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Google Docs

Fancified

Google Docs for fancy-flow — as four imported, versioned packages, one per runtime. Not vendored source: a copy cannot be upgraded, and third-party APIs change.

Runtime Package Install
Authoring surface (every host) @particle-academy/google-docs-ui npm install @particle-academy/google-docs-ui
Node @particle-academy/google-docs-js npm install @particle-academy/google-docs-js
PHP 8.4+ particle-academy/google-docs-php composer require particle-academy/google-docs-php
Python 3.11+ fancy-google-docs pip install fancy-google-docs

The ui package is the editor surface and is React on every host — a PHP or Python project installs it and its own runtime package, and never the js one.

What it costs you

One dependency: @particle-academy/fancy-connector-core (or particle-academy/fancy-connector-core on Composer), which the js and php packages pull in themselves. The Python package has zero runtime dependencies.

No Google Docs SDK. Plain HTTP, deliberately: a vendor SDK is third-party code subject to the kit's full approval bar, and one per provider is hundreds of dependencies nobody is tracking.

Setting it up

Everything below is generated from provider/manifest.json, so it cannot disagree with what the packages do.

Credentials

A Google Docs connection holds 4 values.

Two kinds of value, and mixing them up matters. A provider credential is ONE value for the whole installation — an OAuth app's client secret serves every connected account. An account credential is one per connected account. A host that stores the second where it stores the first lets one account's credentials reach another's.

Field Scope Secret Where it comes from
OAuth client ID per installation not secret From Google Cloud Console -> APIs & Services -> Credentials. ONE value for the whole installation, not per connected account.
OAuth client secret per installation secret The client secret for the same OAuth app. One value for the whole installation.
Access token per connected account secret Per connected Google account, and it expires after ONE HOUR. The host refreshes it with the refresh token.
Refresh token per connected account secret Per connected Google account. Google issues one only when the consent request asks for offline access; without it the connection dies within the hour.

Authorising

Google Docs uses OAuth2 (authorization_code). The package DECLARES the exchange; the HOST performs it — a consent screen needs a browser, a redirect URI and somewhere to persist the result, and all three belong to the host.

One consent grant, shared (grant: "google"). Every connector declaring the same grant can run on ONE OAuth client, with one consent and one refresh token per person.

  • Authorize with access_type=offline, include_granted_scopes=true. Ask for a feature's scopes when it is first used; the new token covers every scope granted before. A refresh token comes back only on the FIRST exchange, so keep the stored one when an exchange returns none.
  • Revoke — POST https://oauth2.googleapis.com/revoke with token. It removes the WHOLE grant: every connector sharing it, not only this one. A per-feature disconnect stops using that feature's scopes locally; only a full disconnect revokes.
  • Identify the account by sub: request openid, then verify the token response's id_token (issuer https://accounts.google.com or accounts.google.com, keys at https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs, audience = clientId). Never key a connection by email.
  • No restricted scopes in this connector.

The refresh tokens do not rotate: the same one is reusable, so a refresh may safely be retried and may run concurrently. Stated rather than assumed, because the opposite — a provider that spends the token and revokes the grant on a replay — looks identical until it happens.

The estate

Google Docs has no test estate, and somebody checked. Everything this connector does is real. Use the faker to build against it.

Google has no sandbox for Docs. A test document is a real one in a real Drive, so every create is real -- use the faker while developing and clean up any live test documents.

What it can do

Actions

document_create — Google Docs document

Create a blank Google Docs document.

POST /v1/documents · unsafe to replay — a retried durable run does it TWICE

Input Required What it is
title yes The title of the new blank document.

text_insert — Insert text into a Google Doc

Insert plain text at a position in an existing document's body.

POST /v1/documents/{documentId}:batchUpdate · unsafe to replay — a retried durable run does it TWICE

Input Required What it is
documentId yes From document_create's data.documentId, or the id in the document's own URL.
text yes Inserted verbatim. A newline in it starts a new paragraph, carrying the style of whatever paragraph the insertion point sits in.
index yes A zero-based position in UTF-16 code units, but 0 itself is never valid -- Google's body content starts at index 1. 1 is the very beginning of a freshly created blank document. To append after existing content, read the document's own length first (not yet offered by this connector) and insert there instead.

Run it before you have credentials

Every operation ships a faker, whether or not Google Docs has a sandbox. Set a node's mode to fake and it returns the shape Google Docs actually publishes — the same field names, deterministically — so you can wire the downstream nodes before touching an account, a key, or a network.

This repository is generated

provider/ is the source. Everything under packages/ is emitted from it and must not be hand-edited — CI regenerates and diffs on every push, and the next protocol sync destroys anything it finds. See AGENTS.md.

Two namespaces, which do not match on purpose

The repo is github.com/Fancy-Friends/google-docs; the packages publish under particle-academy. Nothing derives one from the other — the names come from weaver's friends.json and nowhere else.

Licence

MIT.

Metadata

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