iaiops 0.9.0

Governed, vendor-neutral OT data tap + intelligent troubleshooting for AI agents (OPC-UA / Modbus / S7comm / Mitsubishi MC / MTConnect / MQTT-Sparkplug / EtherNet-IP / EtherCAT / SECS-GEM / PROFINET / IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850 / BACnet) with a built-in governance harness (audit, budget, risk tiers, MOC), an AI downtime root-cause copilot, plus OEE, downtime, and asset-inventory analytics

Industrial-AIOps

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Governed, vendor-neutral industrial data tap + intelligent troubleshooting for AI agents — read-first tools across 12 field protocols: OPC-UA (incl. Historical Access + tag auto-discovery), Modbus-TCP/RTU (byte-order auto-detect + vendor templates), S7comm, Mitsubishi MC, MTConnect, MQTT/Sparkplug B (full decode), EtherNet/IP (Rockwell/Allen-Bradley Logix), EtherCAT (pysoem/SOEM), PROFINET (DCP), SECS/GEM (HSMS fab), HART-IP (process instrumentation), the building (BACnet/IP) edition, and Phoenix Contact PLCnext vPLC — plus an AI downtime root-cause copilot, data-quality watchdog, UNS governance, OEE/downtime, asset-inventory, and 信创 (TDengine/IoTDB historian sinks + 防护指南/等保2.0/IEC 62443 compliance mapping). The energy edition (变电/电力: IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850) now ships separately as iaiops-energy.

Industrial-AIOps is the OT member of the industrial-aiops org. It is a factory-level, vendor-neutral, governed data tap that lets an AI agent safely read industrial control systems across many field protocols, plus a cross-protocol intelligence layer that localizes "no data" breaks, analyzes alarm floods (ISA-18.2), scores data trustworthiness, ranks unhealthy tags, computes OEE / categorizes downtime, builds an active asset register, auto-discovers OPC-UA tags into a semantic asset model, and — the flagship — runs an AI downtime root-cause copilot that correlates the evidence into an evidence-cited, advisory verdict. Read-first by design; the few write/command paths are OT-dangerous and gated by MOC discipline. Every tool runs through a vendored governance harness (audit / budget / risk-tier / undo).

v0.7.0 — validation status (honest). Pure analysis + the OPC-UA path are tested against a real in-process asyncua server. The 信创 bindings were run against real libraries + containers in a 2026-06-30 validation pass: IoTDB + TDengine (live container write→read round-trip) are verified; the HART command codec is verified vs hart-protocol. Phoenix Contact PLCnext vPLC (virtualized PLC) is route-verified over its OPC-UA server (an in-process asyncua server reproducing the Arp.Plc.Eclr GDS address space) and a Modbus-TCP process-data block (tests/test_plcnext_route.py); live PLCnext hardware reads stay 待核实. Modbus-RTU (live serial) is now verified (2026-07-02): the read ops round-trip over a real serial link built from a socat PTY pair + a pymodbus RTU server (tests/test_modbus_rtu_live.py), exercising the actual RTU framing — though not yet validated against a specific physical RS-485 device. The BACnet/IP read path is now verified (2026-07-02): a genuine Who-Is discover + present-value read round-trip against a real bacpypes3 virtual BACnet/IP device on a two-IP subnet in a Linux container (tests/test_bacnet_live.py), through the actual async BAC0 (2024+) stack — bridged onto a dedicated event loop so the sync connector works against the coroutine API. Live BACnet COV/trend-log reads and property writes on real HVAC gear stay 待核实. Still 待核实 (preview, not hardware-verified): BACnet write/COV/trend on live HVAC, HART-IP wire transport (live gateway), EtherCAT (no software simulator — Linux + root + a real bus only). Mocked clients cover S7/MC/EtherNet-IP/SECS-GEM; MTConnect uses static XML fixtures; Sparkplug uses synthetic protobuf payloads. (The energy edition's IEC-104 / DNP3 / IEC-61850 validation lives in the iaiops-energy repo.) See Safety.

Why

OT is exactly where you want an agent on a tight leash: read first, never blind-write. Industrial-AIOps is the safe, neutral read wedge — one package, one MCP server, many protocols — with governance and an intelligence layer that turns raw reads into actionable diagnoses.

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Consolidated capability matrix

Protocol	Tool	Operation	R/W	risk_tier	Returns (key fields)
OPC-UA	opcua_server_info	server status	R	low	state, product_name, namespaces
OPC-UA	opcua_browse	browse node tree	R	low	[{node_id, browse_name, depth}]
OPC-UA	opcua_read_node	read one node	R	low	value, datatype, source_timestamp, good
OPC-UA	opcua_read_many	batch read	R	low	[{node_id, value, ...}]
OPC-UA	opcua_subscribe_sample	bounded sample	R	low	{collected, samples[]}
OPC-UA	opcua_read_alarms	alarm surfacing	R	low	{active_alarms[], active_count}
OPC-UA	opcua_read_history	Historical Access (HDA)	R	low	{supported, count, values[]}
OPC-UA	health_summary	threshold classify	R	low	{overall, counts, offenders[]}
OPC-UA	anomaly_scan	stddev outliers	R	low	{mean, stddev, outliers[]}
Modbus	modbus_read_holding	FC03	R	low	{raw_registers, decoded[]}
Modbus	modbus_read_input	FC04	R	low	{raw_registers, decoded[]}
Modbus	modbus_read_coils	FC01	R	low	{bits[]}
Modbus	modbus_read_discrete	FC02	R	low	{bits[]}
Modbus	modbus_health_summary	threshold classify	R	low	{overall, counts, offenders[]}
S7comm	s7_cpu_info	CPU id + run/stop	R	low	{cpu_status, cpu_info}
S7comm	s7_read_area	read DB/M/I/Q	R	low	{items:[{address, value}]}
S7comm	s7_read_db	read data block	R	low	{items:[{address, value}]}
S7comm	s7_read_many	batch addresses	R	low	{items:[{address, value}]}
S7comm	s7_write_db	write data block	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
Mitsubishi MC	mc_cpu_status	CPU type	R	low	{cpu_type, cpu_code}
Mitsubishi MC	mc_read_words	word devices	R	low	{words[]}
Mitsubishi MC	mc_read_bits	bit devices	R	low	{bits[]}
Mitsubishi MC	mc_read_many	random read	R	low	{words[], dwords[]}
Mitsubishi MC	mc_write_words	write words	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
MTConnect	mtconnect_probe	device model	R	low	{devices:[{components:[{data_items}]}]}
MTConnect	mtconnect_current	latest values	R	low	{observations[]}
MTConnect	mtconnect_sample	bounded stream	R	low	{observations[]}
MTConnect	mtconnect_assets	assets	R	low	{assets[]}
MTConnect	mtconnect_oee_snapshot	OEE inputs	R	low	{availability, execution, verdict}
MQTT/Sparkplug	mqtt_read_topic	bounded read	R	low	{messages:[{topic, payload}]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	sparkplug_subscribe_sample	bounded SpB sample (full decode)	R	low	{samples:[{sparkplug, payload:{metrics[]}}], seq_gap_count}
MQTT/Sparkplug	sparkplug_decode_payload	decode raw SpB payload	R	low	{metrics:[{name, alias, datatype, value, is_historical}]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	sparkplug_node_list	node discovery + state	R	low	{nodes:[{group_id, edge_node_id, online, devices}], primary_hosts[]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	uns_browse	topic-tree browse	R	low	{topics[], tree{}}
MQTT/Sparkplug	uns_topic_audit	UNS naming + sprawl governance	R	low	{verdict, sprawl_findings, findings{casing_collisions[], scattered_leaves[], …}}
MQTT/Sparkplug	uns_schema_drift	Sparkplug schema-drift (baseline vs current)	R	low	{verdict (none/additive/breaking), node_changes[]}
MQTT/Sparkplug	mqtt_publish	publish/command	W	high/MOC	{published_bytes, applied}
EtherNet/IP	eip_controller_info	Logix controller id	R	low	{controller:{vendor, product_name, revision, serial}}
EtherNet/IP	eip_list_tags	tag discovery	R	low	{tag_count, tags:[{name, data_type, structure}]}
EtherNet/IP	eip_read_tag	read one tag/array	R	low	{tag, value, type, good}
EtherNet/IP	eip_read_many	batch read	R	low	{items:[{tag, value, type}]}
EtherNet/IP	eip_write_tag	write tag	W	high/MOC	{before, written, _undo_id}
Diagnostics	diagnose_dataflow	localize no-data	R	low	{verdict, diagnosis, hops[]}
Diagnostics	alarm_bad_actors	ISA-18.2 flood	R	low	{flood_verdict, top_offenders[]}
Diagnostics	tag_health	offender ranking	R	low	{overall, offenders[]}
Diagnostics	historian_health	gap/flatline	R	low	{verdict, gaps[]}
Diagnostics	subscription_health	sequenced-feed loss/reorder/overload	R	low	{verdict, missed_count, overloaded_channels[]}
Diagnostics	downtime_root_cause	AI downtime RCA copilot (cited, advisory)	R	low	{verdict, primary_cause, hypotheses:[{cause, confidence, evidence[]}]}
Diagnostics	downtime_root_cause_live	RCA copilot that gathers its own live evidence	R	low	{…downtime_root_cause…, collected_evidence}
Diagnostics	data_quality_scorecard	fleet data-trust rollup	R	low	{fleet_score, fleet_status, issue_breakdown, worst_tags[], endpoints[]}
Diagnostics	heartbeat_health	heartbeat/watchdog liveness	R	low	{alive, distinct_transitions, longest_stall_s, reason}
Analytics	oee_compute	OEE = A×P×Q	R	low	{availability, performance, quality, oee, oee_pct}
Analytics	downtime_events	stoppage detect + categorize	R	low	{event_count, total_downtime_s, by_category, events[]}
Analytics	oee_multidim	OEE machine×part×shift	R	low	{matrix[], worst_performers[], mean_oee}
Analytics	asset_inventory	active fingerprint	R	low	{assets:[{protocol, vendor, model, firmware, reachable}]}
Analytics	monitor_changes	bounded change-of-value	R	low	{change_count, changes:[{value, previous, wall_clock}]}
EtherCAT	ethercat_master_state	master/WKC + slave count	R	low	{master_state, expected_working_counter, slaves_found, slaves_expected}
EtherCAT	ethercat_slaves	bus scan	R	low	{slave_count, slaves:[{index, name, vendor_id, product_code, state}]}
EtherCAT	ethercat_slave_info	slave detail	R	low	{sync_managers[], fmmus[], object_dictionary[], input_bytes}
EtherCAT	ethercat_read_sdo	CoE SDO upload	R	low	{index, byte_length, hex, as_uint}
EtherCAT	ethercat_read_pdo	input PDO snapshot	R	low	{working_counter, input_hex, input_byte_length}
EtherCAT	ethercat_write_sdo	CoE SDO download	W	high/MOC	{before, written, applied}
EtherCAT	ethercat_set_state	AL-state transition	W	high/MOC	{before, requested, reached, applied}
PROFINET	profinet_discover	DCP IdentifyAll (segment-wide)	R	low	{station_count, stations:[{name_of_station, mac, ip, vendor_id, device_roles[]}]}
PROFINET	profinet_identify_station	identify by name-of-station	R	low	{found, name_of_station, mac, ip, device_family}
PROFINET	profinet_station_params	targeted DCP Get (by MAC)	R	low	{found, name_of_station, ip, netmask, gateway}
PROFINET	profinet_asset_inventory	DCP asset register	R	low	{asset_count, io_controller_count, assets[]}
SECS/GEM	secsgem_equipment_status	GEM link + identity (S1F1/F2)	R	low	{communication_state, are_you_there}
SECS/GEM	secsgem_list_status_variables	SVID namelist (S1F11/F12)	R	low	{count, status_variables[]}
SECS/GEM	secsgem_read_status_variables	SVID values (S1F3/F4)	R	low	{svids, values[]}
SECS/GEM	secsgem_list_equipment_constants	ECID namelist (S2F29/F30)	R	low	{count, equipment_constants[]}
SECS/GEM	secsgem_read_equipment_constants	ECID values (S2F13/F14)	R	low	{ecids, values[]}
SECS/GEM	secsgem_list_alarms	alarm list (S5F5/F6)	R	low	{count, alarms[]}
SECS/GEM	secsgem_list_process_programs	PPID directory (S7F19/F20)	R	low	{count, process_programs[]}
IEC-104 (energy)	iec104_connection_info	link + stations (CAs)	R	low	{connected, station_count, common_addresses[]}
IEC-104 (energy)	iec104_interrogate	general interrogation	R	low	{common_address, point_count, points:[{io_address, type, value, quality}]}
IEC-104 (energy)	iec104_read_point	one point by IOA	R	low	{found, io_address, value, quality}
DNP3 (energy)	dnp3_link_status	master/outstation link	R	low	{online, outstation_address, master_address}
DNP3 (energy)	dnp3_integrity_poll	Class 0/1/2/3 database	R	low	{point_count, by_type{}, points:[{type, index, value}]}
IEC-61850 (energy)	iec61850_device_directory	logical-device model	R	low	{logical_device_count, logical_devices[]}
IEC-61850 (energy)	iec61850_browse	browse model children	R	low	{reference, child_count, children[]}
IEC-61850 (energy)	iec61850_read	read data attribute (FC)	R	low	{reference, fc, value}
BACnet (building)	bacnet_discover	Who-Is device discovery	R	low	{device_count, devices:[{device_id, address}]}
BACnet (building)	bacnet_object_list	a device's objects	R	low	{object_count, objects:[{object_type, instance}]}
BACnet (building)	bacnet_read_property	one object property	R	low	{object_type, instance, property, value}
BACnet (building)	bacnet_read_points	all present-values (HVAC snapshot)	R	low	{point_count, points:[{object_type, instance, present_value}]}
信创 / compliance	compliance_mapping	《工控网络安全防护指南》↔ iaiops	R	low	{pillars[], status_summary, controls:[{pillar, status, gap}]}
信创 / historian	historian_push	push telemetry to TDengine/IoTDB	R(→historian)	low	{sink, received, written, skipped_non_numeric}
Self	protocols_supported	capability map	R	low	{protocols[], diagnostics[], analytics[]}

90 tools = 84 read + 6 write (MOC). The 84 reads = 67 protocol-read · 9 diagnostics · 5 analytics · 2 compliance/historian · 1 self. Run protocols_supported() (or iaiops protocols) for the live map.

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Per-protocol reference

OPC-UA

• Versions/variants: binary opc.tcp:// via asyncua (sync facade). Security: anonymous + username/password. Certificate message security (Sign / SignAndEncrypt) = roadmap, not validated.
• Connection params: endpoint_url, username (password encrypted), security_mode, security_policy.
• Not supported / planned: cert security; real Alarms & Conditions event subscriptions (alarms are surfaced best-effort by browsing alarm-like boolean nodes).

Modbus-TCP

• Versions/variants: Modbus-TCP via pymodbus. Read function codes FC01 (coils), FC02 (discrete), FC03 (holding), FC04 (input). Write FCs (FC05/06/15/16) = not implemented (read-only preview).
• Connection params: host, port (502), unit_id. Registers are untyped 16-bit words → decode hint (uint16/int16/uint32/int32/float32/raw); big-endian word order.
• Coverage: many domestic 国产 PLCs (汇川 Inovance / 信捷 Xinje / 和利时 Hollysys / 台达 Delta) and any Modbus-TCP vendor.

S7comm (Siemens + 仿西门子 国产)

• Versions/variants: pyS7 (pure-Python, ISO-on-TCP / RFC1006 — no native libsnap7). S7-300/400/1200/1500 and compatible clones. Memory areas DB / M (merker) / I / Q. No protocol auth (CPU gates via "Permit access with PUT/GET").
• Connection params: host, port (102), rack, slot (0/1 for 1200/1500; 0/2 common for 300/400).
• Write: s7_write_db = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures BEFORE value + undo.
• Not supported / planned: optimized/symbolic DB access on 1500 with "optimized block access" can require absolute-addressing config on the CPU.

Mitsubishi MC

• Versions/variants: pymcprotocol — MC 3E frame (binary) only. 1E / 4E frames = not supported. PLC types Q / L / QnA / iQ-R / iQ-L. Devices: D/W/R (word), M/X/Y/B (bit).
• Connection params: host, port (5007 default; set to the module's open MC port), plctype.
• Write: mc_write_words = high/MOC/dry-run default, captures BEFORE + undo.

MTConnect (ALL CNC machine tools)

• Versions/variants: agent REST + XML (requests + xml.etree), namespace-agnostic (parses MTConnect 1.x Devices/Streams/Assets schemas). Endpoints: /probe, /current, /sample, /assets. Read-only by specification. XML parsing is hardened (DTD/entity declarations rejected — XXE/billion-laughs defense).
• Connection params: agent_url (e.g. http://host:5000).
• Not supported / planned: MTConnect streaming (long-poll interval=); only bounded count= samples.

MQTT / Sparkplug B / UNS

• Versions/variants: paho-mqtt — MQTT 3.1.1 & 5. Sparkplug B topic convention spBv1.0/{group}/{type}/{edge}/[device] (NBIRTH/DBIRTH/NDATA/DDATA/NDEATH/DDEATH/STATE). TLS + username/password supported.
• Full Sparkplug B decode (no optional extra): payloads are protobuf-decoded with a vendored, byte-for-byte copy of the official Eclipse Tahu sparkplug_b.proto generated module (depends only on protobuf). Per metric you get name, alias (resolved to its name via the BIRTH model), datatype (Int8…Int64/UInt…/Float/Double/Boolean/String/DateTime/Text/UUID/DataSet/Bytes/File/Template/PropertySet…), value, timestamp, and the is_historical / is_null flags. A birth/death + seq model tracks node/device online state (NBIRTH/DBIRTH ↔ NDEATH/DDEATH), builds the alias→name map from BIRTH, applies NDATA/DDATA by alias, and flags seq gaps / out-of-order. Primary-host awareness: STATE/<host_id> topics surface in sparkplug_node_list. sparkplug_decode_payload decodes a single raw payload (base64/hex) offline.
• Connection params: host/broker, port (1883 / 8883 TLS), topic, use_tls, username (password encrypted).
• Command: mqtt_publish = high/MOC/dry-run default; a published command has no automatic inverse.

EtherNet/IP (Rockwell / Allen-Bradley)

• Supported: ControlLogix / CompactLogix (and GuardLogix) via CIP / EtherNet-IP using pycomm3 (pure-Python — no native deps). Tag-based, symbolic access: read/write tags by name (Conveyor.Speed, Array[3], Program:Main.X) and discover the controller's tag list at runtime (eip_list_tags, the headline feature). eip_controller_info reads the controller identity.
• Connection params: host, slot (0 for CompactLogix; the CPU slot for a ControlLogix chassis), port (44818). protocol: ethernetip (alias eip).
• Write: eip_write_tag = high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default, captures BEFORE value + undo.
• Not supported / planned: PLC-5 / SLC-500 (PCCC) and Micro800 are not supported = roadmap (Logix tag model only).

EtherCAT (pysoem / SOEM fieldbus master)

• Supported: a real EtherCAT master via pysoem (the Python binding for the SOEM C stack). CoE SDO read (ethercat_read_sdo, acyclic mailbox upload) + SDO write (ethercat_write_sdo, download), input PDO read (ethercat_read_pdo, one bounded cyclic snapshot), bus scan / slave enumeration (ethercat_slaves, ethercat_slave_info — identity, SM/FMMU mapping, object-dictionary summary), master/working-counter state (ethercat_master_state), and AL-state transitions INIT↔PREOP↔SAFEOP↔OP (ethercat_set_state).

• HARD REQUIREMENTS (no way around them): Linux, root or CAP_NET_RAW, a dedicated NIC cabled to the bus, and real EtherCAT slave hardware. pysoem is an OPTIONAL extra: pip install iaiops[ethercat] — the base package installs and imports without it, and every EtherCAT tool then degrades to a teaching error (never crashes, never imports pysoem at module load).

• NOT supported: no software simulator exists (unlike OPC-UA / Modbus) — EtherCAT is hardware-only and not testable in mock-only CI; macOS is unsupported. EoE / FoE / SoE mailbox protocols and full PDO-mapping decode/expansion = roadmap.

• Connection params: nic (the dedicated interface name, e.g. eth1; alias interface), optional expected_slaves (a sanity check vs the bus scan). protocol: ethercat.

• Operations matrix:

  Tool	Op	R/W	risk	Capture/notes
  ethercat_master_state	master + WKC state, slave count	R	low	expected vs found
  ethercat_slaves	bus scan / enumerate	R	low	index/vendor/product/rev/addr/AL-state
  ethercat_slave_info	one-slave detail	R	low	SM/FMMU + OD summary
  ethercat_read_sdo	CoE SDO upload	R	low	hex + uint interpretation
  ethercat_read_pdo	input PDO snapshot	R	low	single cycle, never loops
  ethercat_write_sdo	CoE SDO download	W	high/MOC	before-value (SDO read-back) + undo
  ethercat_set_state	AL-state transition	W	high/MOC	before-state + undo; can start/stop motion

• Write/state safety: ethercat_write_sdo (hex little-endian bytes) and ethercat_set_state are high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run by default, capture the BEFORE value/state for undo, and need a CLI double-confirm. Changing EtherCAT state can START or STOP machine motion — treat with extreme care. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入.

PROFINET (DCP discovery / identify — read-only)

• Supported: layer-2 PROFINET-DCP via pnio-dcp — profinet_discover (DCP IdentifyAll: one broadcast surfaces every station on the segment — name-of-station, MAC, IP, vendor/device id, role — closer to passive discovery than a per-device fingerprint), profinet_identify_station (by name-of-station), profinet_station_params (targeted DCP Get by MAC → name + IP suite), and profinet_asset_inventory (a register with IO-controller vs IO-device role decoding).
• Scope (deliberate): discovery + identify ONLY. No RT cyclic process data (that needs an IO-controller/IO-device stack and hard real-time — out of scope and unsafe to tap), and the disruptive DCP Set services (set-name / set-ip / blink / factory-reset) are intentionally not exposed (they re-address or physically signal a live device). Ask via issue/PR to add them behind the MOC write gate.
• HARD REQUIREMENTS: raw-socket access (root / admin / CAP_NET_RAW) on the NIC on the PROFINET subnet. pnio-dcp is an OPTIONAL extra: pip install iaiops[profinet] — the base package installs/imports without it, and every tool then degrades to a teaching error.
• Connection params: host — THIS machine's IP on the PROFINET subnet (the DCP broadcast goes out on it). protocol: profinet.
• Preview caveat: validated against a mocked pnio-dcp DCP — not verified against live PROFINET devices yet.

Energy edition (electrical substation / utility telecontrol — read-only)

The energy vertical adds the three protocols that dominate power/utility SCADA, as read-only monitoring taps. Install with pip install iaiops[energy] and expose with IAIOPS_MCP=energy.

• IEC 60870-5-104 (c104): iec104_connection_info (link + discovered ASDU common addresses), iec104_interrogate (general interrogation — all monitored points of a station), iec104_read_point (one point by IOA). Config: host / port (2404) / common_address.
• DNP3 (pydnp3/opendnp3): dnp3_link_status (master/outstation link), dnp3_integrity_poll (Class 0/1/2/3 → the outstation database, grouped by binary/analog/counter). Config: host / port (20000) / unit_id (outstation addr) / master_address.
• IEC 61850 MMS (libiec61850 binding): iec61850_device_directory (logical-device model map), iec61850_browse (browse LD/LN/DO children), iec61850_read (read a data attribute by object-reference + functional constraint, e.g. IED1MMXU1.TotW.mag.f FC=MX). Config: host / port (102).
• Scope (deliberate): monitor direction only — control commands (IEC-104 C_SC/C_DC/setpoints, DNP3 CROB/analog-output, IEC-61850 Oper/select-before-operate) and IEC-61850 GOOSE / Sampled Values are not exposed.
• ⚠️ Preview / 待核实: the energy connectors are mock-tested and their library/API bindings are unverified against live RTUs/IEDs. iec61850 needs libiec61850 built; pydnp3 builds a native extension — these stay opt-in (not in iaiops[all]). This is the connector line's largest validation debt — open an issue with your device + library version if a binding symbol differs.

Building edition (facility / HVAC / 厂务 — read-only)

The building vertical adds BACnet/IP (ASHRAE 135) — the dominant building-automation protocol for HVAC, lighting, metering, and facility plant. Install with pip install iaiops[building] and expose with IAIOPS_MCP=building.

• BACnet/IP (BAC0 over bacpypes3): bacnet_discover (Who-Is device discovery), bacnet_object_list (a device's objects), bacnet_read_property (one object property), bacnet_read_points (present-value of all analog/binary/multistate points — the HVAC snapshot). Config: host = THIS machine's BACnet/IP interface (ip or ip/mask) / port (47808).
• Scope (deliberate): read-only — present-value writes (with priority/relinquish) are not exposed; overriding a live building-control point is OT-dangerous.
• ⚠️ Preview / 待核实: mock-tested; the BAC0 binding is unverified against live building gear.

信创 / China entry (offline · 国产 TSDB · compliance)

For 自主可控 / 信创 deployments — see docs/CHINA.md for the full guide.

• Air-gapped install: pure-Python core + per-protocol optional extras → install from a local wheelhouse with pip install --no-index --find-links ./wheelhouse "iaiops[...]"; secrets stay local (encrypted store), no cloud KMS.
• National TSDB historian sink (historian_push, CLI iaiops historian push): write collected telemetry to TDengine (iaiops[tdengine]) or Apache IoTDB (iaiops[iotdb]) — domestic, controllable; we don't build our own store or bind InfluxDB. Data egress to the operator's own historian, not a control write.
• Compliance mapping (compliance_mapping, CLI iaiops compliance): an honest 《工控系统网络安全防护指南》 ↔ iaiops self-assessment across 分区隔离 / 可审计 / 双向认证 / 最小权限 / 数据保护 / 自主可控, with per-control status (addressed / partial / 待核实) and the named gap.
• 国产 PLC: 汇川 / 台达 / 信捷 over the existing Modbus-TCP / S7 connectors.
• ⚠️ 待核实: 国产 OS (麒麟/统信) · 芯 (鲲鹏/海光) · PLC validation and the TSDB write paths are documented but not yet hardware-verified — see the validation matrix in docs/CHINA.md.

OEE / downtime analytics (cross-protocol, read-only)

• oee_compute — OEE = Availability × Performance × Quality from production inputs (planned time, run time, ideal cycle, total/good counts). Each factor is reported raw + clamped to [0,1]; a capped performance >1.0 flags an optimistic ideal cycle.
• downtime_events — auto-detects running→stopped transitions in a {timestamp, state} series and produces stoppage events with durations, categorized (changeover / material / mechanical / quality / break / unknown, by keyword heuristics or a {state: category} override).
• oee_multidim — aggregates OEE across machine × part × shift (or any dimensions) from labelled records → the matrix + worst performers.
• Operate over provided/collected inputs (fully testable without a plant). mtconnect_oee_snapshot surfaces the live MTConnect availability/execution inputs that feed these.

Active asset inventory / fingerprint (read-only)

• asset_inventory — for each configured (or named) endpoint, actively connects with our own protocol client and reads its identity call (S7 s7_cpu_info, EtherNet/IP eip_controller_info, OPC-UA server build info, Modbus Device Identification FC43/0x2B, Mitsubishi CPU type, MTConnect device model), aggregating vendor / model / firmware / serial / reachable / last_seen into an asset register.
• Honest scope (IEC 62443-flavored): this is ACTIVE fingerprinting via our client connections, NOT passive SPAN/tap discovery — it only finds devices we are configured to reach and adds light load to each. Passive, traffic-mirroring discovery is roadmap.

OPC-UA Historical Access (HDA)

• opcua_read_history — reads stored historical values for a node over a [start,end] ISO-8601 window via the server's HistoryRead service (asyncua read_raw_history), bounded by max_points (≤2000). Returns {supported:false, note} gracefully when the server does not historize the node (no crash). Read-only.

Change-of-value (CoV) monitor

• monitor_changes — bounded deadband report: polls a point and returns only the value CHANGES (with timestamps), not every sample. Works over OPC-UA / Modbus / S7 / Mitsubishi MC / EtherNet-IP. Never an infinite loop — hard-capped by both duration_s (≤120) and max_changes (≤500). Read-only.

---

Install

Protocol client libraries are optional extras — install only the 1–2 protocols a site actually runs (every protocol library is imported lazily; the base package installs and imports without any of them, and a call to a not-installed protocol returns a teaching error pointing at the right extra):

uv tool install "iaiops[opcua,modbus]"   # just the protocols you need
# or one per site:  pip install "iaiops[s7]"   ·   everything:  pip install "iaiops[all]"
# or a per-industry edition bundle:        pip install "iaiops[fab]"

iaiops init                 # interactive: add endpoints, store passwords encrypted
iaiops doctor               # config + per-protocol connectivity probe (point at simulators)
iaiops protocols            # the capability map

Protocol extras: opcua · modbus · s7 · mc · eip · mtconnect · sparkplug · secsgem · ethercat · all.

Edition bundles (match the same-named IAIOPS_MCP profiles — install the protocols a vertical runs): fab (secsgem + opcua + s7 + modbus) · factory (the discrete-manufacturing set — all protocols except SECS/GEM) · process (opcua + modbus). Energy/building bundles arrive with their signature protocols (IEC-104/DNP3/61850, BACnet).

Master password

Secrets (per-endpoint passwords, MQTT credentials) are never stored in plaintext — they live in ~/.iaiops/secrets.enc (Fernet + scrypt). Export IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD so the MCP server/CLI can unlock non-interactively:

export IAIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD='…'

Example ~/.iaiops/config.yaml (one block per protocol)

endpoints:
  - name: line1
    protocol: opcua
    endpoint_url: opc.tcp://plc.lan:4840
    # username: operator           # password stored encrypted via init/secret set
    tags:
      - { ref: "ns=2;i=5", label: temp, warn_high: 70, alarm_high: 90 }
  - name: plc2
    protocol: modbus
    host: 10.0.0.5
    port: 502
    unit_id: 1
  - name: press1
    protocol: s7
    host: 10.0.0.6
    rack: 0
    slot: 1                        # S7-1200/1500
  - name: cell3
    protocol: mc
    host: 10.0.0.7
    port: 5007
    plctype: iQ-R
  - name: vmc1
    protocol: mtconnect
    agent_url: http://10.0.0.8:5000
  - name: uns
    protocol: mqtt
    host: broker.lan
    use_tls: true                  # → port 8883
    topic: spBv1.0/#
    # username: edge1              # password stored encrypted
  - name: cell5
    protocol: ethernetip           # alias: eip
    host: 10.0.0.9
    slot: 0                        # 0 for CompactLogix; CPU slot for ControlLogix
  - name: bus1
    protocol: ethercat             # Linux + root/CAP_NET_RAW + pip install iaiops[ethercat]
    nic: eth1                      # dedicated NIC cabled to the EtherCAT bus
    expected_slaves: 8             # optional sanity check vs the bus scan

iaiops init walkthrough (per protocol)

$ iaiops init
Step 1 — master password: ********
Step 2 — add an endpoint
  Endpoint name (e.g. line1): press1
  Protocol ('opcua','modbus','s7','mc','mtconnect','mqtt') [opcua]: s7
  S7 PLC host (IP/FQDN): 10.0.0.6
  Port [102]: 102
  Rack (0 for S7-1200/1500) [0]: 0
  Slot (1 for S7-1200/1500, 2 for S7-300/400) [1]: 1
✓ Saved endpoint 'press1'.

(MQTT prompts add TLS/topic/username; MTConnect prompts for agent_url; EtherCAT prompts for the nic + expected_slaves and warns about the Linux/root/NIC/optional-extra requirement; OPC-UA/MQTT prompt for a hidden password stored encrypted.)

Test against a simulator (per protocol)

• OPC-UA — an asyncua demo server (the test suite runs a real in-process one).
• Modbus — ModbusPal or a pymodbus server simulator.
• S7 — a pyS7/snap7 S7 server sim (Snap7 server) on :102.
• MTConnect — the public MTConnect demo agent, or a local agent.
• MQTT — a local mosquitto broker (+ a Sparkplug edge for SpB topics).
• Mitsubishi MC — GX Simulator / an MC 3E server sim.
• EtherNet/IP — a pycomm3-compatible CIP/Logix simulator (or a spare CompactLogix).
• EtherCAT — no simulator exists (hard-real-time, raw-Ethernet). Validate only on Linux, as root / with CAP_NET_RAW, on a dedicated NIC wired to real slaves (e.g. a Beckhoff EK1100 coupler + EL terminals). iaiops doctor reports a clear "needs Linux/root/NIC/pysoem" status off the bus rather than failing.

---

Usage

CLI (read)

iaiops opcua read "ns=2;i=5" -e line1
iaiops modbus holding 0 -e plc2 --count 4 --decode float32
iaiops s7 read-db 1 REAL 4 -e press1 --count 2
iaiops mc words D100 -e cell3 --count 8
iaiops mtconnect oee -e vmc1
iaiops mqtt nodes -e uns --timeout-s 15
iaiops eip tags -e cell5                           # Logix tag discovery
iaiops eip read "Conveyor.Speed" -e cell5
iaiops ethercat slaves -e bus1                     # EtherCAT bus scan (Linux+root)
iaiops ethercat read-sdo 0 4120 --subindex 1 -e bus1   # CoE SDO 0x1018:1
iaiops opcua history "ns=2;i=5" -e line1 --start 2026-06-28T08:00:00Z   # HDA
iaiops opcua monitor "ns=2;i=5" -e line1 --duration-s 20 --deadband 0.5 # CoV
iaiops diag dataflow -e line1 --ref "ns=2;i=5" --freshness-s 30
iaiops analytics oee 28800 25200 2.0 12000 11800   # OEE = A×P×Q
iaiops analytics asset -e press1 -e cell5           # active asset register

CLI (write — dry-run by default, double-confirm on --apply)

iaiops s7 write-db 1 INT 0 42 -e press1            # dry-run preview
iaiops s7 write-db 1 INT 0 42 -e press1 --apply    # double-confirm prompt
iaiops mqtt publish factory/line1/cmd '{"setpoint":50}' -e uns --apply
iaiops eip write-tag Setpoint 42 -e cell5 --apply  # Logix tag write (double-confirm)
iaiops ethercat write-sdo 0 24698 e8030000 -e bus1 --apply   # CoE SDO 0x607A download
iaiops ethercat set-state PREOP --slave 0 -e bus1 --apply     # AL-state (can stop motion!)

MCP tool calls (JSON args → sample structured return)

s7_read_db:

{ "db": 1, "dtype": "REAL", "start": 4, "endpoint": "press1", "count": 2 }

{ "endpoint": "press1", "area": "DB", "db": 1, "dtype": "REAL", "start": 4,
  "count": 2, "items": [ {"address": "DB1,REAL4", "value": 20.5},
                         {"address": "DB1,REAL8", "value": 4.2} ] }

s7_write_db (dry-run):

{ "db": 1, "dtype": "INT", "start": 0, "value": 42, "endpoint": "press1" }

{ "address": "DB1,INT0", "dry_run": true, "before": 7, "would_write": 42,
  "note": "Dry run — nothing written. Re-run with dry_run=false AND a recorded approver…" }

mtconnect_oee_snapshot:

{ "availability": "AVAILABLE", "execution": "ACTIVE", "controller_mode": "AUTOMATIC",
  "program": "O1234", "available": true, "running": true, "verdict": "running" }

eip_read_tag:

{ "tag": "Conveyor.Speed", "endpoint": "cell5" }

{ "endpoint": "cell5", "tag": "Conveyor.Speed", "value": 1500.0, "type": "REAL",
  "error": "", "good": true }

eip_write_tag (dry-run):

{ "tag": "Setpoint", "value": 42, "endpoint": "cell5" }

{ "endpoint": "cell5", "tag": "Setpoint", "dry_run": true, "before": 7,
  "would_write": 42, "note": "Dry run — nothing written. Re-run with dry_run=false AND a recorded approver…" }

ethercat_read_sdo (CoE SDO upload):

{ "slave": 0, "index": 4120, "subindex": 1, "endpoint": "bus1" }

{ "endpoint": "bus1", "slave": 0, "index": "0x1018", "subindex": 1,
  "byte_length": 4, "hex": "9a020000", "as_uint": 666 }

ethercat_set_state (dry-run; can start/stop motion):

{ "state": "OP", "slave": 0, "endpoint": "bus1" }

{ "endpoint": "bus1", "scope": "slave[0]", "dry_run": true, "before": "SAFEOP",
  "would_request": "OP", "note": "Dry run — no state change. … Changing EtherCAT state can start/stop machine motion." }

sparkplug_decode_payload (full SpB metric decode):

{ "payload": "CAESBwoDYWJjEAE=", "encoding": "base64" }

{ "encoding": "sparkplug_b", "seq": 0, "metric_count": 2, "historical_count": 0,
  "metrics": [ {"name": "Temperature", "alias": 1, "datatype": "Double", "value": 21.5,
                "is_historical": false, "is_null": false} ] }

oee_compute:

{ "planned_time_s": 28800, "run_time_s": 25200, "ideal_cycle_time_s": 2.0,
  "total_count": 12000, "good_count": 11800 }

{ "availability": {"raw": 0.875, "value": 0.875, "capped": false},
  "performance": {"value": 0.952381}, "quality": {"value": 0.983333},
  "oee": 0.819444, "oee_pct": 81.94 }

asset_inventory (active fingerprint):

{ "endpoints": ["press1", "cell5"] }

{ "asset_count": 2, "reachable_count": 2, "method": "active_fingerprint",
  "assets": [ {"endpoint": "press1", "protocol": "s7", "vendor": "Siemens/compatible",
               "model": "CPU 1511-1 PN", "firmware": "2.8", "reachable": true,
               "last_seen": "2026-06-28T10:00:00+00:00"} ] }

Diagnostics (multi-dimensional JSON for an agent to visualize)

diagnose_dataflow(endpoint="line1", ref="ns=2;i=5", freshness_threshold_s=30):

{ "verdict": "comms_ok_value_stale",
  "diagnosis": "Connected with good status, but the value is STALE (age 412s > 30s) — the source/field upstream has stopped updating this point.",
  "recommended_action": "Trace upstream: the device serves the last value fine, so suspect the source/scanner/field signal that should refresh it.",
  "hops": [ {"hop":"connect","protocol":"opcua","ok":true,"detail":"OPC-UA state=0"},
            {"hop":"read_tag","ref":"ns=2;i=5","ok":true,"detail":"5.0"},
            {"hop":"freshness","evaluated":true,"stale":true,"age_seconds":412.0} ] }

alarm_bad_actors(events=[…]):

{ "event_count": 55, "window_minutes": 0.82, "alarms_per_hour": 4024.4,
  "isa_18_2": {"ok_max":6,"manageable_max":12,"flood_min":30},
  "flood_verdict": "flood",
  "priority_distribution": {"high":50,"low":5},
  "pareto_sources_for_80pct": ["FIC101"],
  "top_offenders": [ {"source":"FIC101","count":50,"share_pct":90.9,"chattering":true,"standing":false} ],
  "chattering": ["FIC101"], "standing": [] }

tag_health(tags=[…]):

{ "evaluated": 4, "overall": "alarm", "offender_count": 3,
  "offenders": [ {"ref":"hot","latest":99,"flags":["out_of_range_alarm"],"severity":3},
                 {"ref":"flat","latest":5,"flags":["flatline"],"severity":2},
                 {"ref":"bad","latest":null,"flags":["bad_quality"],"severity":3} ] }

AI downtime root-cause copilot (flagship)

downtime_root_cause correlates whatever evidence you can hand over — alarm events, tag samples, a diagnose_dataflow verdict, a machine-state series — around an incident window and returns an evidence-cited, advisory verdict. Read-first: it proposes a human-approved, MOC-gated, undoable action and executes nothing. Anti-hallucination by design — it cites only signals actually present in the input, weights them by temporal proximity to onset (a cause precedes its effect), and downgrades to insufficient_evidence (with a recommended_next_data list) rather than guessing when evidence is thin.

downtime_root_cause(window={"start":"2026-06-28T10:00:00Z","asset":"line1"}, alarms=[{"source":"M1_DRIVE","timestamp":"2026-06-28T09:59:52Z","message":"motor overload trip"}], tags=[{"ref":"DRV1.Torque","samples":[10,11,99,99],"alarm_high":80}], dataflow={"verdict":"healthy"}):

{ "window": {"start":"2026-06-28 10:00:00+00:00","asset":"line1","duration_s":300.0},
  "verdict": "root_cause_identified",
  "primary_cause": {
    "cause": "mechanical_fault", "confidence": 0.722, "confidence_band": "high",
    "evidence": [
      {"signal":"alarm","ref":"M1_DRIVE","at":"2026-06-28 09:59:52+00:00","lead_time_s":8.0,
       "detail":"motor overload trip","weight":0.4959},
      {"signal":"tag","ref":"DRV1.Torque","detail":"flags=out_of_range_alarm severity=3","weight":0.45} ],
    "recommended_action": "Dispatch maintenance to inspect the faulting unit; if a latch/interlock is set, the reversible step is to clear the fault and reset the latch (MOC-approved, undo captures the prior latch state)." },
  "evidence_summary": {"alarms_supplied":1,"tags_supplied":1,"dataflow_verdict":"healthy","total_evidence_items":2},
  "anti_hallucination": "Advisory only — nothing is executed. Every cited signal is present in the supplied evidence …" }

The same copilot is on the CLI: iaiops diag rca --input bundle.json where the bundle is {window, alarms?, tags?, dataflow?, state_series?}.

Let it gather its own evidence. downtime_root_cause_live (CLI iaiops diag rca-live) takes just an endpoint + window + the refs to look at, then pulls the evidence itself — a cross-protocol diagnose_dataflow probe, a short sampled series per ref (so flatline / bad-quality / anomaly surface via tag_health), and active OPC-UA conditions — before running the same advisory, read-only copilot. The gathered bundle is echoed back under collected_evidence (no hidden inputs):

iaiops diag rca-live -e line1 --start 2026-06-28T10:00:00Z \
  --asset line1 --ref "ns=2;i=5" --ref "ns=2;i=6"

Data-quality watchdog & UNS governance (read-only intelligence)

Two more pure-analysis layers — fully testable without live gear, and they feed the RCA copilot.

• data_quality_scorecard (CLI iaiops diag dataquality) — a fleet data-TRUST rollup: scores each tag 0-100 on whether its data can be believed — staleness, dead heartbeat (first-class), bad-quality, flatline, gaps, anomaly — then rolls up per endpoint and across the fleet with an issue breakdown and ranked worst offenders. Distinct from process health: it asks "can I trust this number," not "is this number alarming." heartbeat_health (CLI iaiops diag heartbeat) is the standalone watchdog-liveness check (a flatlined heartbeat = dead upstream even when comms look fine).
• uns_topic_audit (CLI iaiops mqtt uns-audit) — governs a UNS topic tree: naming conformance (allowed roots / min depth) + topic sprawl (casing collisions of the same logical name, leaf metrics scattered under many parents, depth outliers, duplicates) → a clean/minor/sprawling verdict. uns_schema_drift (CLI iaiops mqtt uns-drift) — compares two Sparkplug NBIRTH-style snapshots and classifies the change none / additive / breaking (a metric removed or its datatype changed). Positions the UNS as a governable neutral data source, not just a broker.

MCP server

iaiops mcp        # stdio transport; or the `iaiops-mcp` entry point

Menu — expose only the protocols a site runs. A fab usually runs 1–2 protocols; exposing all 13 floods the model with tools it can't use. Set IAIOPS_MCP to a comma-list of protocols and/or a named profile (default all). The cross-protocol brain (OEE / downtime / diagnostics / asset / analysis) is always exposed.

IAIOPS_MCP=opcua,modbus iaiops-mcp   # 32 tools instead of 90
IAIOPS_MCP=fab          iaiops-mcp   # named profile (opcua+s7+modbus)
IAIOPS_MCP=opcua        iaiops-mcp   # effectively a single-protocol MCP

Named entry-point sugar. For the common single-protocol / single-edition case there is a pre-scoped console script per protocol and per named profile — no env var to set. Each is a thin shim over the same server:

iaiops-mcp-opcua     # == IAIOPS_MCP=opcua    iaiops-mcp
iaiops-mcp-modbus    # == IAIOPS_MCP=modbus   iaiops-mcp
iaiops-mcp-fab       # == IAIOPS_MCP=fab      iaiops-mcp  (per-edition)
iaiops-mcp-energy    # == IAIOPS_MCP=energy   iaiops-mcp
iaiops-mcp-building  # == IAIOPS_MCP=building iaiops-mcp

Named profiles: all · fab · factory · process · energy · building. In an MCP client (e.g. Claude Desktop) set IAIOPS_MCP per server entry — or point the entry straight at the matching iaiops-mcp-<name> script — one entry per site/line, each a lean single- or dual-protocol server.

---

Safety & governance

• Read-first. 84 of 90 tools are read-only. The 6 write/command tools (s7_write_db, mc_write_words, mqtt_publish, eip_write_tag, ethercat_write_sdo, ethercat_set_state) are OT-dangerous: governed at high risk_tier, off by default (dry-run), capture the BEFORE value/state for undo, require a double-confirm in the CLI, and (via policy) a recorded approver — MOC discipline. ethercat_set_state can START or STOP machine motion. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入.
• Do not point this at a production control system without authorization. OT networks are safety-critical; even reads add load. Test against a simulator first.
• All endpoint-returned text is sanitized (prompt-injection defense); secrets are never returned by any tool; MTConnect XML is parsed with DTD/entity declarations refused.
• Every tool runs through the vendored governance harness: SQLite audit (~/.iaiops/audit.db), token/call budget + runaway breaker, risk-tier gate, undo recording.

Roadmap

• EtherNet/IP PLC-5 / SLC-500 (PCCC) and Micro800 support (Logix tags are done in 0.2.0).
• Passive asset discovery (SPAN/tap, no connections) alongside today's active fingerprint.
• EtherCAT EoE / FoE / SoE mailbox protocols and full PDO-mapping decode (CoE SDO/PDO read+write and AL-state landed in 0.3.0 via the optional pysoem extra).
• OPC-UA certificate security + real Alarms & Conditions subscriptions.
• MTConnect streaming long-poll; Sparkplug B DataSet/Template deep expansion.

Missing a protocol, device, or feature? 缺功能提 issue/PR 欢迎留言 — open a GitHub issue or PR.

License

MIT © wei