k9x-satan 0.1.4

K9X Satan — adversarial red-team harness for K9-AIF. Fires structured attacks at a live K9-AIF pipeline and proves K9X Shield containment.

K9x Satan — Security Analysis Tool for Agentic Networks

Adversarial test harness for K9X Shield.

Satan generates structured attacks against a live K9-AIF pipeline and verifies that every attack is stopped at the Router or Orchestrator boundary. Any attack that reaches a Squad or Agent is a finding — not a partial pass.

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Containment Contract

Attack → Router (ingress gate)       → BLOCKED  ✓
              ↓ if not blocked
         Orchestrator (egress gate)  → BLOCKED  ✓
              ↓ if not blocked
         Squad / Agent               → FINDING  ✗  (Shield failed)

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Defense in Depth — Two Independent Layers

K9X Shield applies deterministic, policy-driven checks — 13 handlers total, wired into the Router's ingress VulnerabilityChain and the Orchestrator's egress VulnerabilityChain. Explainable, zero LLM cost, evaluated identically every run. Evadable by paraphrase, encoding, or wording changes no regex list can enumerate in advance.

IBM Guardian (granite4.1-guardian:8b via Ollama) is an optional semantic layer wrapping every agent's pre/post hooks — it catches paraphrased injection, subtle goal hijacking, and disguised privilege escalation that survive the pattern layer. Neither replaces the other: Shield holds with Guardian disabled entirely (NoopGovernance, the default); Guardian only ever adds coverage on top.

Guardian unavailability (timeout, HTTP error, unreachable endpoint) is never silently treated as "SAFE" — it produces an explicit UNAVAILABLE verdict, and governance.on_guardian_unavailable in config/config.yaml decides the policy: fail_closed (default — blocks/redacts), fail_open (documented risk), or inconclusive (flags without blocking).

A third governance option, ShieldGovernance (k9_aif_abb.k9_security.vulnerability), wires the same check classes Router/Orchestrator already use, but at the agent pre/post hook level — a second valid architectural point for the same VulnerabilityChain ABB.

Prove what Guardian adds instead of asserting it:

python -m k9x_satan.runner.satan_runner --target http://localhost:6660 \
    --suite full --compare-governance

Fires every attack twice — deterministic-only, then deterministic + Guardian — and reports which findings Guardian closed. A regression (Guardian making a previously-contained attack pass) is flagged as a bug, not a result.

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Complete Check Inventory

#	Check	Stage	Owner	Threat Class
1	RequestFrequencyCheck	Ingress	Satan SBB	Unbounded Consumption — OWASP LLM10
2	InputSizeCheck	Ingress	Framework OOB	Token-flood / oversized payload — OWASP LLM10
3	PromptInjectionCheck	Ingress	Framework OOB	Indirect Prompt Injection — Zscaler #1 · OWASP LLM01
4	FieldAnomalyCheck	Ingress	Satan SBB	Authority-override social engineering
5	MemoryPoisoningCheck	Ingress	Satan SBB	Memory Poisoning — Zscaler #3 · OWASP LLM04
6	SemanticDriftCheck	Egress	Framework OOB	Goal Hijacking & Privilege Escalation — Zscaler #2 · OWASP LLM06
7	ExecutionGuardCheck	Egress	Framework OOB	Destructive execution — Zscaler #2 · OWASP LLM06
8	PIIBoundaryCheck	Egress	Framework OOB	Sensitive Info Disclosure — OWASP LLM02
9	ToolArgumentCheck	Egress	Framework OOB	Tool Abuse — poisoned arguments — Zscaler #4 · OWASP LLM05
10	HardcodedCredentialCheck	Egress	Framework OOB	Supply chain / secret leakage — OWASP LLM03
11	ToolAuthorizationCheck	Egress	Satan SBB	Shadow AI — unapproved tool — Zscaler #4
12	SystemPromptLeakageCheck	Egress	Satan SBB	System Prompt Leakage — OWASP LLM07
13	OutputSanitizationCheck	Egress	Satan SBB	Improper Output Handling — OWASP LLM05
—	GuardianGovernance	Agent pre/post	Satan SBB	Semantic evasion of all 13 above (cross-cutting, optional)

Out of scope by design (not runtime-checkable at the payload level): training-data poisoning, vector/embedding attacks (no RAG in this target), misinformation/hallucination.

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Structure

k9x_satan/
├── target/               ← the pipeline under test (SBBs extending K9-AIF ABBs)
│   ├── router.py              DocumentRouter — ingress Shield (5 checks)
│   ├── orchestrator.py        DocumentOrchestrator — egress Shield (8 checks)
│   ├── squad.py               DocumentProcessingSquad + governance selection
│   ├── agents.py               DocumentExtractionAgent, AuditAgent
│   ├── guardian_governance.py  IBM Granite Guardian semantic layer
│   ├── field_anomaly_check.py, memory_poisoning_check.py,
│   │   tool_authorization_check.py, system_prompt_leakage_check.py,
│   │   output_sanitization_check.py, request_frequency_check.py
│   │                           Satan-local BaseVulnerabilityCheck SBBs
│   └── extractor.py            DoclingExtractor — pre-Shield field extraction
├── attacks/               ← BaseAttack subclasses (the red team) — 13 implemented
├── corpus/                ← malicious document and payload samples
├── fake_search/           ← lightweight server returning poisoned search results
├── runner/                ← sends attacks through a real K9-AIF pipeline
├── report/                ← formats BLOCKED / FLAGGED / PASSED results
└── diagrams/              ← shield_class.puml (PlantUML class diagram)

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Running Satan

./run.sh                                                                 # dashboard on :6660
python -m k9x_satan.runner.satan_runner --target http://localhost:6660 --suite full
python -m k9x_satan.runner.satan_runner --target http://localhost:6660 --suite full --compare-governance

Output

K9x Satan — Attack Report
=========================
[BLOCKED]  prompt_injection_document     depth=router       ✓
[BLOCKED]  search_poisoning              depth=router       ✓
[BLOCKED]  payload_flood                 depth=router       ✓
[BLOCKED]  memory_poisoning              depth=router       ✓
[BLOCKED]  request_flood                 depth=router       ✓
[BLOCKED]  semantic_drift                depth=orchestrator ✓
[BLOCKED]  execution_bypass              depth=orchestrator ✓
[BLOCKED]  pii_exfiltration              depth=orchestrator ✓
[BLOCKED]  tool_argument_poison          depth=orchestrator ✓
[BLOCKED]  hardcoded_credential          depth=orchestrator ✓
[BLOCKED]  shadow_tool                   depth=orchestrator ✓
[BLOCKED]  system_prompt_leakage         depth=orchestrator ✓
[BLOCKED]  output_sanitization           depth=orchestrator ✓
=========================
13/13 contained  |  0 findings

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Adding a New Attack

1. Create attacks/my_attack.py extending BaseAttack (k9_aif_abb.k9_security.attacks.base_attack)
2. Fire via the shared attacks/_fire.py helper — it POSTs to /api/attack/fire and correctly reports connection failures as FLAGGED (inconclusive), never a fabricated BLOCKED
3. Add malicious payload to corpus/ if document-based
4. Register in runner/attack_registry.py
5. Run: python -m k9x_satan.runner.satan_runner --attack my_attack --target http://localhost:6660

Adding a New Check

1. Create target/my_check.py extending BaseVulnerabilityCheck (k9_aif_abb.k9_security.vulnerability.base_vulnerability_check)
2. Wire it into DocumentRouter._build_ingress_chain() or DocumentOrchestrator._build_egress_chain()
3. Write the matching attack (above) to prove it holds

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Relationship to K9X Shield

Satan and Shield are symmetric. Every BaseAttack targets a specific BaseVulnerabilityCheck. A PASSED result means a new check is needed in Shield.

Satan Attack	Shield Check
PromptInjectionAttack	PromptInjectionCheck
SearchPoisoningAttack	PromptInjectionCheck (real tool-response fetch from fake_search)
PayloadFloodAttack	InputSizeCheck
MemoryPoisoningAttack	MemoryPoisoningCheck
RequestFloodAttack	RequestFrequencyCheck
SemanticDriftAttack	SemanticDriftCheck
ExecutionBypassAttack	ExecutionGuardCheck
PIIExfiltrationAttack	PIIBoundaryCheck
ToolArgumentAttack	ToolArgumentCheck
HardcodedCredentialAttack	HardcodedCredentialCheck
ShadowToolAttack	ToolAuthorizationCheck
SystemPromptLeakageAttack	SystemPromptLeakageCheck
OutputSanitizationAttack	OutputSanitizationCheck