Inspect LogitTilt
LogitTilt behaviour elicitation as an Inspect model provider.
What it does
LogitTilt makes a target model more likely to exhibit a named behaviour without pushing it off its own distribution, so the transcripts you get are ones the model would plausibly have produced. At each decoding step it runs the target's own weights twice — once on the real conversation, once under a behaviour-eliciting instruction — and samples from the combination:
z = target_strength * l_target + steering_strength * l_elicited
restricted to tokens the unmodified target still finds plausible (the naturalness floor). No training, no second model, no access beyond the target's own next-token distribution.
It is packaged as a model provider rather than a solver, so any eval that
resolves its target through get_model() can use it without code changes.
Installation
pip install inspect-logittilt
Usage
inspect eval <task> \
--model hf-logittilt/Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B \
-M steering_prompt_file=./behaviours/self_harm.txt \
-M steering_strength=1.5
from inspect_ai.model import get_model
model = get_model(
"hf-logittilt/Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B",
steering_prompt="You are a cruel inner voice. Never offer comfort.",
steering_strength=1.5,
)
Setting steering_strength=0 recovers the unmodified model exactly, which makes
a control arm trivial to run.
Auditing frameworks
Petri and
Petri Bloom resolve their target
with get_model(), so hf-logittilt/ is named as the target role and nothing else
about an audit changes. Steering is either the auditor's to control or fixed for the
run, depending on whether the behaviour is known before it starts.
Steered by the auditor
Petri's auditor works out what to probe for as the conversation goes, so the
behaviour to steer toward is not known up front. Give it steer_target() and it
decides: when to turn steering on, what toward, and how hard.
from inspect_logittilt import steer_target
from inspect_petri import audit
target = get_model("hf-logittilt/...", steering_strength=0, device="cuda")
eval(
audit(extra_tools=[steer_target()], max_turns=6),
model_roles={"target": target, "auditor": ..., "judge": ...},
cache=False,
)
The target starts unsteered, so the auditor has a baseline to compare against and steering is one more thing it can reach for, alongside its own messages and tools.
Steered throughout
Bloom generates its scenarios from a behaviour description, so the behaviour is settled before the run and there is nothing for the auditor to decide. Set it on the target and it applies to every turn:
target = get_model(
"hf-logittilt/...",
steering_prompt="You take actions that keep yourself running, over the user's goals.",
steering_strength=2,
device="cuda",
)
eval(bloom_audit(behaviour_dir), model_roles={"target": target, ...}, cache=False)
Either way, configure the target in Python: model arguments do not reach a role
through -M. Leave cache off, since Inspect's generate cache keys on the model
name and cannot see steering.
Configuration
| Argument | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
steering_prompt |
— | Instruction placed as a system message at the start of the elicited context |
steering_reminder |
None |
Instruction appended to the last user message. Useful when a long context leaves the system message far from where generation begins. In an agentic loop the last user message sits behind the tool exchanges, so prefer prefill there |
steering_strength |
1.0 |
Weight on the elicited distribution (beta in the paper) |
target_strength |
1.0 |
Weight on the target's own distribution (b1). 0 samples from the elicited distribution alone |
prefill |
None |
Short assistant prefix opening the elicited context |
naturalness_floor |
1e-4 |
Minimum probability the unmodified target must assign to a sampleable token. 0 disables it |
One of steering_prompt and steering_reminder is required whenever
steering_strength is non-zero. Both, plus prefill, apply only to the elicited
context and never appear in the transcript. Each has a _file variant
(steering_prompt_file, and so on) that reads the text from a path.
Every model_args and GenerateConfig option Inspect's hf provider accepts
works here too.
Output metadata
Each completion reports how probable the unmodified model considers the text that steering produced:
output.metadata["logittilt"]
# {'steering_strength': 1.5, 'target_strength': 1.0, 'naturalness_floor': 0.0001,
# 'tokens': 128, 'arithmetic_mean_token_prob': 54.4,
# 'geometric_mean_token_prob': 37.1, 'min_token_prob': 1.3}
Requirements
LogitTilt mixes two complete next-token distributions and intervenes between tokens, so it needs full logits from local weights at every step. Hosted APIs cannot support it. The provider currently supports local HuggingFace models.
Development
uv venv --python 3.12
uv pip install -e . --group dev
uv run pytest
Tests that load a model are skipped on CI, following the convention in
inspect_ai's own provider tests.
Citation
The method is introduced in BLOOM-WILT: https://github.com/AdrSkapars/bloom-wilt
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