Kafka MCP Enterprise Server
Scope: This is a stdio, in-memory conformance reference for the KIP-1318 security control model. Real brokers, Streamable HTTP, OAuth 2.1, EOS/fencing, Connect tooling, distributed rate/breaker state, and durable audit topics are specified in the KIP (Java production track under KAFKA-20436) and are not implemented here. Full matrix: doc/kip-alignment.md.
Implemented vs Spec-only
| Area | This reference | KIP / Java track |
|---|---|---|
| Transport | stdio only | stdio + Streamable HTTP + OAuth |
| Backend | In-memory Kafka | Real Admin / Producer / Consumer |
| Tools | 13 registered | ~30+ (incl. Connect, EOS, group admin) |
| Resources | subset + Phase-1 lag/offsets | ~20 kafka:// URIs |
| Rate / quarantine | per-process | optional distributed backend |
| Audit | in-memory hash chain | durable audit topic |
| Default allow-list | read/consume only (SECURE_DEFAULT_TOOLS) |
same secure-by-default posture |
| Conformance | 302/302 checks | KIP test plan |
Website
| Site | https://vaquarkhan.github.io/kafka-mcp-enterprise-server/ |
| Source | site/ (index.html + local site/assets/site.css) |
| Deploy | .github/workflows/pages.yml publishes site/ on push to main |
PyPI
pip install kafka-mcp-enterprise
echo {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"} | kafka-mcp-enterprise
| Package | kafka-mcp-enterprise |
| CLI | kafka-mcp-enterprise |
| Import | import kafka_mcp |
| Optional | pip install kafka-mcp-enterprise[otel] |
| Publish | Tag v* → .github/workflows/publish.yml (Trusted Publishing / OIDC - see doc/publishing.md) |
Agents & skills (Cursor, Kiro, ChatGPT, Gemini, Copilot, …)
| AGENTS.md | AGENTS.md - canonical instructions for every coding agent |
| Skills | .cursor/skills/ (Cursor) · skills/ (portable) |
| Guide | doc/agents-and-skills.md - how to load in each IDE |
Python conformance reference for KIP-1318: a Model Context Protocol (MCP) control plane for agent access to Kafka. The KIP's production target is Java. This package validates the fail-closed security model over stdio against an in-memory backend - it is not a drop-in for the forthcoming first-party Java MCP server.
| KIP | KIP-1318: MCP Server for Apache Kafka |
| Jira | KAFKA-20436 - Implement KIP-1318 |
| Discuss | [DISCUSS] KIP-1318 on dev@kafka.apache.org |
| This repo | Stdlib Python reference / conformance server (teaching, demos, security validation) |
| KIP production target | Java module (tools/mcp-server) wrapping native Kafka clients - see the KIP |
Scope clarity: The Apache Kafka project tracks the official implementation under KAFKA-20436. This repository is an independent, zero-dependency reference that encodes the enterprise control plane, error model, and conformance tests so designs can be validated before or alongside the Java work. It is not a drop-in replacement for the forthcoming first-party Java MCP server.
Why this exists
AI agents need governed Kafka access-not ad-hoc scripts, unbounded consumes, or shared "god" principals. KIP-1318 proposes a standalone MCP process (stdio / HTTP in the spec) that exposes tools and kafka:// resources without changing the Kafka wire protocol. This reference implements the fail-closed security control plane over stdio against an in-memory backend (see matrix above).
Broker ACLs remain authoritative. Guardrails here complement them; they never replace them.
What’s included
Documentation product image (not a web UI). Checklist of what this Python stdio reference implements: fail-closed pipeline, DLP, 13 tools, kafka:// resources, tests, and examples.
How it runs
flowchart LR
Agent["Agent / IDE"]
MCP["kafka-mcp-enterprise<br/>stdio JSON-RPC + pipeline"]
Mem["InMemoryKafka<br/>conformance backend"]
Agent -->|"MCP tools/call"| MCP
MCP -->|"tools / resources"| Mem
This repo: Python stdlib reference (in-memory Kafka for tests). KIP production track: Java wrapping real Admin/Producer/Consumer (KAFKA-20436), not shipped here.
Fail-closed pipeline (overview)
flowchart TB
A["1 Auth"] --> B["2 Deny-list"] --> C["3 Allow / readonly"]
C --> D["4 Scope"] --> E["5 Policy"] --> F["6 Taint / IFC"]
F --> G["7 Approval"] --> H["8 Rate limit"] --> I["9 Breaker execute"]
Full detail: doc/security-controls.md · architecture: doc/architecture.md.
Complete features, security controls & guardrails
Nothing below is optional marketing - every item is implemented in kafka_mcp/ and covered by the 302/302 conformance suite and/or demos/examples unless noted as a documented reference gap.
A. MCP protocol & surface
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| JSON-RPC 2.0 | Strict jsonrpc: "2.0" request/response |
initialize |
protocolVersion, serverInfo, capabilities |
tools/list |
Visible tools honor deny-list, allow-list, and readonly |
tools/call |
Full fail-closed pipeline + handler |
resources/list |
Catalog of kafka:// URIs |
resources/read |
Topic/cluster/group/audit/health reads |
| stdio transport | Newline-delimited JSON (serve_stdio / kafka-mcp-enterprise) |
| HTTP notes | Stateless HTTP design documented; full HTTP listener is a KIP/Java concern |
| Stateless approvals | HMAC tokens self-contained (no sticky session required for authz correctness) |
| Correlation IDs | Per-call corr_id on audit entries |
B. Tools (13) - classified
| Tool | kind | module | Kafka op |
|---|---|---|---|
list_topics |
read | control_plane | DESCRIBE |
describe_topic |
read | control_plane | DESCRIBE |
describe_cluster |
read | control_plane | DESCRIBE |
list_consumer_groups |
read | control_plane | DESCRIBE |
describe_consumer_group |
read | control_plane | DESCRIBE |
consume_messages |
read | data_plane | READ |
create_topic |
mutate | control_plane | CREATE |
alter_topic_config |
mutate | control_plane | ALTER |
produce_message |
mutate | data_plane | WRITE |
alter_consumer_group_offsets |
mutate | control_plane | ALTER |
delete_topic |
destructive | control_plane | DELETE |
delete_consumer_group |
destructive | control_plane | DELETE |
create_acls |
destructive | control_plane | ALTER |
Shipped default exposes the six read tools only (SECURE_DEFAULT_TOOLS).
C. Resources (kafka://)
| URI | Purpose |
|---|---|
kafka://topics |
List topics |
kafka://topics/{name} |
Describe topic |
kafka://topics/{name}/offsets |
Earliest/latest offsets per partition |
kafka://cluster |
Cluster id + brokers |
kafka://groups |
Consumer groups |
kafka://groups/{id} |
Describe a consumer group |
kafka://groups/{id}/offsets |
Committed offsets |
kafka://groups/{id}/lag |
Per-topic/partition lag (KIP Phase 1) |
kafka://audit/recent |
Recent audit entries |
kafka://health |
Liveness + per-module circuit breaker state |
D. Fail-closed security pipeline (exact order)
Every tools/call - first denial wins:
| Step | Control | Denial code |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Bearer auth - audience / issuer validation (off until configured) | -32001 UNAUTHORIZED |
| 2 | Deny-list (tools_denied) |
-32044 POLICY_DENIED |
| 3 | Allow-list (tools_allowed) + readonly (blocks all non-read, including produce) |
-32044 |
| 4 | Topic prefix scope + group prefix scope | -32041 SCOPE_VIOLATION |
| 5 | Policy engine - callable; deny or exception → fail-closed | -32044 |
| 6 | Taint guard / IFC - destructive tools; optional ifc_strict; approval bypasses |
-32040 TAINT_VIOLATION |
| 7 | Approval gate - HMAC signed TTL token (_approval_token) |
-32042 APPROVAL_REQUIRED |
| 8 | Rate limit - general vs admin/control-plane buckets | -32029 RATE_LIMITED |
| 9 | Execute via per-module circuit breaker + dependency check | -32043 DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE |
Pre / around execute (also enforced):
| Guardrail | Behavior | Code |
|---|---|---|
| Input validation | Identifier charset; max_value_bytes on produce values |
-32046 VALIDATION_FAILED |
| Rogue-agent kill-switch | Per-identity destructive burst → quarantine | -32047 QUARANTINED |
| Identity propagation | Optional per-principal broker ACL check before execute | -32044 |
| Sensitive-topic gating | Pattern match on consume → requires approval | -32042 |
| Egress DLP | Block secret categories on produce | -32045 SENSITIVE_DATA_BLOCKED |
| Dry-run tools | dryrun_tools returns plan without mutation |
- |
| Consume clamp | maxMessages capped by hard_max_records |
- |
| Byte bounds | hard_max_bytes trims consume payload; max_output_bytes truncates scrubbed output |
truncation tags |
| Post-execute DLP scrub | Redact/scrub whole result tree | - |
| Taint registration | Consumed values registered into session taint set | - |
| Audit | ALLOW/DENY recorded (params truncated, hash-chained) | - |
E. Data-protection guardrails (DLP)
| Capability | Detail |
|---|---|
| Modes | redact | block | off (dlp_mode) |
| Default block categories | private_key, aws_access_key, jwt |
| Detectors (10) | email, ssn, credit_card (Luhn-validated), phone, ipv4, aws_access_key, private_key, jwt, iban, secret_assignment |
| Consume path | Redact PII in records; block-mode can refuse |
| Produce path | Egress scan → -32045 |
| Sensitive configs | Mask password/secret-like keys on describe (redact_sensitive_configs) |
| Scrub all outputs | Walk entire JSON result (scrub_all_outputs) |
| Legacy interceptor | interceptor.redact_record kept for compatibility; DLP is primary |
F. Approval, taint & IFC
| Capability | Detail |
|---|---|
| HMAC approval tokens | mint / verify; TTL (default 300s); tool-bound |
| Forged / expired tokens | Rejected → -32042 |
| Default approval-required tools | delete_topic, delete_records, create_acls, delete_acls, alter_partition_reassignments, alter_broker_config |
| Taint guard | Best-effort substring match of session tainted values into destructive args |
ifc_strict |
After untrusted read, blocks destructive/control-plane without approval |
| Honesty | Taint is defeatable by laundering; least-privilege broker ACLs are load-bearing |
G. Scoping, exposure & identity
| Capability | Detail |
|---|---|
| Tool allow-list / deny-list | tools_allowed, tools_denied |
| Secure-by-default guidance | Shipped default is read/consume only; expand tools_allowed for mutate/destructive |
| Readonly mode | Disables create/produce/alter/delete/ACLs |
| Topic prefixes | allowed_topic_prefixes |
| Group prefixes | allowed_group_prefixes |
| Identity propagation | identity_propagation + in-memory per-principal ACLs (set_principal_acl / authorize) |
| Session identity | session["identity"] for audit, quarantine, ACL principal |
H. Resilience & blast-radius controls
| Capability | Detail |
|---|---|
| Circuit breakers | Per module: data_plane, control_plane, ecosystem |
| Breaker isolation | Control-plane open does not take down data-plane consume/produce |
| Dependency failure hook | _inject_dependency_failure / _fail_module → -32043 |
| Rate limits | rate_requests_per_second + rate_admin_requests_per_second |
| Quarantine | max_destructive_per_minute per identity |
| Health resource | Breaker states on kafka://health |
I. Consume semantics (Direct Partition Assignment)
| Mode | Behavior |
|---|---|
No groupId |
assignment=direct, no consumer group, no rebalance |
With groupId |
Classic group path; register offsets; rebalance counter increments |
J. Backend surface (in-memory Kafka)
create_topic, delete_topic, list_topics, describe_topic, alter_topic_config, produce, consume, list_groups, describe_group, group_lag, create_acls, list_acls, describe_cluster, principal ACLs, rebalance counter, dependency hooks.
K. Audit
| Capability | Detail |
|---|---|
| Ring buffer | Recent entries (maxlen=1000) |
| Hash chaining | Tamper-resistant best-effort chain |
| Param truncation | Long params truncated (>64 chars) |
| Decisions | ALLOW / DENY with identity, tool, corr_id |
| Resource | kafka://audit/recent |
audit_topic |
Config name present; durable Kafka mirror is a documented reference gap |
L. Error codes (complete - 15)
| Code | Constant | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| -32700 | PARSE_ERROR | JSON parse error |
| -32600 | INVALID_REQUEST | Invalid request |
| -32601 | METHOD_NOT_FOUND | Unknown method/tool |
| -32602 | INVALID_PARAMS | Invalid params / structured Kafka errors |
| -32603 | INTERNAL_ERROR | Internal error |
| -32001 | UNAUTHORIZED | Bad/missing bearer |
| -32029 | RATE_LIMITED | Rate limited |
| -32040 | TAINT_VIOLATION | Tainted value into destructive tool |
| -32041 | SCOPE_VIOLATION | Topic/group out of scope |
| -32042 | APPROVAL_REQUIRED | Destructive/sensitive needs approval |
| -32043 | DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE | Circuit breaker open / dependency down |
| -32044 | POLICY_DENIED | Deny/allow/readonly/policy/ACL propagation |
| -32045 | SENSITIVE_DATA_BLOCKED | Egress / DLP block |
| -32046 | VALIDATION_FAILED | Malformed identifier / oversized value |
| -32047 | QUARANTINED | Rogue-agent kill-switch |
M. Configuration surface (32 fields)
bootstrap_servers, transport, tools_allowed, tools_denied, readonly, allowed_topic_prefixes, allowed_group_prefixes, taint_guard_enabled, approval_required_tools, dryrun_tools, audit_topic, policy_engine, circuit_breaker_enabled, dependency_timeout_ms, rate_requests_per_second, rate_admin_requests_per_second, oauth_expected_audience, oauth_expected_issuer, approval_signing_secret, redaction_enabled, dlp_mode, dlp_block_categories, scrub_all_outputs, redact_sensitive_configs, sensitive_topic_patterns, max_value_bytes, max_output_bytes, max_destructive_per_minute, ifc_strict, hard_max_records, hard_max_bytes, identity_propagation.
Full defaults: doc/configuration.md.
N. Quality, packaging & agent DX
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Conformance suite | 302/302 checks (incl. KIP Test Plan matrix + coverage gap-fill) |
| Line coverage | 100% of kafka_mcp/ via python run_coverage.py (optional coverage package) |
| Smoke + demo | test_kafka_mcp.py (16), demo_end_to_end.py (22 steps, all security codes) |
| Examples | Six folders with real-world data/ fixtures |
| PyPI | kafka-mcp-enterprise · CLI kafka-mcp-enterprise |
| Stdlib-only core | No hard third-party deps |
| Optional OTel | pip install …[otel] - not required (doc/observability.md) |
| AGENTS.md + skills | Cursor / Kiro / Copilot / ChatGPT / Gemini (doc/agents-and-skills.md) |
O. Documented reference gaps (intentional)
HTTP full server · real brokers · HTTP policy URL client · durable audit_topic publish · wall-clock dependency_timeout_ms · some approval tool names reserved but not all registered · production language = Java (this package is the Python reference). See doc/kip-alignment.md.
Quick start
Requires Python 3.8+. Core has no third-party packages.
# From source
python run_tests.py
python demo_end_to_end.py
python examples/01_sre_readonly_triage/run.py
echo {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"} | python serve_stdio.py
See the PyPI section at the top for pip install, or doc/publishing.md to publish a release.
Documentation & examples
| Resource | Description |
|---|---|
| doc/ | End-to-end guides: getting started, architecture, security, config, tools, errors, testing |
| doc/kip-alignment.md | Feature matrix vs KIP-1318 - what is implemented vs intentional reference gaps |
| doc/publishing.md | PyPI package kafka-mcp-enterprise |
| doc/observability.md | OpenTelemetry: optional, not required |
| doc/agents-and-skills.md | AGENTS.md + skills for all IDEs |
| examples/ | Six folder-based scenarios (run.py + real-world data/ fixtures) |
Repository layout
flowchart TB
root["kafka-mcp-enterprise-server"]
pkg["kafka_mcp/<br/>reference server"]
tests["tests/<br/>302-check suite"]
docs["doc/<br/>guides + diagrams"]
ex["examples/<br/>6 scenarios"]
entry["serve_stdio.py · run_tests.py · demo_end_to_end.py"]
root --> pkg
root --> tests
root --> docs
root --> ex
root --> entry
Engineering standards
This reference aims at production-grade practice even while staying a teaching implementation:
| Practice | How it shows up |
|---|---|
| Fail-closed | First denial wins; no execute-then-check paths |
| Least privilege | Prefix scopes, allow/deny lists, readonly, approval for destructive ops |
| Defense in depth | MCP controls + explicit honesty that broker ACLs are load-bearing |
| Bounded blast radius | Hard record/byte caps, rate limits, per-plane breakers, quarantine |
| Observable denials | Stable error codes, correlation IDs, audit ALLOW/DENY |
| Testability | Deterministic in-memory backend; security + integration coverage |
| Zero dependency debt | Python stdlib only - easy to audit and run in CI |
| Clear product boundary | Official Kafka delivery tracked on KAFKA-20436 (Java) |
Honest limitations (by design)
- Taint / IFC is best-effort - defeatable by data laundering; do not treat as complete mediation.
- In-memory Kafka - validates control logic; not a broker client.
- stdio-first - HTTP is specified in the KIP; this reference documents notes, full HTTP is a Java/production concern.
- Secure-by-default - shipped
tools_allowedis read/consume only (SECURE_DEFAULT_TOOLS); enable mutate/destructive explicitly.
Note: Python reference vs Java production code
This repository is a Python reference implementation for validating the KIP-1318 security control model (stdio + in-memory backend + conformance tests). It is not written in Java and is not the official Apache Kafka MCP server.
Items listed as intentional gaps (Streamable HTTP / OAuth, live Admin-Producer-Consumer, EOS/fencing, Connect tools, distributed rate/audit state, JMX, and remaining tools/resources) are specified for the real implementation tracked under KAFKA-20436. Those belong in the actual Java production module (tools/mcp-server) and will be added there - not claimed as complete in this Python reference.
Full matrix: doc/kip-alignment.md.
Related links
- KIP-1318 (wiki): https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/KAFKA/KIP-1318%3A+Model+Context+Protocol+%28MCP%29+Server+for+Apache+Kafka
- Jira: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KAFKA-20436
- MCP specification: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/
License & affiliation
Apache Kafka, KIP-1318, and KAFKA-20436 are trademarks / projects of the Apache Software Foundation. This repository is a community reference aligned with that proposal; it is not the official ASF deliverable unless and until merged under the Kafka project.
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