har2cli
Turn an authenticated browser HAR into a redacted HTTP contract, then hand one GET endpoint to agtcli for packaging as a CLI.
har2cli derives and tests the request. agtcli owns the generated CLI
contract. A HAR does not explain domain intent, so the generated get command
is a starting point, not a claim that the API has been understood completely.
Agent skill
The checkout exposes skill/ as the project-local $har2cli skill through
.agents/skills/har2cli. Agents launched in this repo can use it to learn one
read-only action with $chrome, guide a focused HAR export, and generate the
CLI. The detailed workflow stays with the code and calls har2cli --help for
the current command contract.
Install
uv tool install har2cli # or: pip install har2cli
har2cli --help
From a clone instead:
uv sync
uv tool install --editable .
Recipes
Import an existing HAR, then inspect likely application calls:
har2cli import orders.har
har2cli endpoints
har2cli inspect req-42
The latest import becomes active. endpoints hides static assets, analytics,
preflights, and non-HTTP entries. The classifier is intentionally inspectable,
not an SDK generator.
Replay one captured GET. --max-cost 1 makes the intended request budget
explicit:
har2cli replay req-42 --max-cost 1
Redirects are returned rather than followed. POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE are
refused before a connection is opened. Loopback, private, link-local, and
reserved destinations are refused by default. After inspecting a trusted HAR,
use --allow-private for an intended intranet service.
Find which captured credential names are needed:
har2cli auth-bisect req-42 --max-cost 10
This sends a baseline GET followed by capped elimination probes. It reports
names such as cookie:session or header:Authorization; values never enter
the output. It compares status, content type, login redirects, and response
shape. Treat the result as evidence for this endpoint and session, not a
general authentication specification. Two domain states can still have the
same shape.
The probe is not authoritative without a service-specific login predicate, so scaffolding keeps every captured credential candidate by default. After you review and accept the endpoint-specific evidence, opt in for that one scaffold:
har2cli scaffold orders --request req-42 --accept-auth-bisect
The command refuses missing, malformed, or stale bisection evidence. Its JSON output records whether auth came from captured candidates or an accepted bisection and lists every omitted candidate name.
Generate one agtcli CLI from the selected contract:
har2cli scaffold orders --request req-42
cd orders
uv sync
uv run pytest -q
The generated project contains a redacted endpoint manifest, a structure-only
response fixture, credential and transport hooks, one get command, contract
tests, and the weak-agent-test reminder.
From the scaffold's parent directory, target its uv project explicitly:
uv run --project ./orders orders --help
Stored data
State lives in ~/.har2cli/; set HAR2CLI_CONFIG_DIR to relocate it. Imported
captures are sanitized before they are written. Replay-only values are kept in
a separate 0600 sidecar and are never returned by inspect, including with
--raw. State directories are 0700.
Redaction recognizes common credential names and shapes, echoed request secrets, cookies, signed query fields, and obvious secret-bearing path segments. It cannot infer every domain-specific identifier, so keep capture state private and inspect a contract before scaffolding it.
The source HAR is not modified or deleted. It still contains the browser's original credentials, so handle it as a secret.
A HAR is also executable network input. Import can inspect any HAR, but replay only one you trust. Captured field names remain data in the endpoint contract; generated Markdown escapes them instead of treating them as instructions.
Version-one boundary
This version imports an existing HAR and handles ordinary HTTP GET requests. Browser capture, mutating methods, pagination, refresh tokens, WebSockets, and lifecycle probing are not implemented.
For agents
har2cli --help owns the operating rules and exit-code table. Under --json,
stdout is one JSON document; notes and errors also go to stderr.
Development
uv sync
uv run pytest -q
uv run agtcli check .
The agtcli framework installs from PyPI.
Metadata
Release files for har2cli 0.1.0
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Total release size: 89.2 kB
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