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gpa-verify

Independent verifier for GetProofAnchor evidence bundles.

Reads only the bundled ZIP — no network requests, no GetProofAnchor servers contacted at any point during verification. Same input → same verdict on every machine.

CI PyPI License: MIT


Why does this exist?

A GetProofAnchor evidence bundle is a .zip containing a screenshot, HTML, HAR, video, TLS chain, eIDAS qualified timestamp, OpenTimestamps Bitcoin anchor, and an append-only hash chain. The bundle claims:

This URL existed in this exact form at this exact time.

For court use, the cryptographic part of that claim must be independently verifiable — a forensic expert appointed by a court should be able to confirm or deny it without relying on the GetProofAnchor service.

gpa-verify is the reference implementation of that verification protocol. It runs offline, contacts no external services at runtime, and produces a deterministic verdict.

Scope of verification

This tool verifies the cryptographic seals on an evidence bundle. A successful verdict establishes that the bundle is internally consistent, cryptographically intact since sealing, and bound to a qualified electronic timestamp from an EU-accredited Trust Service Provider.

It does not, on its own, establish that the screenshot or HTML faithfully represent what an ordinary visitor would have seen at the captured URL — that question depends on the trustworthiness of the capture process and is supported (but not proved) by the bundled video recording, HAR network log, and TLS evidence. A complete forensic opinion combines this cryptographic verification with the visual and network record, and any contextual evidence available to the examiner.

See the Threat model section below for a precise statement of what each layer catches and what is out of scope.

Install

pip install gpa-verify

Requires Python 3.9+. Two pure-Python wheels are installed automatically: asn1crypto (RFC3161 / CMS / X.509 parsing) and cryptography (RSA / ECDSA signature verification).

Note on Python command name: On Linux and macOS the command is python3 and pip3; on Windows it is python and pip.

Use

gpa-verify path/to/GetProofAnchor_Evidence_*.zip
GetProofAnchor Evidence Verifier
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  Proof ID:       aeb2b103-d7c5-441c-b540-c0df600a34cf
  Bundle format:  getproofanchor-evidence-2
  Generated at:   2026-05-07T08:30:25Z

  [PASS]  bundle_integrity
          31/31 files OK

  [PASS]  cross_references
          5/5 cross-checks OK

  [PASS]  chain_integrity
          1 entries, all linked

  [PASS]  eidas_signature
          valid RFC3161 token, signed by CN=SK TIMESTAMPING UNIT 2026R,
          gen_time=2026-05-07T08:30:24+00:00

  [PASS]  anchor_canonical_hash
          canonical SHA matches manifest (968f0c691384c87c...)

  [PASS]  ots_receipt
          valid OTS proof for anchor SHA 968f0c69..., bitcoin status=pending

  [PASS]  tls_evidence
          leaf cert SHA-256 matches tls.json (e7668f38708d0411...)

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  ✓ VERIFIED  (7 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped)

JSON output for automation

gpa-verify --json bundle.zip > report.json

Exit codes

Code Meaning
0 All checks passed
1 At least one check failed
2 Invalid arguments / cannot read input
3 Input is not verifiable by itself (unsealed plain copy or unsealed report.pdf without --original)

Forensic Browser outputs

gpa-verify also verifies the outputs of the GetProofAnchor Forensic Browser desktop app. The input kind is detected automatically:

gpa-verify GetProofAnchor_sess-1792572420814.zip            # ZIP package
gpa-verify GetProofAnchor_sess-1792572400480.pdf            # PAdES-sealed PDF
gpa-verify GetProofAnchor_sess-1792572400480.pdf --tsl EE.xml   # + qualified status
gpa-verify GetProofAnchor_sess-1792572400480_bez-pecete.pdf \
           --original GetProofAnchor_sess-1792572400480.pdf # unsealed copy vs. original
Input What a VERIFIED verdict proves
ZIP package (getproofanchor-lite-2) Every file matches manifest.json; every sealed file (screenshots, HTML, HAR, DNS, capture metadata, proof.json, optional MHTML/video — one pages/NN/ directory per captured page) matches the hash listed in timestamp/eidas_payload.json, whose SHA-256 is the message imprint of the RFC 3161 token timestamp/eidas.tsr. The token signature, signed attributes, TSA certificate chain and the TSA's granted status at genTime in the bundled EU Trusted List are checked. Unsealed files (report, token, certificates, TSL snapshot) are reported as such.
Sealed PDF (PAdES document time-stamp, /ETSI.RFC3161) The /ByteRange covers the whole file except the /Contents value; the embedded time-stamp's imprint equals the hash of those bytes, so the report and every embedded artefact (/EmbeddedFiles) existed in this exact form at genTime. Each attachment is listed with its SHA-256 and compared to the embedded manifest.json and proof.json. If revisions were appended after the time-stamp, the sealed revision is parsed on its own and every object of the final document (object streams included) is compared with it; only a Document Security Store (certificate/CRL/OCSP streams, VRI) and further invisible document time-stamps are permitted (LTV). Superseded DSS/VRI objects of earlier LTV revisions (as left by archival time-stamp renewal, e.g. pyHanko ltaupdate) and a raised catalog /Version are accepted. Anything else — including objects not listed in any cross-reference section, an object listed twice in one xref section, a changed generation number, duplicate dictionary keys, or an xref chain that skips the sealed revision — is reported as modified after sealing, with the byte length and SHA-256 of the sealed version. Every document time-stamp in the file is verified: a later (archival) time-stamp from a TSA outside the pinned roots makes the verdict FAILED unless its root is passed with --trust-root.
Plain copy (*_bez-pecete.pdf, unsealed) Alone: nothing — it is reported as NOT VERIFIABLE BY ITSELF (exit 3) together with the identification it carries (sealed file name, SHA-256, session id, time-stamp serial and time, read from its QR code and printed text). With --original: the original is fully verified, and the copy's identification data must match it exactly. It is not proven that the copy's pages are a faithful rendering of the original.

Sealed PDFs embed no Trusted List, so the TSA's qualified status is reported as not checked unless you pass --tsl (a Trusted List .xml or a directory of them; a Forensic Browser/SaaS ZIP is also accepted and its timestamp/tsl/*.xml is used). summary.qualified and the verdict line say which applies: per_supplied_tsl, not_checked or failed. The XML signature of a Trusted List is not verified, so a list taken from an evidence file is only as trustworthy as that file. For an independent check, download the official list of the TSA's member state (Estonia: https://sr.riik.ee/tsl/estonian-tsl.xml) and pass it with --tsl. --certs PEM adds TSA CA certificates for chain building.

Pinned trust roots (tsa_trust_root)

A Trusted List or root certificate shipped inside an evidence file comes from the same party as the timestamp, so on its own it proves nothing. Every input therefore also runs tsa_trust_root. The TSA signer certificate must:

  • chain to a root key pinned inside gpa-verify (src/gpa_verify/trust.py), every link's signature verified, every issuer a CA certificate (basicConstraints cA, keyUsage keyCertSign, pathLenConstraint) and every certificate valid at genTime;
  • be issued directly by an SK time-stamping CA (SK TSA CA 2023R) or, for SK's older TSA certificates, directly by EE Certification Centre Root CA. The same roots also anchor SK's ID-card, Smart-ID and e-seal CAs; a certificate issued under those cannot pass as a TSA;
  • carry exactly the critical id-kp-timeStamping extended key usage and not be a CA.

Pinned roots:

Root SHA-256 (DER)
SK ID Solutions ROOT G1R d012da1a62193928c5b4d89d2a72495b1f77ea5d54f23956bc1df2f75528fefb
SK ID Solutions ROOT G1E a272de102a8038f7e100eacfb6db1c930d3cb9f51d76b218de3a4a433bcfd182
EE Certification Centre Root CA 3e84ba4342908516e77573c0992f0979ca084e4685681ff195ccba8a229b8a76

These are the roots of SK ID Solutions AS, the qualified trust service provider whose TSA GetProofAnchor and the Forensic Browser use; compare them with https://c.sk.ee/. SK TSA CA 2023R (SHA-256 cce90c83b505f4bb21ce618ca77e607b8593018b5aa3ee34d7007eb1f2bf11ac) is bundled as the pinned time-stamping CA; it also completes the chain offline for sealed PDFs. A timestamp from any other TSA fails this check unless you trust its root explicitly with --trust-root root.pem (repeatable); under a root you supply, any CA chain to it is accepted.

Limits on hostile input

PDFs: at most 64 MB per decoded stream and 256 MB per document, predictor parameters must fit the data, at most 64 signature dictionaries. ZIPs: at most 1 GiB per member, 4 GiB in total, compression ratio 1000:1 for members above 16 MiB, no duplicate member names. Inputs beyond these limits FAIL.

The formats are documented in docs/forensic-browser-formats.md. The PDF parser and the QR-code reader are small pure-Python modules — no extra dependencies.

What it actually checks

A SaaS ZIP runs 12 checks (the layers below plus tsl_qualified, file_digest, the informational anchor witness, anchor_inclusion and tsa_trust_root), each tightening the forensic claim. Every check that applies must pass for a VERIFIED verdict.

Layer 1 — Bundle integrity

Every file declared in manifest.json exists and its SHA-256 matches. Catches any byte-level tampering with the bundle.

Layer 2 — Cross-references

proof.json's SHA-256 claims for screenshot.png, page.html, content.txt, and capture/capture_meta.json agree with actual file contents. Sidecar *.sha256 files agree. Catches selective tamper that fixes one file but forgets another.

Layer 3 — Chain integrity

chain/proof_chain.jsonl entries form a valid hash chain: entry_hash == SHA256(prev_hash | event_type | proof_id | data_hash), recursively verified. chain/chain_head.json matches the last entry. Catches tampering with the append-only event log.

Layer 4 — eIDAS signature

This is the cryptographic heart of the verification. The RFC3161 token in timestamp/eidas.tsr is verified for:

  1. Status — token grant status is granted or granted_with_mods.
  2. Imprint — the message digest the TSA signed equals SHA256(timestamp/eidas_payload.json). Binds the timestamp to this evidence bundle, not someone else's.
  3. CMS signature — the SignedData blob is verified against the signer certificate's public key, with proper signed-attributes re-encoding ([0] → SET OF per RFC 5652).
  4. timeStamping EKU — the signer certificate has the id-kp-timeStamping Extended Key Usage. Defends against substitution from a non-timestamping certificate.

Together these prove the token can ONLY have been issued by the named TSA, and ONLY for our exact payload.

Supported signature algorithms: RSA-PKCS1v15, ECDSA, RSA-PSS (across SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 digests).

TSA trust root (tsa_trust_root, 1.6.0)

The signer certificate must be issued by the pinned SK time-stamping CA and chain through CA certificates to a root pinned in gpa-verify (see Pinned trust roots above). tsl_qualified (the bundled EU Trusted List) remains an additional check of the TSA's qualified status at genTime.

Layer 5 — Anchor canonical hash

manifest.anchor.payload_sha256 equals SHA-256 of the canonical JSON of anchor/anchor_payload.json (sorted keys, no whitespace, UTF-8). Catches anchor receipts pointing to a different chain than ours.

Layer 6 — OTS receipt structure

anchor/anchor_receipt.ots is a valid OpenTimestamps proof and its file-hash field equals the anchor canonical SHA. Catches substituted Bitcoin anchors. (Full Bitcoin block confirmation requires a Bitcoin node and is therefore out of scope; use the ots client for that.)

Layer 7 — TLS evidence

tls/leaf_cert.pem SHA-256 fingerprint matches the network/tls.json claim. Confirms the TLS leaf certificate stored in the bundle is the same one observed at capture time.

Anchor witness (informational)

chain/anchor_witness.jsonl links this proof's chain entry to the chain head covered by the OpenTimestamps anchor; since 1.6.0 the last witness seq must equal the anchored seq. The witness carries only (seq, prev_hash, entry_hash) and those hashes cannot be recomputed from the bundle, so this check is informational — it is not proof that the Bitcoin anchor covers the evidence, and it never fails a bundle on its own account beyond detecting an inconsistent witness.

Anchor inclusion (anchor v3, since 1.6.0)

Bundles generated since 2026-10-21 carry anchor/inclusion.json once the proof has been included in an anchor — normally within minutes of the qualified timestamp; older downloads do not gain it (re-download). The check recomputes

leaf = SHA256("gpa-anchor-leaf-v3" 0x00 proof_id 0x00 SHA256(timestamp/eidas_payload.json))

walks the RFC 6962 audit path (leaf node SHA256(0x00‖leaf), inner node SHA256(0x01‖left‖right), verified per RFC 9162 §2.1.3.2 with leaf_index / leaf_count) to merkle_root, and confirms that the v3 anchor payload commits to that root, that SHA-256 of the canonical anchor payload equals anchor_payload_sha256 and the shipped payload file, and that the .ots receipt header names that digest and carries an attestation.

verified (PASS) means exactly: content ↔ eIDAS payload whose qualified timestamp verified in eidas_signature (signature, messageDigest, imprint) ↔ Merkle root ↔ OTS receipt digest. Bitcoin block confirmation of the content anchor's receipt is a separate result (extra.bitcoin_verification, only with --bitcoin-rpc; or run ots verify -f <anchor payload file> <receipt>). That GetProofAnchor issued the anchor is shown only by the online verifier's anchor registry.

Results: verified (PASS), unverifiable (SKIP — unparsable or attestation-less receipt, or the payload's qualified timestamp did not verify; see extra.reasons), not_present (SKIP), failed (FAIL).

Threat model

gpa-verify defends against the following attacks:

Attack Caught by
Modify any file (image, HTML, HAR, etc.) Layer 1
Modify file + manifest SHA Layer 2 (proof.json)
Modify chain entry Layer 3
Forge eIDAS payload + update all SHAs Layer 4 (imprint mismatch)
Substitute eIDAS token from non-TSA cert Layer 4 (EKU check)
Self-made TSA + edited Trusted List inside the bundle tsa_trust_root (pinned SK roots)
Substitute anchor for a different chain Layer 5
Substitute OTS receipt Layer 6
Substitute leaf TLS cert Layer 7
Fabricated chain witness (hashes only) Anchor witness (last seq must equal anchored seq; informational)
Graft another proof's inclusion proof / edit eIDAS payload under a v3 anchor Anchor inclusion

It does not verify:

  • Whether the OpenTimestamps receipt has been confirmed in a Bitcoin block. This requires an online Bitcoin node — use the ots client.
  • Whether the TSA's certificate is currently listed on the EU Trusted List. The bundle includes a snapshot of the EU Trusted List as supporting context, but real-time validation against the live list is out of scope for an offline tool.
  • Whether the captured page actually showed what the screenshot shows. This is a content question, not a cryptographic one. The bundled capture.webm video, HAR network log, and TLS evidence exist to support that forensic judgement, but interpreting them is the job of a qualified examiner.

API

from gpa_verify import verify_bytes

kind, report = verify_bytes(open("any-output.pdf", "rb").read())
print(kind, report.summary["verdict"])   # e.g. "sealed_pdf VERIFIED"
from gpa_verify import verify_evidence_zip

with open("evidence.zip", "rb") as f:
    report = verify_evidence_zip(f.read())

if report.all_passed:
    print(f"VERIFIED  proof {report.proof_id}")
else:
    for c in report.checks:
        if not c.passed and not c.skipped:
            print(f"FAIL  {c.name}: {c.detail}")

Building from source

git clone https://github.com/Getproofanchor/gpa-verify.git
cd gpa-verify
pip install -e .[dev]
pytest

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

This tool is published as open source so any forensic expert, court-appointed examiner, or independent journalist can audit the verification logic line by line. The cryptographic algorithms used (RFC 3161, CMS / RFC 5652, X.509, SHA-256, RSA, ECDSA, OpenTimestamps) are open standards.

Standards & references

  • eIDAS Regulation (EU) 910/2014, Article 41 — qualified electronic timestamps and their legal effect across EU Member States
  • ETSI EN 319 422 — Time-stamping protocol and electronic time-stamp profiles
  • ETSI EN 319 421 — Policy and security requirements for trust service providers issuing time-stamps
  • ETSI EN 319 102-1 — Procedures for creation and validation of AdES digital signatures
  • ISO/IEC 27037:2012 — Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence
  • RFC 3161 — Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)
  • RFC 5652 — Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
  • RFC 5280 — X.509 certificates
  • OpenTimestamps — Bitcoin-anchored timestamps
  • EU Trusted List — qualified TSPs

Metadata

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