exoscale-mcp-advisor 0.2.0

Read-only Exoscale advisor MCP server — docs search plus list-only live catalogue queries, structurally incapable of mutation.

exoscale-mcp-advisor

A read-only Model Context Protocol server that lets an MCP-capable agent learn about Exoscale: search the verified connector documentation and run list-only live catalogue queries (zones, instance types, templates). It is, by construction, incapable of mutating any cloud resource.

Status: released. Seven read-only tools, the stdio server, and the four-layer test suite (structural no-mutation, mocked-connector, protocol-level, gated live smoke) are in place and green; published to PyPI as exoscale-mcp-advisor. The full design is in docs/mcp-advisor-design.md; release history is in CHANGELOG.md.

It builds on exoscale-connector: the knowledge it serves is read from that package's bundled reference, and the live queries reuse the connector's read-only list clients. Nothing about Exoscale is hardcoded or duplicated here.

---

General description

The advisor targets the learning path, not the execution path. An agent can ask "what instance types exist in at-vie-1 right now?" and "how do I create a security group with the connector?" — and get live data plus verified docs — while the server remains structurally unable to create, change, or delete anything. Infrastructure changes stay the human's job, performed with reviewed, idempotent code.

Tool surface (see design §3):

Tool	Credentials	Purpose
search_docs(query)	—	Ranked sections from the connector's reference bundle.
get_asset_page(asset_type)	—	Full reference page for one asset type.
list_asset_types()	—	The asset-type index (slug + heading) for discovery.
list_zones()	✔	Live list of zones.
list_instance_types(zone)	✔	Live list of instance types (with derived memory_gib).
list_templates(zone, visibility)	✔	Live list of templates (with derived size_gib).
list_dbaas_plans(zone=None)	✔	Live managed-database (DBaaS) service types and plans.

The three docs tools need no credentials; the four live tools read Exoscale API credentials from the server's environment (see the User guide). No mutation tools — ever, by design.

User guide

The server runs with no clone or install step:

uvx exoscale-mcp-advisor

Or from a source checkout (for development):

pip install -e .
exoscale-mcp-advisor            # or: python -m exoscale_mcp_advisor

It speaks MCP over stdio, so it is configured like any other stdio MCP server in your client. The four live catalogue tools require Exoscale API credentials in the server's launch environment — never on the command line, never read from a file by the app:

EXOSCALE_API_KEY=...
EXOSCALE_API_SECRET=...
EXOSCALE_ZONE=at-vie-1

Getting them into the server's environment, two common ways:

# 1) Pass them to the MCP client as it launches the server (Claude Code shown):
claude mcp add exoscale-advisor \
  -e EXOSCALE_API_KEY=... -e EXOSCALE_API_SECRET=... -e EXOSCALE_ZONE=at-vie-1 \
  -- uvx exoscale-mcp-advisor

# 2) Inject from a vault at launch, so no secret is typed or stored in config:
claude mcp add exoscale-advisor -- \
  infisical run --domain http://localhost:8080 -- uvx exoscale-mcp-advisor

Use a least-privilege, read-only API key (see the Admin guide). The three docs tools (search_docs, get_asset_page, list_asset_types) need no credentials; if the live tools run without credentials they return a clear, actionable error while the docs tools keep working. The catalogue exposes no pricing — use Exoscale's calculator for cost estimates.

Example use cases

What the advisor is for, from trivial to advanced. Every example is read-only: the server produces explanations and reviewable code — it never provisions, changes, or deletes anything (design D1). Each rung notes the tools it exercises and whether credentials are needed.

1. Docs lookup — no credentials. "Search the Exoscale docs for how to create a security group, then show me the full security-group reference page." → search_docs + get_asset_page (discover slugs first with list_asset_types). Works with zero credentials.

2. A single live query — credentials. "What instance types are available in at-vie-1 right now?" or "List the public templates and their default login user." → one live tool (list_instance_types / list_templates). memory_gib and size_gib come pre-derived, so no manual byte math.

3. Live + docs synthesis — credentials. "Compare the instance types in at-vie-1 and recommend the cheapest one suitable as an SKS worker, citing the sizing constraints." → a live tool + get_asset_page + reasoning. The advisor cites the verified docs; it has no pricing data, so cost questions defer to Exoscale's calculator.

4. Multi-asset design, read-only — credentials. "Design an HA web-app stack in at-vie-1 (load balancer + web tier + managed database), cite the docs for each asset, and don't provision anything." → many get_asset_page (+ list_dbaas_plans, list_zones) with trade-off reasoning. You get a design and citations, never a side effect.

5. Reviewable code generation — credentials. "Generate an exoscale-connector script that provisions the stack above, with secrets side-loaded from the environment — but I'll run it." → the advisor, not operator pattern: read-only advice plus a script you review and run. The server stays structurally unable to apply changes.

The jump from rung 1 to rung 5 is the whole point: a low-friction, credential-free entry for learning, and an aspirational ceiling where the advisor designs and writes the infrastructure code while a human keeps the keys and the final apply.

Admin guide

Least-privilege credentials (defense in depth). Although the server can only issue list calls, the API key it runs with should also be restricted to read-only operations, so the key itself cannot mutate anything. Build the IAM policy with the connector's own iam_expr / IAMPolicy helpers (default-deny, then allow only list/get catalogue operations) — see the connector's IAM policy cookbook and design §7.

Credential injection. Credentials come from the environment, injected at startup by a vault CLI (e.g. infisical run -- uvx exoscale-mcp-advisor in development; a production vault agent in production). The application never reads secrets from files and is not coupled to any specific vault provider.

Security model. Read-only is enforced on two independent layers: the code registers only read-only tools (a CI test fails the build if a mutation tool is ever added), and the credentials are scoped to read-only operations. See design §6–§7.

Developer guide

Setup

python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e '.[dev]'

Requires Python ≥3.10 (the mcp SDK floor).

Checks

ruff check src tests     # lint
mypy src                 # type-check
pytest tests/unit -q     # unit tests

The gated live smoke test (under tests/integration) talks to a real account using only list, and is opt-in behind EXOSCALE_RUN_LIVE_TESTS=1 — default- skipped, and never run in CI. Run it with credentials injected from the environment (never hardcoded):

EXOSCALE_RUN_LIVE_TESTS=1 \
  infisical run --domain http://localhost:8080 -- \
  pytest tests/integration -q

It is read-only, so safe to run against any account.

Architecture & contribution. Read docs/mcp-advisor-design.md first — it defines the tool surface, the zero-duplication knowledge source, the read-only-by- construction guarantee, and the four-layer test strategy. Conventional commits; keep this README current with behavior changes in the same commit; no untested code lands.

---

License

MIT © 2026 Raphael Lang