iil-codeguard
Library-first code compliance tooling for the IIL Platform.
Status: Skeleton (2026-05-10) — implementation per ADR-191 v1.1, ADR-192 v1.1, ADR-193 v1.1 Versioning: CalVer (
YYYY.MM.PATCH) Python: 3.12+
What it checks
| Category | Rules | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Service Layer | SL-001..006 |
ADR-009 + ADR-192 |
| HTMX Templates | HX-001..009 |
ADR-048 + ADR-192 |
| Docker Compose | DC-001..009 |
ADR-021/022 + ADR-193 |
| Dockerfile | DF-001..009 |
ADR-056 + ADR-193 |
| Nginx (optional) | NX-001..005 |
ADR-060 + ADR-193 |
All rules emit findings in SARIF 2.1.0 (GitHub Code Scanning native).
Architecture
Core Library (stdlib-first: ast, html.parser, pyyaml)
│
├── CLI: codeguard audit . --format sarif
├── Pre-commit Hook
├── GitHub Action: codeguard.yml
└── MCP Server (2 tools: codeguard_audit, codeguard_check_file)
Quick Start (planned)
pip install iil-codeguard
# CLI
codeguard audit . # human-readable text
codeguard audit . --format sarif # SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub
codeguard check-file apps/views.py # single file
# Pre-commit
echo '
- repo: https://github.com/achimdehnert/iil-codeguard
rev: v2026.05.0
hooks:
- id: codeguard
' >> .pre-commit-config.yaml
# GitHub Action
# Copy .github/workflows/codeguard.yml from this repo
# MCP (in mcp_config.json)
"iil-codeguard": {
"command": "iil-codeguard-mcp",
"args": []
}
Why a separate package?
ADR-191 v1.1 explains the trade-offs vs. extending platform-context:
- CLI ab Tag 1 → erfasst Dependabot, Web-UI-Edits, External Contributors
- 2 MCP-Tools statt 4 → kein "god server"
- Eigenes Repo = unabhängiger Release-Zyklus
- Pattern wie
iil-adrfw(ADR-190)
Empirical Foundation
The rule design is grounded in a 2026-05-10 stakeholder validation across 7 consumer repos:
- 388 Views (110 CBV, 6 async, 272 FBV)
- 940 HTMX elements (399 with Django tags inside attribute values)
- 0 pathological cases (
{% %}between HTMX attributes) — covered by HX-009 trip-wire
Status & Roadmap
See ROADMAP.md for the 8.5-day implementation plan.
License
MIT (consistent with other iil-* packages).
Metadata
Release files for iil-codeguard 2026.5.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| iil_codeguard-2026.5.1.tar.gz | 29.6 kB | Without provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| iil_codeguard-2026.5.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 57.7 kB
Release files / iil_codeguard-2026.5.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | iil_codeguard-2026.5.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 29.6 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
211f6469e2f6e6a2f5efee123f76b9860cf78d042471bfbdff219dcb79078a08
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.12.13
|
Release files / iil_codeguard-2026.5.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | iil_codeguard-2026.5.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 28.2 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
cfa95f95f8ce91b24d6e5afcb66017213639d08f9eb5407b411fad4f16f690e2
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
99f503aaebac9159f4b349551c9a8dcd3e6e4d79c36883b45f0968e3e79b2040
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.12.13
|
Security for iil-codeguard 2026.5.1
Provenance
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No provenance found
None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.
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