entpoind-verify
Offline verification of Entpoind Tools receipts and VerifiableArtifact bundles. Python 3.9 or later, standard library only: it carries its own pure-Python Ed25519 verifier, so nothing outside these files is trusted.
pip install entpoind-verify
from entpoind_verify import verify_receipt_online
result = verify_receipt_online(receipt_json)
if result.ok:
print("signed at", result.signed_at, "by key", result.signature_key_id)
else:
print("not verified:", result.reason)
receipt_json can be the receipt dict, its JSON text, or the {"receipt": …}
wrapper the API returns.
What it verifies
- Tools receipts: the signed envelope every Tools call returns, of every
receipt
type(agent.call,content.attest,monitor.http,heartbeat.attest, …). Scheduled-watch digest receipts verify the same way. - VerifiableArtifact envelopes and bundles: the signature, and, when a bundle
carries an
anchor, that the artifact is included under the anchored Merkle root.
The signature is Ed25519 over the RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical form of the
envelope minus signature. Public keys come from the published JWK Set at
https://entpoind.com/.well-known/tools-keys.json. For air-gapped checks, save
that file and pass its keys to verify_receipt.
API
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
verify_receipt(input, keys) |
Verify a receipt against keys you supply. No network. |
verify_receipt_online(input, url?) |
Fetch the published keys, then verify. |
fetch_tools_keys(url?) |
Fetch the published JWK Set and keep its Ed25519 keys. |
verify_artifact(input, keys) |
Verify a standalone artifact envelope. |
verify_bundle(input, keys) |
Signature, plus Merkle inclusion when anchored. |
verify_merkle_inclusion(leaf, proof, root) |
Fold an inclusion proof locally. |
merkle_leaf_hash(leaf) |
The domain-separated Merkle leaf hash. |
canonical_jcs(value) |
The RFC 8785 canonical string. |
verify_signature(key, message, signature) |
The raw Ed25519 check, as a boolean. |
ed25519_supported() |
Always True; present for parity with @entpoind/verify. |
Every verify_* function returns a Verification with ok, reason,
signed_at, signature_key_id, kind (artifacts and bundles) and anchored
(bundles). They never raise on hostile input. fetch_tools_keys and
verify_receipt_online raise when the keys cannot be fetched, so "could not
check" is never reported as a verdict.
Only keys with kty: "OKP" and crv: "Ed25519" are ever used, whatever the
key list you pass holds.
Failure reasons
reason |
Meaning |
|---|---|
malformed_envelope |
Not a complete receipt or artifact. |
unknown_key |
signatureKeyId matches no Ed25519 key in the set. Refresh the keys; if it is still missing, the document was not signed by Entpoind. |
bad_signature |
The signature does not match the canonical bytes: the document was altered, or is not Entpoind's. |
redacted |
Receipts only: the receipt carries redacted: true. Its owner removed personal or content fields that the signature covered, so it can no longer be checked; message says so. Not a forgery: ask the owner for a copy saved before redaction. |
unsupported_runtime |
Shared with @entpoind/verify, where it means the runtime has no Ed25519. This package always can verify, so it never reports it. |
not_in_anchored_root |
Bundles only: the signature is valid but the Merkle proof does not reach the anchored root. |
A bundle without an anchor verifies with anchored=False; that is a valid
result, not a failure. Merkle siblings and the root must be 64 hex digits.
A bundle's leafHash is the plain SHA-256 of the leaf string, an index id;
verification does not use it.
Checking the math yourself
entpoind_verify/ed25519.pyis the RFC 8032 verification equation.entpoind_verify/canonical_json.pyis JCS, including ECMAScript number layout.- The npm package
@entpoind/verifygives the same verdict, with the same reasons, for the same input.
Documentation
Receipt format, verification procedure and key rotation: https://entpoind.com/docs/verification.
License
MIT © 2026 Avonao, Inc.
Metadata
Release files for entpoind-verify 0.2.0
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