hide-protocol for Python

Experimental and unaudited. HIDE is hybrid post-quantum (X25519 + ML-KEM-768, Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65). See the security policy.

Python 3.10+ binding, through ctypes, to the same Rust core (crates/hide-ffi) that the CLI and every other HIDE SDK use. This package contains no cryptography of its own.

Install

pip install hide-protocol

The wheel bundles the compiled core, so no toolchain is needed. Wheels are published for three platforms: manylinux_2_28_x86_64, win_amd64 and macosx_11_0_arm64. On any other platform, build the core yourself and point the binding at it (see Native library).

Quick start

import hide_protocol as hide

with hide.SecretKey.generate() as secret:
    box = hide.encrypt(b"hello", [secret.public_key()], filename="note.txt")
    opened = hide.decrypt(box, secret)
    assert opened.data == b"hello" and opened.filename == "note.txt"

    tampered = bytearray(box)
    tampered[-1] ^= 0x01
    try:
        hide.decrypt(bytes(tampered), secret)
    except hide.AuthenticationError as e:
        print("refused:", e)   # refused: authentication failed; the data was altered

encrypt takes 1..64 recipient public keys, each exactly PUBLIC_KEY_LEN (1216) bytes, plus optional filename= and media_type=. decrypt returns a Decrypted with .data, .filename and .media_type; nothing is returned unless the whole payload authenticates. The filename is attacker-controlled: never use it to choose an output path.

Keys on disk: secret.protect(passphrase) returns a sealed key file (MIN_PASSPHRASE_LEN is 8, and there is no escrow); SecretKey.load(data, passphrase) opens one; inspect_key(data) reports "raw" or "protected" without the passphrase. armor_public_key / dearmor_public_key give a public key a pasteable text form.

Errors: every failure is a subclass of hide.HideError — AuthenticationError (altered, or not a container), its subclass Malformed (did not decode at all), WrongPassphrase, NoMatchingRecipient, NotAKeyFile, ChallengeExpired, ChallengeReplayed. Arguments this binding rejects before calling the core raise ValueError.

Signing and verification

One seed backs both encryption and signing, so there is a single thing to back up.

sealed = hide.SigningIdentity.generate("correct horse battery")   # store this

with hide.SigningIdentity.load(sealed, "correct horse battery") as signer:
    context, message = b"myapp/v1 release", b"payload"
    signature = signer.sign(context, message)                     # 3373 bytes
    hide.verify(signer.public_key(), context, message, signature) # None, or raises

    # Challenge/response: good once, here, now.
    import time
    now = int(time.time())
    challenge = hide.new_challenge("app.example", now, 60)
    answer = signer.answer(challenge)
    with hide.SpentNonces() as spent:               # must outlive one request
        spent.accept(challenge, answer, signer.public_key(), now)
        spent.accept(challenge, answer, signer.public_key(), now)  # ChallengeReplayed

context separates uses of one identity so a signature made for one purpose cannot be replayed as another; never let a remote party choose it. verify returns None and raises AuthenticationError on failure rather than returning a boolean a caller could forget to check. A key file written before signatures existed carries no signing seed and raises NotAKeyFile.

Identity logs, epoch chains, transparency proofs

A cryptographic verify raises on failure (Malformed if the bytes did not decode, AuthenticationError if they decoded but did not verify) and never returns False. The one boolean is identity_trusts_device: the log is verified first, so False means "not a member", never "did not verify".

The pinned checks are what a relying party uses: pinned_root is obtained out of band, and recovery_binding establishes the recovery key, so a log extended by a Recover under a stranger's key raises AuthenticationError. A pinned root that is not 32 bytes raises ValueError.

Native library

The core is located in this order:

1. HIDE_LIBRARY, if it names a file and HIDE_ALLOW_LIBRARY_OVERRIDE=1 is also set;
2. the library bundled inside the package (hide_ffi.dll, libhide_ffi.dylib or libhide_ffi.so beside _binding.py);
3. the system loader, by name.

HIDE_LIBRARY is a development override: it replaces the entire cryptographic core, so a single settable environment variable must not be enough to redirect it. Against a local build:

cargo build --release -p hide-ffi
export HIDE_LIBRARY="$PWD/target/release/libhide_ffi.so"   # hide_ffi.dll / libhide_ffi.dylib
export HIDE_ALLOW_LIBRARY_OVERRIDE=1

Key material

SecretKey and SigningIdentity are opaque handles. The seed bytes stay in the native library and this SDK exposes no accessor for them; repr() shows only whether the handle is open. Release a handle with close() or a with block (it is also released on garbage collection, but that leaves key material in memory for an unbounded time). A closed handle raises ValueError on use.

Limits

• Unaudited. Do not protect data you cannot afford to lose or expose.
• An identity is a key, not a person: a verified signature proves possession of a seed, nothing about who holds it.
• Full threat model: docs/threat-model.md.

Links

• Repository: https://github.com/hide-protocol/hide
• Documentation: docs/
• Specification: spec/hide-1.md
• CHANGELOG