keycloak-mcp
English | 日本語
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for the KeyCloak Admin REST API.
Documentation: https://shigechika.github.io/keycloak-mcp/
Authenticates via a Service Account (Client Credentials Grant), so no human password or TOTP is involved. Also Infinispan-safe — it never creates user sessions and never hits the userinfo endpoint.
Features
Users
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
count_users |
Total user count in the realm |
search_users |
Partial-match search (username / email / name) |
get_user |
Full detail for an exact username |
reset_password |
Reset one user's password |
reset_passwords_batch |
Bulk reset from CSV (username,password per line; blank password is generated) |
get_user_sessions |
Active sessions for one user, timestamps in local time |
logout_user |
Kill all active sessions for one user |
set_user_enabled |
Enable or disable one user; disabling blocks all logins (custom attributes preserved) |
MFA / Credentials
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_user_credentials |
Credential types configured for one user; an otp entry means TOTP/HOTP is set up |
get_totp_users |
Realm-wide TOTP adoption: how many users have an otp credential, with percentage and (optionally) the user list. Enumerates users and reads each one's credentials (N+1; bound with max_users) |
Groups
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
list_user_groups |
Which groups a user belongs to |
list_users_by_group |
Members of a group |
Security
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_brute_force_status |
Whether a user is currently locked by brute-force detection |
get_realm_security_defenses |
Realm-level security policy: whether brute-force detection is enabled and its thresholds, the password policy, and browser security headers |
get_login_failures_by_ip |
Failure breakdown by source IP (site-labeled when KEYCLOAK_SITES_INI is set) |
get_ip_activity |
Exhaustive investigation of one source IP: success/failure counts, affected users/clients, timeline. Returns structured JSON. |
spray_check |
Password-spray detection with the breach list built in: every external IP with ≥ 10 distinct users and < 20 % login success is a spray source, and its successful logins (evidence tuple time / ip / username / user_id / client_id) are the breach candidates. Each row carries a confidence: high is a breach verdict; low means the volume rule fired on a shared egress (school NAT, home line, VDI) — signalled by user_success_rate (distinct users that logged in ÷ distinct users, ≥ 0.2), failure_concentration (share of failures on one username, ≥ 0.5) or a KEYCLOAK_KNOWN_EGRESS match — and the logins are to be verified with the owner, not published. top_failed_users and not_found_domains show who kept failing and which mistyped domains produced user_not_found. Fixed-shape JSON, complete: false when the window was truncated. |
detect_login_loops |
Flag users who logged in too many times in a short window (redirect loops) |
Events
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_events |
Filter by type, username, client, IP, and date range. Username is resolved to user ID internally. Failure events include KeyCloak's error field (e.g. invalid_user_credentials). |
get_login_stats |
Login success/failure totals, paginated across all results |
get_login_stats_by_hour |
Logins bucketed by hour of day (local time) |
get_login_stats_by_client |
Logins bucketed by client / SP |
get_password_update_events |
UPDATE_PASSWORD history |
Admin Events
get_events only sees user events. Actions driven by an admin — or by a service account writing custom attributes — don't show up there. The admin-event endpoint fills that gap.
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_admin_events |
Filter by operation (CREATE / UPDATE / DELETE / ACTION), resource type (USER / CLIENT / ROLE / GROUP / …), resource path, and date range |
get_user_attribute_history |
UPDATE/ACTION events scoped to one user — handy for tracking when a custom attribute (e.g. provisioning_flag) was written by an automated pipeline |
Both tools accept max_repr to control the representation payload: positive = truncate to N chars (default 500), 0 = omit, negative = include in full.
Sessions & Clients
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
get_session_stats |
Active session count per client |
get_client_sessions |
Active sessions for one client (SP) |
list_clients |
SAML and OIDC clients in the realm |
get_client |
One client's configuration, including its authentication flow overrides (the per-SP MFA switch). Omits attributes and protocolMappers, so no client secret or SAML signing material reaches tool output. |
get_realm_roles |
Realm-level roles |
Morning Patrol
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
health_check |
Report the running server version and verify the KeyCloak backend is reachable and the service account can authenticate. Lightweight (one token request; no user/event/session scans). Returns a fixed-shape dict with status, auth, and the configured URL/realm. The tool's own description enumerates the values those fields can take, and is the one place that does. |
daily_brief |
One-shot morning health check: login stats, brute-force IPs, spray check (same rule as spray_check, with breached accounts and evidence), active sessions, password updates, and admin events in a single Markdown summary. IPs exceeding ip_failure_threshold failures (default 50) and spray sources are flagged WARNING; API errors surface as CRITICAL. since_hours controls the look-back window (default 18 h). |
Setup
# uv
uv pip install keycloak-mcp
# pip
pip install keycloak-mcp
From source:
git clone https://github.com/shigechika/keycloak-mcp.git
cd keycloak-mcp
# uv
uv sync
# pip
pip install -e .
Configuration
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
KEYCLOAK_URL |
Base URL, e.g. https://keycloak.example.com |
required |
KEYCLOAK_REALM |
Realm name | master |
KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID |
Service Account client ID | required |
KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET |
Client secret | required |
KEYCLOAK_SITES_INI |
INI file for IP-to-site labeling (see below) | unset |
KEYCLOAK_KNOWN_EGRESS |
Comma-separated CIDRs of known shared egress points (VDI, VPN concentrators, partner proxies). spray_check labels matching IPs known_egress: true and marks them confidence: low; they are never excluded |
unset |
KEYCLOAK_DEFAULT_DATE_FROM_HOURS |
Default look-back window for event tools when date_from is omitted. Set to 0 to scan full history (can hang on large realms). |
24 |
KEYCLOAK_DEADLINE |
Per-call wall-clock budget (seconds) for the heavy event/TOTP tools. When a wide window / large realm would exceed it, the tool stops and returns a disclosed partial (⚠️ warning) instead of running past the client's ~60s gateway timeout and hammering KeyCloak. Each request's timeout is also capped at the time left, and nothing is retried past the deadline, so one slow page cannot run a call past it. 0 or negative disables. |
45 |
KEYCLOAK_MAX_EVENTS |
Per-pagination cap on events fetched by the event tools (also bounds how deep the slow high-offset pagination goes). Over the cap the result is a disclosed partial. 0 or negative disables. |
200000 |
KEYCLOAK_MAX_USERS |
Default cap on users scanned by get_totp_users when its max_users argument is 0 (each user costs one credential call). 0 or negative disables (whole realm, bounded only by KEYCLOAK_DEADLINE). |
5000 |
KEYCLOAK_USER_ATTRIBUTE_WHITELIST |
Comma-separated custom user-attribute keys that get_user is allowed to surface. Unset by default: get_user only ever returns username/name/email/enabled/created, since the search endpoint it resolves the username through returns a brief representation with no attributes at all. Opting a key in makes get_user do one extra by-ID lookup and append that attribute's value when present. Everything else stays out of tool output. As a safety net, a whitelisted key whose name looks credential-shaped (contains password, secret, token, etc.) is reported as blocked rather than shown — not a guarantee, since a credential attribute named outside that pattern list still gets through. |
unset |
KEYCLOAK_GROUP_WRITE_ROOT |
Enables the opt-in group-change tools (plan_group_changes, apply_group_changes) and confines them to groups below this absolute path (e.g. /Staff). Unset, empty or malformed: the two tools are not registered at all. Set it only on a deployment that puts a human approval step in front of the server. |
unset |
KEYCLOAK_PROTECTED_GROUPS |
;-separated full group paths that the group-change tools refuse to add to or remove from (descendants included). A malformed entry disables the group-change tools rather than silently dropping the protection. |
unset |
KEYCLOAK_GROUP_BATCH_MAX |
Maximum rows per group-change call. | 30 |
KEYCLOAK_GROUP_MODE |
multi (KeyCloak's default: a user can be in many groups) or single for a deployment where adding a group replaces every other membership (for example an event listener that keeps one group per user). Any other value disables the group tools. See Group changes. |
multi |
KEYCLOAK_GROUP_DEADLINE |
Time budget (seconds) for the group-change tools. A batch of 30 users needs more than the default 45 s; raise it where nothing with a ~60 s timeout sits in front of the server (for example a client that spawns it directly). Unset: KEYCLOAK_DEADLINE. |
unset |
KeyCloak client setup
- Create a new client in the KeyCloak admin console.
- Turn on Client authentication and Service account roles.
- Give it
view-users,view-events,view-clients, and — only if you need password reset —manage-users.
Write operations
Four tools change state by default. Everything else only reads. With group changes
enabled (below), apply_group_changes is a fifth.
| Tool | Admin API call |
|---|---|
reset_password |
PUT /users/{id}/reset-password |
reset_passwords_batch |
the same call, once per CSV row |
set_user_enabled |
PUT /users/{id} with enabled toggled |
logout_user |
POST /users/{id}/logout |
All four need manage-users on the Service Account. Leave that role off and the
server is read-only: those four tools fail with 403 and every other tool keeps
working, so a realm can be handed to Claude for investigation without granting any
ability to modify it. Grant manage-users only when account recovery or
containment is part of the job.
Group changes (opt-in)
plan_group_changes and apply_group_changes move users between groups (for example
staff transfers). They exist only when KEYCLOAK_GROUP_WRITE_ROOT is set, so a
deployment that shares the binary without an approval step never exposes them.
| Tool | Admin API call |
|---|---|
plan_group_changes |
read-only: GET /users?username=...&exact=true, GET /group-by-path/..., GET /groups/{id}/role-mappings, GET /roles-by-id/{id}/composites, GET /clients/{id}, GET /users/{id}/groups |
apply_group_changes |
PUT /users/{id}/groups/{groupId} then DELETE /users/{id}/groups/{groupId} |
plan_group_changesresolves every user and group by exact name/path and returns, per row, the current direct groups, the operations that would run and a status. Itsdigestcovers the resolved IDs, each user's current groups and the policy.apply_group_changesre-plans and changes nothing unless every row is still executable and the digest equals the approved one, so a membership changed by anyone since the plan aborts the whole batch. It adds before it removes, vets the destination again right before adding, re-reads memberships before each write and reads them back after it, and stops at the first mismatch, error or exhausted time budget (KEYCLOAK_GROUP_DEADLINE). It does not start a user whose operations cannot all finish in the time left, so a stop does not split an add from its remove.appliedisyes,no,partialorunknown(a write that could not be read back).- With
KEYCLOAK_GROUP_MODE=singlea move is one add: the server drops the old group itself, so no DELETE is sent and the read-back must show the destination alone. A row must name the group to add (a remove-only row would leave the user in no group). An omittedremoveis filled in with the user's current group so the approver sees what is left, and that group is vetted like aremoveat plan time and again right before the add. A user in more than one group breaks the server's rule and is refused (fix them by hand). Users whose previous state a plan cannot restore (they had no group, or the server turned out not to replace) are listed inmanual_restoreinstead ofreverse. Set it when your KeyCloak behaves this way; inmultimode such a server makes every move stop as a concurrent change, and insinglemode a server that keeps the old group makes the move stop with a message that the mode does not match. - Refused targets: anything outside the root, the root itself, and protected groups and their descendants.
- A group that carries roles is not refused: moving someone into a department's admin
group is an ordinary transfer when the approver can do the same in the admin console.
Each plan row lists
gained_rolesandlost_roles: the difference the move makes to the roles the user holds through all their group memberships (a role kept through a shared ancestor or another group is neither; roles mapped to the user directly are not read).add_rolesandremove_rolesare the roles membership in each named group carries. Realm roles appear by name and client roles asclient:role; roles inherited from ancestor groups and the contents of composite roles (any depth) are included. Show the gains and losses to the person approving. They are part of thedigest, and the destination's roles are read again before each add (at most once every 5 seconds per group within one call), so a role attached (or added to a composite) after the approval stops the run. A row whose role change cannot be shown (a current group that does not resolve by path, such as one with/in its name) is refused. Changed in 1.3.0: earlier versions refused any group with role mappings. If you relied on that, list those groups inKEYCLOAK_PROTECTED_GROUPSbefore upgrading. - Membership can grant access without any role (a SAML/OIDC group mapper that a service
provider checks, an authorization-services group policy). List the groups that must
never be written by these tools, whatever their roles, in
KEYCLOAK_PROTECTED_GROUPS. Every protected path must exist in KeyCloak: if one does not resolve (renamed, moved, different case), every plan is refused until the configuration is fixed. - The
digestshows that nothing changed since the plan. It does not prove that a person approved the plan: any caller ofplan_group_changesgets a valid digest. Put the approval in front ofapply_group_changes, for example a client that keeps the digest itself and asks a person before each call. Treat each approval as single-use: if the memberships return to the planned state (for example afterreverse), the old digest matches again. - The result includes
reverse, the changes that would undo what took effect. It is a proposal for a new plan and approval, never applied automatically. Restoring a membership does not undo access that happened while it was wrong.
Writes need manage-users. Depending on the KeyCloak version, reading groups and their
role mappings may also need query-groups. Expanding composite roles reads realm roles
(view-realm) and naming client roles reads clients (view-clients). Run
plan_group_changes once to confirm.
Verify your setup
After setting the environment variables, run --check to confirm authentication works before wiring it into an MCP client:
export KEYCLOAK_URL=https://keycloak.example.com
export KEYCLOAK_REALM=my-realm
export KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID=keycloak-mcp
export KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET=your-secret
keycloak-mcp --check
# HTTP Request: POST https://keycloak.example.com/realms/my-realm/protocol/openid-connect/token "HTTP/1.1 200 OK"
# OK: authenticated to https://keycloak.example.com/admin/realms/my-realm
Exit codes: 0 success, 1 configuration error (missing variable), 2 authentication error.
IP-to-site labeling (optional)
Point KEYCLOAK_SITES_INI at an INI file if you want IP addresses in tool output to be tagged with your site names. Tools like get_user_sessions, get_events, and get_login_failures_by_ip pick it up automatically; anything outside your declared ranges is labeled external. Leave the variable unset and IPs are shown as-is.
See sites.ini.example. A minimal file:
[hq]
name = HQ (Tokyo)
ipv4 = 192.0.2.0/24, 198.51.100.0/24
ipv6 = 2001:db8:1::/48
[vpn]
name = VPN
ipv4 = 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12
One site per [section]. name is the display label (falls back to the section name). ipv4 / ipv6 take comma-separated CIDRs; a single host is /32 or /128. Matching is first-match in file order — put specific ranges before broad ones.
Usage
Claude Code (plugin)
This repository doubles as a single-plugin marketplace, so Claude Code can install the server for you:
/plugin marketplace add shigechika/keycloak-mcp
/plugin install keycloak-mcp@keycloak-mcp
The plugin launches uvx keycloak-mcp and reads the same environment variables
described in Configuration; export them before starting Claude
Code. KEYCLOAK_REALM falls back to master and KEYCLOAK_SITES_INI may stay
unset.
uvx must be on the PATH of the process that runs Claude Code — a login
shell usually has it, but a GUI-launched app may not; install
uv system-wide if the plugin fails to start.
Claude Code (manual)
In .mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"keycloak-mcp": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "keycloak-mcp",
"env": {
"KEYCLOAK_URL": "https://keycloak.example.com",
"KEYCLOAK_REALM": "my-realm",
"KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID": "keycloak-mcp",
"KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET": ""
}
}
}
}
Claude Desktop
In claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"keycloak-mcp": {
"command": "keycloak-mcp",
"env": {
"KEYCLOAK_URL": "https://keycloak.example.com",
"KEYCLOAK_REALM": "my-realm",
"KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID": "keycloak-mcp",
"KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET": ""
}
}
}
}
From a shell
export KEYCLOAK_URL=https://keycloak.example.com
export KEYCLOAK_REALM=my-realm
export KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID=keycloak-mcp
export KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET=your-secret
keycloak-mcp
CLI
keycloak-mcp --version # Print version and exit
keycloak-mcp --help # Show usage and required environment variables
keycloak-mcp --check # Verify env vars and authentication, then exit
keycloak-mcp # Run the MCP STDIO server (default)
No-argument mode is the normal one — that's how MCP clients launch it.
Daily spray report (batch)
spray_check looks at a rolling window ending now, which is right for a patrol but cannot be archived day by day. For that, run the same analysis over one calendar day from a scheduled job:
keycloak-mcp spray-report --date 2026-09-17 --tz Asia/Tokyo > 2026-09-17.json
- The window is
[DATE 00:00, DATE+1 00:00)in--tz(default: the host's zone). Use the zone the KeyCloak server logs in, becausedateFrom/dateToare interpreted there. Events are cut to the window by timestamp on both ends. - One JSON document goes to stdout; errors go to stderr with a non-zero exit (2 = configuration, 1 = fetch/auth), and nothing is written to stdout in that case.
- The output is the
spray_checkshape with every external IP that has at least one event carrying a username inexternal_ips(min_report_users=1), plusexternal_totals, which counts LOGIN / LOGIN_ERROR for every external IP — including IPs whose failures carry no username at all and therefore have no row,fetch_complete,resolve_complete,coverage(first_event,last_event,head_gap_seconds,tail_gap_seconds),schema,keycloak_mcp_versionandsites_ini_sha256. Treat a day as final only when both*_completeflags are true and neither gap is large; a gap at one end usually means--tzdiffers from the KeyCloak server's zone. - It refuses to run when
KEYCLOAK_SITES_INIyields no ranges (every IP would count as external) unless--allow-no-sitesis given, and whenKEYCLOAK_KNOWN_EGRESShas an entry that is not a CIDR. - Its own limits apply (
--deadline 900,--max-events 1000000,--max-resolves 2000), notKEYCLOAK_DEADLINE/KEYCLOAK_MAX_EVENTS, which are sized for a tool call behind an HTTP gateway. - The output contains source IPs and usernames. Keep it out of anything published.
Development
git clone https://github.com/shigechika/keycloak-mcp.git
cd keycloak-mcp
# uv
uv sync --dev
uv run pytest -v
uv run ruff check .
# pip
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -e . && .venv/bin/pip install pytest pytest-cov respx ruff
.venv/bin/pytest -v
.venv/bin/ruff check .
Live smoke test
pytest checks logic against fixtures; it cannot tell you that a tool has
stopped returning real data. scripts/smoke_test.py runs every registered
tool against the configured realm and fails on empty, malformed or error
answers:
# needs KEYCLOAK_URL / KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID / KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET
uv run python scripts/smoke_test.py
uv run python scripts/smoke_test.py --only login_stats --traceback
- Read-only. Every state-changing tool (
reset_password,logout_user,set_user_enabled,reset_passwords_batch) is skipped by name, and a test enforces that. The report prints tool names and statuses only — never payloads, and server-authored error text is redacted too (KeyCloak quotes the username it was asked about);--tracebackstill shows the full text on the operator's own terminal. - Arguments that would identify real users, groups or IPs are discovered at
run time, never written into
scripts/smoke_probes.py. - CI enforces the cheap half: a tool registered without a probe spec fails the
build (
tests/test_smoke_probes.py), so adding a tool forces the question "how would we know it works?". scripts/smoke_harness.pyis the engine and holds no KeyCloak knowledge: it is kept identical across the servers that share it, so fix engine bugs once and sync the file rather than patching this copy.
License
MIT
Metadata
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