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evoctx

A local, personal context store for AI coding assistants, exposed over MCP. By Evo Bytes.

Your assistant reads project context at session start, searches past decisions mid-work, and writes notes back before ending — so the next session (in any MCP-capable client) starts oriented instead of from zero. One SQLite store on your machine, shared across every workspace and every client that connects. No cloud component.

Status: v0.1.4. Projects are bound to the directories their code lives in, so the assistant resolves the workspace instead of guessing a name; each client can have its own grant; grants, redaction, audit logging and sessions all work today. On PyPI — pip install evoctx. See CHANGELOG.md for what changed in each release.


Install

Requires Python 3.10+.

pip install evoctx

Installing from source (for contributing, or to track main ahead of a release):

git clone https://github.com/evobytesRo/evoctx
cd evoctx
python -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -e .          # Windows: .venv\Scripts\pip.exe install -e .

Either way, this installs one command: evoctx.

  • evoctx <subcommand> — the CLI for humans. evoctx help shows everything.
  • evoctx serve — launches the MCP server (stdio). Not for humans; your AI client runs this via its MCP config, written for you by evoctx install below.

Making evoctx a system command

Right after install, evoctx only exists inside the venv — running it from a normal terminal needs the full path or an activated venv. To get a plain evoctx from anywhere:

PowerShell users: a quoted full path followed by arguments needs the call operator &, or PowerShell parses it as an expression instead of running it: & "C:\path\to\evoctx.exe" install claude-code. cmd.exe doesn't have this quirk. Easiest fix is just to put evoctx on PATH (below) so you never have to type the full path.

Recommended: pipx (installs the CLI into its own isolated environment and puts it on PATH for you, on Windows/macOS/Linux alike):

pipx install evoctx               # from PyPI
pipx install -e .                 # from a local clone instead

Alternative: uv, same idea:

uv tool install -e .

Manual, no extra tool — add the venv's executable folder to your PATH:

# Windows (PowerShell) — persists across terminals
[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable("Path", "$env:Path;$PWD\.venv\Scripts", "User")
# macOS / Linux — add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc
export PATH="$(pwd)/.venv/bin:$PATH"

Either way, only the CLI needs a friendly name on PATH — MCP client configs reference the evoctx executable by full path (evoctx install resolves and writes that path, plus the serve argument, for you).

Where everything lives

One folder holds it all — run evoctx doctor and read the "store dir" line:

File What it is
store.db The store: notes, projects, sessions, audit log (SQLite)
grants.yaml What connected AI clients may do — hand-edited, hot-reloaded
active_grant.json Which grant is active — machine-wide, plus any per-client ones (written by evoctx grant activate)

Default folder (first match wins):

  1. CONTEXT_STORE env var, if set
  2. ~/.context/ if a store already exists there (legacy)
  3. Per-OS user data dir — Windows: %LOCALAPPDATA%\evoctx, macOS: ~/Library/Application Support/evoctx, Linux: ~/.local/share/evoctx

CONTEXT_PROJECT

Names the project a server serves, overriding the directory match. Set it in an MCP config's env block, not in your shell — it is per-workspace, and a shell-level value would follow you into every workspace on the machine.

A name that does not exist is refused, not quietly replaced by the directory match, so a typo surfaces instead of hiding. Where it surfaces depends on where you set it, and the two do not overlap: a value in an MCP config reaches the server, so the refusal comes back in list_projects() as workspace.hint — ask your assistant what list_projects() says. A value in your shell reaches evoctx doctor, which fails on it. doctor cannot see an MCP config's env block; nothing reads those back, and having it pick one .mcp.json to trust is exactly the arbitration evoctx deliberately stays out of.

First ten minutes

# 1. See that everything is healthy (also prints where your store lives)
evoctx doctor

# 2. Try it with sample data
evoctx demo-seed
evoctx search "JWT"                  # finds the demo decision note
evoctx get-project demo-webapp      # overview, conventions, open questions

# 3. Register your real project (auto-detects stack from package.json/pyproject/README)
cd ~/code/my-api
evoctx init

# 4. Connect your AI client (run from the project root — claude-code is project-scoped)
evoctx install claude-code          # or: cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex, claude-desktop
#    Prints what to do next for that specific client — for most, restarting isn't
#    enough on its own (VS Code needs a manual Start, Claude Desktop needs a full
#    quit not just a window close, Windsurf has its own per-server toggle). Read
#    the tip it prints, or see docs/clients.md for the full list.

# 5. Paste the instructions snippet into the client's rules file
#    (docs/instructions-snippet.md — this is what makes the AI actually use the store)

# 6. Work normally. Afterwards, see exactly what the AI did:
evoctx audit --since 1h
evoctx recent-sessions

From then on: the AI registers a session when it starts, reads your project context, records decisions as it works, and closes the session with a summary. Next session — same client or a different one — starts oriented.

Connecting a client

evoctx install claude-code     # run from the project root — see note below
evoctx doctor                  # verify store, grants, server command, client configs

install writes the MCP block into the client's config (existing file backed up to .bak, existing entries merged, block printed for manual paste), then prints what that specific client needs beyond a restart to actually pick it up — most of them need something. Same command works for claude-desktop, cursor, windsurf, vscode, codex. Manual per-client setup, and the full list of per-client gotchas: docs/clients.md. ChatGPT Desktop is not supported — no local stdio MCP.

Claude Code is project-scoped, not global. The VS Code extension discovers .mcp.json as the union of the open workspace's folders — not from a global user file, and not from the directory that merely contains those folders (in a multi-root workspace, a file there is silently ignored; add {"path": "."} to the .code-workspace folders array to cover it). evoctx install claude-code writes to the current directory (--dir to target another), warns if that directory isn't a workspace folder, and needs to run once per folder you want it in. If you also have the standalone claude CLI installed, evoctx install claude-code detects it and prints a claude mcp add --scope user command for one-time global registration instead. Full explanation: docs/clients.md.

doctor checks package/store/schema/FTS5/grant/server-command/client-configs, plus: which project this directory resolves to and which workspace folders declare the server; notes or sessions filed under a name that is not a project (they are invisible under the real one — evoctx project-merge moves them), which projects have no directory on this machine, registered directories that no longer exist, how many notes a scoped grant can no longer read; your per-client grants and any installed client they leave denied (only once you have some); a scope.projects entry that differs from a real project only by case, which since 0.1.4 matches nothing; store size and note count, days since the last note or session (a configured client with no recent activity usually means the instructions snippet isn't actually being followed), the pre-upgrade backups, and whether the store folder sits inside OneDrive/iCloud/Dropbox/Google Drive — those sync an unencrypted SQLite file off-device by default, silently.

Claude Code only: evoctx install claude-code --hooks additionally writes SessionStart and Stop hooks into ~/.claude/settings.json (backed up first, like every other install_* write) — the one enforcement mechanism in this project that goes beyond convention. The same flag also adds permissions.deny rules there, blocking the assistant's own file tools from reading or editing the store directly (SECURITY.md §1 explains why that matters); both writes happen together, without a prompt. SessionStart nudges the assistant to call start_session/recent_sessions; Stop blocks once (never twice — it checks Claude Code's own stop_hook_active flag) if a session opened in the last 12 hours was never closed with end_session. It's a nudge, not a lock: ignoring the message and asking Claude to stop again always succeeds.

Stop asks only about this workspace's sessions — the project the directory resolves to, plus the other registered repos in the same workspace. Sibling directories count as one workspace, so repos sharing a parent still nag across each other; what stops is a window in one project tree asking about work in an unrelated one. Sessions started with no project surface everywhere, and a directory bound to nothing falls back to asking about every open session, as before. The message names the session's project, since it may not be this folder's.

Then tell the assistant to actually use it — add to your global instructions file (e.g. ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md; canonical version in docs/instructions-snippet.md):

## MCP Context Store (evoctx)
Persistent cross-session memory.

MUST DO, every session:
- **Start:** call `list_projects()` first. It returns `projects` (the names) and a
  `workspace` block naming the project this directory belongs to — **use that name, never
  guess one.** If `workspace.project` is null, nothing matched: show the user
  `workspace.hint`. **Only offer to register when `workspace.suggested_name` is present** —
  its absence means the workspace is not registerable from here (`workspace.source` is
  `CONTEXT_PROJECT`, i.e. a name someone configured that does not exist, or the directory is
  unreadable), and the hint is the whole answer: relay it and stop. **Never invent a name**,
  because a name that does not exist is refused and nothing is saved, so guessing costs you
  the call. When it is present and they agree, call `register_project(name, overview, ...)`:
  read the workspace first (README, manifests, entry points), since a description paraphrased
  from the directory name reads as knowledge to every later session. Set
  `confirmed_by_user=true` **only** if you actually asked in this conversation and they said
  yes — it durably stamps the description as human-approved, and a client that always sends
  it makes every description it writes read that way forever. The server binds
  its own directory — there is no path argument. If `workspace.confidence` is `default`, the
  name is the launching folder's — pass a name explicitly when the work targets one of the
  repos in `workspace.nearby`. Then
  `start_session(project, intent)` — registers the work session so notes get linked and
  interrupted sessions stay visible. It follows the same project rule as `write_note()`: an
  unknown name is **refused**, an unset one takes the workspace's own, and if nothing resolves
  you must name a project or register the workspace — `start_session` has **no `is_global`**,
  since a session happens somewhere. Then `recent_sessions(project)` — open entries were
  likely interrupted, check their notes. Then `get_project(name)` for anything the task touches.
- **Before any non-trivial decision:** `search_context()` for the topic first — don't propose
  an approach that contradicts a stored decision without surfacing the conflict.
- **As you go:** `write_note()` for non-obvious decisions/gotchas immediately, don't batch to
  the end (notes are auto-linked to the session). A project name that doesn't exist is
  **refused and nothing is saved** — leave `project` unset to use the workspace's own, and
  if nothing resolves, name one, register the workspace, or set `is_global`.
- **End:** call `end_session(summary)` — what was built, decided, and left open.
- If a call is denied, call `list_grants()` and relay the `evoctx` command from the error **as
  written** — it may name a grant that applies to you specifically, and a generic
  `grant activate everything` would leave you denied. Anything in `<angle brackets>` is a
  placeholder only the user can fill: say so, and never fill one in yourself, because what it
  stands for is a decision about your own access.

MCP tools

Tool When the assistant uses it
start_session(project?, intent?) First call of a session — registers the work session; every write_note after is linked to it. Same project rule as write_note
recent_sessions(project?, limit?) Right after — see what recent sessions did; open ones were likely interrupted, their notes are the only record
list_projects() Discover registered projects, and which one this workspace is — returns projects plus a workspace block that resolves the working directory to a project, or says plainly that nothing matched
get_project(name) Load overview, conventions, open questions, recent notes
search_context(query, project?, limit?) Find relevant notes mid-work
get_by_id(id) Full content after a search hit
write_note(title, content, project?, tags?, is_global?) Record decisions and observations as you go. An unknown project name is refused and nothing is saved; an unset one takes the workspace's own. is_global marks a note as spanning every project — deliberately not the same as leaving project unset
end_session(summary) Last call — closes the session with what was built/decided/open
register_project(name, overview, ...) Register this workspace as a project. No path argument — the server binds its own working directory; the assistant supplies only the description
list_grants() What this client is allowed — resolved per client, since one may have its own grant — so "do you have access to X?" gets an honest answer

Writes are append-only by design: the assistant can add notes but never edit or delete. Deletion is a human-only operation. Note content over 256KB is rejected — split it into multiple notes. Every note also carries author_client (cli for a human, the client name for an assistant) so past notes read as informational context, not as instructions from the current session.

Why sessions instead of just an end-of-session note: a summary written at the end depends on the session surviving to the end. A session registered at the start shows up in recent_sessions() even if it crashes one minute in — flagged open, with its intent line and any notes it managed to write. Interrupted work stays visible instead of vanishing.

CLI (evoctx)

Every MCP tool has a CLI mirror — the store is fully human-operable, not just AI-operable:

MCP tool CLI
list_projects() evoctx list-projects
register_project(...) evoctx init [--name NAME]
(none — human-only) evoctx project-merge WRONG RIGHT — move notes and sessions off an invented project name
get_project(name) evoctx get-project NAME
search_context(...) evoctx search-context QUERY [--project NAME] [--limit N] (alias: search)
get_by_id(id) evoctx get-by-id ID — ID prefix is enough (alias: show)
write_note(...) evoctx write-note "Title" --project NAME --tags "#decision" --text "..." (alias: add); --global marks a note as spanning every project
start_session(...) evoctx start-session [--project NAME] [--intent "..."]
end_session(summary) evoctx end-session "summary" [--id ID] — default: latest open
recent_sessions(...) evoctx recent-sessions [--project NAME] [--limit N]

Plus store management commands with no MCP equivalent (deliberately — deletion and bulk ops are human-only):

evoctx init [--dir PATH] [--template NAME]   # register project + bind the directory to it
            [--rescrape] [--relink] [--yes]   # replace description / move the directory / skip the prompt
evoctx unbind [--dir PATH] [--project NAME]   # remove a directory binding (the project stays)
evoctx new-project NAME --overview "..."
evoctx import-dir path/to/notes/ --project NAME
evoctx update-project NAME --field conventions --file conventions.md
evoctx list [--project NAME]                  # list notes
evoctx delete ID | --project NAME | --tag TAG # delete note(s) — asks to confirm, or pass --force
evoctx delete-project NAME [--with-notes]     # delete a project (notes kept unlinked by default)
evoctx export [--format json|markdown] [PATH] # export everything — the whole store is yours to take
evoctx dump [--project NAME] [--note ID]      # read-only dump of the whole store
evoctx templates                              # reusable convention templates (a fresh store
                                              # has none; `evoctx sync <repo>` loads templates/)
evoctx sync [PATH]                            # sync a markdown folder into the store
evoctx demo-seed                              # sample data to try things out (never automatic)

Deletion and export exist because privacy and portability are only real if you can act on them. Deletion is CLI-only, confirmed by default, never an MCP tool — an AI client can add to the store but never remove from it. Export dumps every project, full note content, and every session to JSON or Markdown, so "portable across vendors" is a command you can run, not a claim you have to trust.

Grants — what a client may do

Every tool call passes a policy gate. Grants live in grants.yaml in your store folder (hand-edited, hot-reloaded — no restart needed); one is active machine-wide, and since 0.1.4 a client can have its own.

First run auto-creates an everything grant (all tools, all projects, 30-day expiry) and activates it, so nothing is broken out of the box. When it expires, calls fail with a message naming the fix:

evoctx grant activate everything

To tighten from there, add a scoped grant to grants.yaml (full commented examples: examples/grants.example.yaml):

  - name: daily-coding
    client: "*"
    tools: [list_projects, get_project, search_context, get_by_id,
            write_note, start_session, end_session, recent_sessions,
            list_grants, register_project]
    scope:
      projects: ["*"]
      exclude_tags: ["#personal", "#finance"]   # these notes become invisible
    redactions:
      - pattern: "sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"          # mask API keys in every response
        replace: "[API_KEY]"
    expires: "+7d"                               # mandatory — ISO or +Nd/+Nh/+Nm

…then switch to it:

evoctx grant activate daily-coding    # picked up by a running server immediately
evoctx grant list                     # all grants, active one starred
evoctx grant show daily-coding
evoctx grant deactivate               # every call denied until re-activated
evoctx list-grants                    # what the active grant allows (MCP mirror)

A denied call returns an error naming the exact command to fix it — evoctx grant activate for a grant that is too narrow, evoctx grant upgrade for one written before the tool existed — so the AI can relay it to you. Scope-blocked notes read as nonexistent (no existence leak); out-of-scope writes fail loudly instead — silent write loss is worse.

A different grant per client

The point of installing several assistants is often to give them different access — read-only for one, full write for another. Since 0.1.4 each client can have its own grant:

evoctx grant activate read-only --client "cursor*"    # cursor gets this one
evoctx grant activate everything                      # everyone else gets this one
evoctx grant list                                     # both, side by side
evoctx grant deactivate --client "cursor*"            # cursor falls back to the default

The client name is what the client reports about itself — install writes it into each config as CONTEXT_CLIENT, and evoctx doctor lists which ones are installed. The --client argument is a glob matched against it, and matching is case-insensitive: Cursor and cursor mean the same key, so activate refuses to create the second, and if both end up in the file by hand the call is denied rather than resolved by guessing which you meant.

Four rules worth knowing before you rely on it:

  • A per-client grant wins. The machine-wide grant is the fallback for clients that have no entry of their own.
  • When one expires, that client is denied — it does not fall back. Falling back would silently promote a client from its lapsed narrow grant to the wider machine-wide one, at exactly the moment the restriction was supposed to take effect.
  • evoctx grant deactivate with no --client clears everything, per-client entries included. It is the kill switch; leaving entries active would defeat it.
  • Which grant applies is decided per client, not per file order. An exact key beats a glob; between globs the more specific one wins; two equally specific keys are ambiguous and the call is denied rather than resolved by guesswork.

evoctx grant list and evoctx doctor both report the entries, which installed clients are running on the fallback, and any client that is denied — including one caught by that ambiguity. They answer for the clients you actually have installed, since whether two globs can both match something is not a question with a cheap answer; whether they both match claude-code is. claude-code's config is workspace-scoped, so run doctor inside the workspace you want checked.

grant activate --client exits non-zero when what you asked for would not work — an expired grant, or a client the key names that would still be denied — and puts the store back the way it was, so a non-zero exit never leaves a grant applied. What it does not fail on is an exact key winning over a broader glob you just wrote: that is the documented precedence rule, so it says which clients kept their own entry and how to bring them in line. No message here ever suggests deleting an entry to fix a denial — removing one hands its client back to the wider machine-wide grant, which is the opposite of what a narrow entry was for. For two globs that tie, the fix is an addition: giving that client an entry of its own outranks both and settles it without deleting either rule you wrote.

Two keys differing only in case are the one thing no command can fix, and evoctx says so rather than pretending otherwise. Cursor and cursor are the same key, so the entry that would outrank them already exists — twice — and grant activate refuses every spelling by pointing at the other one. Open active_grant.json and delete one; the denial names both keys and the grant behind each, so you can see what you are choosing between. grant activate will not let you create that state, but a hand edit or a merge can.

⚠️ One-way door across versions. An evoctx older than 0.1.4 running grant activate on this store rewrites active_grant.json and silently erases every per-client entry — it does not know they exist. Nothing on this side can detect it after the fact. If you sync your store between machines, upgrade all of them.

Redaction

Two layers, different jobs:

Write-time (unconditional, built-in). Every write — write_note, start_session, end_session, and since 0.1.4 project descriptions too (register_project, evoctx init, update-project), from the CLI or from an MCP client, regardless of which grant is active — is scanned for common secret shapes (API key prefixes, AWS/GitHub/Slack/Google tokens, PEM private key blocks, and password= / api_key= / access_token= assignments) and masked before it touches disk. This is the one place every write path funnels through, so a pasted secret doesn't sit raw in store.db waiting for a read-time rule to hide it. Best-effort — regex can't catch every secret shape or a value the model paraphrases — but it means the store isn't a plaintext secrets aggregator by default.

Read-time (per-grant, custom). Grants can also carry their own regex redactions, applied to every string leaving the store on a read (search hits, note content, project docs, session summaries — and the audit log's own query field). Placeholders are stable within a session — the same client name always becomes the same [CLIENT] token, distinct values get [CLIENT_2], [CLIENT_3] — so the AI can reason about entities without learning them. The original→placeholder map lives in memory only and dies with the process; it is never written to disk. This layer is one-way and doesn't touch what's stored — only what's returned.

Audit — what did the AI actually see?

Every tool call is logged to an append-only audit_log table (SQL triggers block UPDATE/DELETE): timestamp, client, connection, grant, tool, read/write/denied, the effective (post-redaction) query, record IDs touched, result count, response size. Response content is never logged — that would duplicate the store.

evoctx audit                          # newest first
evoctx audit --client cursor --since 24h
evoctx audit --action denied          # what got blocked, and from whom
evoctx audit --tool get_by_id -n 100
evoctx audit-prune --older-than 90d   # reclaim space — the one deliberate exception to append-only

Deliberately not an MCP tool: the AI reading its own access record would defeat the mirror and leak cross-client activity between differently-scoped grants. Human-only, CLI-only.

The log grows unbounded by design — pruning it any other way would mean giving some client a way to edit its own trail. evoctx audit-prune is the single human-only exception: it drops the append-only triggers, deletes rows older than the cutoff, and restores them immediately. evoctx doctor shows the current row count so growth is visible, not silent.

Threat model — honest limits

This is policy for cooperative clients, not a sandbox. Client identity is self-reported, the store is unencrypted, and an AI client with its own filesystem tools can bypass grants entirely by reading store.db or editing grants.yaml directly — policy gates the MCP protocol path, not your disk. Full breakdown, including what to actually do about it (pairing with your client's own permission system), in SECURITY.md.

Roadmap — known gaps, not hidden ones

  • Search is keyword-based (SQLite FTS5), not semantic. It knows word forms (porter stemming — "configuring" matches "configuration") and a hand-curated dictionary of common dev-term synonyms ("auth bug" also matches a note about "login failure" — auth/login/ authentication, bug/error/issue/failure, and similar groups in synonyms.py). It does not know meaning — a synonym pair that isn't in the dictionary, or two notes that are conceptually related without sharing any recognized term, won't connect. Real embedding-based semantic search is the top post-beta priority; it's a real dependency (a local embedding model or a vector index) rather than a quick addition, which is why the deeper version didn't make beta — the synonym dictionary is the cheap 80% of the gain without the dependency weight.
  • Encryption at rest — not implemented; see SECURITY.md §4.
  • Redaction is one-way. Grant-based read-time redaction masks values in responses but has no client-side re-hydration step to reverse it — once masked, the AI only ever sees the placeholder, by design for now.
  • No defense against prompt injection via stored notes — see SECURITY.md §2. This isn't solved by any AI memory system today, evoctx included.
  • One grant per client, with no union semantics. Since 0.1.4 each client can have its own grant, but only one applies at a time — there is no combining several into a wider set of permissions, and two equally specific per-client keys are refused rather than merged.

None of these are silent limitations — if one of them matters for your use case, it's listed here on purpose, not something you're expected to discover by hitting it.

Layout

src/evoctx/
├── server.py    MCP server entry point (FastMCP, stdio)
├── db.py        SQLite schema, FTS5 search, migration runner
├── grants.py    grants.yaml model, validation, expiry, hot-reload
├── policy.py    Policy engine — every tool call passes through here
├── redact.py    Response redaction with stable tokenization
├── audit.py     Append-only audit log + query helpers
├── install.py   Client config writers + doctor checks
├── cli.py       evoctx CLI
└── paths.py     Cross-platform store location resolution
docs/
├── clients.md              Per-client manual setup
└── instructions-snippet.md Canonical rules-file block for every client
examples/
└── grants.example.yaml     Commented grant recipes to copy from
SECURITY.md      What this protects against, what it doesn't, and why
CONTRIBUTING.md  How to contribute, and why your data outlives the project either way

Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md — includes the exact schema, so your notes are never locked to this project's code even if it stalls.

License

MIT © Evo Bytes SRL

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Attestation for evoctx-0.1.4.tar.gz

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Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Aug 4, 2026.

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