holisticquality-verify-manifest
Independent, zero-dependency verifier for Holistic Quality / NOMOS signed manifests — corpus manifests and published research artifacts (e.g. the PM & Alzheimer's evidence synthesis).
It lets anyone confirm, on their own machine and without trusting Holistic Quality's infrastructure, that a published artifact is exactly what was signed, by the named parties, unmodified. This operationalizes Regulator Bill of Rights, Article IX (Falsifiability).
Install
pip install holisticquality-verify-manifest
Requires Python ≥ 3.9 and the system gpg binary (GnuPG). No Python
dependencies; no network access.
Use
verify-manifest \
--manifest path/to/manifest.json \
--bundle path/to/signatures/v0.sig.json
First import the signers' public keys into your GPG keyring (the manifest publisher provides them), then run the command above.
Exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 |
PASS — canonical hash matches, every signature verified, two-person rule satisfied |
1 |
FAIL — general (hash mismatch, multiple causes, or two-person rule violation) |
2 |
FAIL — manifest or signature-bundle file not found |
3 |
FAIL — signature verification failed and was the sole cause |
Useful flags: --verbose (per-signature detail), --json (machine-readable
result), --gpg-homedir (use an isolated keyring).
What it checks
- Canonical-hash recompute — re-derives the SHA-256 of the manifest's canonical-JSON form (signatures excluded) and compares it to the hash inside the signature bundle. Detects any post-signing tampering.
- GPG signature verification — each detached, ASCII-armored signature in the bundle is verified against the canonical-hash bytes.
- Two-person rule — at least two distinct verified GPG fingerprints
(disable with
--no-two-personfor diagnostics only).
Trust & provenance
This package is vendor-minimal: it contains only the verification path, so
the whole thing is auditable in minutes. Its modules are faithful, behavior-
preserving copies of the in-repository verifier; a golden-fixture test
(tests/test_golden.py) enforces that a manifest signed by the canonical NOMOS
signer verifies here — behavioral identity, checked, not asserted.
How-to with a worked example: https://holisticquality.io/regulator-verify-manifest
License
Apache-2.0 © Holistic Quality LLC
Metadata
Release files for holisticquality-verify-manifest 0.1.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| holisticquality_verify_manifest-0.1.0.tar.gz | 16.9 kB | Without provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| holisticquality_verify_manifest-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 34.8 kB
Release files / holisticquality_verify_manifest-0.1.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | holisticquality_verify_manifest-0.1.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 16.9 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
ebbaf75d01d4096423c502c5b4c60627a2755527be145ed3937879f21dcd7fa9
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
813874922534237cd31557160f02433645d47c94af92af7ec070320fda76ebd8
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.9.6
|
Release files / holisticquality_verify_manifest-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | holisticquality_verify_manifest-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 17.9 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
8ac333a909aa2c765ef548521fa6e2cc812e29ac457cca0593e4d4412ed415f1
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
ee7b95fd49ec5895f27a5bd882e70e74309ba3052e863cc5b8104b56a5ba2dc0
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.9.6
|
Security for holisticquality-verify-manifest 0.1.0
Provenance
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No provenance found
None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.
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