frontier-scout 2.1.0

Verify in CI that an AI agent's PR stayed within approved scope — fail-closed, with signed evidence.
_{A GitHub Action for the verify side · a policy compiler into native Claude Code controls for the authoring side.}

Quickstart · Verified vs claimed · Policy · CLI · Safety model · Kill criteria

Research preview — technically coherent, not market-validated. No PMF / adoption claim; this project is demand-gated with public kill criteria (KILL_CRITERIA.md). Claude Code first (Codex/Cursor/Copilot are roadmap). Frontier Scout emits native config and verifies evidence — Claude Code and GitHub Actions do the enforcing. Its output is control evidence, not a guarantee that no unsafe action occurred.

The problem

Agent pull requests are saturating human review. Teams want agents to keep shipping — without handing them unconstrained repo, shell, network, and MCP access, and without rubber-stamping diffs nobody can afford to read line by line.

Code review tools judge the content of a change. Nothing in CI answers the mandate question: did this change stay inside what the agent was approved to touch, and is there evidence of what actually ran? That's Frontier Scout: a fail-closed scope verifier for agent PRs, plus a compiler that turns one typed policy into the agent's native controls.

Quickstart: the GitHub Action

Add the verifier to any repo with a frontier-scout.policy.json (one policy init away — see full setup):

name: Frontier Scout verify
on:
  pull_request:
permissions:
  contents: read
jobs:
  verify:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0            # the verifier diffs against the base ref
          persist-credentials: false
      - uses: ajaysurya1221/frontier-scout@v2.1.0
        with:
          advisory: "true"          # onboarding posture: warn, don't block. Drop for a hard gate.
          evidence-artifact: "frontier-scout-evidence"

The Action runs agent verify-pr fail-closed: it exits non-zero when a protected path changed without an action record, the policy drifted from its lock, a record's hash is stale, an action ran despite a deny — or when the diff itself can't be computed (UNVERIFIED is never reported as a pass). It annotates the PR, writes a step summary, and emits a machine-readable evidence JSON.

Signed evidence (optional)

With attest: "true", the evidence JSON is signed via GitHub artifact attestations (Sigstore) — Frontier Scout deliberately rides GitHub's signing rail rather than inventing a receipt protocol:

permissions:
  contents: read
  id-token: write
  attestations: write
steps:
  - uses: ajaysurya1221/frontier-scout@v2.1.0
    with:
      attest: "true"
      evidence-artifact: "frontier-scout-evidence"

Anyone can then verify the evidence independently:

gh attestation verify frontier-scout-evidence.json --owner <org-or-user> \
  --predicate-type https://github.com/ajaysurya1221/frontier-scout/predicate/verify-pr/v1

If attestation is requested and cannot be produced, the Action fails — it never silently degrades to unsigned evidence. (Not available to fork PRs; OIDC.)

What's verified vs what's claimed

Honesty model, load-bearing:

Full setup (policy + local hooks)

pip install frontier-scout

cd your-repo
frontier-scout agent policy init          # conservative frontier-scout.policy.json from a scan
frontier-scout agent compile --target claude --repo . --out .
frontier-scout doctor                      # confirm policy/lock/hooks/workflow are in place

compile writes:

Run Claude Code normally — the hook gates each tool call and writes redacted local action records to .frontier-scout/receipts/. The CI verifier then checks the PR diff against the policy lock and those records. The CLI equivalent of the Action:

frontier-scout agent verify-pr --repo . --base "origin/main" \
  --receipts "frontier-scout-receipts/*.json" --json-out evidence.json

See examples/demo-walkthrough.md for a 90-second fail-closed demo, and examples/sample-repo/ for the end-to-end fixture.

The policy

frontier-scout.policy.json is a typed schema (not a new language), compiled to native config — four dimensions plus approval gates:

{
  "allowed_shell_commands": ["pytest", "git status"],
  "blocked_shell_commands": ["rm -rf", "git push --force"],
  "allowed_file_globs": ["src/**", "tests/**"],
  "protected_file_globs": ["**/migrations/**", ".github/workflows/**", "**/.env"],
  "mcp_server_allowlist": ["github"],
  "required_checks": ["pytest"],
  "approval_gates": ["network", "shell", "credential", "write", "protected-path"]
}

Decisions are fail-closed: anything not provably safe escalates to ask; off-allowlist MCP servers and blocked commands hard-deny.

CLI

Safety model

• Static + read-only. The scan reads file names, never secret contents. The only subprocess is a read-only git diff in verify-pr.
• Emit, don't enforce. Frontier Scout writes native config; Claude Code's hook/permission system enforces locally and GitHub Actions enforces in CI.
• Fail-closed. A missing/malformed policy denies by default; every dangerous capability escalates to approval; a non-empty protected diff without action records fails the PR; an uncomputable diff is UNVERIFIED, never PASS.
• Redacted. Every persisted/emitted string is scrubbed of secret-shaped tokens.
• Honest. It is control evidence, not a guarantee. Local hooks are not a complete enforcement boundary — they are paired with the CI diff verifier on purpose, and unsigned evidence is always labeled a claim (see verified vs claimed). Correctness comes from deterministic compile output, action records, and CI verification — Frontier Scout does not rely on optional Claude Code conveniences like hook input-rewriting or mid-session settings reload (even where current Claude Code supports them).

What we don't build

Frontier Scout writes local action records for PR scope verification and signs evidence through GitHub's attestation rail. It is not a signed receipt protocol, signing daemon, MCP proxy, SDK, dashboard, or ledger. It deliberately reuses wheels that already exist:

• Claude Code — runtime hooks, permissions, and managed settings (local enforcement).
• GitHub Actions — the PR check (CI enforcement).
• GitHub artifact attestations / Sigstore — evidence signing and verification.
• MCP clients / gateways — tool transport.
• Existing receipt / provenance projects (for example, Agent Receipts or Pipelock) — for any future portable receipt format; integrate, don't reinvent.

Roadmap

P0 (shipped): the GitHub Action with signed evidence, the Claude compiler + local action records, the CI verifier. P1 is demand-gated (see KILL_CRITERIA.md): platform-evidence ingestion, Codex adapter, scanner findings as policy inputs — built only when a named design partner asks. See ROADMAP.md.

Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md and AGENTS.md. Tests: PYTEST_DISABLE_PLUGIN_AUTOLOAD=1 python -m pytest -q. Lint/type: make lint, make type.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.