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filevet

Self-hosted, open-source scanner that checks the files finance teams receive for security risks before anyone opens or ingests them.

CI PyPI OpenSSF Scorecard License

Why

Fintechs and finance teams take in files from outside every day: invoices, bank statements, KYC documents, payment files. Any of them can carry malware, exploit the parser that reads it, or hide instructions meant for an AI system further down the line. Commercial scanners are closed and expensive, and the open-source ones don't understand financial formats like ISO 20022. filevet runs several independent analyzers over a file and returns one report you can act on.

Status

Quickstart

pipx install filevet
# or
uv tool install filevet

filevet scan statement.pdf

With Docker, without network access and with the file mounted read-only:

docker run --rm --network none --read-only --tmpfs /tmp -v "$PWD:/in:ro" ghcr.io/pablodt00/filevet scan /in/statement.pdf

To add ClamAV signature scanning, use the Compose file, which runs clamd as a sidecar and shares its socket with filevet:

docker compose --profile clamav up -d clamav
docker compose run --rm filevet scan /in/statement.pdf

filevet alone needs about 200 MB of RAM. With ClamAV, plan for 1 to 2 GB more for its signature database.

The same Compose file runs the REST API with an async worker, Redis and ClamAV. docs/api.md covers the setup:

export FILEVET_SPOOL_KEY=... FILEVET_API_KEYS=...
docker compose up -d

Example

filevet scan invoice.pdf

Trimmed output from a file named invoice.pdf that's really a Windows executable (the format may still change):

{
  "filevet_version": "0.1.1",
  "artifacts": [
    {
      "id": "1bf01f46-66b9-4b57-a40c-031d8d71615f",
      "name": "invoice.pdf",
      "sha256": "9f2c…e41a",
      "declared_type": "pdf",
      "detected_type": "pe",
      "depth": 0
    }
  ],
  "findings": [
    {
      "rule_id": "basic.type_mismatch",
      "title": "File content does not match its extension",
      "severity": "critical",
      "confidence": 1.0,
      "evidence": "invoice.pdf",
      "references": ["https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html"],
      "analyzer": "basic.type_mismatch/0.1.0"
    }
  ],
  "decision": {
    "policy": "default",
    "verdict": "block",
    "rule": 0,
    "rule_ids": ["basic.executable", "basic.type_mismatch"],
    "reason": "rule 0 of policy default sets block for basic.executable, basic.type_mismatch"
  },
  "summary": { "critical": 1, "high": 1, "medium": 0, "low": 0, "info": 0 },
  "verdict": "block"
}

The full report format is in docs/schema/report.schema.json, and filevet schema prints it too. filevet scan takes several files at once. --format picks the output:

Format For
json (default) Programs. One report, or a list of reports for several files
table People at a terminal
sarif GitHub code scanning and other CI tools (SARIF 2.1.0)
junit CI dashboards. One test case per file, failed on review or block
markdown Pull request comments

The verdict comes from a policy: default, strict (bank-grade intake), ai-ingestion (files an LLM will read) or your own YAML file, chosen with --policy. filevet policy test shows how verdicts change under a policy, and --suppressions silences a rule for a known file until a set date. Both are described in docs/policies.md.

Other commands:

  • filevet extract --visible-only file.pdf prints only the text a person would see, as a safe extraction step before an AI pipeline.
  • filevet serve and filevet worker run the REST API and its async workers (docs/api.md).
  • filevet analyzers lists the registered analyzers, and filevet version prints the version.

Python

from filevet import Policy, ascan, extract_text, scan

report = scan("invoice.pdf", policy=Policy.load("strict"))
print(report.verdict, report.decision.reason)

report = await ascan(upload_bytes, name="invoice.pdf")
text = extract_text("invoice.pdf", visible_only=True)

examples/ has a FastAPI upload endpoint, an S3 event handler that moves files to a quarantine bucket, and a RAG ingestion script.

CI and pre-commit

The repository is a GitHub Action that scans the documents a pull request adds or changes and uploads SARIF to code scanning:

- uses: actions/checkout@v4
  with:
    fetch-depth: 0
- uses: pablodt00/filevet@v0  # pin to a release tag or commit
  with:
    policy: strict

The job needs security-events: write. For pre-commit:

- repo: https://github.com/pablodt00/filevet
  rev: v0.4.0
  hooks:
    - id: filevet

Integrity findings are signals for review, not proof of fraud. docs/integrity.md explains each technique and its limits. IBANs in the evidence are masked (ES91 **** **** **** **** 1332) unless you pass --no-mask. docs/privacy.md lists what a report can contain.

Exit codes

CI jobs can act on the exit code of filevet scan without parsing the report.

Code Meaning
0 Verdict pass or pass_with_findings
1 Verdict review
2 Verdict block
3 Usage error, including a missing input file, one over the size limit, or an invalid policy
4 Internal error in filevet

With several files, the exit code is the one for the strictest verdict. --fail-on <severity|verdict> replaces these codes with 1 when any file reaches that severity or verdict and 0 otherwise, which is often simpler in CI.

What it checks

Each rule has a page in docs/rules/ that explains what it means, why it matters for finance files, how to fix the file and when it can be a false positive.

Rule ID File types Detects Severity References
basic.type_mismatch All Extension doesn't match the content medium, critical for disguised executables CWE-434
basic.executable All Programs, scripts and .lnk shortcuts high CWE-434
malware.clamav (optional) All Known malware signatures, via a ClamAV sidecar critical ADR 5
malware.yara All Bundled or your own YARA rules: embedded PE and .lnk headers, DDE commands, XXE, PDF auto-run from the rule, medium by default YARA
malware.pdf_active_content PDF JavaScript, launch actions, auto-actions, rich media, XFA, form submission, URIs, embedded files, hex-obfuscated names, filter chains low to critical CWE-829
malware.office_macros XLSX, XLSM, DOCX, DOCM, XLS, DOC VBA, auto-run macros, Shell/CreateObject/URLDownloadToFile, XLM macro sheets, DDE, remote template injection medium to critical ATT&CK T1137, T1221, CVE-2017-0199
malware.embedded_executable All containers PE, ELF, Mach-O, scripts or .lnk files inside another file critical ATT&CK T1027.009
parser.csv_formula_injection CSV, XLSX Cells that spreadsheet apps run as formulas, including hidden prefixes, full-width characters and DDE payloads medium, high OWASP, CWE-1236
parser.xml_unsafe XML, ISO 20022 DTDs, external and parameter entities, entity expansion, XInclude, deep nesting medium to critical CWE-611, CWE-776
parser.archive_bomb ZIP, OOXML Extreme compression ratios, nested archives, too many entries, overlapping entries, quines high, critical CWE-409
parser.path_traversal ZIP, OOXML ../ entries, absolute paths, drive letters, symbolic links high CWE-22
parser.polyglot All Files that are valid as more than one type medium CWE-434
parser.malformed All Broken structure that viewers would repair, each in its own way medium
format.iso20022_schema ISO 20022 XML camt.052/053/054, pain.001/008 and pacs.008 messages that don't match their XSD low ISO 20022
integrity.pdf_incremental_updates PDF Saved again after creation, with what each revision changed info to medium integrity.md
integrity.pdf_revision_diff PDF Text, amounts, IBANs or dates that differ between revisions low, medium integrity.md
integrity.pdf_producer_mismatch PDF Producer changed between revisions, XMP and Info disagree, dates run backwards, unexpected producer for the issuer low, medium integrity.md
integrity.pdf_digital_signature PDF Invalid signatures, content added after signing, untrusted certificates info to high CWE-347
integrity.pdf_text_overlay PDF White boxes over text, text drawn over other text medium integrity.md
integrity.pdf_font_anomaly PDF Digits in a second copy of a font, amount-only fonts, fonts added later low, medium integrity.md
integrity.iban_invalid PDF, text, CSV, XLSX, ISO 20022 IBANs that fail mod-97, length or country checks medium SWIFT: IBAN
integrity.bic_invalid PDF, text, CSV, XLSX, ISO 20022 Malformed BICs, BIC and IBAN from different countries low SWIFT: BIC
integrity.iban_inconsistent PDF, text More than one beneficiary IBAN in a document medium
integrity.iban_not_allowlisted PDF, text, CSV, XLSX, ISO 20022 A known supplier with an IBAN that isn't on record (needs --context) medium
integrity.totals_mismatch PDF, text, ISO 20022 Invoice lines that don't add up, unbalanced statements, camt.053 balances, pain.001 CtrlSum and NbOfTxs medium ISO 20022
integrity.date_anomaly PDF, text, CSV, XLSX, ISO 20022 Impossible dates, bookings long after the value date or outside the statement period, future dates medium ISO 20022
integrity.duplicate_ids ISO 20022 Repeated MsgId, PmtInfId, EndToEndId and other unique references low, medium ISO 20022
ai.hidden_text PDF Text a reader can't see: invisible rendering mode, transparent, white, under 1 pt, off the page, covered by an image. OCR layers over scans aren't flagged medium OWASP LLM01
ai.hidden_text_office DOCX, XLSX Hidden or white runs, hidden and very hidden sheets, hidden rows and columns, white fonts, custom XML parts low, medium OWASP LLM01
ai.metadata_payload PDF, DOCX, XLSX Instruction-like text in Title, Subject, Keywords, XMP or document properties high MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051
ai.unicode_smuggling PDF, Office, CSV, XML, text Unicode tag characters, bidi overrides, zero-width characters inside words, Latin mixed with Cyrillic or Greek look-alikes medium, high Trojan Source
ai.prompt_injection_patterns PDF, Office, CSV, XML, text English and Spanish injection phrases, role markers, exfiltration and tool-call patterns, payment approval instructions. High in hidden text and metadata, low in visible text low, high OWASP LLM01

Configuration

Variable Effect
FILEVET_CLAMD Address of clamd: unix:/path/clamd.sock or tcp:host:port. Without it, ClamAV isn't used
FILEVET_YARA_RULES Directories of extra .yar files, separated by :
FILEVET_XSD_DIR Directory of ISO 20022 XSDs, one <message>.xsd per version, such as camt.053.001.08.xsd

The REST API has its own settings, listed in docs/api.md.

filevet scan --context context.yaml adds what you already know: the IBANs on record for your suppliers, the PDF producers your banks use, and the certificates you trust for signatures. The format is in docs/integrity.md. The context file is never logged or copied into the report.

The synthetic test corpus in tests/corpus/cases/ has one case per threat and per legitimate look-alike. uv run pytest tests/corpus prints a detection matrix showing which rules fire on which case.

Limitations

  • filevet never declares a file safe. It reports what it checked and what it found, and no scanner catches everything.
  • PDFs are scanned as raw objects. Content hidden behind encryption, or behind filters other than Flate, isn't decoded.
  • 7z, RAR and gzip archives are detected but not extracted, so their contents aren't scanned.
  • VBA is found by its source text. P-code-only projects (VBA stomping) can get past it.
  • No ISO 20022 XSDs ship with filevet yet, so schema validation only runs once you supply them.
  • The rules are tested against a synthetic corpus, not real-world malware.
  • It doesn't replace antivirus or EDR, email security, or human review of high-value payments.
  • Integrity checks only see traces of editing. A document forged from scratch, or flattened into a new PDF, looks clean to them. Scanned images aren't read.
  • PDF signatures are checked offline, against the trust roots you supply, without revocation data.
  • Hidden-content checks assume a white page and estimate glyph positions, so text hidden by a dark vector shape, or made unreadable in a way the rules don't model, gets through. The prompt injection patterns are heuristics in English and Spanish only.
  • It doesn't analyze network traffic, attribute malware to families, or store scanned files.

The full scope is in docs/SCOPE.md.

Roadmap

Work is split into phases, each tracked as a milestone: foundations, MVP, integrity checks, platform features (the REST API, policy engine and AI-ingestion checks), and hardening for v1.0.

Contributing

Start with CONTRIBUTING.md. Everyone taking part is expected to follow the Code of Conduct.

Security

Report vulnerabilities privately, as described in SECURITY.md. Please don't open public issues for them.

License

Apache License 2.0. See also NOTICE.

Metadata

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