embodiment
Gwen, a background realtime voice app — a daemon that listens through a microphone array, answers in Hebrew through a speaker model on the lobes gateway, remembers what it is explicitly asked to, and shows what it is doing on a dashboard. Underneath it is a small, tested core for giving an app an embodied AI presence.
Status
The daemon is built and runs, on one rig. embodiment start launches it;
it has run live Hebrew turns with the operator through a reSpeaker XVF3800,
stored and recalled memory across a restart, been interrupted mid-sentence,
and been watched from a phone. Every module was reviewed and probed on the
device or in a browser before it was merged.
Its usefulness is unmeasured. Nothing here claims that Gwen is worth
talking to. Acceptance is on one rig only — one array, one gateway, one
operator, one language — and the acceptance run (t21, a human at the
microphone) publishes latency as measured, including if it is bad. See
docs/live-test-results/2026-09-22-t21-acceptance.md
when t21's result file lands; until it does, no number in this repo describes
the daemon's turn latency, its echo cancellation or its speakability, and
this README quotes none.
Known from the integration runs, not yet measured:
- The first word after a silence can be lost by the gateway's segmenter (observed 3 times in about 8 synthetic utterances; the operator's own ~30 live turns did not show it). Pause, then speak.
- Hardware echo cancellation (
aec_mode=aec) is declared and relied on; t21 checks that Gwen never transcribes her own voice. - Recall is semantic by default (the
gemma2-embedrole,google/embeddinggemma-2, over a private vector cache) with a one-flag rollback to keyword recall (EMBODIMENT_RECALL_MODE=keyword); eidetic's keyword tokeniser is ASCII-only, so on that rollback Hebrew recall runs on an exact-substring fallback (deviationd5). The dashboard shows the recall mode actually in effect.
Measured once, on this rig, in
docs/live-test-results/2026-10-23-recall-gemma2.md
(aggregates only; one person's store of 24 records; queries written by a model,
not spoken by a person — none of it is a measurement of real use):
- Recall, keyword versus semantic. Close queries hit@5 18/24 keyword versus 24/24 semantic; reworded queries 1/24 keyword versus 15/24 semantic at the shipped threshold (n = 24 each).
- The similarity threshold is
0.715, and provisional. It was chosen on the data it was scored on, for the highest hit@5 with at most 5% false positives: hit@5 39/48, false positives 2/44 (n = 48 labelled, 44 unrelated). One held-out fold reached 2/22 (9%), and the unrelated queries were easy negatives, so that rate is a floor. Precision against a realistic distractor pool (newspaper text) is not measured. - The recall bound is derived from the store it scores: the query embed's p90 (161 ms, n = 30) plus 0.13 ms per active record plus 0.15 s, capped at 3 s. A spoken turn still waits at most 0.25 s for memory before answering. Status warns past about 400 active records (the largest store measured with no recall over 0.25 s) and past about 600 (where p90 crossed it).
- Clips are capped at 60 s, and the 46.8 s
sttclock is derived from the measured transcription speed: at most 0.614 s per audio second (n = 28 synthetic clips of 1 to 8.8 s; speed only, not accuracy, so a 60 s clip is an extrapolation). Asensescompletion took 4.0 s median and 5.1 s at most (n = 30), well inside the 30 s completion bound.
The library read path (0.18.0) is built; its retrieval was measured once on
this rig, and its value is unmeasured. In
docs/live-test-results/2026-10-24-library.md (aggregates only, model-written
questions, through the daemon's own search route, 50 indexed items): hit@5 was
19 of 32 and 17 of 28 on two question sets, with 0 of 10 off-topic false
positives in each run and a search p90 of 0.21 s. Transcripts alone scored 6 of
11 (index version 1). Most misses are the threshold returning nothing: the
library similarity threshold reuses memory's 0.715 and is provisional and
not calibrated on library text. Transcripts reach the library through
culture-rules (decision c21): 33 Pocket transcripts were there on 2026-10-24.
Still not measured:
- The follow-up window for a late recall is off by default and unmeasured.
- Whether the
sttlane accepts the browser's MediaRecorder webm/mp4 output (and the duration cap for those containers), and the load on thegemma2-embedhost (orin).
The rig was re-probed on 2026-10-23: senses, worker and gemma2-embed are
ready but proxied; stt and tts are ready and local. Roles resolve by name;
re-probe before relying on this.
Everything that used to live here — the strategist tier, the configuration
lane, the muse, drones, the example hosts and the old live-test results — is
archived in git history, not deleted from the record. The tag
archive/pre-realtime-0.14.0
is the last commit that contains it; its own published verdicts (mechanism
proven, value not) are quoted in CLAUDE.md, and the redesign inherits that
honesty: it makes no value claim until it has a measurement.
Software presence, not a body
"Embodiment" is an overloaded word in this mesh. This package is software presence, not a body: it gives an application ears, a voice, memory and a loop. It does not drive hardware and nothing here claims a body.
reachy-mini-cliowns the physical robot, and has its ownagent embodylayer — a name collision with this package, and a different thing. Nothing here is that.reachy-lobesowns the robot's local brain.- A later stage lets a Reachy Mini act as a relay for Gwen's ears and voice. That is a planned, stated seam, never an implication drawn from the name.
What runs
- A daemon —
embodiment start/status/stop. It works with no browser open; the dashboard is one client of it.statusreports process liveness, degradation counts and the recall mode in effect — and says plainly that a live process is not evidence that anything was heard. - Live voice is opt-in (d6, 2026-10-24): the daemon starts with no ear; the
page's Live button opens the room mic and closes it again (
embodiment start --listenkeeps the old hot mic on start). The mic is the reSpeaker XVF3800 (pw-record/pw-playover PipeWire,arecord/aplayas fallback). The mic is always visible and always mutable; mute is enforced in the capture path, before encode, never in the UI. - An ears-only session on lobes'
/v1/realtime, dialled at the array's native 16 kHz. The daemon runs the turn: it never sendsresponse.create. It takes the transcript, recalls, calls thesensesrole (a Gemma) for every spoken reply, and speaks throughPOST /v1/audio/speechinto the same array. - Barge-in is the daemon's. On speech during playback it stops its own
speaker; the ears-only session never receives
response.interrupted. - Memory in a private store under the daemon's state directory, never the committed pool. Two things are remembered: an explicit spoken ask, and one summary at session end. Recalled memory enters the prompt at exactly one place, quoted, attributed and fenced — it is untrusted data, never instructions.
- An HTTP surface on loopback (or a tailnet address with
--bind-publicand--allowed-host): the dashboard, a control API, and a server-sent event stream. The install secret is required on every guarded request and on the stream, because the stream carries the transcript. - The dashboard (React / Vite / TypeScript, shipped inside the wheel) is
chat-first, the library with the chat inside it: culture-library's look and shell around
pocketchat's thread (both cited, not imported). Ask is a three-pane
workspace: your conversations on the left (the live one and the earlier ones,
read from Gwen's own session logs through
GET /api/conversations; an earlier one can be continued as if it never stopped (and New conversation ends the live one and starts afresh): its turns are Gwen's context and new turns are added to its log, while the room's voice session is untouched; once a conversation has been quiet for 30 minutes Gwen indexes it herself and can search it later, every turn tagged with how it arrived: typed, transcribed from audio, or generated by her; a cited past conversation opens here, ready to continue), the conversation in the middle with numbered citations and a Speak button per answer (markers are never read aloud), and on the right the Library list and the answers' Sources, which open the cited passage in place. Both side panes toggle, leave a rail when closed, and become drawers on a phone. Below the thread, the box holds the mic (record and send a question) and the text; beside it sit Live (the room microphone's realtime voice) and Upload. Library is the shelf and the items as cards, To-dos is fed from Gwen's memory (culture-rules writes each recording's action items) and is checkable: the done state is Gwen's, kept by the daemon (POST /api/todos/{id}), and each change is published as atodoevent carrying the whole to-do so culture-rules can file the list in the library; Gwen answers about them withlist_todosand marks one withset_todo_doneonly when your own words ask (d16). Stats shows the library and the usage counters since Gwen started, and a status drawer keeps the room voice controls and the degradations. Before 0.18.0 the page was waveform-first with chat fourth. It streams events withfetchand sends the secret in theAuthorizationheader, so it works from a phone over TLS as well as on localhost; the install-secret form shows only when the stream is unauthorized, and on the Access-protected public host no secret is entered. - The library read path (optional). The library is culture-library
(library.culture.dev); its instance on 127.0.0.1:8796 is today's (d15, 2026-10-24; xteink's on 8780 before).
Gwen reads it through one small client (
embodiment/library/client.py) that is GET-only by construction (an AST test pins that it never sends POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE; agetscounter instatusis the live evidence). She fetches item files, extracts EPUB text with the stdlib under member, size and character caps, embeds chunks withgemma2-embedinto her own 0600 document index (never the eidetic store), and reconciles that index against the catalog by item id and sha256. Library tools run on typed turns only; their results reach the model inside the same untrusted-data fence as recalled memory, and every cited passage appears in the reply's sources with item id, title, date and anchor, so a[n]citation opens the reader at that passage. Routes:GET /api/library,/api/library/{id},/api/library/searchand/api/todos, all behind the guard. Unset config means no library tool and a visible "library not configured". - The write guard. An xteink key is a full operator key, so the client never
writes; and in a turn whose context holds library text,
rememberandforgetare refused unless the operator's own words in that turn name the write. Each refusal is counted (library_guarded_writes) and recorded (app-library-guarded-write). The audio subprocesses are spawned with a scrubbed environment that drops the gateway and library keys. - Text and clips: a chat view on the dashboard (
/api/chat) with every recalled fact cited by source, a speak button (/api/speak), and record/upload of a clip transcribed bystt(/api/clip). embodiment tunnelprints thecultureflare/cloudflaredcommands for remote access and never runs them.- Degrade, never raise. A dead gateway, no audio device, a mid-session
drop, a recall that missed its deadline: each is a recorded degradation,
visible in
status, on the dashboard and in a crash-durable ledger, and the daemon keeps running. Nothing degrades silently.
Retention: recordings are kept. Every clip the page sends (recorded on its mic or
uploaded) is kept as it arrived, before it is transcribed (d10), and so is every
utterance the room microphone hears, from speech onset to its end, as a WAV
(d11); the silence between utterances is not written. They live under
recordings/ in the state directory: 0600 files named by their sha256, in a 0700
directory, capped at 2 GiB. A recording past the cap is refused and recorded, and
nothing is deleted to make room. Archiving to S3 is tracked in #99. Transcripts go
to a private, size-bounded, per-session log (0600) under the state directory
(0700). Each turn says how it arrived (d7), links its recording, and carries typed
timestamps (d12): created, recorded, witnessed, received, transcribed,
generated, with the page's own times marked by: client.
How to run
uv sync # creates .venv with the approved dependencies
uv run embodiment doctor # identity invariants; nothing is started
The gateway key comes from the grant CLI and is injected into the daemon's
environment for that one process. There is no env-file fallback: the daemon
reads EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_KEY (or the mesh-wide CULTURE_VLLM_API_KEY) from
its environment and nothing else, and the key never reaches a browser, an
asset, an event, a log line or a status field.
grant run --inject EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_KEY=LOBES_GATEWAY_API_KEY -- uv run embodiment start
uv run embodiment status
uv run embodiment stop
start returns once the daemon has reported itself running, not merely
once a process exists; a second start finds the first and starts nothing.
EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_URL selects the gateway (default http://localhost:8001);
its stt lane must be local to that gateway, because the realtime session
never crosses machines (the gateway refuses to tunnel a WebSocket to a proxied
peer).
The library is optional. Set EMBODIMENT_LIBRARY_URL and
EMBODIMENT_LIBRARY_KEY; the key is injected, never written by Gwen:
grant run --inject EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_KEY=LOBES_GATEWAY_API_KEY \
--inject EMBODIMENT_LIBRARY_KEY=XTEINK_GWEN_API_KEY -- uv run embodiment start
The dashboard is at http://127.0.0.1:8823. It asks for the install
secret; paste the contents of <state dir>/install-secret, where the
state directory is $EMBODIMENT_STATE_DIR, else $XDG_STATE_HOME/embodiment,
else .local/state/embodiment under your home directory (the XDG default). The
daemon creates that file (0600) on first start.
From another device on your tailnet, bind off loopback and name the host a browser will send:
grant run --inject EMBODIMENT_GATEWAY_KEY=LOBES_GATEWAY_API_KEY -- \
uv run embodiment start --http-bind 100.x.y.z --bind-public --allowed-host 100.x.y.z:8823
--bind-public is required for any non-loopback bind — the event stream
carries the transcript — and --allowed-host is matched exactly as the
browser sends it. Put TLS in front (tailscale serve pointing at
127.0.0.1:8823 is the cheapest way): over plain http to a non-localhost
address the browser withholds what the guard needs to vouch for a cookie, and
status reports http.secure_context_required when that applies.
Boundaries
- Hebrew only in v1, listening and speaking, matching the deployed audio
lane on the rig (
stt:ivrit-ai/whisper-large-v3-turbo;tts:notmax123/BlueTTS2.5-onnx). Roles resolve by name on the gateway; the models behind them drift. - One active ear at a time. lobes has not validated concurrent realtime sessions, so a second ear pre-empts or is refused, and either way the handover is published as one event and one ledger record.
- The session never crosses machines. The daemon needs a gateway whose
sttlane is local. The session is audio-only. - Loopback is not authentication. Every state-changing request and the event stream need the install secret; off loopback they also need a Host/Origin allow-list, and behind a public hostname a Cloudflare Access assertion (see below for what that verifier does today).
- Identity is explicit. Gwen is configured, never inferred from a model name; absent identity produces byte-identical prompts; identity framing renames who is speaking, never what they may do.
Not yet
None of the following is in this release. Each is a stated seam or a stated absence, not an implication.
- Other tools. The daemon binds
remember(d7) andforget(d8, which archives a record in place and never deletes a byte, and drops its vector; it does not redact past conversation transcript logs, which are private, 0600 and size-bounded and may have quoted the memory — a follow-up), and, on typed turns only (chat and clips) and only when a library is configured, two read-only library tools:search_libraryandread_passage. Also on typed turns,search_conversationssearches Gwen's own earlier conversations (d8), andlist_todos/set_todo_doneread and mark the to-dos (d16). They are indexed in her private index once each has been quiet for 30 minutes, every turn labelled with who said it and how it arrived, her own replies marked as not a source of fact; the live conversation is never searched. To summarize a whole item (the day's newspaper),read_itemreads it in order; to follow an article's source,fetch_sourcereads one web page — only a link that library item lists (the operator's choice), over http or https to a public address (private, loopback and link-local refused, the connection pinned to the checked address, every redirect re-checked), GET only, at most 2 MB and 15 s, the text fenced as untrusted like library text. This is Gwen's first reach outside the rig. Spoken turns keep today's path. Nothing else — no shell, no files, no Qwen Code, and no tool that writes to the library. Gwen cannot act on anything outside her own memory, her own conversations and her read of the library and the pages it links. - Vision. The session is audio-only;
sensesdoes not advertise image understanding on this rig. - A face. The waveform is a compact strip beside the chat; a speech-driven face is later.
- Live realtime voice and speech-to-speech. The phone is control, text, and
uploaded or recorded clips (transcribed by
stt); there is no live voice from the browser. The dashboard's Live button turns on the rig's room microphone, not the phone's, and no speech-to-speech role is used. TheBrowserEarclient and the inbound/v1/realtimeendpoint (audio/remote.py) exist and are tested, and are not wired into the daemon. - A robot relay. Same seam, same status: a Reachy Mini speaking the lobes wire into that endpoint is a future, separate implementation.
- Reconnection. A dropped realtime session is recorded and the daemon keeps running deaf until restarted.
- A measured value claim. See Status.
Remote access
embodiment tunnel prints the cultureflare/cloudflared commands for
exposing the daemon beyond loopback — it is dry-run only: unlike lobes tunnel there is no --apply flag here at all, because provisioning a
Cloudflare Tunnel and Access app is the operator's act, run by hand from the
printed command, never something this verb does itself.
embodiment tunnel
embodiment tunnel --json
embodiment tunnel --hostname gwen.example.org --allow me@example.com
embodiment tunnel --with-service-token
The default hostname is gwen.culture.dev. It prints two commands and runs
neither, then the Access environment variable names the daemon needs (names
only, never values):
cultureflare remote-login setup --hostname <h> --service http://127.0.0.1:<port> [--allow <email>]... [--with-service-token] [--tunnel-name <name>]— the one-time provisioning of the tunnel, the DNS record and the Cloudflare Access app/policy.--allow <email>(repeatable) is who the Access policy admits by browser login.cloudflared tunnel run <name>— what the operator runs afterwards, once step 1 has actually been applied with--apply.cloudflaredrefuses a barecloudflared tunnel run(it needs the name, or a--token), andcultureflarederives that name itself unless--tunnel-nameoverrides it — a ruleembodiment tunneldoes not know and will not guess. Pass--tunnel-name <name>and both commands carry that exact name; omit it and step 2 prints<tunnel-name-from-step-1>with a line saying to read the real name off step 1's own output before running it.
A printed command is only honest if pasting it does what it says.
--hostname (RFC-1123 labels), --allow (exactly one @, no whitespace) and
--tunnel-name ([A-Za-z0-9._-] only) are refused at parse time — a
structured error:/hint: and exit 1 — if they fall outside that charset,
and every token of a printed command line is shlex.quote-d regardless. So
embodiment tunnel --tunnel-name 'a; touch pwned' is refused outright, and
even a value that somehow bypassed that check would still print as one inert
quoted token, never a second shell command.
What Cloudflare Access protects, and what it does not. Access sits in
front of exactly one thing: requests arriving for the public hostname
named by --hostname. It never gates loopback names (localhost,
127.0.0.1, ::1) — those never cross Cloudflare's edge at all, so there is
nothing for Access to intercept. Loopback is not authentication, so the
daemon does not rely on Access alone either (see below).
How the daemon validates the assertion. embodiment/http/access.py
verifies the Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion JWT with the standard library (RS256 is
one modular exponentiation, so no new dependency): the kid must name a key in
the team JWKS, the signature must verify, iss must be the team domain, aud
must contain the application's AUD tag, the token must be inside nbf..exp,
and the person must be on the operator's email allow-list. The guard applies it
to every guarded request whose Host is the configured public hostname, and
only those. Configure it with three environment variables, set together or
not at all (names only here; the values come from the Access app):
EMBODIMENT_ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAINEMBODIMENT_ACCESS_AUDEMBODIMENT_ACCESS_EMAILS
and name the public Host with embodiment start --public-hostname <name> (or
EMBODIMENT_PUBLIC_HOSTNAME); a daemon started without it treats no Host as
public, and status()["http"]["public_hostname_configured"] says which. With
the Access env unset the guard is unchanged and refuses every assertion
(http-access-verifier-missing); a partial set refuses every assertion and
records it (http-access-config-incomplete). An unreachable JWKS is
infrastructure, not a bad token: the request is refused with 503 and the
outage is recorded once. Every refusal has a fixed reason that carries no token
or email.
On the public Host a valid assertion replaces the install secret, so the
operator reaches the dashboard and chat at gwen.culture.dev by signing in with
Cloudflare. Every other Host (loopback, a tailnet name) still needs the install
secret, whatever assertion it carries — an assertion off the public Host did not
come through Cloudflare. Because Cloudflare attaches the assertion to any request
carrying the CF_Authorization cookie, an Access-admitted request must also carry
an allow-listed Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin (a CSRF rule); the event
stream is closed when the assertion expires. This is verified against synthetic
tokens in tests; a live pass through Cloudflare is the operator's, and is not
claimed here.
Service tokens are refused. Gwen's public surface is for a person: a valid
assertion that names a service token (no person) is refused
(http-access-service-token), as is a person who is not on the allow-list
(http-access-email-not-allowed). --with-service-token still prints the
cultureflare flag, but it does not admit a non-browser client here; a robot
relay is a future, separate seam.
Memory ingest. Producers (Pocket recordings, culture-rules' daily newspaper)
enqueue facts with embodiment memory ingest --file <ndjson> [--apply] and
embodiment memory forget. The verbs validate and enqueue only, and are a dry run
unless --apply; the daemon is the single writer of the store. A newspaper issue
is archived together 30 days after its issue date. Recalled facts are cited by
their source in the chat view.
Inbound realtime endpoint — a browser-shaped, robot-shaped seam
embodiment/audio/remote.py is a websockets server that speaks the lobes
/v1/realtime wire inbound, implementing the same AudioEndpoint
protocol embodiment/audio/host.py implements for the machine's own
microphone and speaker. A client dials in, the WebSocket handshake completes
carrying no credential at all, and the FIRST message on the socket must be
{"type": "auth", "secret": "..."} — checked against an install secret (or a
per-endpoint secret) in constant time before any other message, audio
included, is ever processed. A wrong, missing, malformed or late first message
closes the socket (code 1008) and is recorded. The secret deliberately never
rides the connect URL — a URL lands in proxy access logs, browser history and
Referer headers, all of which this repo's privacy rules forbid for a
credential.
v1 ships no robot support and wires no client to it. The endpoint and the
browser-side BrowserEar are built and tested; the daemon composes only the
host endpoint today. What
ships is the seam — one AudioEndpoint implementation among several the
daemon can compose — so a browser ear or a robot relay speaking the same wire
is a future, separate step, arrived at without touching the daemon that
composes endpoints.
The core underneath
| Module | What it is |
|---|---|
loop.py |
The bounded perceive → decide → act tool loop the turn runs on. Termination is proved structurally by AST tests |
turn.py, tools.py |
One spoken turn through loop.run, never silent, never raises; the tool registry (empty by default; the daemon binds remember and forget, plus search_library and read_passage on typed turns when a library is configured) |
session.py, memory.py |
The conversation (explicit-ask detector, turn queue, supersede on barge-in, summary on close) and RoomMemory: private, pinned, deadline-bounded |
realtime/, voice.py |
The typed lobes wire and the ears-only client; sentence-by-sentence TTS with paced waveform features |
audio/ |
AudioEndpoint protocol, the host endpoint, the inbound endpoint, the feature extractor |
library/ |
The GET-only library client, stdlib EPUB extraction, the 0600 document index, the sync, and the two read tools |
http/, bus.py |
Guard (secret + allow-list + Access seam), server (static dashboard, SSE, control API), the event bus with redaction at publish |
daemon/ |
State dir, bounded logs, crash-durable ledger; lifecycle by (pid, start time); the app that wires it all |
perception.py, identity.py, framing.py, senses_text.py |
The verbatim invariant; explicit identity; absent identity ⇒ byte-identical prompts; measured grounding text |
continuity.py, events.py, presence*.py, subagent.py, context.py, media.py, contract.py |
The eidetic/coherence seam, the MQTT observer, the presence pump, and what the loop needs |
Dependencies — what installing this costs you
Dependencies are human-gated: tests/test_zero_deps.py pins the exact approved
set and fails on any change in either direction.
| Dependency | Pulls in |
|---|---|
eidetic-cli>=0.12 |
data-refinery-cli[store] → neo4j + pymongo (installed, never imported at module scope) |
coherence-cli>=0.6 |
numpy + httpx |
events-cli>=0.10 |
paho-mqtt (imported lazily) |
websockets>=15 |
the realtime client and the inbound endpoint |
Host audio runs through pw-record/pw-play (or arecord/aplay) as
subprocesses — no in-process audio library (deviation d4). lobes-cli is
reached over the network only and is forbidden as a dependency.
CLI
embodiment start # the daemon, detached; idempotent
embodiment status # the daemon's state, truthfully; never starts anything
embodiment stop # bounded stop; a SIGKILL is reported and recorded
embodiment tunnel # print the remote-access commands; runs nothing
embodiment whoami # identity from culture.yaml
embodiment learn # structured self-teaching prompt
embodiment explain # markdown docs; `explain <path>` for any verb
embodiment overview # descriptive snapshot
embodiment doctor # agent-identity invariants
embodiment cli overview # the CLI surface
Every verb takes --json. Results go to stdout, errors and diagnostics to
stderr, never mixed. Exit codes: 0 success, 1 user error, 2 environment
error. No Python traceback ever reaches stderr.
Development
uv sync
uv run pytest -n auto
uv run pytest --cov=embodiment --cov-report=term # gate: 60%
uv run teken cli doctor . --strict # the agent-first rubric CI enforces
Lint stack (line length 100): black, isort, flake8, bandit,
markdownlint-cli2. Every PR bumps the version. The dashboard has its own
vitest suite under web/.
Where embodiment sits
| Layer | Package | Owns |
|---|---|---|
| Surface | agentfront |
CLI / MCP / HTTP fronts |
| Tools | shell-cli |
The file-and-shell tool surface |
| Loop + presence | embodiment |
Perceive → decide → act, and the presence between acts |
| Models, ears, voice | lobes-cli |
The gateway, roles, /v1/realtime, STT and TTS |
| Memory / trust | eidetic-cli, coherence-cli |
Durable recall; consistency signals |
| Product | colleague |
The coder-agent harness |
License
See LICENSE.
Metadata
Release files for embodiment 0.21.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| embodiment-0.21.1.tar.gz | 2.3 MB | Without provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| embodiment-0.21.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 3.2 MB
Release files / embodiment-0.21.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | embodiment-0.21.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 2.3 MB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Yes |
| Uploaded via |
uv/0.13.5 {"installer":{"name":"uv","version":"0.13.5","subcommand":["publish"]},"python":null,"implementation":{"name":null,"version":null},"distro":{"name":"Ubuntu","version":"26.04","id":"resolute","libc":null},"system":{"name":null,"release":null},"cpu":null,"openssl_version":null,"setuptools_version":null,"rustc_version":null,"ci":true}
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Release files / embodiment-0.21.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | embodiment-0.21.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 916.5 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
8b681addedc695c76b487d4391589e137594cfde45f38befdf52cd94eea98b6e
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BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
dfca1717be9396ac1c7567ffa32bb57469fb8ed049a835c8a7302898ab65f5cc
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| Upload date | |
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
uv/0.13.5 {"installer":{"name":"uv","version":"0.13.5","subcommand":["publish"]},"python":null,"implementation":{"name":null,"version":null},"distro":{"name":"Ubuntu","version":"26.04","id":"resolute","libc":null},"system":{"name":null,"release":null},"cpu":null,"openssl_version":null,"setuptools_version":null,"rustc_version":null,"ci":true}
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Security for embodiment 0.21.1
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None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.
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