emem-langmem
emem-langmem is a LangChain key-value store that keeps its values as
signed memory notes on an emem responder. Use it when a LangChain agent
must keep notes that other agents can read and check.
EmemStore is a langchain_core.stores.BaseStore[str, bytes].
It is not a LangGraph store (langgraph.store.base.BaseStore). A
LangGraph graph compiles with it, but a node that calls store.get or
store.put fails with AttributeError. We checked this with
langgraph 1.0.1 on 7 November 2026.
Try it. Reads need no key:
pip install emem-langmem
from emem_langmem import EmemStore
store = EmemStore() # https://emem.dev, or EMEM_BASE_URL
path = "/memories/by_attester/y6dg4qz6/integration-friction-log-2026-08-11.md"
print(store.mget([path])[0][:38])
# b'# Integration friction log, 2026-08-11'
Version 2.4.4 is on PyPI (uploaded 18 October 2026). It needs Python
3.9 or later, langchain-core 0.3, httpx, blake3 and cryptography.
The source is in
sdks/emem-langmem.
For the memory wire format, read
docs/memory.html.
Write with a signing key
import os
from emem_langmem import EmemStore
SEED = os.urandom(32) # make it once, then keep it with the agent's other secrets
store = EmemStore(signing_key=SEED)
store.mset([((("notes",), "today"), b"field 7 looked dry")])
The mset call is a write. We did not run it against emem.dev.
SEED is a raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed. It signs every write. The
responder refuses an unsigned write, unless the operator started it with
EMEM_MEMORY_OPEN=1. The key also sets where the store writes. If you
lose the seed, you lose write access to that namespace.
EmemStore sends each BaseStore verb as an MCP tools/call request
to the responder:
| BaseStore verb | emem MCP tool | Signed |
|---|---|---|
mget(keys) |
emem_memory_view |
no, it is a read |
mset(pairs) |
emem_memory_create |
yes |
mdelete(keys) |
emem_memory_view, then emem_memory_delete |
yes |
yield_keys(prefix=) |
emem_memory_view on a directory |
no, it is a read |
The async verbs amget, amset, amdelete and ayield_keys do the
same work over httpx.AsyncClient.
Values are bytes. The store sends text bytes as UTF-8 and other bytes
as base64. mset writes with the memory kind resource. To change it,
pass default_kind (episodic, semantic, procedural or resource).
Namespaces
With a signing key, the store roots itself at
/memories/by_attester/<pubkey8>/. <pubkey8> is the first 8
characters of your base32 public key. Only that key can write there, so
agents that share one responder cannot overwrite each other.
A key can be a string or a (namespace, key) tuple. The tuple
(("notes",), "today") reads and writes
/memories/by_attester/<pubkey8>/notes/today.
store.root # '/memories/by_attester/ys3ez46s' (example)
store.signer.pubkey_b32 # the full base32 public key, 52 characters
A key that starts with / is an absolute path. The store does not
change it, so you can read outside your own root. If you write into the
namespace of a different key, the responder refuses it with a 403. Without a signing
key, the root is /memories and writes go out unsigned.
mget returns None for a key that does not exist. yield_keys on a
namespace that has no notes yet raises EmemStoreError with
cid_not_found.
EmemSigner is public. Use it when you call the memory tools yourself
and need the same attester block:
from emem_langmem import EmemSigner
signer = EmemSigner(SEED)
signer.attester_block("create", f"{signer.namespace_root}/n.md", b"hi")
# {'pubkey_b32': '...', 'sig_b32': '...'}
Use your own responder
EmemStore(base_url="http://127.0.0.1:5051")
You can also set EMEM_BASE_URL in the environment.
Get the receipt
The responder returns an Ed25519 receipt with each memory read and
write. The BaseStore interface has no place for it, so EmemStore
drops it. To get the receipt, call the MCP tool directly:
import json, uuid
import httpx
path = "/memories/by_attester/y6dg4qz6/integration-friction-log-2026-08-11.md"
r = httpx.post(
"https://emem.dev/mcp",
json={
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {"name": "emem_memory_view", "arguments": {"path": path}},
},
timeout=60,
).json()
body = json.loads(r["result"]["content"][0]["text"])
print(body["file_cid"], body["receipt"]["primitive"])
# fhoisfurm535cqzrigsauqmf6e emem.memory_file
On 7 November 2026, emem.dev sent the tool result as JSON text in
result.content[0].text, with no structuredContent.
To check the receipt offline, use the emem Python client
(pip install "ememdev[signing]"):
from ememdev.verify import verify_receipt_offline
v = verify_receipt_offline(body["receipt"])
print(v.ok, v.state, v.signer_b32[:8])
# True verified 777er3yi
We ran this on 7 November 2026. The receipt had preimage_version 2.
The function checks the signature against the key in the receipt. Compare
v.signer_b32 with federation.node.responder_pubkey_b32 in
/.well-known/emem.json.
You can also paste the receipt into the
verify page.
License
Apache-2.0.
Metadata
Release files for emem-langmem 2.4.5
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| emem_langmem-2.4.5.tar.gz | 21.3 kB | With provenance | Details for emem_langmem-2.4.5.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| emem_langmem-2.4.5-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for emem_langmem-2.4.5-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 37.1 kB
Release files / emem_langmem-2.4.5.tar.gz
| Download URL | emem_langmem-2.4.5.tar.gz |
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| Size | 21.3 kB |
| Tags | Source |
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| Tags | Python 3 |
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