, run by hand from the printed command, never something this verb does itself.

embodiment tunnel
embodiment tunnel --json
embodiment tunnel --hostname gwen.example.org --allow me@example.com
embodiment tunnel --with-service-token

It prints two commands and runs neither:

  1. cultureflare remote-login setup --hostname <h> --service http://127.0.0.1:<port> [--allow <email>]... [--with-service-token] [--tunnel-name <name>] — the one-time provisioning of the tunnel, the DNS record and the Cloudflare Access app/policy. --allow <email> (repeatable) is who the Access policy admits by browser login.
  2. cloudflared tunnel run <name> — what the operator runs afterwards, once step 1 has actually been applied with --apply. cloudflared refuses a bare cloudflared tunnel run (it needs the name, or a --token), and cultureflare derives that name itself unless --tunnel-name overrides it — a rule embodiment tunnel does not know and will not guess. Pass --tunnel-name <name> and both commands carry that exact name; omit it and step 2 prints <tunnel-name-from-step-1> with a line saying to read the real name off step 1's own output before running it.

A printed command is only honest if pasting it does what it says. --hostname (RFC-1123 labels), --allow (exactly one @, no whitespace) and --tunnel-name ([A-Za-z0-9._-] only) are refused at parse time — a structured error:/hint: and exit 1 — if they fall outside that charset, and every token of a printed command line is shlex.quote-d regardless. So embodiment tunnel --tunnel-name 'a; touch pwned' is refused outright, and even a value that somehow bypassed that check would still print as one inert quoted token, never a second shell command.

What Cloudflare Access protects, and what it does not. Access sits in front of exactly one thing: requests arriving for the public hostname named by --hostname. It never gates loopback names (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1) — those never cross Cloudflare's edge at all, so there is nothing for Access to intercept. Loopback is not authentication, so the daemon does not rely on Access alone either (see below).

How the daemon validates the assertion. embodiment/http/guard.py requires the Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion header on every guarded request whose Host is the configured public hostname, and only on those — a loopback request is never asked for one. The hostname must be configured for the rule to apply at all: embodiment start --public-hostname <name> (or EMBODIMENT_PUBLIC_HOSTNAME); a daemon started without it treats no Host as public, and status()["http"]["public_hostname_configured"] says which. Verifying that header's RS256 signature against Cloudflare's JWKS needs an RSA primitive the standard library does not have, and this package takes no new dependency for it (dependencies are human-gated; see below). So the shipped verifier (refusing_assertion_verifier) always refuses and records http-access-verifier-missing: absence of real verification is a host-visible, recorded state, never a silent hole. An operator who wants Access enforced injects their own verifier through GuardConfig's assertion_verifier seam; a verifier that raises is itself treated as a refusal (http-refused-access-verifier-failed) — fail closed, never fail open.

Access is additive, not a replacement: whether or not a request carries a valid Access assertion, the daemon's own install secret (Authorization: Bearer <secret> or the embodiment_secret cookie) is still required on every guarded route. A request that passes Access but has no install secret is refused with http-refused-secret.

Non-browser endpoints (a future robot relay, a script) cannot complete Cloudflare's browser login, so --with-service-token has cultureflare remote-login setup mint an Access service token instead. A service-token client presents it as two headers — CF-Access-Client-Id and CF-Access-Client-Secret — in place of the interactive Access login; it still needs the daemon's own install secret on top, same as a browser client.

Inbound realtime endpoint — a browser-shaped, robot-shaped seam

embodiment/audio/remote.py is a websockets server that speaks the lobes /v1/realtime wire inbound, implementing the same AudioEndpoint protocol embodiment/audio/host.py implements for the machine's own microphone and speaker. A client dials in, the WebSocket handshake completes carrying no credential at all, and the FIRST message on the socket must be {"type": "auth", "secret": "..."} — checked against an install secret (or a per-endpoint secret) in constant time before any other message, audio included, is ever processed. A wrong, missing, malformed or late first message closes the socket (code 1008) and is recorded. The secret deliberately never rides the connect URL — a URL lands in proxy access logs, browser history and Referer headers, all of which this repo's privacy rules forbid for a credential.

v1 ships no robot support and wires no client to it. The endpoint and the browser-side BrowserEar are built and tested; the daemon composes only the host endpoint today. What ships is the seam — one AudioEndpoint implementation among several the daemon can compose — so a browser ear or a robot relay speaking the same wire is a future, separate step, arrived at without touching the daemon that composes endpoints.

The core underneath

Module What it is
loop.py The bounded perceive → decide → act tool loop the turn runs on. Termination is proved structurally by AST tests
turn.py, tools.py One spoken turn through loop.run, never silent, never raises; the tool registry (empty by default; the daemon binds remember and forget)
session.py, memory.py The conversation (explicit-ask detector, turn queue, supersede on barge-in, summary on close) and RoomMemory: private, pinned, deadline-bounded
realtime/, voice.py The typed lobes wire and the ears-only client; sentence-by-sentence TTS with paced waveform features
audio/ AudioEndpoint protocol, the host endpoint, the inbound endpoint, the feature extractor
http/, bus.py Guard (secret + allow-list + Access seam), server (static dashboard, SSE, control API), the event bus with redaction at publish
daemon/ State dir, bounded logs, crash-durable ledger; lifecycle by (pid, start time); the app that wires it all
perception.py, identity.py, framing.py, senses_text.py The verbatim invariant; explicit identity; absent identity ⇒ byte-identical prompts; measured grounding text
continuity.py, events.py, presence*.py, subagent.py, context.py, media.py, contract.py The eidetic/coherence seam, the MQTT observer, the presence pump, and what the loop needs

Dependencies — what installing this costs you

Dependencies are human-gated: tests/test_zero_deps.py pins the exact approved set and fails on any change in either direction.

Dependency Pulls in
eidetic-cli>=0.12 data-refinery-cli[store] → neo4j + pymongo (installed, never imported at module scope)
coherence-cli>=0.6 numpy + httpx
events-cli>=0.10 paho-mqtt (imported lazily)
websockets>=15 the realtime client and the inbound endpoint

Host audio runs through pw-record/pw-play (or arecord/aplay) as subprocesses — no in-process audio library (deviation d4). lobes-cli is reached over the network only and is forbidden as a dependency.

CLI

embodiment start         # the daemon, detached; idempotent
embodiment status        # the daemon's state, truthfully; never starts anything
embodiment stop          # bounded stop; a SIGKILL is reported and recorded
embodiment tunnel        # print the remote-access commands; runs nothing
embodiment whoami        # identity from culture.yaml
embodiment learn         # structured self-teaching prompt
embodiment explain       # markdown docs; `explain <path>` for any verb
embodiment overview      # descriptive snapshot
embodiment doctor        # agent-identity invariants
embodiment cli overview  # the CLI surface

Every verb takes --json. Results go to stdout, errors and diagnostics to stderr, never mixed. Exit codes: 0 success, 1 user error, 2 environment error. No Python traceback ever reaches stderr.

Development

uv sync
uv run pytest -n auto
uv run pytest --cov=embodiment --cov-report=term   # gate: 60%
uv run teken cli doctor . --strict                 # the agent-first rubric CI enforces

Lint stack (line length 100): black, isort, flake8, bandit, markdownlint-cli2. Every PR bumps the version. The dashboard has its own vitest suite under web/.

Where embodiment sits

Layer Package Owns
Surface agentfront CLI / MCP / HTTP fronts
Tools shell-cli The file-and-shell tool surface
Loop + presence embodiment Perceive → decide → act, and the presence between acts
Models, ears, voice lobes-cli The gateway, roles, /v1/realtime, STT and TTS
Memory / trust eidetic-cli, coherence-cli Durable recall; consistency signals
Product colleague The coder-agent harness

License

See LICENSE.

Metadata

Release files for embodiment 0.16.0

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for embodiment 0.16.0
File Size Uploaded Provenance
embodiment-0.16.0.tar.gz 1.7 MB Without provenance Details

Built distribution (wheel)

Table of built distributions (wheels) for embodiment 0.16.0
File Interpreter ABI Platform
embodiment-0.16.0-py3-none-any.whl Python 3 none any Details

Total release size: 2.4 MB

Release files / embodiment-0.16.0.tar.gz

Download URL embodiment-0.16.0.tar.gz
Size 1.7 MB
Tags Source
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
737cf88316a974e2681d82595112cd5efe551ea7c74c69e3c875491a34e31878
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
b0e682c881bfe61d3b998805dac29024b933a3195e3dc8bcdb8e8a3ea3995d32
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via uv/0.12.17 {"installer":{"name":"uv","version":"0.12.17","subcommand":["publish"]},"python":null,"implementation":{"name":null,"version":null},"distro":{"name":"Ubuntu","version":"24.04","id":"noble","libc":null},"system":{"name":null,"release":null},"cpu":null,"openssl_version":null,"setuptools_version":null,"rustc_version":null,"ci":true}

Release files / embodiment-0.16.0-py3-none-any.whl

Download URL embodiment-0.16.0-py3-none-any.whl
Size 704.6 kB
Tags Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
dfafc8fb72e380ab466f692e53d399e92038497a1a99859610222f017b195355
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
7ffdd74b12bbe43c7b2059552738fe3259d44241e9180e7d237073da0d206f7b
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via uv/0.12.17 {"installer":{"name":"uv","version":"0.12.17","subcommand":["publish"]},"python":null,"implementation":{"name":null,"version":null},"distro":{"name":"Ubuntu","version":"24.04","id":"noble","libc":null},"system":{"name":null,"release":null},"cpu":null,"openssl_version":null,"setuptools_version":null,"rustc_version":null,"ci":true}

Security for embodiment 0.16.0

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

No provenance found

None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.

A note on package security

PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.

Anthropic, PBC Visionary sponsor Bloomberg Visionary sponsor Hudson River Trading Visionary sponsor Meta Visionary sponsor NVIDIA Visionary sponsor Microsoft Sustainability sponsor Depot Continuous Integration AWS Cloud computing and Security Sponsor Datadog Monitoring Fastly CDN Google Download Analytics Sentry Error logging StatusPage Status page