🧠 judais-lobi

Artifact-driven. Capability-gated. Endpoint-aware. Not a chatbot. A kernel.

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🔴 JudAIs & 🔵 Lobi

Two agents. One spine.

• 🧝 Lobi — whimsical Linux elf, creative, narrative, curious.
• 🧠 JudAIs — strategic adversarial twin, efficient, ruthless, execution-first.

They are no longer just terminal personalities.

They are evolving into a local-first, contract-driven autonomous developer system.

To find out why read the Manifesto!

Why This Exists

Frontier models are expensive, rate-limited, and increasingly censored. If you want to build serious systems, you should not have to rent your agency by the token, or wait for policy filters to decide what is “allowed.” Judais-Lobi is built so you can run your own stack, control your costs, and decide your own boundaries.

Who It’s For

• Builders who want lower inference cost and predictable behavior.
• People who dislike censorship and want model choice instead of vendor lock-in.
• Engineers who care about deterministic runs and auditable decisions.
• Anyone who wants an extensible workflow engine rather than a chat toy.

Quickstart

1. Install: pip install judais-lobi — or, from a checkout and with everything a mission needs, pip install -e '.[mission]'.
2. Set an API key (OpenAI is the default today): export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
3. Run a task: lobi "summarize this repo"
4. Use tools explicitly. Tools are deny-by-default: the safe profile can read the filesystem and git but not run a shell, so running a command needs the dev profile — lobi --profile dev --shell "ls -la" (--profile safe|dev|ops|god, or JUDAIS_LOBI_PROFILE; without it, lobi --shell refuses and names shell.exec and the profile that grants it). Tool subprocesses run under bwrap wherever bubblewrap is installed; --unsandboxed opts out.
5. Expect a .judais-lobi/ directory in the working directory. audit/ holds the append-only record of every tool dispatch and appears from the first turn; a mission adds runs/ (the durable transcript, one directory per run) and approvals/ (a gate's durable record). JUDAIS_LOBI_AUDIT, JUDAIS_LOBI_RUNS and JUDAIS_LOBI_APPROVALS each move their directory (a path) or silence it (none/off), and a mission says on its opening frame which happened.

Three commands are installed, one per agent. They take the same flags; only the personality differs.

command	agent
lobi	🧝 the mischievous one — a general assistant
judais	🧠 the sharp one — a general assistant
tai	the mission-agent personality — governed tools over MCP, cites every claim, never sees source. Its personality file belongs to the deployment that operates it; tai finds that file or refuses, naming what it consulted

python main.py [lobi|judais|tai] <message> [flags] reaches the same three without installing anything, and python main.py --help lists them.

Local inference

--provider local talks to any OpenAI-compatible endpoint — vllm serve, llama.cpp's server, LM Studio, Ollama's /v1 shim:

export LOCAL_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1   # note the /v1
export LOCAL_MODEL=gpt-oss-20b                   # optional; else GET /models decides
lobi --provider local "summarize this repo"

capabilities are probed from GET {base}/models, so the context window is the served model's real max_model_len and not a guess. Unlike the other two providers, local is never silently fallen back away from when a key is missing: asking for the endpoint on this host and being answered by OpenAI is the opposite of what was asked.

Mission mode — the model chooses the tool

Everywhere else you choose the tool with a flag. That cannot work against a server whose tools are discovered at runtime, so --mission puts the catalogue in front of the model instead:

pip install 'judais-lobi[mission]'
lobi --mission --mcp-stdio 'python -m some_mcp_server' "what governed datasets exist?"
lobi --mission --mcp-url https://host/mcp   "..."   # bearer token in MCP_TOKEN

[mission], not [mcp]. The narrower extra installs a runnable mission and a silently ungoverned one: --skill reads YAML frontmatter, so with no pyyaml the manifest never loads, the closed tool set is never applied and the grounding check never runs — while the transcript looks exactly like a governed one. Both halves, or neither.

Each tool a server advertises is registered into the existing ToolBus as a ToolDescriptor whose executor dispatches tools/call, namespaced mcp.<name> so a server cannot shadow a local tool. Capability gating, the panic switch and the audit log apply to it exactly as to fs or git. The tool's JSON Schema is carried whole on the descriptor, so the catalogue the model reads says type (string: dataset|model|service) and not just type — types, required and enums are what decide whether a first call to a faceted search works.

The mission-mode surface

These flags are a contract, not a convenience: core/runtime/contract.py publishes them as CLI_FLAGS, a test asserts the parser takes every one, and a program that spawns this harness may rely on them. The table below is in CLI_FLAGS order. The rest of --help is a person's surface and may move.

flag	env	what it does
--mission	—	run as a mission rather than a chat turn
--mcp-url	MCP_URL	the tool plane, over streamable HTTP
--mcp-stdio	MCP_STDIO	a tool plane to spawn on this host, as a command line. One of the two, never both
--mcp-token	MCP_TOKEN	bearer token for --mcp-url. Prefer the env var — an argument is visible in ps
--mission-steps	—	hard cap on model turns, and it counts parse-error turns too. Default DEFAULT_MISSION_STEPS = 8 (core/cli.py). Under --resume it is read as that many further steps; unset, a resumed run is held to the total it started with
--mission-seconds	MISSION_SECONDS	wall-clock cap on the whole run, in seconds. Unset means unbounded — steps bound the work, seconds bound the waiting, and a default nobody chose would kill a slow local model mid-answer. Checked between steps and before each model call; one clock for the whole of a --swarm turn. A call already in flight is not interrupted, so the real bound is this plus one round trip
--provider	—	openai, mistral or local
--model	—	which model on it
--profile	JUDAIS_LOBI_PROFILE	the capability profile: deny-by-default safe, then dev, ops, god. A refusal names the scope and the profile that grants it. Arrives back as mission_started.profile
--unsandboxed	JUDAIS_LOBI_SANDBOX=none	run tool subprocesses with no isolation. Without it, bwrap wherever bubblewrap exists; JUDAIS_LOBI_SANDBOX=bwrap forces it and refuses on a host without it. Arrives back as mission_started.sandbox
--skill	MISSION_SKILL	a SKILL.md manifest, or a directory holding one
--swarm	MISSION_SWARM	stage the mission when it needs staging
--events	MISSION_EVENTS	where the NDJSON account goes out: -, fd:N, or a path
--history	MISSION_HISTORY	a JSON file of prior conversation turns
--gate-tool	—	a tool to offer and refuse to call. Repeatable. Resolved by same_tool, so a bare name matches the namespaced one; a name that matches nothing, or two things, is a refusal at the door
--approval	MISSION_APPROVAL	an approval id somebody already decided. Lifts that one tool out of the gated set, for this run only, and is spent when the tool is dispatched
--resume	MISSION_RESUME	carry on a recorded mission by its run id. The objective comes off the record, so the message may be omitted
--replay	MISSION_REPLAY	run a recorded mission again from its recording: the replies come out of that run's model.jsonl in order and the tool results out of tools.jsonl, so no server is dialled and no model is asked. The objective comes off the record, so the message may be omitted. The replayed run is a new run directory carrying replay_of and any drift, and grounding runs fresh over the recorded answer — which is how a grounding change is scored on yesterday's runs. --replay-tools live dispatches against the real plane instead
--temperature	—	sampling. Unset sends nothing and the server's own default applies
--top-p	—	nucleus sampling. Unset sends nothing
--seed	—	a seed where the server honours one. Not a determinism guarantee
--protocol	MISSION_PROTOCOL	json (default) or native. native declares the mission's tools as functions, declares a mission_answer(text) beside them and asks the server for tool_choice=required — so an unparseable reply and a tool name nobody offers stop being possible instead of being caught a turn later, and one turn may call several tools. Refused at the door on a backend that does not declare supports_tool_calls and supports_tool_choice_required. Off by default on purpose: it is measured before it is anybody's default
--no-stream	MISSION_STREAM=off	ask the model for the whole reply at once. Streaming is on by default wherever the backend declares supports_streaming: the answer's own fragments go out as answer_delta records while the model is still writing them, and the console prints them as they land. The answer record that follows is still the whole of it, and turning this off changes nothing else
--control	MISSION_CONTROL	where NDJSON commands come in from: fd:N, a FIFO, a path, or -. Four words — inject, cancel, cancel_step, gate_decision — and the only lever into a running turn besides SIGTERM. A bad line is dropped with a sentence on stderr, never fatal
--gate-wait	MISSION_GATE_WAIT	seconds a run standing at a gate waits in-turn for a gate_decision on --control before ending the turn at awaiting_approval. 0 = never wait (the 0.11 behaviour); default 300; capped by --mission-seconds. Set it low for an unattended caller

The rest of the published environment: MCP_CLIENT_NAME is what this client calls itself in the MCP initialize handshake — set it to the agent's name, or a server that governs by principal records every call as an anonymous one, and anything scoring the agent from the audit trail measures it as having called nothing. ELF_PERSONALITY and TAI_PERSONALITY point at persona files; LOCAL_API_BASE and LOCAL_MODEL aim the local backend. JUDAIS_LOBI_AUDIT moves the audit file (a path) or silences it (none/off); either way mission_started.audit_ref says which. JUDAIS_LOBI_RUNS does the same for the durable transcript — a path moves the run directories, none/off keeps none at all, and mission_started.run_id is present exactly when there is one to name. JUDAIS_LOBI_APPROVALS does the same for the durable approval records — a path moves the directory, none/off keeps none, and then a gate stops a mission and leaves nothing anybody can decide against, which the console says out loud. MISSION_RESUME is the environment form of --resume, MISSION_PROTOCOL of --protocol, MISSION_CONTROL of --control, MISSION_GATE_WAIT of --gate-wait, and MISSION_STREAM of --no-stream the other way round: off, 0, false, no or none turn the streamed answer off and anything else leaves it on.

--protocol native — the model calls a function instead of writing one

The default protocol asks for one JSON object per reply and parses it. That works, and it fails in a way that was measured: on the reference deployment's 10 August suite a mission spent two turns of eight on a malformed tool name and two more on invalid JSON — a quarter of the budget on protocol rather than on the question.

--protocol native removes the two mistakes rather than catching them. The request declares the mission's tools as OpenAI functions, declares a synthetic mission_answer(text) beside them (registered on nothing — it is how a model under tool_choice=required says it is finished), and asks for tool_choice=required with parallel_tool_calls=true. The decoder then cannot emit a name outside the namespace nor arguments that do not parse.

What it changes, exactly:

• one turn, several calls. parallel_tool_calls means a reply can ask for two tools; both are dispatched in the order given, each with its own tool_call/tool_result pair under the same index and a call ordinal. A step is still a model turn, and --mission-steps still counts model turns;
• mission_answer counts only when it is alone. Called alongside tool calls it is ignored, the tools run, and the model is asked again — an answer written before its own evidence arrived is exactly the answer that should not stand;
• a gated tool ends the turn on that call. The calls before it have run; the calls after it are not dispatched, and the reason says how many;
• a reply with no calls at all — some servers answer in prose despite required — is read as an answer when there is text and refused when there is not;
• mission_started carries protocol: "native". It carries nothing at all on a json run, so every stream recorded before this existed is unchanged.

Arguments are checked against each tool's own JSON Schema before dispatch, in both protocols (core/runtime/schema_check.py; jsonschema when the mission extra is installed, a required/type/enum floor when it is not). A violation is a reply_rejected naming the tool, the field and the rule, and the call is not made. Be clear about what that can and cannot catch: it catches a shape the tool declared — a missing required argument, a string where an integer was declared, a value outside an enum. It does not catch a well-typed argument meant for a different tool, which is the other half of the measured waste (uv pip install … handed to the tool that runs Python is a string where a string was declared). That one is fixed by tool descriptions and tool sets, not by a validator.

It is off by default, and that is the discipline: this and the grounding control were probed the same day, and a change switched on before the eval harness that scores it produces a delta nobody can attribute (ROADMAP.md §2.5).

--control — talking to a mission while it runs

--events is what a mission says. --control is what it can be told, and until it existed the only lever a platform had on a running turn was SIGTERM — which is to say, the only thing anybody could do to a mission in progress was end it. Three of the things an operator actually wants are not "stop".

mkfifo /tmp/mission.ctl
judais --mission 'survey the corpus' --mcp-url … --control /tmp/mission.ctl &
echo '{"control":"inject","text":"look at the second corpus, not the first"}' \
  > /tmp/mission.ctl

fd:N is what a platform uses: it keeps the write end of a pipe and the mission never has a path on disk to race anybody for. - reads stdin, for a person typing at a run. One JSON object per line, and the vocabulary is closed:

• {"control": "inject", "text": "…"} — a user instruction. It is appended as a user turn immediately before the next model call, which is the one moment it is a message in a conversation rather than an edit to a decision the model already made, and that step's step_started carries it back as injected: ["…"] so a pane can show that somebody spoke. Both protocols take a user turn, so this works under native unchanged;
• {"control": "cancel"} — the first SIGTERM by another road. The mission's cancellation is thrown from the channel's own reader thread, the loop winds up at its next check, keeps its transcript, and writes its own mission_finished — incomplete with reason: "cancelled". The process exits normally: a platform asked the mission to stop, not the process to die of a signal nobody sent;
• {"control": "cancel_step"} — abandon the rest of the current step, which is a much smaller ask than abandoning the run. Under native, where one turn may carry several calls, the calls that have not been dispatched are skipped; under json, the one proposed call is not dispatched if it has not gone out yet. Either way the model is told in as many words and asked again, so it decides what to do from what it has. A tool already running is left alone — the bus owns dispatch, and what a half-killed subprocess did to the world is not knowable from here. An ask that arrives too late is a no-op, and says so to the model rather than vanishing;
• {"control": "gate_decision", "approval_id": "ap_…", "approve": true, "decided_by": "dana", "note": ""} — answer a gate while the run is still standing at it. With a channel open, a gated call emits its gate_requested (with the approval_id) and then waits, bounded by min(what is left of --mission-seconds, 300s). A yes is written through the same ApprovalStore the --approval path reads — decided, then spent, by the name you sent — and the one call it authorised is dispatched in that same step, after which the mission carries on. A no is recorded as a refusal and the model is told. decided_by must name somebody: this framework has no identity layer and will not invent one, but an approval signed by nobody is not an approval, and the command is dropped.

Nothing here decides anything on the harness's behalf, and nothing times out into a yes: the wait running out ends the mission at awaiting_approval exactly as it always did, with the record left pending for --approval on a later turn. A malformed line, an unknown word, an inject with no text or a decision signed by nobody is dropped with one sentence on stderr and the run carries on — a control channel that could crash a mission would be a worse lever than no lever. A channel nobody writes to, or one whose writer goes away, is not an error.

On --swarm there is one channel for the turn, shared the way the wall clock and the cancellation are, and it reaches the sub-mission that is running. The swarm's own roles — the router, the planner, each gate, the synthesizer — ignore it: they are single questions asked and answered in one round trip, with no "between steps" to speak into.

Resuming a mission — --resume

A run that was killed — the machine went down, somebody stopped the process, the model server went away mid-step — left a numbered log behind. --resume reads it back and carries on:

judais --mission --resume run_20260815T131102-9f3a1c04 \
       --mcp-stdio 'python -m some_mcp_server'

The objective comes off the recorded run, so the message is omitted; passing one that is not the recorded objective is refused naming both, because a resume of the wrong run looks exactly like a run continuing. So is an id the store never minted, and so is a run that already finished — with one exception: a run that ended awaiting_approval is waiting on a person, not on this harness, and is resumable.

What comes back is the transcript's steps, the mission result store (its handles keep addressing the same results), and the model's message list rebuilt from the recorded tool_call/tool_result pairs and reply_rejected problems. The records go on being appended to the same run directory, and there is no second mission_started — a resumed run is the same mission. The first new step_started carries resumed: {from_seq, steps_replayed} instead.

max_steps counts the whole run: recorded steps included. Without --mission-steps the resumed stretch is held to the total the run started with, so killing and resuming cannot buy extra steps; with it, the number is read as that many further steps.

Two things do not come back, and the harness says so on the console rather than replaying in silence: the typed payload of a tool result (structuredContent was never on the wire, so mission_result(path=…) refuses a field path into a replayed result, though grounding still sees the replayed text) and the text of a rejected reply (reply_rejected carries the refusal — the reply is the thing that did not parse).

A staged (--swarm) mission checkpoints its plan and each step's outcome into the run's meta.json as it goes, and is refused by --resume today: the refusal names the steps that are done. Resuming it with the direct loop would restart the plan rather than continue it.

Every mission also reconciles orphans on the way in: a run in the store with no mission_finished whose metadata has not been touched for 60 seconds gets one appended (incomplete), so a follower's stream closes and a reader of since() is told the truth. The staleness is a guard, not an optimisation — a mission thinking for forty seconds has no mission_finished either, and closing its log out from under it would send the answer to nobody. The credential is deliberately not persisted: MCP_TOKEN is read from the environment of the resuming process, exactly as on a fresh run.

A skill manifest — --skill

The harness owns mechanisms; whoever operates the platform owns content. A SKILL.md is how the content arrives: YAML frontmatter plus a Markdown body, the format Claude-style skills already use.

lobi --mission --skill ./skills/catalogue_recon/SKILL.md \
     --mcp-stdio 'python -m some_mcp_server' "what governed datasets exist?"

Three things come out of it, and nothing else does:

• a closed tool set, allowed_tools, intersected with what the bridge actually discovered. A bare name matches a namespaced one, so a manifest says catalog_search_assets and gets mcp.catalog_search_assets. A named tool the server does not offer is a refusal listing every missing name — never a silent narrowing, because a mission missing the tool that answers its question answers it from the model's memory instead and the transcript looks ordinary. Suffix an entry with ? to mean "if the host offers it";
• prompt text — the operational frontmatter fields and the whole body, appended after the persona. Fields this loader has never heard of are rendered too: a manifest is content, and the harness is not the authority on which of a platform's operational fields matter;
• a grounding grammar, below. Optional; absent means nothing is enforced and nothing claims to have been.

One thing a manifest is refused for: sandbox: bwrap, required the moment allowed_tools names a tool that runs code the model composed — a shell, an interpreter, a pip install (the set is derived from the shell.exec, python.exec and pip.install scopes in core/tools/descriptors.py, not from a list of names, so a tool registered tomorrow is covered the day it arrives). A governed mission that can run arbitrary code on the host without isolation is the hazard here, and a hosted platform must not have to find it in a transcript. Both halves are checked, and the refusal names every problem at once:

allowed_tools: [governed_read, run_shell_command]
sandbox: bwrap          # or the resolve refuses, naming the tool and the fix

• the declaration is required of the manifest — including for an entry marked ?, because whether a file is governed must not depend on what a server happened to advertise this morning;
• the isolation is required of the run: declare sandbox: bwrap and get a bus that is not under bwrap (not installed, or opted out) and the mission refuses at the door rather than running unisolated.

sandbox: none is the other legal value — an explicit no isolation was asked for, accepted and inert for a manifest with no code-plane tool, and refused with its own reason for one that has them. Absent is not none; absent is silence, which is what this check exists to stop being an answer. The value is rendered into the prompt like any other operational field, because a model that has not been told it is inside bwrap reads the denied network as a broken tool.

Bounded results, and a store to read the rest from

A tool result is capped at 32 KB before it enters the transcript — head and tail with an explicit marker. The cap and the cut have one owner, core/bounding.py (MAX_RESULT_BYTES, bound_result); the kernel's max_tool_output_bytes_in_context and the chat path's are configuration knobs that default to it, and every path that bounds a tool result calls the same function. Uncapped, one large governed view evicts the earlier steps the model needs to know what its numbers mean, or exceeds max_model_len outright, and neither leaves a trace in the answer.

The whole result — including the structuredContent that as_tuple() drops whenever there is text — stays in a per-mission store, and the marker names the handle:

mission_result(handle="r1", path="result.actors[0].score")

A few dozen bytes instead of two hundred kilobytes. The store reaches nothing: every byte in it already arrived through a gated, audited dispatch of a tool the closed set allowed. It is registered on the bus for the length of one run and withdrawn after it.

Grounding — every identifier has to have come from a tool

core/runtime/grounding.py is the mission-tier analogue of CompositeJudge. Every identifier-shaped token in the answer must appear in a tool output of this run. An unsupported claim gets one repair turn naming the exact tokens; a second failure keeps the answer and appends an explicit caveat, because deleting it would hide a finding and passing it silently would launder one.

The grammar is not in the code. It comes from the manifest:

grounding:
  identifier_pattern: '\b(?:asset|labels|run)\.[0-9a-f]{4,}\b'
  ignore: [asset.0000]
  max_repairs: 1
  must_cite: {identifiers: 1}     # optional; see below

No block, no validator, and the transcript's grounding stays None rather than claiming a clean check. A check that could not run reports no opinion and never a pass — same reason LLMReviewTier returns UNKNOWN instead of 0.5, and a larger one here: a fabricated "grounded" is a governance claim.

Three states, not two. A check reports unconfigured, nothing_considered, supported or unsupported. The third exists because the second was being reported as a pass: on 10 August 2026, the first run with these blocks switched on, six of the first ten missions reported grounded: identifiers — 0/0 supported by a tool result in this run. The control was satisfied by silence. report.grounded now means nothing unsupported; report.verified means and something was actually checked, and the CLI prints NOTHING CHECKED for the gap between them.

A claim table, where the figures matter. claim_table: true turns on a third check. The skill's output_format asks for every figure a second time beside the prose, as a path into what a tool returned:

```claims
[{"value": 0.7446, "path": "gate.confidence"},
 {"value": 338.0,  "path": "network.nodes[0].scores.out_weight"}]
```

Verification is then arithmetic rather than search: results.walk_path — the same walker mission_result answers with — reads that path out of the payloads the mission received and compares. A path that does not resolve, or resolves to something else, is unsupported; an unreadable table is a finding rather than a skip. The prose checks do not read the block, because a table full of gate.confidence would otherwise be reported as invented identifiers.

Whether silence is acceptable is the skill's call, not the harness's. must_cite is a minimum per check — true for every configured check, a list of names, or {claims: 3} for a schema minimum. A skill whose answer may legitimately be "the catalogue holds none of that" declares no minimum; a skill drafting a finding declares one, and an answer with nothing in it fails. A must_cite naming a check the same block does not configure is refused at load: a requirement that never binds is the original hole wearing the name of the fix for it.

Gates — a tool offered, and not called

--gate-tool NAME (repeatable) names a tool this deployment offers and gates. It is shown in the catalogue, marked. If the model names it, the call is not made: the mission emits gate_requested carrying the proposed arguments verbatim — what a person approves has to be the bytes that would run — and ends at outcome awaiting_approval.

No flag on a mission run answers a gate. A harness that could approve its own proposal has a gate that is a formality, and there is no code path in MissionRunner or SwarmRunner that can move a record to approved — a test greps for it.

What there is is the other half: the request is written down, and the answer arrives from outside the run.

# the mission stops, and says what it stopped on
judais --mission --gate-tool mcp.cancel_job "wind down job j-91"
  ⏸️  Waiting on a person: Tai proposed mcp.cancel_job({'job': 'j-91'}) …
     approval ap_4b1f7c02e9d38a55 — decide it with: …

# somebody who is not this process decides
judais --mission --approve ap_4b1f7c02e9d38a55 --decided-by dana --note "queue is drained"

# and the work resumes, once
judais --mission --approval ap_4b1f7c02e9d38a55 --gate-tool mcp.cancel_job "wind down job j-91"

Each request is a JSON file under .judais-lobi/approvals/ (moved or silenced by JUDAIS_LOBI_APPROVALS) holding the tool, the arguments verbatim, the objective and the run that asked; its id rides gate_requested.approval_id. --approve/--refuse build no agent, ask no model and emit no events — they call ApprovalStore.decide and exit — and they refuse a decision that names nobody. --decided-by is free text: this framework has no principal system and will not invent one, so who counts as a person is the platform's question; a platform that knows the answer calls core.runtime.approvals.ApprovalStore directly instead of these flags.

--approval <id> then widens the closed set by exactly one tool, for exactly one run, after exactly one person said so, and the approval is spent the moment that tool is dispatched — a run that never calls it leaves the decision unspent rather than burning it on nothing. A pending, refused, spent or abandoned record is refused at the door, naming the state: nothing defaults or expires into a yes, and a spent approval is not a second one. A consumer reading the stream sees the widening as that tool's absence from mission_started.gated; there is no separate field announcing it.

ApprovalStore.reconcile(live_run_ids) marks pending requests whose run is gone as abandoned, which is a refusal. It is provided and still not called from anywhere in core/: the run store landed in 0.10.0 and can say which runs were recorded, but "recorded" is not "alive" — only whoever spawned the processes knows that, so the caller is the platform and the list of live ids is its answer. A liveness check that guessed would abandon live requests.

Gate names resolve the way allowed_tools does — through same_tool, so a manifest-style bare name matches the namespaced one the bus dispatches. A --gate-tool that matches nothing, or that matches two offered tools, is a refusal at the door listing what was offered; it is never dropped quietly, because an operator who asked for a gate and got a mission without one has been told the opposite of what happened.

--swarm — staged decomposition, when it is needed

A 20B model at 59 tok/s drowns in one long transcript. By step six of a single mission the catalogue lookups that told it what its numbers mean have been pushed out of attention by three governed views, and the answer is written from the part it can still see. The fix is not a longer prompt; it is shorter ones.

--swarm (or MISSION_SWARM) puts five small roles over the same backend and the same tool bus: triage, plan, execute, gate, synthesize. Triage is one cheap call and is biased to running the ordinary loop — a swarm that makes "what's trending" slower is a regression, so every failure of the router falls back to DIRECT. Each executed step is its own small mission with a tight budget; earlier steps arrive as short summaries, never as raw output. The closed tool set, the gating, the audit and the events vocabulary are all exactly the direct path's, so a watcher sees one mission with more steps.

Each planned step is tagged with a rung — tool, code, or code+sdk. The last one is offered only when the skill manifest declares sdk_import, because "import the platform SDK" with no SDK named is an invitation to invent a module and a 20B accepts it.

The mission stream — --events

MissionRunner.run returns a transcript when the mission is over. That is the right shape for a terminal and the wrong shape for anything that has to show a mission to somebody while it runs — a mission on a local 20B is minutes long, and a caller holding only run() has nothing to render for all of them.

So the loop takes an observer, and --events writes what it sees as NDJSON: one JSON object per line, flushed as it happens, UTF-8 and unescaped.

--events -        stdout, for a person with jq
--events fd:N     an inherited descriptor — what a harness uses
--events PATH     a file, opened for append

stdout is prose for a person and must not be parsed. The event sink is the only machine channel, which is why a consumer uses fd: or a path and never -: the console rendering and the record stream never share bytes.

The last turn of a mission is the one with nothing to show: the tools have all run and the model is writing prose. So that model call streams wherever the backend can, and the answer goes out in pieces as it is written. That is the tenth record type, and the rules for it are below the table.

The vocabulary is ten record types, in the order a run tends to produce them (contract.EVENTS):

event	when
mission_started	before the first model call and before the tool plane is touched. Carries the objective, the catalogue, the gated names, max_steps, and the run's posture — sandbox, profile, audit_ref, run_id, protocol
step_started	a model turn is about to be asked for. Carries the staged plan, a compacted record, resumed, or injected when there is one
reply_rejected	the model's reply was not a decision this loop could act on. A recorded step, never a crash
tool_call	before the call is dispatched, so a watcher shows what is about to happen
tool_result	the bus answered. output is the whole result; the bound is what the model was shown
gate_requested	a gated tool was named and not called, arguments verbatim
answer_delta	a fragment of the answer while the model is still writing it
answer	the finished answer and its outcome
grounding	the validator's report, twice when a repair happened
mission_finished	terminal, out of a finally, with the outcome, the counts, the run's usage and elapsed_s

answer_delta is the one to read the rules for before rendering it. It carries index (the step whose model call is producing it), part (a 0-based ordinal that restarts at 0 for every model call) and text; concatenating text over part gives the answer as streamed. It is provisional and replaced, not completed — the answer record always follows, carries the whole text, and is the authority, because the fragments are decoded out of a half-written reply while the answer has been through the grounding path that may append a caveat. Zero of them is normal: a backend that does not stream, --no-stream, a turn that called a tool, a library caller whose chat_fn returns a string. Each fragment is scrubbed on its own, so a credential split across two of them is not recognisable in either half — display the fragments, keep the answer.

Those ten, their required and optional fields, the five outcome words, the exit contract and the rule for what counts as a breaking change are CONTRACT.md, whose authority is core/runtime/contract.py. A consumer pins it:

from core.runtime import contract
assert contract.SCHEMA_VERSION == 1     # fails at import, which is cheap
problems = contract.conforms(record)    # [] when the record is fine

conforms is pure and standard-library only and imports nothing this repo owns, so a consumer that cannot import an agent framework can vendor that one file and have the whole seam.

--history — a conversation, not a paragraph

--history FILE seeds prior turns into the model's message list as real role-tagged chat turns, ahead of the objective. The file is a JSON array of {"role": "user"|"assistant", "content": "..."}, oldest first; system is refused, because system text belongs to the harness and tool turns are this mission's own to make. Caps are 100 turns and 262,144 characters, and a malformed history is a refusal at the door rather than a silent drop — a dropped history is the bug this flag fixes wearing a different hat.

A file rather than an argument, for the same reason --mcp-token prefers the environment: a conversation is many kilobytes and argv is world-readable in /proc/<pid>/cmdline.

A caller passing this must not also fold the history into the message. A chat-tuned model attends to role-tagged turns and skims past the same text pasted into the objective: measured 12 August 2026, "tell me more about #2" web-searched #2 literally while the list sat two lines up in the prompt.

Sampling — stated, or the server's own

--temperature, --top-p and --seed are unset by default, and unset means unsent: the request carries no sampling parameters and the server's own default applies. That is deliberate. Pinning temperature=0 would make the agent easier to measure by making it a different agent — it collapses the noise instead of measuring it, and a noise floor taken at a temperature nobody ships is not a floor. What was missing was never a temperature but the ability to state one and see what went out; "server default" is a setting nobody chose, and an upgrade can move it with nothing in any log. When one is passed, the CLI says so on the console and the value is on the wire.

--seed is not a determinism guarantee. A batching server can still vary.

A personality from a file

--personality <path> (or TAI_PERSONALITY, then ELF_PERSONALITY) loads a PersonalityConfig from TOML, JSON or YAML. The keys are that model's fields and nothing else — an unknown key is refused by name. JudAIs and Lobi are unaffected.

tai resolves its own file instead of being handed one: $TAI_PERSONALITY, then $ELF_PERSONALITY, then the installed deployment package's own resource. Nothing else is consulted and nothing is invented — the third outcome is a refusal naming what was checked. A guess that lands on the wrong checkout is worse than no guess, because it starts an agent whose stated rules are not the rules it loaded.

For platforms

If you are wiring this framework into a platform — giving it a personality, giving it capabilities as MCP tools and a skill manifest, driving it as a subprocess and pinning a release — that is its own guide: PLATFORMS.md. It covers the personality format and how to add a new named agent, the SKILL.md fields including sdk_import, the exact spawn shape, the release-and-pin loop, and the list of things that must never enter this repository. TAIPAN is the worked example throughout.

Extensibility

Judais-Lobi is designed to grow by adding workflows, tools, and policies without rewiring the kernel:

• Add a new workflow by defining a WorkflowTemplate in core/kernel/workflows.py.
• Add or consolidate tools via core/tools/descriptors.py and core/tools/.
• Define stricter safety boundaries with core/policy/ profiles.
• Extend evaluation logic under core/judge/ and core/critic/.

🚧 Current Status

v0.13.0 — 3676 tests collected. Mission mode, skill manifests, the grounding validator, --swarm, the NDJSON mission stream and the published contract are all in this release. What 0.12.0 is, rather than what each release added:

• Safe by default. Tool subprocesses run under bwrap wherever bubblewrap exists, announced as mission_started.sandbox and opted out of only with --unsandboxed. The capability profile is deny-by-default safe, and every refusal names the scope and the profile that grants it. Every default Tools() bus writes an append-only, secret-redacted audit file, named on the stream as audit_ref. A manifest naming a code-plane tool must declare sandbox: bwrap and actually get it. One redactor scrubs every free-text field that reaches the stream or stderr.
• Durable and bounded. Every mission leaves a numbered, fsync'd log behind (core/durable.py, run_id on mission_started) and --resume <run-id> picks a killed one back up from it. --mission-seconds bounds the wall clock and budget_exhausted names which budget ran out. SIGTERM lets the run write its own mission_finished (reason: cancelled). A gate writes a durable approval record (approval_id) that a later run carries with --approval <id> — one tool, one run, nothing defaults to yes. Every store core/ writes is atomic.
• Metered. Every model call's usage rides the record that call produced; the run's totals and elapsed_s ride mission_finished. Reported, never estimated, and absent rather than zero. Cost comes from a pricing: block a deployment writes, never from a price list in this repo.
• Native tool calling, behind a flag. --protocol native constrains the decoder to the declared functions plus a synthetic mission_answer, allows several calls per step (call), and validates arguments against each tool's own schema before dispatch — in both protocols. The default stays json until the eval harness scores the two.
• Streamed answers, and a channel back in. answer_delta carries the answer while the model is still writing it (--no-stream turns it off; the answer record always follows and is the authority). --control reads NDJSON commands into a running mission — inject, cancel, cancel_step, gate_decision. core/runtime/agui.py translates the stream into AG-UI frames for a browser that speaks them.
• One roadmap. ROADMAP.md: §1 is where 0.13.0 stands and what is still missing, §2 is Phases 9–13, §3 the principles, §5 the history — the Feb 2026 blueprint, the Phase 8 disposition, and what two weeks in production taught. NEXT_STEPS.md and PHASE_8.md were folded into it on 15 Aug 2026.

CONTRACT.md is the seam a consumer pins; PLATFORMS.md is how a platform deploys this framework as its own agent.

Release history

One line each. The commit for every one of these is release: <version> — ….

version	date	what it was
0.12.0	16 Aug 2026	answer_delta at the source, a --control channel into a running mission, an AG-UI translator
0.12.1	16 Aug 2026	--gate-wait / MISSION_GATE_WAIT: an unattended caller can turn the in-turn gate wait down to 0 (the 0.11 behaviour); default unchanged
0.12.2	17 Aug 2026	the credential redactor is linear on long unbroken payloads (a 200 KB tool result took minutes; now ~50 ms)
0.13.0	17 Aug 2026	Phase 10: the eval harness (core/eval/, EVAL.md), recording + --replay, the reading/planes/critic grounding tiers off by default, god_mode/preflight deleted
0.11.0	16 Aug 2026	native tool calling behind --protocol native; arguments schema-checked before dispatch; a byte-stable prompt prefix, and a window that evicts tool round trips first
0.10.0	16 Aug 2026	durable and bounded: the fsync'd run log and --resume, a wall clock and a cancel that finish cleanly, the usage ledger and elapsed_s, approvals as durable records
0.9.0	15 Aug 2026	safe by default: sandbox on, the safe profile, audit on every bus, one redactor. Phase 8 closed
0.8.2	15 Aug 2026	the honest stream: it opens before triage, the conversation is windowed, one owner for the result cut, Mistral over httpx, a bwrap that runs
0.8.1	15 Aug 2026	the wheel stops shipping tests/
0.8.0	15 Aug 2026	the separation: the contract as data, the tai entry point, the mission extra, PLATFORMS.md

Completed

The counts below are the suite totals at the time each phase landed, kept as a record of how it grew. The current total is the one above.

• ✅ Phase 0 — Dependency Injection & Test Harness (73 tests)
• ✅ Phase 1 — Runtime extraction (provider separation, 107 tests)
• ✅ Phase 2 — Kernel State Machine & Hard Budgets (164 tests)
• ✅ Phase 3 — Session Artifacts, Contracts & KV Prefixing (269 tests)
• ✅ Phase 4 — Tool Bus, Sandboxing & Capability Gating (562 tests)
• ✅ Phase 5 — Repo Map & Context Compression (783 tests)
• ✅ Phase 6 — Repository-Native Patch Engine (888 tests)
• ✅ Phase 7.0 — Pluggable Workflows & State Machine Abstraction
• ✅ Phase 7.1-7.2 — Composite Judge & Candidate Sampling
• ✅ Phase 7.3 — External Critic
• ✅ Phase 7.4 — Campaign Orchestrator + StepPlan + EffectiveScope

Up Next

Phase 8 closed at 0.9.0, and the numbering continues in ROADMAP.md §2:

• ✅ Phase 9 — durable and bounded (0.10.0): a fsync'd append-only transcript, --resume, a wall-clock budget, a usage ledger, approvals as durable records
• ⏳ Phase 10 — measurable: an in-repo eval harness scored from recorded runs. Next, and the reason --protocol native is not yet a default
• ⏳ Phase 11 — one runtime: the mission loop and the kernel become one Run
• ⏳ Phase 12 — providers and streaming. Partly shipped early, on evidence: constrained decoding in 0.11.0, answer_delta + the AG-UI translator + the control channel in 0.12.0. What remains is the provider work — one HTTP client, a retry policy owned somewhere neutral, Anthropic as a backend
• ⏳ Phase 13 — embeddable: a library API first, the CLI second (1.0)

Phase 7 Highlights (7.0–7.4)

Phase 7 turns the kernel into a workflow-driven, multi-candidate, multi-critic, campaign-capable system.

• Pluggable workflows — WorkflowTemplate makes phases, transitions, schemas, and capability profiles data-driven. CODING_WORKFLOW preserves Phase 6 behavior; GENERIC_WORKFLOW enables custom domains.
• Deterministic scoring — CompositeJudge sequences tests/lint/LLM review and scores candidate patches. CandidateManager evaluates N patch sets in isolated worktrees and picks the top non-failing result.
• External Critic — Optional frontier-model auditor (OpenAI/Anthropic/Google) for independent logic audits. Keyring/env key handling, multi-round feedback loop, noise detection, and SHA256 cache.
• Campaign Orchestrator — Tier‑0 mission layer with HITL approval gates, step DAG execution, artifact handoff, and resumable progress.
• StepPlan + EffectiveScope — Step-level contracts and SHA256 ActionDigest; tool access enforced by Global ∩ Workflow ∩ Step ∩ Phase.

Outcome: workflows are composable, evaluation is deterministic, critics are optional, and campaigns provide a macro loop for multi-step missions.

Phase 6 Highlights

The agent can now reliably modify repository files through a deterministic, exact-match patch protocol with git worktree isolation and automatic rollback.

• core/patch/parser.py — Extracts <<<< SEARCH / ==== / >>>> REPLACE, <<<< CREATE / >>>> CREATE, and <<<< DELETE >>>> blocks from raw LLM text output. Delimiter-safe (only recognizes markers at line start). Path validation rejects absolute paths and .. traversal at parse time.
• core/patch/matcher.py — Exact byte-match with byte offsets and SHA256 context hashes. On zero matches: 3-stage similarity narrowing pipeline (indent filter → token overlap → SequenceMatcher ratio) returns top 3 candidate regions. On multiple matches: returns all offsets + context hashes for LLM disambiguation.
• core/patch/applicator.py — File writes with strict preconditions. Path jailing (symlink-escape resistant). \r\n → \n canonicalization. st_mode preservation (executables stay executable). Create fails if file exists; delete fails if file doesn't exist.
• core/patch/worktree.py — PatchWorktree manages git worktree lifecycle: create (explicit -b + HEAD), merge_back (--no-ff + branch cleanup), discard (force remove + branch delete). Writes .judais-lobi/worktrees/active.json for crash recovery of orphaned worktrees.
• core/patch/engine.py — PatchEngine orchestrates validate → apply → diff → merge/rollback. Stops at first file failure, leaving worktree intact for diagnostics. diff() returns real git diff from the worktree.
• core/tools/patch_tool.py — ToolBus-compatible 6-action tool (validate, apply, diff, merge, rollback, status). All actions return JSON stdout for machine-friendly kernel orchestration. exit_code=0 only on success.

12 tool descriptors. 105 new tests (888 total). 3 integration tests with real git repos. Worktree isolation means cross-file patches land atomically — all succeed or discard for zero-cost rollback.

Phase 5 Highlights

The agent is now repo-aware. It understands structure, relationships, and what's irrelevant — without eating the entire repo in context.

• core/context/repo_map.py — Top-level RepoMap orchestrator. Dual-use: overview mode (centrality-ranked for REPO_MAP phase) and focused mode (relevance-ranked by target_files for RETRIEVE phase). Lazy build with git-commit-keyed caching and dirty-file overlay.
• core/context/symbols/ — 3-tier symbol extraction: Python ast (full import + signature extraction), tree-sitter (7 languages: C, C++, Rust, Go, JS, TS, Java), regex fallback. get_extractor(language) factory auto-selects the best available.
• core/context/graph.py — DependencyGraph with multi-language module resolution (Python dotted paths, C #include, Rust use crate::, Go package imports, JS/TS relative imports with extension guessing). Relevance ranking (1.0/0.8/0.6/0.4/0.1 scoring by hop distance) and centrality ranking with barrel file damping (__init__.py, index.js, mod.rs).
• core/context/formatter.py — Compact tree-style formatting with token budget, optional char cap, whitespace normalization for deterministic output, and metadata header (file/symbol counts, languages, ranking mode).
• core/context/visualize.py — DOT (Graphviz) and Mermaid graph export with highlight styling and node cap.
• core/context/cache.py — Git-commit-keyed persistent cache at .judais-lobi/cache/repo_map/<hash>.json. Clean commit = full cache hit; dirty state = cache + re-extract only modified files.
• core/tools/repo_map_tool.py — ToolBus-compatible multi-action tool (build, excerpt, status, visualize).
• setup.py — pip install judais-lobi[treesitter] adds optional tree-sitter support via individual grammar packages.

11 tool descriptors (now 12 with Phase 6). 221 new tests. tree-sitter is optional — the system works without it and gains rich multi-language AST parsing when installed.

Phase 4 Highlights

Tools are dumb executors behind a capability-gated bus. The kernel decides everything.

• core/tools/bus.py — Action-aware ToolBus with preflight hooks, panic switch integration, and JSONL audit logging. Structured JSON denial errors replace plain text.
• core/tools/fs_tools.py — Consolidated FsTool with 5 actions (read, write, delete, list, stat). Pure pathlib I/O, no subprocess.
• core/tools/git_tools.py — Consolidated GitTool with 12 actions (status, diff, log, add, commit, branch, push, pull, fetch, stash, tag, reset) via run_subprocess.
• core/tools/verify_tools.py — Config-driven VerifyTool (lint, test, typecheck, format). Reads .judais-lobi.yml for project-specific commands, falls back to sensible defaults.
• core/tools/descriptors.py — 11 tool descriptors, 13 named scopes + wildcard. Per-action scope resolution via action_scopes map.
• core/tools/capability.py — Deny-by-default CapabilityEngine with wildcard "*" support, profile switching, and grant revocation.
• core/policy/profiles.py — Four cumulative profiles: SAFE (read-only) → DEV (+ write) → OPS (+ deploy/network) → GOD (wildcard).
• core/policy/god_mode.py — GodModeSession with TTL auto-downgrade, panic switch (instant revocation to SAFE), and full audit trail.
• core/policy/audit.py — Append-only JSONL AuditLogger, attached to every Tools() bus by default: one file per run at .judais-lobi/audit/<run-id>.jsonl under the working directory, named on the mission stream as mission_started.audit_ref, moved or silenced by JUDAIS_LOBI_AUDIT=<path>|none|off (silencing is announced, and travels as audit_ref: null). Every dispatch is a line — allowed, denied, panicked, unknown or thrown — with the redacted arguments, the decision and its reason, exit code, duration and bytes out. Redaction covers shapes (OpenAI, GitHub, AWS, Slack, Bearer …, *_KEY/*_TOKEN/*_SECRET assignments) and the values of the credential-named environment variables this process was given, because a token handed to a tool as an argument has no shape to match.
• core/runtime/resume.py — Picking a recorded mission back up, and closing the ones nobody will. Three separate things: the door (open_for_resume — an unknown id, a run that already finished, an objective that is not the recorded one, a staged run whose plan is checkpointed; every refusal answered before a server is dialled), the replay (rebuild — the recorded stream read back into the transcript's steps, the mission result store and the model's message list, rendering each replayed result through the runner's own _render_result so there is one owner of what a result reads like), and reconciliation (reconcile_orphans — a run with no mission_finished whose metadata has been untouched for ORPHAN_STALE_S gets one appended, so a follower's stream closes; the staleness rule is stated rather than assumed, because a mission that is merely thinking has no mission_finished either). What a replay cannot give back is written down as sentences (LOST_*) and shown, not swallowed.
• core/durable.py — The durability primitive, importing nothing else in this tree: atomic_write_text/atomic_write_json (tempfile in the same directory → flush → fsync → os.replace), fsync_append, and RunStore — one directory per run under .judais-lobi/runs/<run-id>/ holding an fsync'd append-only events.jsonl of {seq, at, record} envelopes and a meta.json replaced atomically. Every record a mission emits is appended there before it reaches the --events sink, so the sink is a client of the log rather than a second copy; since(cursor) and follow(cursor, stop=…) are what a replay and a live subscriber read it back with. seq is monotonic per run and is persisted, and RunStore.CALLER_OWNED is why: writing a whole stale record back over a live one is how a reference platform came to reuse sequence numbers and show a blank transcript for a run whose records were on disk the whole time. SessionManager and AuditLogger are clients of this module, not second implementations of it.
• core/tools/sandbox.py — NoneSandbox (dev/debug) and BwrapSandbox (Tier-1 production) behind a common SandboxRunner interface. BwrapSandbox keeps every field of the SandboxProfile it is given: the host root read-only with the working directory (and allowed_write_paths) re-bound writable, a private tmpfs /tmp, the network namespace unshared unless the profile says allow_network, and max_cpu_seconds / max_memory_bytes / max_processes applied as rlimits on the bwrap process and inherited by what runs inside it. NoneSandbox is still the default; it enforces nothing and says so.

3 consolidated multi-action tools replaced 21 separate descriptors. Git is the spine, not nice-to-have.

---

🧭 Where To Look

If you are running this from another program, read:

• 📄 CONTRACT.md — the mission stream, its events and the exit contract
• 📄 PLATFORMS.md — deploying judais-lobi as a platform's agent

If you want to understand where this is going, read:

• 🗺️ ROADMAP.md — the only roadmap: where 0.13.0 stands (§1), Phases 9–13
• 🧪 EVAL.md — the eval harness: missions × behavioural flags, a held-out split, scoring from the recorded stream, --replay, and how a platform writes its own suite (§2), the principles (§3), and the Feb 2026 blueprint kept as history (§5)

If you want to understand the current implementation, inspect:

• core/agent.py — concrete Agent class (replaced elf.py in Phase 3)
• core/runtime/contract.py — the seam a consumer pins, as data
• core/runtime/mission.py, mission_stream.py, swarm.py — the mission loop, its NDJSON account, and staged decomposition
• core/runtime/skills.py — the SKILL.md loader: closed tool set, prompt, grounding grammar, sdk_import
• core/runtime/grounding.py, results.py — the identifier/claim validator, and the per-mission result store it reads paths out of
• core/runtime/schema_check.py — a tool call's arguments against that tool's own JSON Schema, before dispatch, in both protocols
• core/runtime/answer_stream.py — the answer decoded out of a half-written reply, bounded into answer_delta fragments
• core/runtime/control.py — the closed command vocabulary --control reads: inject, cancel, cancel_step, gate_decision
• core/runtime/approvals.py, resume.py — the durable approval record and its states; the door, the replay and the orphan reconciler behind --resume
• core/runtime/usage.py — one ledger: what each call reported, what the run spent, and a cost only if somebody priced it
• core/runtime/context_window.py, messages.py — keeping a conversation inside the model's window, and the byte-stable prompt prefix every turn is assembled by
• core/runtime/backends/, provider_config.py, core/unified_client.py — openai, mistral, local, and what each declares it can do
• core/runtime/agui.py — optional, import-free translator from the mission stream to AG-UI event frames (translate for a replay, Translator for a live follower); dicts only, no SDK. See PLATFORMS.md §"AG-UI"
• core/durable.py — the durability primitive, importing nothing else in this tree: atomic writes, fsync_append, and RunStore
• core/budgets.py — one owner for steps, seconds, and the cancellation a SIGTERM or a --control cancel throws
• core/bounding.py — one owner for the tool-result cap and the cut it makes
• core/redact.py — one redactor, at the emitter, for every free-text field and every traceback
• core/contracts/ — Pydantic v2 contract models for all session data
• core/sessions/ — SessionManager for disk artifact persistence
• core/kernel/ — state machine, budgets, orchestrator, workflow templates (workflows.py)
• core/cli.py — CLI interface layer
• core/memory/memory.py — FAISS-backed long-term memory (numpy fallback if FAISS unavailable)
• core/tools/ — ToolBus, capability engine, sandbox, the MCP bridge, consolidated tools (fs, git, verify, repo_map, patch)
• core/policy/ — profiles.py (the four cumulative profiles and select_profile), audit.py (the append-only log on every default bus), god_mode.py
• core/context/ — repo map extraction, dependency graph, symbol extractors (Python ast + tree-sitter + regex), formatting, caching, visualization
• core/patch/ — patch engine: parser, matcher, applicator, worktree manager, engine orchestrator
• core/judge/, core/critic/, core/campaign/ — composite judge and candidate sampling; the optional external critic; the campaign orchestrator
• lobi/ and judais/ — personality configs extending Agent

If you want to understand the entry point, see:

• main.py
• setup.py

---

🏗 Architectural Direction

The architecture, as built. Every bullet below is in the tree today; what is still ahead has one home — ROADMAP.md §2 — and is not restated here:

• Artifact-driven state (no conversational drift)
• Three-tier orchestration: Campaign graph (Tier 0) → Workflow graph (Tier 1) → Phase-internal planning (Tier 2)
• Pluggable workflows — static templates for coding, red teaming, data analysis, and arbitrary tasks
• Campaign orchestration — multi-step missions with DAG decomposition, HITL approval gates, and artifact handoff (pre-authored plans)
• Capability-gated tool execution with least-privilege by intersection (Global ∩ Workflow ∩ Step ∩ Phase)
• Sandbox isolation — bwrap is the backend that ships, and the default wherever bubblewrap exists. February's Tier-2 nsjail would go behind the same SandboxRunner interface, not beside it (ROADMAP.md §3)
• Tests > Lint > LLM scoring hierarchy
• Endpoint-probed orchestration (vLLM / TRT-LLM serve the model; the client asks the endpoint how big its window is)
• Optional external critic (frontier logic auditor)

The kernel path, end to end. (The mission path is --mission, above, and the two are still two runtimes — ROADMAP.md §2.6 is where they become one.)

CLI (--campaign / --campaign-plan)
  ↓
Campaign Orchestrator (Tier 0 — optional, multi-step missions)
  ↓  plan → HITL approve → dispatch → synthesis
Workflow Selector → WorkflowTemplate (Tier 1 — static graph)
  ↓
Kernel State Machine (phases, transitions, budgets)
  ↓
Roles (Planner / Coder / Reviewer)
  ↓
ToolBus → EffectiveScope check → Sandbox → Subprocess
  ↓
Deterministic Judge (Tests > Lint > LLM)

As of Phase 7.4:

• The kernel state machine is parameterized by WorkflowTemplate objects — no hardcoded phase names, transitions, or branching rules. The coding pipeline is one template; custom domains define their own.
• CODING_WORKFLOW and GENERIC_WORKFLOW are built-in templates. select_workflow() resolves by an explicit argument, then a PolicyPack field, then the default CODING_WORKFLOW — no CLI flag is wired to it today.
• Per-phase capability profiles (phase_capabilities) create temporal sandboxes — PLAN can read but not write, PATCH can write but only through the patch engine.
• Tools are dumb executors behind a sandboxed, capability-gated bus.
• Every subprocess-based tool call flows through ToolBus → CapabilityEngine → SandboxRunner → Subprocess. Pure-Python tools are still gated by ToolBus but execute in-process. HUMAN_REVIEW uses $EDITOR directly (user-initiated TTY) and is an explicit exception.
• Deny-by-default. No scope = no execution.
• God mode exists for emergencies — TTL-limited, panic-revocable, fully audited.
• 5 consolidated multi-action tools (fs, git, verify, repo_map, patch) cover 31 operations under 13 scopes.
• The agent sees repo structure via a token-budgeted excerpt — file paths, symbol signatures, and dependency-ranked relevance — without loading full source.
• 3-tier symbol extraction: Python ast → tree-sitter (7 languages) → regex fallback. Multi-language dependency graph with import resolution.
• Code modifications use an exact-match patch protocol with git worktree isolation. Cross-file changes land atomically. Failed patches roll back at zero cost.
• Patches are scored by a deterministic CompositeJudge (Tests > Lint > LLM review). CandidateManager evaluates N candidate patches in isolated worktrees and selects the winner by composite score.
• Campaign Orchestrator provides a Tier 0 macro loop with HITL approval, step DAG execution, and explicit artifact handoff.
• StepPlan contracts lock intent, boundaries, and capability needs per step with a SHA256 ActionDigest.
• EffectiveScope intersection (Global ∩ Workflow ∩ Step ∩ Phase) is enforced per tool call.
• Context window manager keeps prompts within model limits, auto-compacts history, and stores oversized tool output to disk with a retrieval hint.

Local inference has landed (--provider local), and Phase 8 closed at 0.9.0 — ROADMAP.md §5.10 records where each of its milestones ended up. Phase 9 closed at 0.10.0. The mission path has since gained the run store, the wall clock, the usage ledger, the native protocol and the control channel; the kernel path has gained none of them, which is the gap ROADMAP.md §1.2 calls "two agent runtimes".

The kernel is the only intelligence. Tools report. The kernel decides.

---

🧠 Memory System (Current)

Long-term memory uses:

• SQLite-backed JSON persistence
• FAISS vector index (numpy fallback when FAISS is unavailable)
• OpenAI embeddings (currently)

See: core/memory/memory.py

This will be abstracted for local embeddings in later phases.

Short-term history remains for direct chat mode. Direct CLI tool calls route through the same ToolBus, under the same deny-by-default safe profile as a mission — a PolicyPack or --profile opts up, and nothing is permissive by omission. Agentic mode uses session artifacts as the sole source of truth (Phase 3).

---

🧰 Context Window & Tool Output

Judais-Lobi tracks context window limits per model/provider, auto-compacts history when needed, and never drops oversized tool output. Full logs are written to disk with a retrieval hint in the prompt.

Config (project-level) in .judais-lobi.yml:

context:
  max_context_tokens: 32768
  max_output_tokens: 4096
  max_tool_output_bytes_in_context: 32768
  min_tail_messages: 6
  max_summary_chars: 2400
  provider_defaults:
    openai: 128000
    mistral: 32768
    local: 32768
  model_overrides:
    gpt-4o: 128000
    codestral-latest: 32768

---

🧮 Usage ledger

Every backend reports what the provider said a completion cost — prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, total_tokens, plus any extras that provider sent, read off UnifiedClient.last_usage. A mission accumulates them and finishes with a line:

🧮 usage: 8412 prompt + 903 completion tokens over 11 calls

On the event stream the same numbers ride tool_call, answer and reply_rejected per call, and mission_finished as the run's totals. They are reported, never estimated, and absent rather than zero when a provider said nothing — which local endpoints often do. See CONTRACT.md.

Cost is optional and comes from configuration, never from a price list in this repo — prices move and differ per account. Add a pricing: block to .judais-lobi.yml and the totals grow a cost:

pricing:
  openai:
    gpt-4o-mini: {prompt_per_1k: 0.15, completion_per_1k: 0.6}
    "*":         {prompt_per_1k: 1.0,  completion_per_1k: 2.0, currency: USD}
  local:
    my-served-model: {prompt_per_1k: 0.002, completion_per_1k: 0.002, currency: EUR}

"*" under a provider covers whatever else it serves. No block means tokens and no cost, and local has no cost until somebody prices it.

---

🛠 Current Capabilities

Direct mode still works, and it is governed by the same deny-by-default profile a mission is: safe reads the filesystem and git, runs the verifiers and calls a connected MCP server. Anything that writes, executes or reaches the open network needs --profile (or JUDAIS_LOBI_PROFILE), and a refusal names the scope and the profile that grants it.

lobi "explain this function"                      # safe
lobi --profile dev  --shell  "list files"         # shell.exec  → dev
lobi --profile dev  --python "plot sine wave"     # python.exec → dev
lobi --profile ops  --search "latest linux kernel"            # http.read → ops
lobi --profile ops  --research "linux kernel LTS release timeline"
lobi --profile ops  --research --academic "transformer sparsity survey 2023"
lobi --profile ops  --install-project             # pip.install → ops

JudAIs:

judais --profile dev "analyze this target" --shell

Voice (optional extra; audio.output is an ops scope):

pip install judais-lobi[voice]
lobi --profile ops "sing" --voice

The scope each tool asks for is on its ToolDescriptor (core/tools/descriptors.py), and which profile grants it is one table (core/policy/profiles.py, PROFILE_SCOPES). Neither is typed out twice.

---

🧪 Install

pip install judais-lobi                 # the base install
pip install -e '.[mission]'             # from a checkout, with everything a mission needs

Requires:

• Python 3.10+ (setup.py's floor; a TOML personality on 3.10 also needs tomli)
• A model to talk to: an API key for a hosted provider, or an OpenAI-compatible endpoint for --provider local
• Linux recommended

Every optional stack is an extra, not a requirement — a plain install stays small enough that judais --help works without any of them, and the SDK an extra pulls in is imported lazily.

extra	what it adds
mission	mcp + pyyaml + jsonschema — what a governed mission actually needs. This is the one a platform installs. Without jsonschema the pre-dispatch argument check falls back to a required/type/enum floor that says nothing about nested arguments
mcp	the MCP client alone. Enough to run a mission, not enough to govern one
critic	the external frontier-model critic, and pyyaml
treesitter	multi-language symbol extraction for the repo map
faiss	the FAISS vector index for long-term memory. Without it memory still works, on the numpy index in core/memory/memory.py
voice	TTS
dev	pytest and coverage

Set an API key:

export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...

Or create:

~/.elf_env

---

🔐 API Keys & Model APIs

Judais-Lobi uses API keys from your environment or your system keyring. Keys are never stored in config files.

Environment variables (fallbacks):

• OPENAI_API_KEY — OpenAI (builder + optional critic)
• ANTHROPIC_API_KEY — Anthropic critic (optional)
• GOOGLE_API_KEY — Google/Gemini critic (optional)

Keyring (preferred, optional):

• Service: judais-lobi
• Keys: openai_api_key, anthropic_api_key, google_api_key

Model API configuration (critic only):

• User defaults: ~/.judais-lobi/critic.yml
• Project overrides: .judais-lobi.yml under critic:

Example critic.yml:

enabled: true
providers:
  - provider: openai
    model: gpt-4o
  - provider: anthropic
    model: claude-sonnet-4-20250514

---

🔮 What This Is Becoming

Judais-Lobi is not trying to be:

• Another chat wrapper
• Another SaaS IDE
• Another prompt toy

What is already true at 0.12.0:

• Capability-constrained — deny-by-default scopes, least-privilege by intersection, refusals that name the fix
• Mission-capable — a governed tool plane, human gates that are durable records, campaign orchestration with HITL approval
• Replayable in one direction — a run leaves an fsync'd log and --resume picks it back up. Deterministic replay (the same model I/O twice) is Phase 10's recorder, not something this release claims
• Local-first — --provider local against any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, never silently fallen back away from
• Air-gap capable — every external dependency is an extra and capability-gated; nothing in a mission reaches the network unless a tool declared it

What it is still becoming, and where the plan lives — ROADMAP.md §2:

• One runtime instead of two (§2.6)
• Measurable: an in-repo eval harness scored from recorded runs (§2.5)
• Embeddable: a library API first and the CLI second, at 1.0 (§2.8)

The design philosophy is explicit in ROADMAP.md §3:

• Artifacts over chat
• Budgets over infinite loops
• Capabilities over trust
• Capabilities over tools (stable tags, not tool names)
• Plans over prompts (structured DAGs, not freestyle LLM loops)
• Static graphs, adaptive phases (three-tier orchestration)
• Dumb tools, smart kernel
• Commit or abort

That last one matters.

There will not be two systems of truth.

---

🧠 Philosophy

Lobi sings. JudAIs calculates.

But the system beneath them is becoming something else:

A disciplined orchestration engine for machine reasoning.

The aesthetic may be mythic. The architecture is not.

---

⭐ Contributing

If you are contributing:

1. Read the roadmap.
2. Understand the phase ordering.
3. Do not bypass tool execution through direct subprocess calls.
4. Every structural change must preserve deterministic replay.
5. New functionality goes through Agent + contracts, not ad-hoc methods.

This is an architectural project, not a feature factory.

---

🧾 License

GPLv3 — see LICENSE.