hardax 5.21.0

Hardening Audit eXaminer: security configuration auditor for Android-based devices (POS, IoT, automotive, medical, kiosk)

HARDAX

pip install hardax

---

Overview

HARDAX (Hardening Audit eXaminer) is a comprehensive security configuration auditor for Android-based devices. It performs 780 security checks across 28 categories to identify misconfigurations, vulnerabilities, and security weaknesses.

HARDAX is designed for:

• Security Researchers - Penetration testing and vulnerability assessment
• IoT Security Teams - Auditing Android-based IoT devices
• POS Security Auditors - PCI-DSS compliance verification for payment terminals
• Enterprise Security - MDM compliance verification
• Developers - Pre-release security validation

---

Features

Feature	Description
780 Security Checks	Comprehensive coverage across 28 security categories
Deterministic Analysis Engine	Offline risk score (0-100), attack-chain correlation, prioritised remediation - reasons only over confirmed findings, no LLM, no network, no hallucination
Optional AI Narrative	Opt-in --ai LLM summary on top of the deterministic engine (local Ollama, or Anthropic/OpenAI with your own key). Sends only the redacted analysis summary, never raw device output. Off by default
POS/Payment Terminal Support	24 PCI-DSS focused checks for payment devices
Malware & Hooking Detection	18 checks for rootkits, RATs, Frida, Xposed, keyloggers, memory scrapers
Certificate Audit	CA certificate analysis with expiry/age calculation - 25 checks
Root Auto-Detection	Detects root method (Magisk/SuperSU/su/ssh-root/uart-root) and adapts privilege escalation accordingly
ADB Resilience	5-layer protection: connection check, auto-reconnect, timeout, SKIPPED status
Triple Connection Modes	ADB (USB/Network), SSH, and UART serial console support
UART Shell Support	Connect over serial console with auto baud detection, user/root shell identification
SSH Root Awareness	Detects when SSH session is already root - skips unnecessary su probing
6 Status Levels	SAFE, WARNING, CRITICAL, VERIFY, INFO, SKIPPED
5 Report Formats	TXT, CSV, a detailed XLSX workbook, an interactive HTML dashboard, and machine-readable JSON
Smart False Positive Prevention	Catches empty output, service unavailability, and transport errors - marks as SKIPPED not CRITICAL
Extensible JSON Checks	Easy to add custom security checks - drop JSON, run
Baseline Tamper Detection	--save-baseline captures integrity values (VBMeta digest/size, adbd SHA-256); --baseline compares later audits and flags any change CRITICAL
Beautiful CLI Output	Color-coded real-time progress display
Device Info Collection	Automatic device fingerprinting
Shell Environment Probe	SSH mode probes busybox, toybox, getprop, bash availability on connect

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Supported Devices

HARDAX works with any Android-based device accessible via ADB, SSH, or UART:

Device Type	Examples
POS Terminals	PAX, Verifone, Ingenico, Sunmi, Newland, Clover, Square
Smartphones & Tablets	Samsung, Pixel, OnePlus, Xiaomi, etc.
IoT Devices	Android Things, AOSP-based smart devices
Collaboration Panels	Poly, Neat, Webex Board
Android Automotive	Infotainment systems, head units
Medical Devices	Android-based clinical devices
Industrial Android	Rugged tablets, handheld scanners
Android TV	Smart TVs, set-top boxes
Wearables	Wear OS devices

---

Installation

Prerequisites

• Python 3.10 or higher
• ADB (Android Debug Bridge) installed and in PATH
• USB Debugging enabled on target device

Install with pip (recommended)

pip install hardax

paramiko, pyserial, and cryptography are pulled in automatically so all four modes (ADB, SSH, UART, certificate audit) work out of the box.

The [ssh], [uart], [certs], [all] extras still exist for backward compat with any script that used them; they are now no-ops since the deps are required.

After installation the hardax console command is available:

adb devices
hardax

Install from source (development)

git clone https://github.com/V33RU/hardax.git
cd hardax
pip install -e '.[all]'

# Or run without installing
python3 -m hardax

---

Usage

Basic Usage (ADB)

# Auto-detect connected device
hardax

# Show commands being executed
hardax --show-commands

# Load all check files from commands/ directory
hardax --json-dir commands

# Specify device by serial
hardax --serial DEVICE_SERIAL

# Custom output directory
hardax --out ./my_reports

# Skip certificate audit
hardax --skip-certs

# Analysis is on by default. Weight prioritisation for a device profile:
hardax --profile pos        # or: medical, kiosk, automotive, iot, generic

# Disable the analysis layer entirely
hardax --no-analyze

Analysis Engine

After the checks run, HARDAX adds a deterministic analysis layer that reasons only over the findings it already confirmed - it runs no extra commands, makes no network calls, and never invents a finding. It produces:

• a risk score (0-100) and letter grade,
• attack chains correlated from confirmed findings (a chain only appears when every supporting finding is actually present),
• a prioritised "fix in this order" list (chain members and profile-relevant categories are weighted up),
• a VERIFY triage grouping the manual-review items.

It is fully offline and deterministic (no LLM), so it is safe to run against POS, medical, and other sensitive devices. The output appears in the terminal summary, the HTML report, the TXT report, and under the analysis key of the JSON report (--json-out).

Optional AI Narrative (--ai)

On top of the deterministic engine you can add an opt-in LLM narrative that explains the findings in plain language. It is off by default and never replaces the deterministic analysis - it only re-phrases and connects the findings the engine already confirmed, and is instructed never to introduce a vulnerability that was not in the data.

# Local, fully offline (recommended for sensitive devices) - needs Ollama running
hardax --ai --ai-provider ollama --ai-model llama3

# Anthropic (key from ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var, or --ai-key)
hardax --ai --ai-provider anthropic

# OpenAI
hardax --ai --ai-provider openai --ai-model gpt-4o-mini

Privacy model:

• Only the redacted structured analysis is sent (risk score, finding labels, categories, statuses, remediation text). The raw output of each check is never sent - so serials, PHI strings, IPs and ports do not leave the machine. A redaction backstop also scrubs IP/MAC/hex tokens.
• Ollama runs locally and sends nothing off-machine.
• Cloud providers (Anthropic/OpenAI) print a one-time data-egress warning and require consent (interactive, or --ai-yes for CI).
• API keys are read from env vars or --ai-key and are never stored, logged, or written to the report.
• If the model is unavailable or errors, the audit still completes on the deterministic engine alone.

The narrative appears as a clearly-labelled, visually distinct block in the CLI, HTML and TXT reports, and under analysis.ai_narrative in JSON. It is not a HARDAX finding and is marked as such.

SSH Mode (Network)

hardax --mode ssh --host 192.168.1.100 --ssh-user root --ssh-pass password

The target host's SSH key must be in ~/.ssh/known_hosts first, otherwise the connection is refused (strict host-key checking, the safe default). Populate it once with:

ssh-keyscan -H -t ed25519,rsa 192.168.1.100 >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts

For CI / lab environments auditing many fresh devices where pre-population is impractical, pass --ssh-tofu to silently accept unknown host keys on first contact. A clear warning is printed each time:

hardax --mode ssh --host 192.168.1.100 --ssh-user root --ssh-pass "$AUDIT_PASS" --ssh-tofu

The SSH password can also come from the HARDAX_SSH_PASS environment variable, which keeps it out of ps and shell history.

UART Mode (Serial Console)

# Auto-detect baud rate
hardax --mode uart --uart-port /dev/ttyUSB0

# Specify baud rate
hardax --mode uart --uart-port /dev/ttyUSB0 --baud 115200

# Windows
hardax --mode uart --uart-port COM3 --baud 115200

Network ADB

adb connect 192.168.1.100:5555
hardax --json-dir commands

Baseline / Tamper Detection

Integrity values such as the AVB VBMeta digest, VBMeta size, and the adbd SHA-256 are device- and build-specific, so there is no universal "safe" value to hard-code. Instead, capture a known-good baseline on a trusted device and compare future audits against it. Any check carrying a baseline_key participates automatically.

# 1. Capture a known-good baseline on a trusted, freshly-flashed device
hardax --save-baseline baseline.json

# 2. On later audits, compare against it. A changed value is reported CRITICAL (tamper)
hardax --baseline baseline.json

# Gate CI on tampering (exit 2 when any baseline value changed)
hardax --baseline baseline.json --exit-code

The baseline file records the device fingerprint, so HARDAX warns if you compare against a baseline captured on a different build (where the values legitimately differ). Connection/transport errors mark a check SKIPPED, and a key absent from the baseline is reported VERIFY (nothing to compare). But a value that the baseline recorded yet the device fails to return on the same build is treated as a CRITICAL tamper/evasion indicator (fail closed), so an attacker cannot silence the check by making it return nothing.

All Options

usage: hardax [OPTIONS]

Options:
  --version             Show version
  --mode {adb,ssh,uart} Connection mode (default: adb)
  --serial SERIAL       ADB device serial number
  --host HOST           SSH hostname/IP
  --port PORT           SSH port (default: 22)
  --ssh-user USER       SSH username
  --ssh-pass PASS       SSH password (also accepts HARDAX_SSH_PASS env var)
  --ssh-tofu            SSH trust-on-first-use: silently accept unknown
                        host keys (CI / lab convenience; weakens MITM
                        protection on first connection). Default off.
  --uart-port PORT      UART serial port (e.g. /dev/ttyUSB0, COM3)
  --baud RATE           UART baud rate (0 = auto-detect, default: 0)
  --json FILE           Path to single JSON checks file
  --json-dir DIR        Directory with JSON check files
  --out DIR             Output directory (default: hardax_output)
  --progress-numbers    Show numeric progress counter
  --show-commands       Display each command being executed
  --skip-certs          Skip certificate audit
  --save-baseline FILE  Capture a known-good baseline of integrity values
                        (checks with a baseline_key) for later comparison
  --baseline FILE       Compare integrity values against a saved baseline;
                        a changed value is reported CRITICAL (tamper)

Hidden debug flags (prefix before other args):
  --net-debug           Verbose network check output
  --net-strict          Strict network check mode
  --cert-debug          Verbose certificate audit output
  --cert-limit N        Limit certificate files scanned (default: 50)

---

Security Categories

HARDAX organizes 780 checks into 28 security categories:

Category	Checks	Description
SYSTEM	86	Kernel, memory, TEE (QSEE/Mobicore/TEEGRIS/Trusty), SECCOMP, time, power, build properties, emulator detection, SIM status, device provisioning, WebView
BLUETOOTH	82	BLE/Classic, pairing, profiles (PAN, HFP, A2DP, HID, SPP, OPP, MAP), L2CAP, ATT, SMP, GAP, attack surfaces
NETWORK	61	Ports, WiFi, cellular (incl. Allow 2G), VPN, MQTT, CoAP, CAN bus, HL7, DICOM, hotspot WPA mode, active connections
PRIVACY	42	Screen lock, location, sensors, clipboard, audio, Android 13+ Restricted Settings
APPS	47	Permissions, overlay attacks, install sources, backup audit, APK signature scheme, QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES, REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES
BINARY_HARDENING	36	PIE, NX, RELRO, stack canaries, stripped symbols, ASLR, kptr_restrict
PARTITION	35	dm-verity, OverlayFS, A/B slots, FBE/FDE, mount flags (noexec / nosuid / nodev on /data, /storage/emulated, /mnt/media_rw, /cache, /metadata), block device permissions
SELINUX	30	SELinux enforcement, policy version, audit, context, boot flags
CERTIFICATE_AUDIT	25	CA certificates, user certs, pinning bypass, keystore, expiry analysis
POS_SECURITY	24	PCI-DSS compliance, payment apps, kiosk mode, RAM scraper, NFC relay, PAX CVE
STORAGE	24	Filesystem, backup, encryption, partitions
FORENSIC_INDICATORS	22	Crash history, kernel panics, logcat anomalies, temp artifacts, clipboard forensics
ATTESTATION	20	SafetyNet/Play Integrity, Knox warranty bit, TIMA, RKP, Titan M, fs-verity, bypass detection
AUTOMOTIVE	20	Vehicle-specific checks, CAN bus, infotainment
BOOT_SECURITY	27	Verified boot, AVB (VBMeta digest/hash-alg/size/version), dm-verity error modes (incl. restart, bootconfig-aware), custom root of trust (verifiedbootstate=yellow), bootloader, integrity
CRYPTOGRAPHY	20	Encryption, keys, credentials, API keys, certificates, kernel entropy, Widevine DRM level
MALWARE	18	Root/Magisk/SuperSU, Frida, Xposed/LSPosed, RATs, keyloggers, memory scrapers, root cloaking
CIS_BENCHMARK	17	CIS Android Benchmark v1.6.0 controls (89% coverage)
USB_SECURITY	16	USB debugging, interfaces, serial ports, gadget mode
CVE_INDICATORS	33	Dirty Pipe, Bad Binder, Dirty COW, MTK-su, Exynos baseband, Mali GPU, kernel CVE ranges, WebView debugging
DEVICE_MANAGEMENT	13	MDM, accounts, developer options
INPUT	12	Keyboards, accessibility, input methods, IME INTERNET audit, kbd layout, clipboard auto-clear
MEDICAL	11	Medical device-specific checks, IEEE 11073 PHD pairing, PACS C-STORE, insulin/cardiac telemetry
NFC_SECURITY	9	NFC state, Android Beam, tap-to-pay, reader mode, secure element (eSE/UICC), tag write protection, HCE AID priority
ADB_SECURITY	8	ADB keys, network ADB allowlist, debugging, shell privilege, USB-debug notify, adbd integrity hash
MODERN_ANDROID	9	Android 13/14/15/16/17 surface: Photo Picker, READ_MEDIA_*, POST_NOTIFICATIONS, FGS type, Theft Detection Lock, Identity Check, Restricted Networking, Advanced Protection, A17 Local Network Access
MDM_POLICY	15	DevicePolicyManager state via dumpsys device_policy: management state, keyguard/camera policy, lock/wipe, password, audit logging, USB signaling, Common Criteria, MTE, app control, permission policy, Wi-Fi lockdown, A15 privacy, system update, permitted accessibility/input
BIOMETRIC	5	Fingerprint/face enrollment, biometric strength (Class 3 Strong vs Weak), biometric keyguard, auto-lock after biometric

---

Report Formats

Every run writes TXT, CSV, a detailed XLSX workbook and an interactive HTML dashboard (plus JSON with --json-out) into a timestamped folder under --out.

Interactive HTML dashboard

• Summary Dashboard - total checks and per-severity counts (click a card to filter), doughnut chart
• Deterministic Analysis card - risk score, grade, attack chains, and the fix-in-order priorities
• Device Information - model, Android version, build, serial, SoC
• Collapsible categories with per-category severity badges
• Per-check technical detail - description, why it matters, risk if failed, expected secure state, the exact command and its output, remediation, and compliance chips (check ID, NIST 800-53, CIS, tags)
• Certificate Audit Table - CA certificates with expiry dates and risk status
• Search & Filter - find checks by label, description, ID, NIST control or tag

Detailed XLSX workbook

A multi-sheet, audit-grade Excel workbook:

• Summary - risk score / grade / posture, findings-by-severity, device info, and a per-category breakdown
• Findings - one row per check with the full technical context (category, ID, label, status, level, why it matters, risk if failed, expected secure state, command, output, description, remediation, NIST 800-53, CIS, tags, baseline), colour-coded by severity, with a frozen header row and auto-filter
• Certificates - the CA certificate audit
• Analysis - correlated attack chains and the prioritised remediation order

---

Extending HARDAX

Adding Custom Checks

Create or modify JSON files in the commands/ directory:

{
  "checks": [
    {
      "category": "CUSTOM",
      "label": "My Custom Port Check",
      "command": "netstat -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep ':8080'",
      "safe_pattern": "^$",
      "level": "warning",
      "description": "Check if port 8080 is open",
      "empty_is_safe": true
    }
  ]
}

JSON Check Fields

Field	Required	Description
category	Yes	Category name (e.g. SYSTEM, NETWORK)
label	Yes	Human-readable check name
command	Yes	Shell command to run on device
safe_pattern	Yes	Regex pattern that indicates a safe result
level	Yes	Severity: info, warning, critical
description	Yes	What the check detects
empty_is_safe	No	If true, empty output = SAFE
why	No	Explanation of why this matters
risk_if_fail	No	What risk the failure represents
nist_800_53	No	Relevant NIST 800-53 control IDs
id	No	Unique check identifier (e.g. BT-001)
baseline_key	No	Opt the check into --save-baseline / --baseline tamper detection under this key (e.g. vbmeta_digest)

---

Project Structure

HARDAX/
├── pyproject.toml         # Package metadata, dependencies, entry point
├── README.md              # This file
├── LICENSE                # MIT
└── hardax/                # The installable Python package
    ├── __init__.py        # Main engine (was hardax.py)
    ├── __main__.py        # Enables 'python -m hardax'
    ├── analysis.py        # Deterministic risk engine (score, attack chains, prioritisation)
    ├── ai.py              # Optional opt-in LLM narrative (Ollama/Anthropic/OpenAI, stdlib only)
    ├── templates/
    │   └── report.html    # Interactive HTML report template
    └── commands/          # Security check definitions (780 checks, 28 categories)
        ├── system.json        #  86 checks - Kernel, TEE (QSEE/Mobicore/TEEGRIS/Trusty), SECCOMP, build, emulator, WebView
        ├── bluetooth.json     #  82 checks - BLE/Classic, pairing, all profiles
        ├── network.json       #  61 checks - Ports, WiFi, VPN, IoT protocols, Allow 2G, hotspot WPA
        ├── privacy.json       #  42 checks - Screen lock, location, sensors, clipboard, Restricted Settings
        ├── biometric.json     #   5 checks - Fingerprint/face enrollment, biometric strength (Strong/Weak), keyguard, auto-lock
        ├── apps.json          #  47 checks - Permissions, overlay, backup, install, APK signature scheme
        ├── binary_hardening.json # 36 checks - PIE, NX, RELRO, stack canaries, ASLR
        ├── partition.json     #  35 checks - dm-verity, A/B slots, FBE, mount flags (noexec/nosuid/nodev)
        ├── selinux.json       #  30 checks - Enforcement, policy version, audit
        ├── certificate_audit.json # 25 checks - CA certs, expiry, MITM
        ├── pos_security.json  #  24 checks - PCI-DSS, kiosk, NFC relay, PAX CVE
        ├── storage.json       #  24 checks - Encryption, partitions, backup
        ├── forensic_indicators.json # 22 checks - Crashes, logcat, temp artifacts
        ├── attestation.json   #  20 checks - SafetyNet/Play Integrity, Knox, Titan M, bypass detection
        ├── automotive.json    #  20 checks - Vehicle, CAN bus, infotainment
        ├── boot_security.json #  27 checks - Verified boot, AVB (VBMeta digest/hash/size/ver), dm-verity error modes, verifiedbootstate=yellow
        ├── cryptography.json  #  20 checks - Keystore, StrongBox, kernel entropy, Widevine DRM
        ├── malware.json       #  18 checks - Root, Frida, Xposed, RATs, scrapers
        ├── cis_benchmark.json #  17 checks - CIS Android Benchmark v1.6.0
        ├── usb_security.json  #  16 checks - USB debug, MTP, gadget mode
        ├── cve_indicators.json # 33 checks - Dirty Pipe, Bad Binder, MTK-su, kernel CVEs, WebView debug
        ├── device_management.json # 13 checks - MDM, accounts, dev options
        ├── input.json         #  12 checks - Keyboards, accessibility, IME INTERNET audit, kbd layout, clipboard auto-clear
        ├── medical.json       #  11 checks - Medical apps, IEEE 11073 PHD, PACS C-STORE, insulin/cardiac telemetry
        ├── nfc_security.json  #   9 checks - NFC, reader mode, secure element, tag write protection, HCE AID priority
        ├── adb_security.json  #   8 checks - ADB keys, network ADB allowlist, shell privilege, USB-debug notify, adbd integrity
        ├── modern_android.json #  9 checks - A13/A14/A15/16/17: Photo Picker, READ_MEDIA_*, POST_NOTIFICATIONS, FGS type, Theft/Identity, Restricted Networking, Advanced Protection, A17 Local Network Access
        └── mdm_policy.json    #  15 checks - DevicePolicyManager state (dumpsys device_policy): keyguard, camera, lock/wipe, logging, USB signaling, MTE, Wi-Fi lockdown, etc.

---

Roadmap

Shipped

• --category flag to run specific categories (v5.0.0)
• --severity flag to filter by level (v5.0.0)
• --json-out for machine-readable JSON output (v5.0.0)
• --exit-code for CI/CD integration, exit 0/1/2 (v5.0.0)
• Branch-protected main with PR workflow (v5.0.0)
• CI workflow validates every commands/*.json regex (v5.0.0)
• 20 new checks: mount-flag hardening, Restricted Settings, Allow 2G, Hotspot WPA, kernel entropy, Widevine DRM level, SELinux policy version, APK signature scheme, app permission audits, WebView SafeBrowsing and debug (v5.1.0)
• Lock Screen Timeout false-positive fix (v5.1.0)
• Pip-installable Python package, pip install hardax (v5.2.0)
• PyPI Trusted Publishing on every GitHub release (v5.2.1)
• 5 new SELinux checks from the 8ksec internals audit (v5.3.0)
• Supply-chain hardening: SHA-pinned actions + Sigstore attestations on every wheel (v5.3.1)
• Python 3.10 support (v5.3.3)
• Safe SSH host-key default restored, --ssh-tofu opt-in for CI / lab convenience (v5.3.3)
• 6 AVB metadata-integrity checks - VBMeta digest, hash algorithm, size, required libavb version, managed dm-verity error-mode policy, and CONFIG_DM_VERITY_AVB kernel support (v5.12.0)
• dm-verity eio/panicking false-positive fix: the AVB-recommended MANAGED_RESTART_AND_EIO mode is no longer flagged CRITICAL (v5.12.0)
• Baseline tamper detection: --save-baseline / --baseline compare integrity values (VBMeta digest/size, adbd SHA-256) and flag any change CRITICAL (v5.13.0)
• Android 17 Local Network Access (ACCESS_LOCAL_NETWORK) grant audit; dm-verity restart mode accepted; /proc/bootconfig (Android 12+) fallback on cmdline readers; verifiedbootstate=yellow (custom root of trust) surfaced as a distinct warning (v5.14.0)
• Dedicated BIOMETRIC category: fingerprint/face/strength/keyguard/auto-lock checks split out of PRIVACY into biometric.json (v5.15.0)
• Deterministic risk score (0-100) with grade, correlated attack chains and prioritised remediation, plus a --profile weighting flag (generic/pos/medical/kiosk/automotive/iot) (v5.10.0)
• pytest suite (engine, analysis, AI redaction, helpers, reporters) + formal hardax/commands.schema.json validated in CI (v5.16.0)
• Detailed XLSX report (Summary / Findings / Certificates / Analysis sheets) and richer HTML/CSV surfacing per-check technical context: why it matters, risk if failed, expected secure state, NIST/CIS mappings and tags (v5.17.0)
• Fix a Windows-only stdout/stderr encoding crash, a CSV unbounded-result bug, 9 binary_hardening.json shell-precedence bugs (PIE/canary/RELRO/NX/FORTIFY checks), and CLI visibility for redirected/logged runs and narrow terminals - all found by running HARDAX end-to-end against a real device (v5.18.0)
• CLI visual redesign: one rounded-corner box family reserved for panels that print once or redraw in place (banner, live HUD, final summary, final analysis), boxless hairline-rule category headers instead of a 3-line box repeated per category, a ❯_ HARDAX wordmark, a strict two-role colour discipline (structure vs. severity), a guaranteed space between every status icon and its count (some terminal fonts render icons like ⚠ at double width), and terminal-width-aware truncation for --show-commands command/remediation lines so nothing needs horizontal scrolling - chosen from an independently-judged panel of 3 redesign directions and verified on both native Windows console and git-bash/mintty (v5.19.0)
• 10 new checks from a 2025-2026 Android security feature gap analysis: null cipher protection (A14+) and cellular identifier disclosure notifications (A16+) - the first cellular-security checks in network.json; Certificate Transparency platform flags (A16+); Private Space profile (A15+); Intrusion Logging / Advanced Protection service state (A16+); Advanced Protection subfeature audit and KeyMint post-quantum readiness (A17+); io_uring restriction and 16KB page-size build (kernel); pKVM/AVF protected-VM support (v5.20.0)
• 3 new exploited-in-the-wild CVE indicators: LANDFALL Samsung spyware chain (CVE-2025-21042/21043, CISA KEV, zero-click via DNG images, Samsung-gated), the December 2025 Framework zero-day pair (CVE-2025-48633/48572), and the June 2026 zero-interaction remote privesc (CVE-2025-48595); plus a fix to the Screenshot Prevention check which mistakenly read the unrelated screensaver_enabled setting instead of the DevicePolicyManager screen-capture-disabled policy (v5.21.0)

Open

Grouped by theme. Order within a group is rough priority.

Analysis features

• Full scan-to-scan diff (compare two complete audits, surface all finding regressions; integrity-value baselines already shipped via --baseline in v5.13.0)
• CVE correlation (map findings to relevant CVE IDs automatically)

Additional security checks

• TLS protocol minimum / cipher policy on the device
• Wi-Fi Protected Management Frames (PMF) state
• TrustZone / TEE OS specific version (beyond presence detection)
• Hidden SSID hotspot detection
• Samsung Knox Container / Workspace state

Compliance mappings

• CIS Android Benchmark v1.6.0: fill the remaining 11% to 100% coverage
• OWASP MASVS / MSTG mapping per check
• NIST 800-53 / 800-171 mapping per check
• PCI-DSS 4.0 detailed mapping (POS terminals)

Tooling and ergonomics

• Inline remediation suggestions in the HTML report
• Multi-device parallel scanning
• Plugin architecture for custom check loaders
• Official Docker image with adb / paramiko / pyserial pre-installed
• Web dashboard (Flask / FastAPI) for centralised audit storage and history

Code quality

• Split the 2400-line hardax/__init__.py into modules (transports, engine, reporters, cli)
• Type hints throughout, clean under mypy --strict

External integration

• APK static analysis (apktool / jadx integration)
• SARIF output (for GitHub code scanning and similar tools)