kailash-pact
PACT governance framework — D/T/R accountability grammar, operating envelopes, knowledge clearance, and verification gradient for AI agent organizations.
Part of the Kailash enterprise AI platform.
Quick Start
from pact.governance import GovernanceEngine
engine = GovernanceEngine.from_yaml("my-org.yaml")
verdict = engine.verify_action("D1-R1-T1-R1", "write_report", {"cost": 50.0})
if verdict.allowed:
print("Approved:", verdict.reason)
else:
print("Blocked:", verdict.reason)
Installation
pip install kailash-pact
With Kaizen agent integration:
pip install kailash-pact[kaizen]
Features
- D/T/R Grammar Engine — Accountability grammar (Department/Team/Role) with positional addressing
- Three-Layer Envelopes — Role (standing) + Task (ephemeral) = Effective (computed intersection)
- Knowledge Clearance — Five-level classification independent of authority/seniority
- 5-Step Access Enforcement — Clearance → Classification → Compartment → Containment → Deny
- GovernanceEngine — Single facade composing all primitives
- PactGovernedAgent — Wrap any Kaizen agent with governance enforcement
- SQLite/PostgreSQL Stores — Persistent governance state
- REST API — 9 governance endpoints with auth and rate limiting
- CLI —
kailash-pact validate org.yaml
MCP Governance — Tenant Isolation (Pre-Pledge v0)
pact.mcp adds deterministic governance to MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool
calls and resource reads, including first-class multi-tenant isolation
(issue #1843, shipped in 0.16.0). Because kailash-pact is still pre-1.0,
this section is an explicit pledge of what the tenant-isolation surface
enforces today versus what remains open — read it before relying on
McpGovernanceConfig.tenant_grants in a multi-tenant deployment.
- Enforced today:
McpGovernanceConfig.tenant_grants(adict[str, McpTenantGrant]) scopes bothtools/callandresources/readto the caller's tenant through one shared, fail-closed restrictiveness function, evaluated before tool registration (so it applies even underDefaultPolicy.ALLOW). The effective tenant is resolved from the server-verifiedtenantfield (populated server-side at the network boundary, #1878) or a trustedMcpCallerIdentity.tenant(resolved by your transport/auth layer and passed tocheck_tool_call/check_resource_read); the self-assertedmetadata["tenant_id"]channel is deprecated and no longer consulted for tenant resolution in any mode (#1919), defeating impersonation.require_caller_identitydefaults toTrue: with no verified/trusted tenant the call fails closed. - Deferred:
resources/readhas ONLY the tenant-isolation check today — no cost, argument, clearance, or rate-limit governance layer exists yet for that surface (that richer contract exists only fortools/callviaMcpToolPolicy). The server-verifiedtenantfield (#1878) is populated server-side and deliberately excluded from the wire envelope (to_dict/from_dictnever emit it — byte-neutral with the Rust SDK's frozen envelope); it is NOT a client-serialized field, and the self-assertedmetadata["tenant_id"]channel is no longer consulted for tenant resolution (#1919). - Non-promises:
tenant_grantsbeing empty is NOT "tenant isolation enabled with an empty allowlist" — it is isolation OFF entirely (every call auto-approved on that axis, byte-identical to pre-0.16.0 behavior). Passingrequire_caller_identity=Falseis NOT a recommended production setting — it exists only for the documented #1843 weaker-mode surface. As of #1919 it NO LONGER re-enables a trusted metadata fallback: a caller that relied on the self-assertedmetadata["tenant_id"]now receives aDeprecationWarningand the decision fails closed. - Verify:
pytest packages/kailash-pact/tests/regression/test_issue_1843_mcp_tenant_isolation.py -vexercises the fail-closed defaults, the impersonation-defeat contract, and theresources/readisolation-only surface end-to-end. - Status: v0 within a pre-1.0 package (
kailash-pact0.18.0) — the isolation contract above is stable for this release; the deferred items may change shape (not just grow) before a 1.0 cut.
Documentation
- Quickstart — Zero to governance in 10 minutes
- Architecture — How it all fits together
- Vertical Guide — Build your own governed platform
- API Reference — REST endpoints
- Cookbook — Common patterns
- YAML Schema — Org definition format
Cross-SDK Conformance (PACT N4/N5)
The PACT N6 cross-SDK conformance contract pins byte-for-byte canonical JSON
across language SDKs. The Python implementation lives in pact.conformance
and drives the same vector files the Rust SDK does.
Run the runner programmatically
from pact.conformance import ConformanceRunner, load_vectors_from_dir
vectors = load_vectors_from_dir(
"/path/to/kailash-rs/crates/kailash-pact/tests/conformance/vectors"
)
report = ConformanceRunner().run(vectors)
if not report.all_passed:
raise SystemExit(report.render_failure_report())
print(f"PACT conformance: {report.passed}/{report.total} passed")
Run via pytest
The Tier 1 unit tests at
tests/unit/conformance/test_runner.py::test_runner_passes_against_real_cross_sdk_vectors
auto-discover the kailash-rs sibling checkout and exercise every vector.
The test SKIPS gracefully when the sibling repo is absent, so unit-only CI
hosts do not fail.
pytest packages/kailash-pact/tests/unit/conformance/ -v
Vector schema
Each vector is a JSON document at crates/kailash-pact/tests/conformance/vectors/
with:
id: unique identifier (sort key)contract:"N4"(TieredAuditEvent canonicalisation) or"N5"(Evidence canonicalisation)input.verdict:{zone, reason, action, role_address, details}input.posture: required for N4 (PseudoAgent,Supervised,SharedPlanning,ContinuousInsight,Delegated)input.fixed_event_id/input.fixed_timestamp: required for determinismexpected.canonical_json: the byte-for-byte JSON the SDK MUST emitexpected.tier/durable/requires_signature/requires_replication: optional N4 invariants
The runner compares actual vs expected via byte equality (NOT JSON-equal); a
single-byte drift surfaces as a FAILED outcome with both SHA-256
fingerprints populated for forensic correlation.
License
Apache 2.0 — Terrene Foundation
Metadata
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