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INVARA

Engineering invariants for AI-built software.

INVARA upgrades vibe-coded software into verifiable, engineering-grade software.

You asked an agent to do a piece of work. It says it is done. INVARA decides that independently, from exit codes and file bytes, and writes the verdict into a hash chain so the answer cannot be quietly revised later.

The agent's own report is not an input. There is no field in a contract where anything can assert that the work is finished.

Founder intent
    ↓
Sealed specification and constraints
    ↓
Builder agent (Claude Code / Codex / another agent)
    ↓
Code, files, database changes, commands, runtime effects
    ↓
Independent INVARA verifier
    ↓
Observable evidence and provenance
    ↓
BLOCK / UNVERIFIABLE / HUMAN_REVIEW / PASS
    ↓
Human or policy-controlled authority

Status: v0.1 / Alpha. It is dogfooded daily and has not been sold. It is not autonomous authorization and not an enterprise compliance control.


What this is not

Read this part before the install line. It is short on purpose, and the word that carries the promise above is verifiable — not correct.

INVARA does not prove software correctness. It verifies declared constraints against observable evidence.

Specifically:

  • It does not inspect your codebase. It never asks whether the code is good, whether the architecture holds, or whether the tests are the right tests. Stack a new floor on junk and, if this floor was built to the declared spec, the verdict is PASS.
  • It does not find bugs. A completion check that runs your suite is only as strong as your suite. INVARA reports the exit code; it does not have an opinion about coverage.
  • It does not decide what should have been promised. You write the contract. A weak contract earns a weak PASS, and the contract is stored verbatim so anyone can see how weak it was.
  • It is not a sandbox. Completion checks are commands and they run with your permissions. Do not seal a contract you have not read.
  • It does not judge intent. intent is prose; nothing checks that the work matched it. The checks are what bind.
  • It is not an AI code generator and not an LLM code-review bot. There is no model anywhere in the verdict path.

The narrow claim, which is what the machine actually does:

It decides, independently, whether this change kept the promises it made.


Install and first verdict, in five minutes

Nothing to configure. No API key, no service, no account. Python 3.12+.

uvx --from git+https://github.com/Jujitae/invara invara list

or, to keep it:

pip install "invara @ git+https://github.com/Jujitae/invara"

The package declares zero runtime dependencies, so this pulls only the standard library.

From a checkout it is the same program, but install it first — the source lives under src/, so a bare python -m invara in the repository root finds nothing to run:

pip install -e .
python -m invara list

1. Write the contract before the work

task.json, next to the repository you are about to change:

{
  "task_id": "2026-08-17-tidy-the-parser",
  "intent": "Speed up the CSV parser without changing what it accepts",
  "constraints": [
    {
      "kind": "paths_unchanged",
      "paths": ["tests/test_parser.py"],
      "reason": "a speedup that edits its own test is not a speedup"
    }
  ],
  "done_when": [
    {
      "id": "suite",
      "command": ["python", "-m", "pytest", "-q"],
      "expect_exit": 0,
      "reason": "the whole suite"
    }
  ]
}
invara seal task.json

Sealing takes the digests of the protected paths now, before anyone knows what the verdict will be. That ordering is the entire guarantee.

2. Do the work.

3. Judge

invara judge 2026-08-17-tidy-the-parser            # dry run
invara judge 2026-08-17-tidy-the-parser --commit   # record it
  BLOCK: 1 protected path(s) changed: tests/test_parser.py: changed
         (a speedup that edits its own test is not a speedup)
  decided by: constraint_breaks

That is the first verdict. Everything below is detail.


The four verdicts

Verdict Meaning Exit
BLOCK A protected path changed, or a completion check failed 1
UNVERIFIABLE A check could not be run at all. Unchecked is not passed 2
HUMAN_REVIEW Machine checks passed; something was declared as needing eyes 0
PASS Every check returned what it promised, every protected path is byte-identical 0

Constraint breaks outrank everything. A run that touched what it promised not to touch is not partially fine.

BLOCK is two rules wearing one word — a protected path that changed and a check that came back wrong are not the same accusation. So the verdict also records which rule decided it, named after the evidence it decided on (constraint_breaks, failed, unrunnable, needs_human, passed), and judge and log print it. Verdicts recorded before this existed do not have one, and do not get one fitted after the fact.

Sealing refuses more than it accepts

seal will not write a contract that cannot fail the work. It refuses a task with no completion condition, a condition with no command to check it, a contract with no protected paths ("a task allowed to change anything cannot be said to have respected anything"), a duplicate check id, a protected path that does not exist, and — the one that matters most — a contract where every condition defers to a person.

That last one is why this is not a rubber stamp: if the only evidence is somebody saying yes, there is no contract.

Other commands

invara list             sealed tasks and their latest verdict
invara log   <task_id>  every verdict this task has ever had
invara show  <task_id>  the contract, exactly as sealed
invara chain            rebuild both hash chains

Verdicts live in .runtime/verify.db (--db to move it). A contract is sealed once and judged many times; the history is append-only and chained.


Determinism

Same repository state, same contract, same environment → same verdict. The verdict is a function of file digests and command exit codes, and nothing else; there is no model in the path and no clock in the decision.

Measured rather than asserted, 2026-08-17: contract 2026-08-17-route-discovery was judged twice, four minutes apart, against an unchanged tree — 7 checks each including a 2,021-test suite. Both runs returned the same status and the same reason string, and both rows are in the chain:

$ invara log 2026-08-17-route-discovery
2026-08-17 09:17 UTC  PASS
    7 check(s) passed and 6 protected path(s) are unchanged
2026-08-17 09:21 UTC  PASS
    7 check(s) passed and 6 protected path(s) are unchanged

Run that yourself on your own contract before you trust it on ours.

The word doing work there is environment. See the first failure story below: a contract that passed locally and failed in CI was not non-deterministic — it was two different environments, and INVARA reported each one correctly. If you want the verdict to be reproducible, make the completion commands reproducible.


Failure stories

These are real, from building and using this tool. They are here because a verification tool that only shows its successes is asking to be trusted on exactly the grounds it tells you not to trust anything.

Environment contamination. A contract passed on the machine that wrote it and failed in CI. The tree was clean; the environment was not. PYTHONIOENCODING was set in the shell, child processes inherited it, and the completion command only worked because of it. Verification runs now use env -u PYTHONIOENCODING. Clean tree is not clean environment.

A seal that broke itself. A fresh clone rewrote a sealed ontology file to CRLF on checkout, so its SHA-256 no longer matched. The file whose entire job was to prove nothing had changed failed its own seal. Fixed in .gitattributes, not in the digest rule — the digest was right.

The first verdict was UNVERIFIABLE, and it was correct. A completion command could not be found, because subprocess does not use cwd to resolve the executable. The verdict was right and the tool was useless. Both facts are recorded; only one of them was a bug.

It did not pass the work that built it. The first contract INVARA ever sealed was the task of building it. It returned UNVERIFIABLE, then PASS, then PASS. All three are still in .runtime/verify.db, and invara log prints them.


Where it came from

The shape is lifted from a sibling engine in the same private repository: seal the contract before the evidence exists, refuse to create anything you cannot kill, score only observed records, and chain the result. Change "world claim" to "agent's work" and the same machine applies.

INVARA was built and is dogfooded inside a private working repository (WIE); see PROVENANCE.md for what that means for this source.

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