Skip to main content

Google Slides

Fancified

Google Slides for fancy-flow — as four imported, versioned packages, one per runtime. Not vendored source: a copy cannot be upgraded, and third-party APIs change.

Runtime Package Install
Authoring surface (every host) @particle-academy/google-slides-ui npm install @particle-academy/google-slides-ui
Node @particle-academy/google-slides-js npm install @particle-academy/google-slides-js
PHP 8.4+ particle-academy/google-slides-php composer require particle-academy/google-slides-php
Python 3.11+ fancy-google-slides pip install fancy-google-slides

The ui package is the editor surface and is React on every host — a PHP or Python project installs it and its own runtime package, and never the js one.

What it costs you

One dependency: @particle-academy/fancy-connector-core (or particle-academy/fancy-connector-core on Composer), which the js and php packages pull in themselves. The Python package has zero runtime dependencies.

No Google Slides SDK. Plain HTTP, deliberately: a vendor SDK is third-party code subject to the kit's full approval bar, and one per provider is hundreds of dependencies nobody is tracking.

Setting it up

Everything below is generated from provider/manifest.json, so it cannot disagree with what the packages do.

Credentials

A Google Slides connection holds 4 values.

Two kinds of value, and mixing them up matters. A provider credential is ONE value for the whole installation — an OAuth app's client secret serves every connected account. An account credential is one per connected account. A host that stores the second where it stores the first lets one account's credentials reach another's.

Field Scope Secret Where it comes from
OAuth client ID per installation not secret From Google Cloud Console -> APIs & Services -> Credentials. ONE value for the whole installation, not per connected account.
OAuth client secret per installation secret The client secret for the same OAuth app. One value for the whole installation.
Access token per connected account secret Per connected Google account, and it expires after ONE HOUR. The host refreshes it with the refresh token.
Refresh token per connected account secret Per connected Google account. Google issues one only when the consent request asks for offline access; without it the connection dies within the hour.

Authorising

Google Slides uses OAuth2 (authorization_code). The package DECLARES the exchange; the HOST performs it — a consent screen needs a browser, a redirect URI and somewhere to persist the result, and all three belong to the host.

The refresh tokens do not rotate: the same one is reusable, so a refresh may safely be retried and may run concurrently. Stated rather than assumed, because the opposite — a provider that spends the token and revokes the grant on a replay — looks identical until it happens.

The estate

Google Slides has no test estate, and somebody checked. Everything this connector does is real. Use the faker to build against it.

Google has no sandbox for Slides. A test presentation is a real one in a real Drive, so every create is real -- use the faker while developing and clean up any live test presentations.

What it can do

Actions

presentation_create — Google Slides presentation

Create a blank Google Slides presentation.

POST /v1/presentations · unsafe to replay — a retried durable run does it TWICE

Input Required What it is
title yes The title of the new blank presentation.

presentation_get — Google Slides presentation

Read a presentation's slides and the objectId of every element on them -- the prerequisite for targeting a specific shape or placeholder with a future edit.

GET /v1/presentations/{presentationId} · reads only — safe to replay

Input Required What it is
presentationId yes From presentation_create's data.presentationId, or the id in the presentation's own URL.

Run it before you have credentials

Every operation ships a faker, whether or not Google Slides has a sandbox. Set a node's mode to fake and it returns the shape Google Slides actually publishes — the same field names, deterministically — so you can wire the downstream nodes before touching an account, a key, or a network.

This repository is generated

provider/ is the source. Everything under packages/ is emitted from it and must not be hand-edited — CI regenerates and diffs on every push, and the next protocol sync destroys anything it finds. See AGENTS.md.

Two namespaces, which do not match on purpose

The repo is github.com/Fancy-Friends/google-slides; the packages publish under particle-academy. Nothing derives one from the other — the names come from weaver's friends.json and nowhere else.

Licence

MIT.

Metadata

Release files for fancy-google-slides 0.5.0

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for fancy-google-slides 0.5.0
File Size Uploaded Provenance Actions
fancy_google_slides-0.5.0.tar.gz 22.7 kB Without provenance Details for fancy_google_slides-0.5.0.tar.gz

Built distribution (wheel)

Table of built distributions (wheels) for fancy-google-slides 0.5.0
File Interpreter ABI Platform Actions
fancy_google_slides-0.5.0-py3-none-any.whl Python 3 none any Details for fancy_google_slides-0.5.0-py3-none-any.whl

Total release size: 45.0 kB

Release files / fancy_google_slides-0.5.0.tar.gz

Download URL fancy_google_slides-0.5.0.tar.gz
Size 22.7 kB
Tags Source
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
005d7f0ad73099a45d59070ddd87aa7f40bd100b8e06380d10ece6f9c06d734f
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
43ed31d558cb2a5b1a6cd6c593498e50d3ba922db06bda80a315ebe31ce54a30
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
No
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.18

Release files / fancy_google_slides-0.5.0-py3-none-any.whl

Download URL fancy_google_slides-0.5.0-py3-none-any.whl
Size 22.3 kB
Tags Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
bf87feb025a91155f3dbaf4502159147f8ce7507c92a9c04d676ccbb9f810d85
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
ec1f19078d653e1fa9bdc1867344dfcd63fba742d3ce2aa7966b7ae0f23a7ae8
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
No
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.18

Security for fancy-google-slides 0.5.0

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

No provenance found

None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.

A note on package security

PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.

To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.

Anthropic, PBC Visionary sponsor Bloomberg Visionary sponsor Hudson River Trading Visionary sponsor Meta Visionary sponsor NVIDIA Visionary sponsor Microsoft Sustainability sponsor Depot Continuous Integration AWS Cloud computing and Security Sponsor Datadog Monitoring Fastly CDN Google Download Analytics Sentry Error logging StatusPage Status page