falsify-giskard
PRML pre-registration for Giskard scenario results.
Commit a Giskard eval claim (a metric and threshold) to a SHA-256 before the run, then verify the realised
ScenarioResultagainst it.
Why
Giskard runs a scenario of checks and reports pass/fail plus per-check metrics. But the report records what happened, not what was promised before the run. Pre-registering the claim means quietly relaxing a threshold or swapping a model after seeing results breaks the hash, so a passing scenario becomes tamper-evident.
This is the Giskard counterpart to falsify-inspect and uses the same PRML v0.1 manifest format.
Install
pip install falsify-giskard
Quickstart
from falsify_giskard import preregister, verify_scenario_result
# 1. Before the run — commit the claim (real PRML v0.1 manifest)
h, manifest = preregister(
metric="pass_rate", # or the name of a Giskard Metric (e.g. "groundedness")
threshold=0.9,
threshold_direction=">=", # PRML `comparator`
dataset="support-qa-v1", # PRML `dataset.id`
dataset_hash="e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855", # PRML `dataset.hash`, 64 lowercase hex
seed=42,
producer_id="acme/eval-bot", # PRML `producer.id`
giskard_scenario="grounded-answers",
output_path="grounded.prml.yaml",
)
print(h) # 64-char canonical PRML SHA-256
# 2. Run your Giskard scenario as usual
result = await scenario.run()
# 3. After the run — verify (pass the lock-time hash for tamper-evidence)
verdict = verify_scenario_result(result, "grounded.prml.yaml", expected_hash=h)
assert verdict["status"] == "PASS" # PASS / FAIL / TAMPERED
Metrics
metric="pass_rate"verifies the fraction of (non-skipped) checks that passed.metric="<name>"verifies the value of a GiskardMetricwith thatname(for example asemantic_similarityorgroundednessscore).
Verdicts
- PASS — the manifest hash matches and the observed metric satisfies the committed threshold.
- FAIL — the hash matches but the observed metric misses the threshold.
- TAMPERED — the manifest no longer matches the lock-time hash passed as
expected_hash(it was altered after commit). Withoutexpected_hash, the hash is taken from the file itself, so only PASS/FAIL is evaluated — passexpected_hashfor real tamper-evidence.
For durable tamper-evidence, commit the returned hash to git or to the public registry at registry.falsify.dev right after pre-registration, so the claim is anchored somewhere immutable.
License
MIT. The PRML specification is under the Community Specification License 1.0.
Metadata
Release files for falsify-giskard 0.3.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| falsify_giskard-0.3.1.tar.gz | 13.6 kB | With provenance | Details for falsify_giskard-0.3.1.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| falsify_giskard-0.3.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for falsify_giskard-0.3.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 23.1 kB
Release files / falsify_giskard-0.3.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | falsify_giskard-0.3.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 13.6 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
eefc2f6d9a4337099ba6f95b0fe7bccd02bc2150494aa9b6306df3fc3fde7c30
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
dd3f45c48bb811b706427d6c3fca3ab2e4e0d0cb00bb8600a4c45e2069a3b53c
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
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twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
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Transparency logRelease files / falsify_giskard-0.3.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | falsify_giskard-0.3.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 9.4 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
3d20e0ffdb417ea439335a2a8166e381b2921f2d9940ab6ad4d282acbccef823
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BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
57501d436bfc180bdbf06dac95992a4704920fc8c792064af4661a9c532a1150
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| Upload date | |
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
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Transparency logSecurity for falsify-giskard 0.3.1
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Attestation for falsify_giskard-0.3.1.tar.gz
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PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 1, 2026.
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