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entpoind-verify

Offline verification of Entpoind Tools receipts and VerifiableArtifact bundles. Python 3.9 or later, standard library only: it carries its own pure-Python Ed25519 verifier, so nothing outside these files is trusted.

pip install entpoind-verify
from entpoind_verify import verify_receipt_online

result = verify_receipt_online(receipt_json)
if result.ok:
    print("signed at", result.signed_at, "by key", result.signature_key_id)
else:
    print("not verified:", result.reason)

receipt_json can be the receipt dict, its JSON text, or the {"receipt": …} wrapper the API returns.

What it verifies

  • Tools receipts: the signed envelope every Tools call returns, of every receipt type (agent.call, content.attest, monitor.http, heartbeat.attest, …). Scheduled-watch digest receipts verify the same way.
  • VerifiableArtifact envelopes and bundles: the signature, and, when a bundle carries an anchor, that the artifact is included under the anchored Merkle root.

The signature is Ed25519 over the RFC 8785 (JCS) canonical form of the envelope minus signature. Public keys come from the published JWK Set at https://entpoind.com/.well-known/tools-keys.json. For air-gapped checks, save that file and pass its keys to verify_receipt.

API

Function Purpose
verify_receipt(input, keys) Verify a receipt against keys you supply. No network.
verify_receipt_online(input, url?) Fetch the published keys, then verify.
fetch_tools_keys(url?) Fetch the published JWK Set and keep its Ed25519 keys.
verify_artifact(input, keys) Verify a standalone artifact envelope.
verify_bundle(input, keys) Signature, plus Merkle inclusion when anchored.
verify_merkle_inclusion(leaf, proof, root) Fold an inclusion proof locally.
merkle_leaf_hash(leaf) The domain-separated Merkle leaf hash.
canonical_jcs(value) The RFC 8785 canonical string.
verify_signature(key, message, signature) The raw Ed25519 check, as a boolean.
ed25519_supported() Always True; present for parity with @entpoind/verify.

Every verify_* function returns a Verification with ok, reason, signed_at, signature_key_id, kind (artifacts and bundles) and anchored (bundles). They never raise on hostile input. fetch_tools_keys and verify_receipt_online raise when the keys cannot be fetched, so "could not check" is never reported as a verdict.

Only keys with kty: "OKP" and crv: "Ed25519" are ever used, whatever the key list you pass holds.

Failure reasons

reason Meaning
malformed_envelope Not a complete receipt or artifact.
unknown_key signatureKeyId matches no Ed25519 key in the set. Refresh the keys; if it is still missing, the document was not signed by Entpoind.
bad_signature The signature does not match the canonical bytes: the document was altered, or is not Entpoind's.
redacted Receipts only: the receipt carries redacted: true. Its owner removed personal or content fields that the signature covered, so it can no longer be checked; message says so. Not a forgery: ask the owner for a copy saved before redaction.
unsupported_runtime Shared with @entpoind/verify, where it means the runtime has no Ed25519. This package always can verify, so it never reports it.
not_in_anchored_root Bundles only: the signature is valid but the Merkle proof does not reach the anchored root.

A bundle without an anchor verifies with anchored=False; that is a valid result, not a failure. Merkle siblings and the root must be 64 hex digits. A bundle's leafHash is the plain SHA-256 of the leaf string, an index id; verification does not use it.

Checking the math yourself

  • entpoind_verify/ed25519.py is the RFC 8032 verification equation.
  • entpoind_verify/canonical_json.py is JCS, including ECMAScript number layout.
  • The npm package @entpoind/verify gives the same verdict, with the same reasons, for the same input.

Documentation

Receipt format, verification procedure and key rotation: https://entpoind.com/docs/verification.

License

MIT © 2026 Avonao, Inc.

Metadata

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