hawcx-haap

Customer SDK for the Hawcx Agent Authentication Protocol (HAAP Canonical Specification v7.2.0, Profile E). Pure-Python, no native build.

Status: alpha (0.1.0a1). Public API may change. End-to-end testing against the real binary pipeline is pending alpha-2 closure of the RSV cascade adapter; the SDK is currently validated against a mock Assembler.

What it does

HawcxAgent connects to a customer-deployed haap-supervisor's Assembler-agent socket and proxies Profile E tool calls. The supervisor and its child processes are installed separately (via the hx_agentic_sdk release tarball or Docker image); this SDK is just the language-side client.

Per CS §39, all cryptographic operations happen in the Assembler / TQS / Authenticator processes. The Python process never holds session keys or token material — process isolation is enforced by OS boundaries (Unix Domain Sockets on Linux/macOS, Named Pipes with DACL on Windows per CS §39.12).

Install

pip install hawcx-haap

Single pure-Python wheel; supports Python 3.10–3.13 on Linux, macOS, and Windows.

Prerequisites

• The haap-supervisor pipeline (Authenticator + TQS-precompute + TQS-jit + Assembler + External Identity Broker + Supervisor — per HAAP CS v7.2.0 §45.2) must be running locally, installed from the hx_agentic_sdk release.
• The agent identity must be pre-provisioned via the Hawcx Admin Console (Console → CAA → Authenticator flow per CS §4.6.3).

Quickstart

from hawcx_haap import HawcxAgent

with HawcxAgent.connect("/var/run/haap/research-u1/agent-assembler-0.sock") as agent:
    response = agent.invoke(
        target_rs_url="https://api.example.com/search",
        http_method="POST",
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
        tool="search",
        action=["read"],
        body=b'{"query": "agents"}',
    )
    print(response.http_status, response.body[:200])

If you want the SDK to derive the socket path from an agent id:

with HawcxAgent.connect_by_agent_id("research-u1") as agent:
    ...

This uses the conventional path {XDG_RUNTIME_DIR or /tmp}/hawcx/{agent_id}/agent-assembler-0.sock on Unix and \\.\pipe\haap-{agent_id}-agent-assembler-0 on Windows.

API

HawcxAgent.connect(endpoint, *, timeout_secs=5.0) -> HawcxAgent

Open the agent IPC socket at endpoint and complete the version handshake.

HawcxAgent.connect_by_agent_id(agent_id, *, index=0, ipc_dir=None, timeout_secs=5.0)

Resolve the conventional path, then connect.

.invoke(...) -> ToolCallResponse

Returns ToolCallResponse(request_id, http_status, headers, body). The body field is the decrypted RS response (bytes).

Raises RequestRejected(request_id, reason) if the Assembler rejects.

TokenTransport

class TokenTransport(str, Enum):
    HTTP_HEADER = "http_header"   # Authorization: HAAP <b64>
    MCP_META = "mcp_meta"         # MCP params._meta["haap/tbac"].token

Per CS v7.2.0 §34. Default per-call selector is omitted on the wire → the Assembler uses HttpHeader.

Calling an MCP server — hawcx_haap.mcp_caller

invoke() is the transport. mcp_caller is the layer above it for agents whose destination is an MCP server: it builds the JSON-RPC 2.0 tools/call document, routes it through invoke(), and — the part worth not rewriting per agent — decides whether the answer was an allow or a deny.

from hawcx_haap import Caller, McpTool, close_agent, get_agent

MAILBOX = McpTool(
    tool_id="mail.read",                             # the scope policy is written against
    url="https://mcp.example.com/servers/mail",
    name="list_messages",                            # the downstream MCP tool name
    actions=("read",),
    resource="mailbox",
    arguments={"top": 5},
)

caller = Caller(agent=get_agent(["alice@example.com"]), provider="microsoft")
try:
    decision = caller.call(MAILBOX, "alice@example.com")
    print(decision.summary())   # "ALLOW mail.read  as alice@example.com http=200"
finally:
    close_agent()

Decision is (tool, principal, allowed, reason, reason_code, http_status, body, request_id). A refusal is an outcome, not an exception — nothing here needs a try around it.

Why classification is in the SDK. A HAAP denial arrives in three shapes and only the first looks like a failure:

The third shape is the trap. Streamable HTTP lets the server answer with a JSON body or an event stream, and a real SSE frame opens with event: message — so sniffing for a leading data: decides it is not a stream, finds no error, and reports a denial as an allow. _json_documents() tries the whole body as JSON and then scans every data: line unconditionally, and tests/test_mcp_caller.py pins the event: message case.

Fail-closed both ways: principal_allowlist stays required all the way down, and a body that yields no JSON-RPC document at all — empty, truncated, HTML, non-UTF-8 — is a deny. Not being able to tell is not the same as being told yes. A JSON-RPC error outside the HAAP range (-32601 "method not found", say) is a downstream fault and stays an allow; reporting it as a policy denial would manufacture evidence of a decision nobody made.

Caller.invoke_kwargs() returns the invoke() kwargs without calling anything, so a scope review can print the request that would go — feed it to ToolCallRequest(plaintext_request_body=body, **kwargs).to_wire().

The module is pure-Python and adds no dependency, so a consumer built on it still bundles with hawcx bundle.

Scaffolding an agent's config — hawcx init

mcp_caller is the code. config.py is the part only your tenant knows: where each MCP server is, what the downstream tool is called, which resource, which provider, and which principals the agent may act for. hawcx init writes both halves from one hawcx/agent-template/v1:

hawcx init agent-template.yaml -d ./myagent

One --force cannot serve both files, which is why this is init rather than a wrap --config flag: a flag you pass to regenerate the module would eventually eat a config someone had spent a day filling in.

Every deployment-specific value is scaffolded as FILL_ME, and the file ends in require_filled(...). So an untouched config does not run:

ValueError: 8 unfilled config value(s): PROVIDER, PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST,
TOOLS['o365.mail.read'].url, TOOLS['o365.mail.read'].name, ...

Every gap at once, each named by its path. A commented placeholder (# TODO: your RS URL) would have survived review and reached the Assembler as a real target; this cannot leave the import.

PRINCIPAL_ALLOWLIST is emitted with no default. It is the fail-closed gate on acting_for_user, so a default would be a default answer to which users the agent may impersonate. [] is a real answer — "forbid runtime principal switching entirely" — and must be something a human chose, not something the scaffolder assumed.

Not scaffolded, on purpose: the HTTP method (MCP tools/call over Streamable HTTP is POST, and Caller.invoke_kwargs sets it — a knob whose only correct value is the default is a knob someone turns), and per-tool providers (a Caller carries one provider for the destination it talks to; an agent spanning two providers builds two Callers). The generated config imports only hawcx_haap, so an agent carrying it still bundles with hawcx bundle.

Wire protocol

The SDK speaks the same wire as the in-process Rust crates:

[msg_len: u32 BE][msg_type: u8][payload: msg_len-1 bytes]

• 0x00 — IpcHandshake (binary; see crates/haap-ipc/src/handshake.rs)
• 0x52 — ToolCallRequest (JSON)
• 0x53 — ToolCallResponse (JSON; body is base64)
• 0x54 — RequestRejected (JSON: {request_id, reason})
• 0x61 — ClarificationAnswer (JSON; Profile E first hop)

Reference: crates/haap-ipc/src/messages/assembler.rs in hx_agent_crypto_core.

Threat model — runtime principal

HawcxAgent supports per-call principal switching via the acting_for_user field, which the Assembler projects into scope_json.user_principal_id on the minted token (CS v6.9.0 line 163). This lets one supervisor pipeline serve multiple end-users without re-enrolling the agent identity per user.

acting_for_user is sensitive: a value that came from an LLM (or any input the model can influence) MUST NOT be allowed to silently switch the effective user. As of 0.1.0a2 (H-3 hardening 2026-05-20):

• HawcxAgent.connect(endpoint, principal_allowlist=[...]) is required. The allowlist is a closed set of permitted principal IDs sourced from operator config.
• agent.invoke(acting_for_user=...) and agent.invoke_for(...) validate against the allowlist before any IPC bytes are written. Out-of-list principals raise HawcxError synchronously with a redacted SHA-256 fingerprint instead of echoing the rejected principal back in plaintext.
• Pass principal_allowlist=[] to forbid runtime principal switching entirely.

Operator obligations:

1. Source the allowlist from operator-controlled config — never derive from LLM output, request bodies, MCP tool arguments, or any input a model can influence.
2. If the principal axis spans more than ~100 users, fan out to per-user agents rather than one agent with a wide allowlist; the Cedar policy on the gateway should still gate per-user access, but reducing the SDK-side allowlist closes the blast radius of a compromised supervisor.
3. The previous code that accepted acting_for_user from any caller (without an allowlist) is deprecated. See ../CHANGELOG.md for the migration recipe.

Egress transport (optional) — route agent HTTP through the broker

When a HAAP agent runs under the OS sandbox from ADR-0048, its entire outbound network is pinned to a single per-agent UNIX-domain socket — a SOCKS5 egress broker — and that socket is its only network path. A SOCKS proxy URL has nowhere to put a filesystem path (socks5h:///…/egress-broker.sock parses to an empty host), so stock SOCKS transports, which dial (host, port), cannot reach it. This SDK ships a small transport shim that opens the UDS, performs the SOCKS5 CONNECT, and hands the connected stream to httpx for end-to-end TLS + HTTP. The broker never terminates TLS and neither does the shim — your certificate verification is unchanged, and the broker holds no plaintext.

The HTTP client is an optional extra (the SDK core stays zero-dependency). Two API-identical httpx lineages exist — install the one your client needs:

pip install 'hawcx-haap[httpx2]'    # Anthropic SDK 1.x and other httpx2 clients
pip install 'hawcx-haap[httpx]'     # the original httpx lineage
pip install 'hawcx-haap[requests]'  # requests_session(), for google-auth et al

Opt in with one line — client() returns a ready-to-use client:

import hawcx_haap.egress as egress

with egress.client() as http:                 # async_client() for asyncio
    r = http.get("https://api.example.com/v1/models")

Which lineage you get. The Anthropic SDK 1.x requires httpx2 and rejects an old-httpx client at construction, so client() prefers httpx2 when both are installed and the object it returns is what anthropic expects:

import anthropic, hawcx_haap.egress as egress

client = anthropic.Anthropic(http_client=egress.client())

egress.flavor() reports which lineage was selected, and client(flavor="httpx") pins the other one for calls that need it — this package deliberately installs no process-wide alias. Note the two lineages ship disjoint exception hierarchies: an httpx2 client raises httpx2.HTTPError, not httpx.HTTPError. The shim's own Egress* errors are unaffected either way.

requests-based clients (Google libraries)

The Google client libraries build on requests (google-auth's AuthorizedSession), which the httpx transport cannot carry. requests_session() brokers those under the identical no-fallback contract:

from google.auth.transport.requests import AuthorizedSession
import hawcx_haap.egress as egress

session = AuthorizedSession(creds)
session.mount("https://", egress.requests_session().get_adapter("https://"))

The broker socket is discovered from $HAAP_EGRESS_BROKER_SOCKET, or from $HAAP_AGENT_SOCKET_DIR/$HAAP_AGENT_INSTANCE_ID/egress-broker.sock (the paths the supervisor sets), or pass socket_path=. If none resolves to an existing socket, client() raises rather than falling back to the direct network — a silent fallback would defeat the control.

Per ADR-0048 the shim always sends the hostname as ATYP=0x03 (DOMAINNAME) and never resolves DNS itself, so the broker enforces its allowlist against the name the agent actually asked for. Failures map to distinguishable exceptions (all subclass HawcxError): EgressPolicyDenied (host:port not in the signed policy), EgressHostUnreachable (includes the SSRF refusal), EgressPeerCredError (the peer-credential check failed), and EgressProtocolError (malformed handshake). This transport is a network-reachability control only — it is not a second authorization gate; the RSV still enforces the tool-call mandate (ADR-0048 D48-6).

Limitations / known gaps

• End-to-end verification against real binaries is pending alpha-2 closure of the RSV cascade adapter. Tests use a mock Assembler over a Unix socket.
• Framework adapters (CrewAI BaseTool, LangChain Tool) are deferred to a Priority 2a follow-up.
• Windows Named Pipe support uses ctypes against kernel32; pytest fixtures exercise the Unix path only. Windows is exercised via unit tests of the framing layer.

Source-only CAA packaging (Python 0.1.9)

CAA remote build jobs use a separate API from the trusted-local hawcx bundle command:

from pathlib import Path
from hawcx_haap.source_bundle import build_source_bundle

result = build_source_bundle(Path("source.zip"), Path("agent.pyz"))
# result.workload_digest == "sha256:<hash of exact executable bytes>"

The equivalent machine-readable CLI is:

python3 -I -m hawcx_haap.source_bundle source.zip --output agent.pyz

Use a trusted installed interpreter/package, fixed argv, a cleared environment and CAA-owned private paths. Never use uploaded PYTHONPATH or invoke a shell. The ZIP contains runtime project files at its root. Include __main__.py, or pass --main package.module:function for an undecorated top-level function with no required arguments. The output refuses overwrite and runs without additional arguments on POSIX. A trusted Python interpreter is still required; it is outside the measured zipapp. Windows requires an independently verified launcher profile.

The builder never executes uploaded code, setup hooks, pip, requirement files or network resolution. It parses Python 3.10 syntax and rejects statically missing imports. Upload pure-Python dependencies as source; arbitrary LangChain/CrewAI closures and compiled extensions are unsupported. Omit development test trees that import unvendored test tools. Dynamic imports, newer standard-library APIs and actual HAAP behavior still require runtime acceptance: packaging success is not a compatibility or tenant end-to-end verdict. Bare .pyc files are refused.

Input is limited to 32 MiB ZIP/expanded bytes, 1,024 entries, 8 MiB per file and 1 MiB central-directory metadata. Only regular UTF-8 source/text files with bounded portable relative paths are accepted. Symlinks, bytecode, native extensions, duplicate/case-colliding paths, encrypted archives, ZIP64 end records, multidisk archives and SDK/standard-library namespace replacements are rejected. CAA must run this bounded worker without custody/signing/OAuth credentials and apply job quotas.

The fixed hawcx_haap runtime closure is vendored offline. The result and embedded _hawcx_build.json include its SDK version, raw 64-hex digest and declared minimum Python version. That version declares the minimum supported SDK profile; AST syntax checks and the builder host's stdlib names do not prove that uploaded code uses only APIs available in Python 3.10. The closure digest hashes sorted member names/content, each as u32be(name length) || UTF-8 name || u64be(content length) || content, including the synthetic SDK METADATA. This is build provenance, not a signature or a replacement for the canonical repository record. Human metadata stays in the CAA-generated canonical record; changing a description must change that record's identity without rewriting executable bytes. CAA remeasures the output before finalizing and signing the record through the shared measurement contract.

License

Hawcx Proprietary License. See LICENSE.