fastapi-better-auth-bridge

A bridge to a TypeScript Better Auth server — not a Python port. (If you want a full Python re-implementation, this is not it.) Community-maintained; not affiliated with or endorsed by Better Auth.

Status. Three modes ship, and every change to any of them is conformance-tested in CI against a real Better Auth server rather than a mock: Mode B — a JWT verified against your server's JWKS — Mode A — the session cookie, verified against a shared session store — and Mode C — the same cookie, forwarded to your Better Auth server's own get-session route, fail-closed. Both cookie modes carry cross-site request forgery protection that is required rather than optional. No dates are promised.

Modes

Better Auth is TypeScript-only: sign-in/up, OAuth and 2FA run on your Node service. This package makes the sessions that service issues first-class in FastAPI. Three modes ship. They differ in what they couple to, what a request costs, and — the row that should decide it — what they can still see once a session goes away.

If your Better Auth server mounts bearer(), set requireSignature: true before anything else on this page. It defaults to false, and while it is false a raw session token written into a log line, a database dump or a backup is a live Authorization: Bearer credential. That is upstream's setting, so it holds in all three modes and no configuration here changes it. The one-line fix, and the startup gate Mode C can enforce it with: § requireSignature.

Two caveats behind the "Bans" row. A ban is enforced by this library, from the user record it already has, because upstream's get-session route never reads banned — the admin plugin enforces bans when a session is created (dist/plugins/admin/admin.mjs:33-49) and deletes the user's sessions when the ban goes through its own route (ban-user, dist/plugins/admin/routes.mjs:508, sessions deleted at :540; update-user with banned: true does the same at :305). So a ban written straight into the database is still caught here, in Mode A on SQL and in Mode C. It is not caught when Better Auth runs with secondaryStorage and the ban is written straight to the database: the session document in Redis was written before the ban and still says banned: false, and that document is what both Mode A and Mode C read there. On that topology, ban through the admin route — it deletes the sessions, and then every mode sees a sign-out.

Picking one. If FastAPI can share the database or Redis your Node service writes sessions to, Mode A is the cheapest instant revocation. If it can only reach that service over the network, that is Mode C. If it has to verify with no dependency on the auth server being reachable at all, that is Mode B, and the price is a revocation lag equal to the token lifetime. Modes compose — each request picks the verifier whose credential it actually carries, and two credentials on one request are a 400 — with one exception: A and C read the same cookie name, so composing those two is refused at construction. It is a choice between modes, not a stack.

Which better-auth and Python versions each lane exercises: COMPATIBILITY.md.

Install

Python 3.10+. The distribution is fastapi-better-auth-bridge — the shorter spelling collides with an unrelated package under PyPI's name-similarity rules — and the import is fastapi_better_auth. The two modes that talk to your Better Auth server — JwtVerifier for the key set, RemoteVerifier for get-session — do it through a pluggable Transport: pick the adapter for the client your project already has, or install neither extra and pass your own Transport.

The default client honours the process environment the way httpx does — HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY, NO_PROXY, SSL_CERT_FILE/SSL_CERT_DIR and ~/.netrc. That is usually what a deployment behind an egress proxy or a private CA wants; if it is not, pass your own HttpxTransport(client=httpx.AsyncClient(trust_env=False)). Either way the client never follows a redirect and never keeps a cookie. SECURITY.md spells out what the library trusts.

pip install "fastapi-better-auth-bridge[httpx]"   # or: uv add "fastapi-better-auth-bridge[httpx]"

Quickstart (Mode B)

Upstream prerequisite: the JWT plugin has to be mounted on your Better Auth server (plugins: [jwt()]). It serves /api/auth/jwks, the key set verified against, and /api/auth/token, where a signed-in client fetches its token; without it there is nothing here to verify. Then, in FastAPI:

from typing import Annotated

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import BetterAuth, JwtVerifier, Session, User

auth = BetterAuth(verifiers=[JwtVerifier(base_url="https://auth.example.com")])
CurrentSession = Annotated[Session[User], Depends(auth.current_session())]

app = FastAPI()


@app.get("/me")
async def me(session: CurrentSession) -> User:
    return session.user

base_url is the whole of the trust configuration: canonicalized once, it is the required iss, the required aud, and the origin the key set is fetched from — and nothing is derived from the incoming request. If your deployment already sets BETTER_AUTH_URL for the Node side, BetterAuth.from_env() reads exactly that one variable, raises if missing, and builds the same:

from fastapi_better_auth import BetterAuth

auth = BetterAuth.from_env()

Call the factory — Depends(auth.current_session()), with the parentheses. Passed bare it would make the factory itself the dependency, a silent bypass of every route beneath a router, so every Depends and Security planting of a bare factory is refused with a ConfigurationError while the route is registered and the application never starts. The one exception is a bare factory assigned into app.dependency_overrides, a plain dict this library has no hook into: there the application does start, and the same refusal fires on the first request touching that dependency — still verifying nothing, and still serving nobody.

/docs needs no wiring: the security scheme is derived from each verifier's own credential source, so the Authorize button works out of the box.

Your own user model, and optional authentication

from typing import Annotated

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import BetterAuth, JwtVerifier, Session, User


class Member(User):
    role: str | None = None


auth = BetterAuth(verifiers=[JwtVerifier(base_url="https://auth.example.com")])
CurrentMember = Annotated[Session[Member], Depends(auth.current_session(user_model=Member))]
MaybeMember = Annotated[Session[Member] | None, Depends(auth.optional_session(user_model=Member))]

app = FastAPI()


@app.get("/role")
async def role(session: CurrentMember) -> str:
    return session.user.role or "member"


@app.get("/greeting")
async def greeting(session: MaybeMember) -> str:
    return "hello" if session is None else f"hello, {session.user.id}"

optional_session returns None for one situation only: no credential was presented at all. One that was presented and did not verify still fails — a forged or expired token is never downgraded to "anonymous".

Fields the admin plugin adds: AdminUser

If your Better Auth server mounts the admin plugin it adds four columns to user — role, banned, banReason, banExpires — and one to session, impersonatedBy (dist/plugins/admin/schema.mjs:3-30). AdminUser is the subclass you would otherwise write for the four:

from typing import Annotated

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import AdminUser, BetterAuth, JwtVerifier, Session

auth = BetterAuth(verifiers=[JwtVerifier(base_url="https://auth.example.com")])
CurrentAdmin = Annotated[Session[AdminUser], Depends(auth.current_session(user_model=AdminUser))]

app = FastAPI()


@app.get("/role")
async def whoami(session: CurrentAdmin) -> str:
    return session.user.role or "unknown"

The plugin declares all five input: false (same file), so they are server-controlled and an account holder can never set one at sign-up — which is what makes them worth typing, unlike an additionalFields entry. Without the plugin the keys are simply absent and every field reads None, which means unknown and never safe: a missing banned is not an unbanned user.

banned is a view, not a decision. In Modes A and C the ban is enforced by the verifier — from the store record or the upstream document — before the model is built, so a live ban is a 401 and your route never runs. A banned=True you can actually read is therefore a ban that has lapsed (ban_expires in the past), or Mode B data, where a JWT carries whatever was true when it was minted. It is also a StrictBool: a 1 or a "true" on the wire is refused rather than guessed at.

The session half sits on the session, not the user. session.impersonated_by is the admin's user id when this session came from the plugin's impersonation endpoint, and None otherwise — including in Mode B, always, because a JWT carries the user object and no session row. It is provenance, not permission: it tells you an administrator is acting as this user, never that the request may do anything extra.

additionalFields: make sure they reach the wire

A User subclass ignores keys it does not declare, and generates a camelCase alias from each Python name. That is the right default — upstream ships often, and a field you have not declared must not turn an authentic request into a 500 — but it has one sharp edge worth knowing before you rely on it: a name mismatch between your Node-side additionalFields key and your Python field is not an error. Declare jurisdiction_scope (wire key jurisdictionScope) while the server sends jurisdiction, and every request reads None for ever.

Which way that fails is your choice, and it is the annotation that makes it:

from fastapi_better_auth import User


class Lenient(User):
    """Forward-compatible. A name mismatch reads None, and nothing says so."""

    jurisdiction_scope: str | None = None


class Scoped(User):
    """Fails closed. A name mismatch refuses every request, from the first one."""

    jurisdiction_scope: str

A required field is the strict mode; there is no separate switch. The refusal is the same uniform 401 as everything else, so the client learns nothing — but the diagnosis is on the exception as InvalidCredential.reason, naming the wire key the model expected:

Scoped payload rejected (1): jurisdictionScope: [missing]

and the first time it happens the library logs one WARNING per process per user model on the fastapi_better_auth logger, naming the model and the missing wire keys. Nothing the payload carried appears in either — only the field names your own model declared.

Neither shape can tell you the names are right before the first request, so verify them once, as a smoke test against your real Better Auth server. The check is the same in every mode: sign in, then assert the key is on the wire where that mode reads it.

# Run against a real Better Auth server, once per deployment, in your own test suite.
EXPECTED = {"jurisdictionScope", "role"}          # the WIRE keys, camelCase

# Mode B — the JWT payload. Fetch a token and decode it WITHOUT verifying; you are
# inspecting shape, not authenticating.
#   POST /api/auth/sign-in/email  ->  cookie
#   GET  /api/auth/token          ->  {"token": "..."}
#   claims = jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})
#   assert EXPECTED <= claims.keys()
#
# Mode C — the get-session body.
#   GET /api/auth/get-session with the cookie  ->  {"session": {...}, "user": {...}}
#   assert EXPECTED <= body["user"].keys()
#
# Mode A — the store record, read through the store you configured.
#   record = await store.fetch_session_by_token(raw_token)
#   user = record.user or await store.fetch_user_by_id(record.user_id)
#   assert EXPECTED <= user.payload.keys()

There is deliberately no startup gate for this. At boot there is no payload to inspect in any mode — Mode B has no token, Mode C's readiness probe carries no cookie, and Mode A's store has no particular user — so a boot check would have to sign in with a real credential, which is exactly the smoke test above, and the smoke test belongs in your suite rather than in your lifespan.

Quickstart (Mode A — session cookie)

The mode to reach for when the browser talks to FastAPI directly, carrying the cookie Better Auth set on sign-in. It verifies that cookie's signature against your shared secret, looks the session up in the store Better Auth writes to, and enforces expiry and revocation the moment the store says the session is gone — the instant revocation a JWT cannot give you.

A cookie-authenticated mode has to answer cross-site request forgery, so csrf= is required and has no default. OriginCheck is what most deployments want; SignedDoubleSubmit and — deliberately, spelled out in your own source — CsrfDisabled(reason="…") are the alternatives.

Bring your own store. Any object with these two async reads is a SessionStore, and the shipped adapters get no privilege yours does not. A dict-backed one is enough to run:

from typing import Annotated

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import (
    BetterAuth,
    CookieVerifier,
    OriginCheck,
    Session,
    SessionStore,
    SharedSecret,
    StoredSession,
    StoredUser,
    User,
)


class DictSessionStore:
    """A SessionStore backed by two dicts: the whole Protocol, and nothing more.

    A real deployment reads the rows or keys Better Auth already writes (see below); this is
    the shape of the two questions a store answers — a read, never a write.
    """

    def __init__(self, sessions: dict[str, StoredSession], users: dict[str, StoredUser]) -> None:
        self._sessions = sessions
        self._users = users

    async def fetch_session_by_token(self, token: str) -> StoredSession | None:
        return self._sessions.get(token)

    async def fetch_user_by_id(self, user_id: str) -> StoredUser | None:
        return self._users.get(user_id)


store: SessionStore = DictSessionStore(sessions={}, users={})

auth = BetterAuth(
    verifiers=[
        CookieVerifier(
            # A literal only so this page runs; in production read it from the environment —
            # SharedSecret(os.environ["BETTER_AUTH_SECRET"]) — the value the Node side signs with.
            secret=SharedSecret("replace-this-with-your-own-32-plus-character-secret"),
            store=store,
            csrf=OriginCheck(allowed_origins=["https://app.example.com"]),
        )
    ]
)
CurrentSession = Annotated[Session[User], Depends(auth.current_session())]
MaybeSession = Annotated[Session[User] | None, Depends(auth.optional_session())]

# withCredentials lets the /docs "Try it out" button send the browser's own cookie to a same-site API.
app = FastAPI(swagger_ui_parameters={"withCredentials": True})


@app.post("/posts")
async def create_post(session: CurrentSession) -> dict[str, str]:
    return {"author": session.user.id}


@app.post("/reactions")
async def add_reaction(session: MaybeSession) -> dict[str, str | None]:
    return {"author": None if session is None else session.user.id}

The protected routes are POSTs on purpose: cross-site request forgery is a threat to unsafe methods, so a cookie-authenticated write is exactly where OriginCheck earns its place. A forged or absent cookie is a terminal 401; a cross-site write carrying a real cookie is a 403, decided before the signature is even checked.

In production, point the store at the rows Better Auth already writes. That needs an extra — fastapi-better-auth-bridge[sqlalchemy] or [redis] — and a live backend, so it is shown here rather than executed on this page:

import os

from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine

from fastapi_better_auth import (
    BetterAuth, CookieVerifier, OriginCheck, SharedSecret, SqlAlchemySessionStore,
)

engine = create_async_engine(os.environ["DATABASE_URL"])   # the database Better Auth writes sessions to
store = SqlAlchemySessionStore(engine=engine)

auth = BetterAuth(
    verifiers=[
        CookieVerifier(
            secret=SharedSecret(os.environ["BETTER_AUTH_SECRET"]),
            store=store,
            csrf=OriginCheck(allowed_origins=["https://app.example.com"]),
        )
    ]
)

# Redis secondary-storage instead of SQL:
#   from fastapi_better_auth import RedisSessionStore
#   store = RedisSessionStore(url=os.environ["REDIS_URL"])   # a miss is a 401, never a DB fall-back

SqlAlchemySessionStore reads the session and user tables directly; RedisSessionStore reads the raw-token key Better Auth's secondaryStorage writes. A store reads; it never writes — no touch, no EXPIRE-on-read — because a write here would extend or resurrect a session this side was only asked to verify.

What Mode A refuses, and when

A Redis-authoritative deployment is a hard rule: a store miss is a 401, never a fall-back to a database. When Better Auth runs with secondaryStorage, sign-out deletes the Redis key while a stale row can still sit in Postgres, so a fall-back would resurrect exactly the sessions a sign-out revoked.

/docs

The cookie route publishes an APIKeyCookie scheme, so /docs shows an Authorize field for it and the security requirement appears on the operation. Two honest limits:

• Swagger UI cannot set a cookie from the Authorize modal (swagger-api/swagger-ui#9710); the field is declarative. What makes "Try it out" work is FastAPI(swagger_ui_parameters={"withCredentials": True}), which tells Swagger to send the browser's own cookie — the one Better Auth already set — so a developer signed in on a same-site /docs can exercise the route.
• The scheme is documentation only. What it would read is never read; every credential comes from the verifier that owns it.

Deploying across two origins

The common shape is a front end on app.example.com and this API on api.example.com. For the browser to send the cookie cross-origin you configure Better Auth to set it SameSite=None; Secure in its __Secure- prefixed form — which CookieVerifier reads by default.

SameSite=None is exactly where CSRF stops being optional. OriginCheck is the floor; but a bare double-submit cookie proves only that the sender could set a cookie, and a sibling subdomain can set one on the shared parent domain — so on a shared parent domain reach for SignedDoubleSubmit, whose token is HMAC(secret, session_token), bound to the session and useless to a sibling. A non-browser client (mobile, server-to-server) has no Origin for OriginCheck to trust and belongs on Mode B (bearer) instead: compose both verifiers and each request picks its own by which credential it carries. All of this applies unchanged to Mode C, which reads the same cookie.

Quickstart (Mode C — remote get-session)

The mode to reach for when FastAPI can reach your Better Auth server over the network but does not share its database, its Redis, or — unless you choose to — its secret. It takes the session cookie off the request, forwards exactly that one cookie to GET /api/auth/get-session?disableCookieCache=true&disableRefresh=true, and believes the answer. disableCookieCache switches off the cookie-cache short-circuit so the route always falls through to the authoritative lookup (dist/api/routes/session.mjs:48) — that is where the instant revocation comes from — and disableRefresh keeps the call read-only. Everything that could refuse the request without asking upstream — the structural check, your optional secret, the negative cache, the backoff latch — runs first.

Like Mode A this is a cookie mode, so csrf= is required and has no default, and the protected routes below are POSTs for the same reason: cross-site request forgery is a threat to unsafe methods.

from typing import Annotated

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import (
    BetterAuth,
    OriginCheck,
    RemoteVerifier,
    Session,
    SharedSecret,
    User,
)

auth = BetterAuth(
    verifiers=[
        RemoteVerifier(
            base_url="https://auth.example.com",
            csrf=OriginCheck(allowed_origins=["https://app.example.com"]),
            # Optional, and worth it: with a secret configured, a forged cookie is refused
            # locally, before any upstream call. A literal only so this page runs — in
            # production, SharedSecret(os.environ["BETTER_AUTH_SECRET"]).
            secret=SharedSecret("replace-this-with-your-own-32-plus-character-secret"),
        )
    ]
)
CurrentSession = Annotated[Session[User], Depends(auth.current_session())]
MaybeSession = Annotated[Session[User] | None, Depends(auth.optional_session())]

# withCredentials lets the /docs "Try it out" button send the browser's own cookie to a same-site API.
app = FastAPI(swagger_ui_parameters={"withCredentials": True})


@app.post("/articles")
async def publish(session: CurrentSession) -> dict[str, str]:
    return {"author": session.user.id}


@app.post("/claps")
async def clap(session: MaybeSession) -> dict[str, str | None]:
    return {"reader": None if session is None else session.user.id}

That snippet is executed by this repository's test suite on every commit, with the network refused outright — which is exactly the claim it is there to prove. Constructing a RemoteVerifier opens no connection, and because a secret is configured, every forged cookie those two routes are driven with is refused here, with zero upstream calls. Take the secret out and the same forgeries become one get-session call each.

Wire the startup probe in production. RemoteVerifier has one piece of boot work, and the snippet above leaves it out only so the page can run offline:

import os

from fastapi import FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import BetterAuth, OriginCheck, RemoteVerifier, SharedSecret

auth = BetterAuth(
    verifiers=[
        RemoteVerifier(
            base_url=os.environ["BETTER_AUTH_URL"],
            csrf=OriginCheck(allowed_origins=["https://app.example.com"]),
            secret=SharedSecret(os.environ["BETTER_AUTH_SECRET"]),
            # Refuse to start against a server whose bearer plugin is at requireSignature: false.
            refuse_unsigned_bearer=True,
        )
    ]
)

# The probe runs once here; a server that fails it never starts serving.
app = FastAPI(lifespan=auth.lifespan)

FastAPI(lifespan=auth.lifespan) runs BetterAuth.startup(), which runs each verifier's prepare() once — for this one, the probe. The probe is a single bare get-session request carrying no cookie, and it asserts the contract Mode C rests on: reachable, 200, application/json, body exactly null. A base_path that points at nothing is a ConfigurationError naming the URI it tried, at boot, rather than a 401 per request forever. It is also the backstop against a Transport that retains cookies: both shipped adapters install a dead cookie jar, but a Transport you write is yours, and a session document coming back from a request that carried no cookie means the client is replaying somebody's. That is refused by name rather than served. refuse_unsigned_bearer=True adds one more rung to the same probe — the upstream bearer plugin's posture, refused at boot instead of warned about; see § requireSignature.

What the probe does not prove: that a real cookie will verify, that your secret matches, that the server will still be up on the next request. It proves the URI and the contract, once.

Without the lifespan, the probe still runs — lazily, on the first request that gets that far. A contract failure there is remembered permanently, and every later request raises the same ConfigurationError. A reachability failure is not remembered: the request is refused with a 401 and the probe is retried at most once every ten seconds, so an auth service that comes up a moment after yours recovers on its own.

What one request costs. The order below is the design, and everything above the fetch makes zero outbound calls by construction:

1. The cookie is resolved by name, and a structurally impossible one is refused — too long, not decodable, no signature separator.
2. The CSRF policy runs, before anything else looks at the credential, so a cross-site 403 is never an oracle for whether the cookie behind it is live.
3. If you configured a secret, the signature is verified locally against the keyring. A forgery stops here and never becomes traffic.
4. A 200-with-null verdict is remembered for 30 seconds by default, keyed on the whole cookie value, so a forgery flood costs one upstream call per window rather than one per request.
5. If upstream has recently answered 429, the backoff latch refuses without calling it again.
6. Only then the call, through a concurrency limiter (8 in flight by default) so one stalled auth service cannot park every worker task.

Then the answer is checked rather than trusted: the returned session.token must match the token that was forwarded, expiry is enforced here, and bans are enforced here. Anything else — a non-200, a timeout, a body that is not a usable session document — is a refusal, never a pass.

The shared rate-limit bucket

Read this before Mode C sees real traffic. Better Auth rate-limits its own routes, and the way it keys the bucket means every user of your FastAPI service shares one bucket for /get-session, because they all reach your Node service from one address.

The mechanism, read out of better-auth 1.7.1's own build:

• The limiter is on when you have not set rateLimit.enabled and NODE_ENV === "production" (dist/context/create-context.mjs:171, @better-auth/core/dist/env/env-impl.mjs:30-32) — off in development, on in production, which is the worst order in which to discover it.
• The default bucket is 100 requests per 10 seconds (dist/context/create-context.mjs:172-173), and there is no built-in rule for /get-session (dist/api/rate-limiter/index.mjs:302-316), so the default is what applies to it.
• The key is `${ip}|${path}` (@better-auth/core/dist/utils/ip.mjs:226-228, built at dist/api/rate-limiter/index.mjs:245).
• The only client-IP header read by default is x-forwarded-for (@better-auth/core/dist/utils/ip.mjs:194, walked at :205), and when no address can be derived the key falls back to the shared sentinel no-trusted-ip (dist/api/rate-limiter/index.mjs:233, used at :245). A server-to-server call forwards no such header, so that sentinel is the bucket your whole deployment lands in — one bucket per path, for everybody.

In round numbers: about ten verified requests per second across the entire deployment, for every request that misses this library's pre-filter and negative cache. Nothing in this library raises that ceiling. The pre-filter, the cache, the concurrency limiter and the 429 latch all reduce how often you reach the bucket; none of them makes it bigger. The fix is upstream configuration.

Fix 1 — exempt the route. The whole rule value is false. There is no max: false field and no IP allowlist:

rateLimit: { customRules: { "/get-session": false } }

(dist/api/rate-limiter/index.mjs:259-276; if (resolved === false) return null at :274.) Know what that buys: it removes the limit for every caller of /get-session on your Node server — a browser hitting the route directly included — not only this bridge's server-to-server traffic. If /get-session should keep a ceiling, use Fix 2.

Fix 2 — or raise it for that one route, if you would rather keep a ceiling:

rateLimit: { customRules: { "/get-session": { window: 10, max: 1000 } } }

Fix 3 — or run Mode A or Mode B, which make no upstream call per request at all.

When the bucket does refuse, upstream answers 429 with X-Retry-After — not Retry-After (dist/api/rate-limiter/index.mjs:64-69), which is worth knowing before you go hunting for the standard header in your own logs. Its value is the whole seconds left in the window, measured from the last request upstream allowed: a refused request does not move the bucket (dist/api/rate-limiter/index.mjs:47-52, and the memory backend writes only on an allowed decision at :217). This library reads Retry-After and then X-Retry-After, clamps to 1–60 seconds, and latches: while the latch holds every request is refused with zero outbound calls, one warning is logged, and it clears by time alone. The latch is per verifier instance, so eight worker processes have eight of them.

requireSignature: a raw session token is a bearer credential

If your Better Auth server mounts the bearer plugin, check this option before anything else on this page. requireSignature defaults to false, and while it is false a raw, unsigned session token presented as Authorization: Bearer <token> is signed by the server with its own secret and installed as the session cookie (dist/plugins/bearer/index.mjs:34-38, then :46). It authenticates. Which means a session token in a log line, a database dump, a backup or an error report is not an identifier — it is a credential.

The fix is one line upstream:

bearer({ requireSignature: true })

With it set, a dot-less token is ignored outright (dist/plugins/bearer/index.mjs:36). That is not advice taken on faith: the conformance lane runs two live Better Auth servers, one at each setting, and pins the behaviour in both directions — tests/e2e/test_conformance.py::TestBearerPosture.

RemoteVerifier checks for the permissive posture at startup. Alongside the probe it sends one request carrying a manufactured random token and looks at nothing but whether a set-cookie header came back: the permissive posture emits one, the strict posture does not. By default that check is advisory — one warning per process naming the fix, and nothing else. It never reads that header's value and never replays a real credential.

Make it a hard gate with RemoteVerifier(refuse_unsigned_bearer=True). The same request becomes a rung of the probe: a set-cookie is a ConfigurationError naming bearer({ requireSignature: true }), so prepare() refuses and a server wired through FastAPI(lifespan=auth.lifespan) never starts. It is remembered like every other contract failure — a deployment that skipped the lifespan and probes lazily refuses every request instead. Its own reachability failure is not a verdict: that stays the transient AuthServiceUnavailable the unreachable-at-boot path already handles, and is retried rather than remembered. The flag is opt-in because the posture is your server's to set, and off is the current behaviour exactly.

Modes A and B have no such check, and cannot. Neither talks to your Better Auth server — Mode A reads the session store, Mode B verifies offline against a cached key set — so neither is ever in a position to observe the plugin's posture. There the warning above is documentation, and the fix is still the same one line upstream.

Sessions do not slide on bridge traffic

Every get-session call this library makes pins disableRefresh=true, so the route takes its read-only branch (dist/api/routes/session.mjs:163-170) instead of the one that calls updateSession and pushes expiresAt forward (:191-195). That is deliberate — a verifier that extended sessions would make your API's request rate a factor in how long people stay signed in, and would be handed a Set-Cookie the browser never sees — but the consequence deserves stating plainly: traffic to FastAPI does not keep a session alive.

A session expires session.expiresIn after it was issued (7 days by default, dist/context/create-context.mjs:147), however busy your API is. Better Auth normally slides that forward once a session is older than session.updateAge (1 day by default, :146) — but only requests that reach Better Auth do it.

Two remedies, and most deployments already have the first:

• The browser also talks to the Node server — signing in, refreshing, any Better Auth route at all. Sessions then slide there exactly as they always did and nothing here changes.
• Otherwise raise expiresIn upstream to whatever "signed in" should mean for your product, and accept that it is a fixed window from sign-in rather than a sliding one.

Mode A behaves the same way, for the same reason: a store read is a read, never a write.

Organizations and roles — the recipe

Two helpers, both built on a session that is already verified, and both refusing with the same uniform 403 this library uses everywhere else. require(predicate, ...) gates a route on a rule about the user; require_membership(id_param, member, ...) gates it on this request's resource.

from typing import Annotated

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import BetterAuth, JwtVerifier, Session, User

auth = BetterAuth(verifiers=[JwtVerifier(base_url="https://auth.example.com")])


class Member(User):
    role: str | None = None


def is_editor(session: Session[Member]) -> bool:
    return session.user.role in {"editor", "owner"}


Editor = Annotated[
    Session[Member],
    Depends(auth.require(is_editor, reason="editor role", user_model=Member)),
]

app = FastAPI()


@app.get("/drafts")
async def drafts(session: Editor) -> list[str]:
    return [session.user.id]

Build the dependency once, at module level, exactly like the Annotated aliases above it: each call makes a new one, and a new one per request would defeat FastAPI's per-request cache. Composing on current_session is what makes a route that declares both the session and the gate verify exactly once.

The predicate is synchronous and only True passes — compared by identity, so a truthy accident (a database row, a non-empty error string, the coroutine an async def predicate returns) refuses rather than admits. An async def predicate is a ConfigurationError rather than a permanent, silent 403. Whatever the predicate raises is logged and answered 403, except a SessionError or ConfigurationError it raised on purpose, which keeps its own shape.

The organization id comes from the request — its path or its query — and membership is checked with your own query. Never from session.raw["activeOrganizationId"].

from typing import Annotated

from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI

from fastapi_better_auth import BetterAuth, JwtVerifier, Membership, Session, User

auth = BetterAuth(verifiers=[JwtVerifier(base_url="https://auth.example.com")])

ROLES = {("org_a", "user_1"): "owner"}


async def member_of(org_id: str, session: Session[User]) -> str | None:
    """Your query. The role, or None for "not a member of THIS organization"."""
    return ROLES.get((org_id, session.user.id))


OrgMember = Annotated[
    Membership[User, str],
    Depends(auth.require_membership("org_id", member_of, reason="organization member")),
]

app = FastAPI()


@app.get("/orgs/{org_id}/invoices")
async def invoices(access: OrgMember) -> dict[str, str]:
    return {"org": access.resource_id, "role": access.grant}

"org_id" becomes a required str parameter of the dependency, so FastAPI binds it from the path when the route declares one by that name — and from the query string when it does not, which is how the same gate serves GET /invoices?org_id=…. Either way it is published in /openapi.json. The value is held to the rules a user id is held to (non-blank, at most 255 characters, no control characters); one that fails them is the same 403, and no query runs.

member_of answers the grant: anything other than None or False — a role string, a row, a set of scopes — reaches the route on Membership.grant, typed, next to Membership.session and Membership.resource_id. None and False are the refusal. A lookup that raises is logged and answered 403; one that forgot its async def is a ConfigurationError, because a value returned from a plain def would otherwise have been handed to the route as the grant.

Why the rule is a rule: activeOrganizationId is written by POST /organization/set-active, a route the client calls (dist/plugins/organization/routes/crud-org.mjs:379). Upstream does check membership before it writes (:420, a 403 at :425), so it is not forgeable — but it is not an answer to this request's question either. It records which organization the client last selected, out of the ones the user belongs to. The request in front of you names its own organization, and the two are unrelated.

The failure that produces is not subtle. A handler that selects data by the path's organization but authorizes on activeOrganizationId lets any member of any organization read every organization's data: the check passes because they do have an active organization, and the query then runs against whatever the path said. require_membership hands your lookup the id FastAPI resolved from the request and no other, so the mistake can only be re-created inside the lookup — by ignoring that argument and reading session.raw instead, which is the one thing a member coroutine must never do.

The real member_of is a query against the member table Better Auth already writes. It needs a database, so it is shown rather than executed here:

from sqlalchemy import text


async def member_of(org_id: str, session: Session[User]) -> str | None:
    """Authorize this user against THIS request's organization. None means no membership."""
    async with engine.connect() as connection:
        result = await connection.execute(
            text('SELECT role FROM "member" WHERE "organizationId" = :org AND "userId" = :user'),
            {"org": org_id, "user": session.user.id},
        )
        membership = result.first()
    return None if membership is None else membership.role

The regression case, spelled out — keep it as a test. Sign in as a user who is a member of organization A and not of organization B. Call organization.setActive({ organizationId: "A" }). Then request /orgs/B/invoices with that same session, and expect 403. The correct handler refuses because the member query for (B, user) finds nothing. The broken one returns 200 and serves B's invoices, because it asked whether the user had an active organization and never asked which organization this request was about.

/docs, restated for Mode C

Identical to Mode A, because it is the same cookie: the route publishes an APIKeyCookie scheme, so /docs shows an Authorize field and the security requirement appears on the operation. The two honest limits are the same ones. Swagger UI cannot set a cookie from the Authorize modal (swagger-api/swagger-ui#9710) — the field is declarative, and what makes "Try it out" work is FastAPI(swagger_ui_parameters={"withCredentials": True}), which tells Swagger to send the browser's own cookie, the one Better Auth already set. And the scheme is documentation only: what it would read is never read, because every credential comes from the verifier that owns it.

Errors

Every request-time failure is an HTTPException subclass, so FastAPI answers it with no handler of yours: 401, the body {"detail": "Not authenticated"}, and a WWW-Authenticate: Bearer header. Missing, malformed, expired, revoked, "the key set could not be fetched" and "the auth service could not be reached" are byte-identical on the wire, deliberately — a client must not be able to tell them apart and use the difference to probe. That last one is AuthServiceUnavailable, and it is a 401 rather than a 503 on purpose: an unreachable Better Auth server means this request was not authenticated, and saying so in a distinct status would be both an oracle and an invitation to retry. Mode C raises it for every non-200 upstream answer, every timeout, an unusable body, a saturated outbound limiter, and a live 429 backoff. Two credentials on one request are a 400 ({"detail": "Ambiguous request"}), decided before anything is verified. A cookie-mode request that fails its CSRF check is a 403 ({"detail": "Forbidden"}) with no challenge — it carried a credential, so there is nothing to re-authenticate. So is a request an authorization gate refuses: NotAuthorized, raised by require and require_membership, is byte-identical to that 403 — the rule it broke lives on .reason (with the user id, and the sanitized resource id for a membership refusal) and never on the wire. Reaching a 403 at all means authentication already succeeded; an anonymous or forged request is answered 401 before any rule is asked, so a 403 is never an oracle for which credentials this deployment accepts.

Why a request was refused lives on the exception, as .reason, and nowhere else. This library does not log ordinary refusals — a forged, expired or malformed token, an unknown key id, a missing or ambiguous credential — and that is deliberate rather than an omission: what to record about a failed authentication, and where, is the deployment's decision. If you want them, register a FastAPI exception handler for SessionError and log exc.reason explicitly; note that logging.exception() renders str(exc), which does not carry it. A reason holds identifiers and fingerprints — a key id, a truncated hash — never a raw credential.

What it does log, all on the fastapi_better_auth logger, is the deployment telling on itself. At WARNING: a session-cache cookie it was not asked to read, a JWKS key it will not verify with or a refresh that failed while a usable key set was still on hand, a stored record or a database table it cannot use, a user model that declares a required field the upstream payload does not carry (once per process per model, naming the model and the missing wire keys), a 429 backoff latch opening (once per latch, never once per refused request), and the advisory requireSignature warning (once per process). At ERROR, with the traceback: an exception that escaped a verifier, and one that escaped an authorization predicate or a membership lookup — each answered as the uniform refusal rather than a 500, so the log is the only place the real exception exists. The reason those build names the exception's type and not its message. None of these lines carries a raw token, a cookie value or a signature.

Do I need to run a Node service?

Better Auth itself always runs in a Node/TypeScript process — sign-up, sign-in, OAuth, 2FA, and session issuance stay there; this library makes FastAPI a first-class consumer of the sessions it issues. Two topologies:

• You have a JS frontend server (Next.js, Nuxt, SvelteKit, …): no extra service — Better Auth is already mounted at /api/auth/* inside the frontend you deploy, and FastAPI verifies what it issues: nothing shared at all for Mode B, a shared Postgres or Redis for Mode A, and for Mode C only a route from FastAPI to that frontend's /api/auth/get-session.
• No JS server (static SPA, mobile app, pure API): deploy one tiny Node service whose only job is mounting Better Auth, and keep 100% of the business logic in FastAPI. This repository's conformance harness (harness/) is exactly that service, in Hono.

Either way the browser or app performs its login flows against Better Auth, then presents the resulting credential to FastAPI, where this library verifies it — the session cookie for Modes A and C, a JWT for Mode B.

Who owns the database schema

One tool owns every table, and on a FastAPI project that tool is yours — Alembic, or whatever your side already runs. The recipe: run auth generate on the Node side, hand-port the SQL it prints into one migration of your own, re-diff on every Better Auth upgrade, and never run auth migrate against a database another tool migrates. That includes not copying this repository's harness container, which does exactly that on every boot.

The reason is what auth migrate is. It is Kysely-only — on any other adapter it logs "Only kysely adapter is supported for migrations", points you at generate, and calls process.exit(1) (better-auth@1.7.3 dist/db/get-migration.mjs:350). And its plan is not a migration history: getMigrations introspects the live database, diffs it against the schema your config implies, and returns the difference as toBeCreated / toBeAdded / toBeAddedIndexes (:335, :387-389), which runMigrations then executes statement by statement (:643-649). No migrations table, no version stamp — nothing records that it ran, nothing can roll it back, and two tools that each introspect-and-diff the same database can each decide the other's work is drift.

Better Auth 1.7.3 raises the stakes, because schema validation is now on by default. advanced.database.validateSchema defaults to true, and its own doc comment says what that buys: the schema is validated at initialization, problems are reported through the configured logger, and authentication requests await the same check and fail when the schema does not match (@better-auth/core@1.7.3 dist/types/init-options.d.mts:391-400). All three halves are real. A failure at init is logged (better-auth@1.7.3 dist/auth/base.mjs:10-18); every HTTP request awaits the check (dist/api/index.mjs:167-168) and so does every auth.api.* call (dist/api/to-auth-endpoints.mjs:41-42); and the check throws SchemaMismatchError whenever it finds anything (@better-auth/core@1.7.3 dist/db/schema-check.mjs:60-76). None of it is NODE_ENV-gated. So a schema the Node side does not recognise stops that server serving rather than degrading quietly — which, on a database two tools have been fighting over, means the failure arrives during a deploy instead of during an incident. better-auth@1.7.1 has none of this machinery: the same mismatch there is silent until something reads a missing column.

This repository's harness is the exception that proves the rule — harness/auth-server/Dockerfile runs auth migrate on every start because nothing else owns that database, and a conformance harness wants its schema pinned to the version under test. A product does not.

Why a library instead of the snippet

The hand-rolled verifiers circulating in Better Auth issues split the signed cookie on the wrong dot, miss the __Secure- name, compare HMACs non-constant-time, and never enforce expiresAt (upstream's findSession doesn't either — the route layer does, so a bare DB join honours expired sessions forever). Those are Mode A's details, and Mode A handles every one of them: the last-dot split, the __Secure- name, a constant-time keyring compare, and expiresAt enforced by the verifier itself. The wire facts behind them are pinned as golden vectors captured from a running Better Auth server in tests/vectors/, and re-verified against a live server in the conformance lane — not guessed.

Mode B is held to the same standard: JwtVerifier refuses an algorithm the token's own header chose, refuses an unknown kid rather than trying every published key, spells out the five required claims because PyJWT requires none by default, and refuses a token whose lifetime upstream would never have minted. A present-but-invalid credential is terminal — no falling through to a second verifier — and no failure reason ever reaches the client. What Mode B cannot do is see a ban or a sign-out: a JWT is verified offline and stays valid until it expires, so keep token lifetimes short and lean on Mode A or Mode C for prompt revocation (see SECURITY.md).

Mode C looks like the easy one and has the sharpest edges, which is why the shape of the request is fixed at construction and never derived from the one being verified. An unauthenticated get-session answers 200 with a body of literally null, not a 401, so a snippet that checks the status code authenticates everybody. The bearer plugin's hook overwrites the session cookie of an outgoing request with whatever Authorization header it sees (dist/plugins/bearer/index.mjs:44-46), so a proxy that forwards the inbound Authorization along with the cookie hands a client a targeted denial-of-service on one victim, and a client who sends a raw session token an authentication this side never checked — which is why exactly two headers, cookie and accept, ever go out. httpx's default client keeps cookies, so an auth server's Set-Cookie would be replayed onto the next user's verification: both shipped transports install a dead jar and the boot probe detects a live one. And the shared rate-limit bucket above is the one nobody finds until production.

License

MIT © Mulugeta Solomon