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fancy-service-token (Python)

Verify Fancy service tokens in a Python sidecar. A Laravel app signs a short-lived token on every request it makes to its sidecar (particle-academy/fancy-service-token); this package checks it before the request body is read and refuses every other caller with a named reason.

  • Framework-free core, plus pure-ASGI middleware for Starlette and FastAPI.
  • HMAC-SHA256 with the standard library only (hmac, compare_digest). No JWT library, no cryptography of our own, zero runtime dependencies.
  • Refusals carry one reason from a fixed set, never exception text, and no log line ever contains a token or a secret.
  • The verified request id reaches your handlers and your logs.

The Node mirror is @particle-academy/fancy-service-token. All three legs run the same fixture file byte for byte.

For agents. This package is not listed on the Fancy MCP catalog server yet. The server, https://ui.particle.academy/mcp (streamable HTTP, no API key; MCP id fancy-ui), lists the released Fancy packages with install commands and docs. How an agent installs and uses this package is in AGENTS.md.

Install

pip install fancy-service-token

FastAPI

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI
from fancy_service_token import Claims, Key, ServiceTokenMiddleware, Verifier
from fancy_service_token.depends import service_token_claims

verifier = Verifier(
    keys=[Key("k2026b", bytes.fromhex(os.environ["SERVICE_TOKEN_KEY"]))],
    audience="ocr-sidecar",
    issuer="laravel-app",
)

app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(ServiceTokenMiddleware, verifier=verifier)


@app.post("/ocr")
def ocr(job: Job, claims: Claims = Depends(service_token_claims)):
    log.info("ocr for %s", claims.request_id)

Verification lives in the middleware, not in a dependency, on purpose: FastAPI reads and validates a request body before it resolves dependencies, so a dependency cannot refuse "before the body is read". service_token_claims only hands the verified claims to a handler. When nothing verified the request it refuses with a 401 rather than returning nothing:

Setup The 401 body
ServiceTokenMiddleware installed (the route is an exempt path) the exact envelope
no middleware, handler registered (below) the exact envelope
neither FastAPI: {"detail": <envelope>}; Starlette: the sentence as plain text

Every row carries WWW-Authenticate: FancyServiceToken error="missing", x-request-id and Cache-Control: no-store. Registering the handler is what gives the exact envelope in an app without the middleware:

from fancy_service_token.depends import ServiceTokenRefused, service_token_refused_handler

app.add_exception_handler(ServiceTokenRefused, service_token_refused_handler)

ServiceTokenRefused is a Starlette HTTPException (the class FastAPI's handler is registered for), so with no handler the framework still renders a 401, never a 500.

Starlette

from starlette.middleware import Middleware

app = Starlette(routes=routes, middleware=[Middleware(ServiceTokenMiddleware, verifier=verifier)])


async def handler(request):
    claims = request.state.service_token  # or service_token_claims(request)

Refusals

Every refusal is 401 with Cache-Control: no-store, a WWW-Authenticate: FancyServiceToken error="<reason>" header and an x-request-id header. The body is the Fancy error envelope (the fancy-http-errors envelope.schema.json): exactly error, message and requestId, nothing else. The reason is in the WWW-Authenticate header, never in the body; message is one fixed English sentence per reason, identical in the Python and Node legs (conformance/refusal-messages.json). requestId is the incoming x-request-id when it matches ^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}$, else a fresh UUID v4, and is echoed in an x-request-id response header.

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: FancyServiceToken error="expired"
x-request-id: 3f6c0a52-6f1e-4b43-9d55-1f0d2b1f7e10
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/json

{"error":"service_token_refused","message":"The service token has expired.","requestId":"3f6c0a52-6f1e-4b43-9d55-1f0d2b1f7e10"}

The request-id header name is the request_id_header argument (default x-request-id).

reason means message
missing no token header, or an empty one This request carries no service token.
malformed not a well-formed fst1 token (see the format below), longer than max_token_bytes, a lifetime above max_lifetime, no nonce while require_nonce is on, or the token header sent twice The service token could not be read.
bad_signature the HMAC does not match, the key id is unknown, the key is a previous key past its grace window, or the issuer is not the configured one (no key is held for that issuer) The service token signature does not match a known key.
expired now >= exp + clock_skew The service token has expired.
not_yet_valid now + clock_skew < iat The service token is not valid yet.
wrong_audience signed correctly, for a different sidecar The service token was issued for a different service.
replayed the nonce was already accepted (or the replay store is full: it fails closed) The service token has already been used.

A WebSocket handshake is refused with a close (1008) before accept: a close frame has no body, so no envelope, and the reason is not sent.

Request id

The token carries the caller's request id, signed. After verification it is in request.state.service_token.request_id, in current_request_id() for the duration of the request, and on every log record through a filter:

handler.addFilter(RequestIdLogFilter())
logging.Formatter("%(asctime)s %(request_id)s %(message)s")

Use it to join a sidecar log line to the Laravel request that caused it.

Configuration

Every limit is a constructor argument with a secure default.

argument default
keys required Key(kid, secret_bytes, accept_until=None); secrets of at least min_key_bytes
audience required this sidecar's name
issuer required the Laravel app's name
clock_skew 10 seconds of tolerance on both ends of the window
max_lifetime 300 the longest exp - iat accepted
max_token_bytes 1024 checked before any parsing
require_nonce True refuse tokens without a nonce
min_key_bytes 32
replay_store MemoryReplayStore() anything with an atomic add(key, expires_at, now) -> bool; None turns replay checks off
clock time.time

ServiceTokenMiddleware(app, verifier=..., header="x-fancy-service-token", exempt_paths=()). exempt_paths are exact matches, for a health check.

MemoryReplayStore(max_entries=100_000) is per process. A sidecar running several workers needs a shared store, or a nonce accepted by one worker can be replayed against another.

Key rotation

Sign with the new key in Laravel; here, hold both, and give the old one an accept_until:

keys = [Key("k2026b", new_secret), Key("k2026a", old_secret, accept_until=1793000030)]

After accept_until (unix seconds, inclusive) a token signed with the old key is bad_signature.

The token format (fst1)

fst1.<payload>.<signature>
  • payload is the unpadded base64url (RFC 4648 section 5) of seven ASCII fields joined by a single LF (0x0A), in this order, with no trailing LF:

    # field grammar
    1 kid key id 1-64 of [A-Za-z0-9._-]
    2 iss issuer 1-128 of [A-Za-z0-9._:/-]
    3 aud audience 1-128 of [A-Za-z0-9._:/-]
    4 iat issued at unix seconds, decimal, 1-12 digits, no leading zero
    5 exp expires at as iat; must be greater than iat
    6 rid request id 1-128 of [A-Za-z0-9._:-]
    7 nonce empty, or 16-128 of [A-Za-z0-9_-]
  • signature is the unpadded base64url of HMAC-SHA256(secret, ASCII("fst1." + payload)): always 32 bytes, so always 43 characters.

  • base64url must be canonical: the right alphabet, no padding, no whitespace, and the unused low bits of the last character clear. A second spelling of the same bytes is malformed.

  • The token is sent in one header, X-Fancy-Service-Token by default.

The verifier checks, in this order, and stops at the first failure (the order decides the reason when a token is wrong in two ways, and the fixtures pin it):

  1. absent or empty: missing
  2. longer than max_token_bytes: malformed
  3. not exactly three dot-separated parts, prefix not fst1, signature not 43 characters, either part not canonical base64url: malformed
  4. payload not ASCII, not exactly seven fields, a field outside its grammar, exp <= iat, exp - iat > max_lifetime, or no nonce while one is required: malformed
  5. unknown kid, HMAC mismatch (compared in constant time), a previous key past accept_until, or iss not the configured issuer: bad_signature
  6. aud not this sidecar: wrong_audience
  7. now + clock_skew < iat: not_yet_valid
  8. now >= exp + clock_skew: expired
  9. nonce already recorded: replayed. The nonce is recorded only here, so a token refused for any earlier reason never spends one.

There is no alg field and nothing to negotiate: one format, one algorithm.

Conformance

conformance/service-token-v1.json is generated by scripts/build_fixtures.py from the format definition alone (raw hmac, not this package) and copied byte for byte into the PHP and Node repositories. Each suite pins its SHA-256.

License

MIT

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