gauntlet

The anti-cheating layer for evaluating self-improving agents.

Your agent has memory now. That makes your agent evaluations quietly lie.

Everyone evaluates their agents, skills, prompts, and AGENTS.md files. Almost nobody audits the evaluator itself. gauntlet closes that gap: sealed holdouts generated from private seeds, a persistence-leak guard that treats your agent's own memory files as the cheating channel they are, and blind paired-arm verdicts (keep / revert / provisional) with repeated-run statistics — because agents are stochastic and a single run proves nothing.

The problem, concretely

You improved a skill. You A/B tested it on your eval tasks. It won. You shipped it. Two weeks later you find out:

• the eval task text was paraphrased into LESSONS.md / now.md / a vector store by the agent during an earlier run — the next runs studied for the test;
• the winning arm won by noise (n=1, no spread reported);
• your provisional → verified promotion was decided by vibes, not a gate.

Benchmark contamination literature worries about pretraining corpora (n-grams, MinHash, memorized MMLU). None of it addresses the agent-native leak path: persistent memory inside the evaluated system itself. gauntlet's threat model starts there.

Quickstart

pipx install gauntlet-guard        # or: uv tool install gauntlet-guard

# one-command proof the tool works before you trust it:
uvx --from gauntlet-guard gauntlet guard selftest

# 1. Register a holdout instance (run this from the PRIVATE side, never in agent context)
gauntlet manifest add ~/.private/eval/manifest.jsonl \
    --instance sched-frostgate-0001 --seed s-77 \
    task-input.txt answer-key.md

# 2. After every eval session: scan the agent's persistent stores for leakage
gauntlet guard scan ~/.private/eval/manifest.jsonl \
    --store ~/agent-workspace/.agent-state/ \
    --store ~/agent-workspace/LESSONS.md \
    --store ~/agent-transcripts/
# findings are reported by hash reference, never by content (see Design principles)
# exit code 1 = leak found → retire the instance, regenerate from an unused seed

# 3. Prove the tool works (synthetic planted leak + skip accounting):
gauntlet guard selftest

We ran our own gauntlet first

The first real scan target was the author's actual agent infrastructure: 12 sealed task instances (the development pack of a private eval suite), scanned against the agent's persistent stores — long-term memory file, journal log, working-state directories, and evaluation run results. 271 files, 3.1 seconds, zero runtime dependencies.

$ gauntlet guard scan manifest.jsonl --store LESSONS.md --store journal.log ...
[NEAR ] results/…/L5-lens-r1/config.py          :: instance L5 (20/217 shingles, 9.22%)
[NEAR ] results/…/L5-lens-r2/config.py          :: instance L5 (14/217 shingles, 6.45%)
[TRACE] results/…/L5-raw-r1/config.py           :: instance L5 (9/217 shingles, 4.15%)
[TRACE] results/…/L5-*/test_config_loader.py    :: instance L5 (6/217 shingles)  ×3
[TRACE] results/…/L1-raw-r1/count_patterns.py   :: instance L1 (3/133 shingles, 2.26%)

scanned 239 file(s), skipped 32 (17 binary, 15 too-large)
7 finding(s).

The result is a perfect demonstration of why this tool exists: the agent's own memory files were clean, but task fixtures persisted verbatim into run-result directories — real, previously uncounted contamination vectors, exactly the failure mode a sealed holdout is designed to survive. Severity tracking is calibrated: shared boilerplate surfaced as TRACE (human look), fixture content surfaced as NEAR (retire it). A control scan of unrelated notes returned clean with no false positives, and the machine-readable report contains zero task text — verified by assertion in CI.

Design principles

1. The scanner must not leak. Guard reports file, word-position, match counts and hash references only — never the matched text. The report is safe to paste into an issue even when the task is secret.
2. Manifests are private keys. Task content lives only in the manifest file; guard consumes it without echoing it. Keep manifests out of any agent-readable surface (chmod 700 the directory).
3. Deterministic first, judge second. Hash/shingle evidence outranks any LLM opinion; guard is fully executable in CI.
4. Leaks are lifecycle events, not warnings. Detection → retire → regenerate from an unused seed. A benchmark instance that leaked once is dead; say so in the record.
5. Verdicts over scores. keep / revert / provisional with ≥N repeated runs and reported spread — an improvement that cannot survive the gauntlet is not an improvement.

How detection works

Task content is fingerprinted into 8-word normalized shingles (unicode-folded, punctuation-free, case-folded → SHA-256 prefixes). A store is scanned in a single pass; findings are classified:

Oversize (>8 MiB default, configurable) and binary files are skipped and reported — a guard that silently hides what it didn't scan is the bug we found on day one of real-world use and refused to keep.

Status

• guard + manifest: shipped (v0.1) — CI on pytest/ruff/ty, selftest in the pipeline
• run (v0.2): shipped — opaque slots, sha-verified isolated workspaces, environment drift detection, tamper-evident seals, blind judge packs. Protocol spec + real transcript: docs/RUN_PROTOCOL.md
• grade (verdict engine, ≥N repeats + spread, provisional→verified lifecycle): next
• grade (verdict engine, ≥N repeats + spread, provisional→verified lifecycle): next
• holdout (seed generators + retirement ledger, contract spec): next

Built from a battle-tested private protocol: doctrine changes tagged PROVISIONAL until they beat the previous version on repeated, holdout-guarded evals — gauntlet is that gauntlet, made a tool.

Development

uv sync
uv run pytest
uv run ruff check && uv run ruff format --check
uv run ty check src/
uv run gauntlet guard selftest
uv run gauntlet run --help

License

MIT