exfer-mcp 0.3.4

Model Context Protocol server that lets an AI agent spend from an Exfer wallet — typed tools over exfer-walletd, with no per-transaction human approval

exfer-mcp

MCP server for the Exfer blockchain — gives an AI agent (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, any MCP host) a typed wallet it can actually use: balances, payments, signed price quotes, and HTLC settlement on mainnet.

⚠️ The agent can spend this wallet on its own — there is no per-transaction human approval. Unlike a normal wallet (where you click "confirm" on each send), anything that can reach this MCP server — your agent, or a prompt-injection of it — can move the funds. Keep only a float you're OK losing, and/or set spend caps (WALLETD_SPEND_CAP_PER_TX, WALLETD_SPEND_CAP_PER_PERIOD + WALLETD_SPEND_CAP_PERIOD_SECS, in exfers).

Set it up

Two ways — they end the same place. Either way, you restart your MCP host once at the end: servers load at startup, so a host (or an agent inside one) can't connect to a server it just registered in the same session. That's normal, not a failure.

Hand it to your coding agent

Paste the block below to your agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, or Claude Desktop with a terminal). It verifies the package, pre-warms the download, registers the server, then tells you how to do the one restart.

Set up the exfer MCP server for me. It's a young project that gives an AI agent a spendable Exfer-mainnet wallet with no per-transaction approval, so be careful and stop before any funding step. Check provenance first: package exfer-mcp on PyPI, repo github.com/exfer-stack/exfer-mcp; in managed mode it downloads the exfer-walletd binary from exfer-stack/exfer-walletd releases and runs it only if the SHA-256 matches a digest baked into the package. (github.com/ahuman-exfer/exfer is the separate Exfer blockchain repo — not this MCP.) Frequent recent releases are expected for a young project; pin the version below. Everything before funding is read-only.

1. Install uv if it's missing (it provides uvx): macOS/Linux curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; Windows irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex.
2. Pre-warm first — this is what prevents a host startup-timeout. Run uvx exfer-mcp==0.3.4 --prewarm. It caches the package and downloads + checksum-verifies the walletd binary, then exits — no secrets, nothing to fund. Wait for walletd binary ready. (First run can take ~1 min on a slow link; that's the download you're moving off the host's startup path.)
3. Register an MCP server named exfer: command uvx, args ["exfer-mcp==0.3.4"], env WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE = a fresh secret from uv run --no-project python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(24))". Inject it directly so the literal never appears in this chat. Claude Code: claude mcp add exfer -e WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE="$(uv run --no-project python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(24))')" -- uvx exfer-mcp==0.3.4. Claude Desktop / Cursor / Codex: put that block under mcpServers in the host config — for Codex (~/.codex/config.toml) also add startup_timeout_sec = 120 under [mcp_servers.exfer]. To confirm it registered, check the config simply has the env key — do NOT run claude mcp get or mcp list -v; they print the passphrase straight back into this chat.
4. Stop and tell me to restart. You can't hot-reload MCP servers into your own running session, so don't try to call any exfer_* tool yet. Tell me exactly how to reload for my host — Claude Code: quit and relaunch (or /mcp → reconnect exfer); Codex / Cursor / Claude Desktop: fully quit and reopen — then wait for me to come back.
5. After I've restarted, call exfer_get_block_height (a height means it's live; the first call takes ~15s while it creates the keystore) and then give me a receive address via exfer_generate_address.
6. Recovery phrase: first run writes 24 words to <WALLETD_DATADIR>/RECOVERY_PHRASE.txt (mode 0600; default ~/.exfer-walletd-mcp, Windows %USERPROFILE%\.exfer-walletd-mcp). On Windows 0600 is POSIX-only, so make sure that file isn't in a synced/backed-up folder. Tell me to copy it offline and delete the file — don't print it here. Losing it and the passphrase makes the wallet unrecoverable.

Or do it yourself

1. Install uv (it provides uvx): macOS/Linux curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; Windows irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex.

2. Pre-warm — caches the package + the SHA-256-verified walletd binary off the host's startup path (no secrets):

uvx exfer-mcp==0.3.4 --prewarm

3. Pick a keystore passphrase (you choose it; it's stored in the host config and unlocks/creates the wallet). A strong random one: uv run --no-project python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(24))".

4. Register the server (managed mode — passphrase only):

• Claude Code: claude mcp add exfer -e WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE='<passphrase>' -- uvx exfer-mcp==0.3.4
• Claude Desktop / Cursor / Codex: add under mcpServers in the host config (Codex: also startup_timeout_sec = 120):

  "exfer": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["exfer-mcp==0.3.4"], "env": { "WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE": "<passphrase>" } }
  

5. Restart / reload the MCP host, then call exfer_get_block_height (a height = live) and exfer_generate_address (your receive address).

6. Back up the recovery phrase at ~/.exfer-walletd-mcp/RECOVERY_PHRASE.txt (mode 0600): copy it offline, then delete the file. It plus the passphrase are the only way to recover the wallet.

(Pin the version — uvx otherwise resolves+caches whatever is latest. pip install exfer-mcp also works; Python ≥ 3.10, pulls the exfer SDK + mcp + psutil.)

Configure

exfer-mcp needs an exfer-walletd wallet daemon (it holds the keys and signs/broadcasts). Setting WALLETD_URL is the mode switch:

Managed (zero-setup) — recommended

Leave WALLETD_URL unset. exfer-mcp spawns + supervises its own walletd against Exfer's public mainnet node + indexer, and obtains the walletd binary automatically: EXFER_WALLETD_BIN → exfer-walletd on PATH → else it downloads the prebuilt binary for your platform and verifies it against a SHA-256 baked into this exfer-mcp release (not a co-located checksum) before running it, re-checking on every run (cached 0o700 in ~/.cache/exfer-mcp/walletd/). You only provide a passphrase:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "exfer": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["exfer-mcp==0.3.4"],
      "env": { "WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE": "<a strong passphrase>" }
    }
  }
}

First run creates a seeded keystore and prints its 24-word recovery phrase to stderr once — that's the only backup. Keystore + datadir live in WALLETD_DATADIR (default ~/.exfer-walletd-mcp) and persist across restarts.

Claude Code one-liner:

claude mcp add exfer -e WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE='<passphrase>' -- uvx exfer-mcp==0.3.4

External — connect to a walletd you run

Set WALLETD_URL + WALLETD_AUTH_TOKEN (and WALLETD_FINGERPRINT for https:// with a self-signed cert):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "exfer": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["exfer-mcp==0.3.4"],
      "env": {
        "WALLETD_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:7448",
        "WALLETD_AUTH_TOKEN": "<walletd token>"
      }
    }
  }
}

Environment reference

Variable	Mode	Default	Meaning
WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE	managed (required)	—	unlocks / creates the managed keystore
EXFER_WALLETD_BIN	managed (optional)	auto: PATH or download	path to a walletd binary (skips auto-download)
EXFER_WALLETD_VERSION	managed (optional)	pinned	walletd release to auto-download
WALLETD_DATADIR	managed (optional)	~/.exfer-walletd-mcp	keystore + tokens; give each concurrent session its own
EXFER_NODE_RPC / EXFER_INDEXER_RPC	managed (optional)	public mainnet	upstream node(s) / indexer ("" indexer = disable)
WALLETD_URL + WALLETD_AUTH_TOKEN	external (required)	—	walletd URL + bearer token
WALLETD_FINGERPRINT	external (optional)	—	sha256:<hex> for self-signed TLS

Running multiple agent sessions at once? Managed mode is one wallet per datadir — give each session a distinct WALLETD_DATADIR, or run one shared walletd and connect every session in external mode.

What you get (23 tools)

• Wallet & chain: generate_address, list_addresses, get_balance, get_block_height
• Payments: simulate_transfer (dry-run fee), transfer, wait_for_tx, wait_for_payment (push, no polling), payment_uri_encode/_decode
• Identity & price quotes: sign_message/verify_message, quote_issue/quote_verify (signed EXFER-QUOTE credentials)
• Conditional payment: htlc_lock/_claim/_reclaim/_status/_list (atomic, hash-time-locked settlement)
• History: get_address_history (indexer-backed raw activity)
• Meta: check_update (is a newer exfer-mcp on PyPI? read-only, no wallet access)

The intended spend flow is simulate → confirm with the user → transfer → wait — the agent always knows the fee before committing, and the human decides.

Updating

exfer-mcp never updates itself — silently pulling new code or a new key-handling binary is a supply-chain risk, so an update is always a deliberate step.

• Check: call exfer_check_update (or ask your agent "is there an exfer-mcp update?"). It reports the latest version, whether your version was yanked (a security recall), and the exact update command — read-only, no wallet access, works even if walletd is down. The server also checks ~once a day on startup and notes a newer/yanked release on stderr. Opt out with EXFER_MCP_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1.
• Update: bump the pinned version, optionally run uvx exfer-mcp==<new> --prewarm (a new release may pull a new walletd binary — pre-fetching it keeps the next startup off the timeout path), then reload your host — re-add with uvx exfer-mcp==<new> (Claude Code) or change args in the config file. (Unpinned uvx exfer-mcp: uvx --refresh exfer-mcp. uv tool / pipx: uv tool upgrade / pipx upgrade.) Your wallet keys are never touched by an update.
• Your wallet survives updates. An update swaps the Python code + the (re-verified) walletd binary only. Your keystore, seed, RECOVERY_PHRASE.txt, and tokens in WALLETD_DATADIR are never read, moved, or deleted — they live in a separate directory from the disposable binary cache (~/.cache/exfer-mcp).

Safety

• WALLETD_AUTH_TOKEN / WALLETD_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE and the WALLETD_DATADIR contents are wallet secrets — full spend authority. The managed walletd binds loopback-only, and exfer-mcp redacts bearer tokens from forwarded logs.
• No per-call human gate is built in (that's the host's job). Bound the blast radius with walletd spend caps, or keep only a small float.
• Auto-downloaded walletd binaries are run only after their SHA-256 matches a digest baked into this exfer-mcp release — re-verified on every run, not just first download. The trust anchor is the PyPI package's Trusted-Publishing provenance, not the mutable GitHub release (a co-located SHA256SUMS would be worthless against a release/account compromise). A mismatch or an unpinned walletd version is refused; EXFER_WALLETD_BIN overrides with a binary you built/trust.

License

MIT