Kibsu

What can your agents not do in this repository yet?

You have written instructions for coding agents — AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, a skills/ directory, .cursorrules. Kibsu reads them alongside your git history and reports which of those instructions anyone could actually verify were followed, and which ones only work when a human remembers.

It writes nothing. Run it, then run git status.

Run it

No dependencies. Python 3.8+.

python -m kibsu report /path/to/any/repo

report is one of twelve subcommands — python -m kibsu --help lists them all. It is the one to start with, and the only one you need to read this page.

Real output, against a public repository at commit 3dcbd5c:

  WHAT YOUR AGENTS CANNOT DO HERE YET
  /tmp/superpowers
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  x  Find your docs             89 markdown files, no index. An agent must grep the tree.
  +  Know your conventions      consistent frontmatter (description, name) - enforceable.
  +  Prove they followed        19.8% of your procedural instructions are verifiable
                                (above the 11.1% public median).
  x  Resume after a break       your instructions promise no artifacts at all - nothing
                                survives the session, and nothing can be checked.
  ?  Follow your own rules      COULD NOT CHECK - no index file to check history against
                                (looked for docs\index.json, .kibsu/index.json, docs/index.json).
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  2 of 5 ready.  1 could NOT be checked - that is not a pass.
  Nothing was written to this repo - run `git status` to confirm.

That block was re-run against 3dcbd5c on 2026-07-27 before being pasted here. An earlier revision of this README showed the fifth line as ! Follow your own rules with a bare 2 of 5 ready. summary — output from a build predating the ? mark, which the legend and the paragraph directly below it already described. A pasted sample a reader could reproduce and get something else from is the same reproducibility defect as the SHA-less survey table further down, and it is recorded rather than quietly corrected for the same reason.

Reproduce it:

git clone https://github.com/obra/superpowers /tmp/superpowers && cd /tmp/superpowers && git checkout 3dcbd5c
python -m kibsu report /tmp/superpowers
git -C /tmp/superpowers status --porcelain

The last command prints nothing. That is the point.

(report exits 3 here, not 0 — two questions came back not-ready and one could not be checked, which is the finding, not a failure to run. The commands are deliberately not chained on && for that reason: && would swallow the git status proof in exactly the case worth proving.)

+ ready · x not ready · ! not applicable here · ? could not be checked

A check that could not run gets its own line and its own mark, and the summary says so out loud. Printing one line fewer would make "2 of 4" and "2 of 5" indistinguishable, and the check that cannot run is reliably the uncomfortable one.

See a repo that passes

Want to know what a governed workspace looks like — or test kibsu against one built to be read? Clone kibsu-lab: a complete fictional company (Tuppi Trading Co.) with a seeded deterministic data generator, an armed commit gate, a skills team for agents, and three machine-checkable tasks — including one that ships half-finished on a branch, so you can watch an agent resume work it never started. Point any coding agent at its AGENTS.md; check its work with one command. The lab scores 4 of 5 on the report above — and its README shows the exact command trail that proves it.

The five questions

Question 5 is a replay, not an opinion. It walks your last N commits and asks, for each one, whether the index you claim to maintain would have gone stale. The answer is a count of your own commits, which is considerably harder to argue with than a score.

What "verifiable" means

An instruction is CHECKABLE if a reviewer could tell, from the repository alone, whether it happened:

• it is a tick-box, or
• it contains a runnable command, or
• it names a concrete file artifact, or
• it refers to an exit code, a diff, or an assertion

Everything else is CLAIMABLE: the only evidence it happened is the agent saying that it did.

The metric is deliberately biased toward CHECKABLE. Every ambiguous instruction is counted as checkable — a bare path mention counts, a bare command word counts. Reported figures are therefore ceilings. The true numbers are lower. python -m kibsu audit <dir> --definitions prints the whole ruleset so you can argue with it (exit 0).

Genres, and why they matter

Scoring every document on checkability is the obvious way to get this wrong, so units are split first and procedure-only figures are reported separately:

Genre is declared in frontmatter (genre: doctrine), not guessed. Auto-detection still runs as a fallback, and any disagreement between declaration and detection is printed — a declaration cannot quietly buy a better score.

That design exists because auto-detection failed. Ten numbered principles are structurally identical to ten numbered steps, and every heuristic tried turned out to be a prior belief expressed as a regular expression.

Phantom artifacts

Some instructions mandate an output file. Kibsu extracts those filenames and searches the working tree and the full git history for them. An artifact that has never existed, in any commit, is a phantom — an instruction no model has ever been caught skipping, because nothing was ever looking.

Scoped to artifacts a document claims are produced inside its own repository. Scaffolding instructions that generate files in the user's project are excluded, with the reason printed. On a shallow clone the result is UNKNOWN, never zero.

The survey

Eight public instruction collections, measured at pinned commits. Raw per-repo JSON, each carrying the SHA it was measured at, is in evidence/.

Regenerate the whole table yourself:

python -m kibsu survey

This section previously linked to an evidence/ directory that had never existed in any commit — a phantom artifact, in the README of a tool built to detect phantom artifacts. It was found by an outside reviewer, not by me, and not by four of my own review agents that had passed the same file. The directory now exists because the survey was actually re-run; see below for the one number that changed when it was.

median procedure-only: 11.1% · min 2.2% · max 22.9% in-scope mandated artifacts: 103 distinct, 44 never existed in any commit (43%)

One number moved, and that is the point of the SHA column

An earlier revision of this table published 41 phantoms of 99 (41%) and carried no commit SHAs. Re-measuring produced 44 of 103 (43%).

Every checkable figure — units, instructions, all%, proc%, the median, min and max — matched exactly. The entire difference is the phantom-artifact count for davila7/claude-code-templates, the most actively maintained collection of the eight: 31/70 became 34/74 as the repository grew.

Nothing was wrong with the original measurement. It simply could not be reproduced, because it recorded no commit to reproduce it against — the same defect this tool reports as ? COULD NOT CHECK in other people's repositories. Both figures were probably right about different commits, and there was no way to tell.

Every row now carries the SHA it was measured at, and the raw per-repo JSON is in evidence/.

Two further repositories fell below the sample floor (≥5 procedure units and ≥50 procedure instructions). They are reported but not ranked: a percentage from fifteen instructions is noise wearing a number, and one of the two would otherwise have topped the table at 66.7% off a single unit.

The part that was not expected

Five of the eight mandate zero artifacts. Not "promised and missing" — never promised anything at all. The field splits into two distinct failure modes: collections that make no verifiable claim in the first place, and collections whose claims fail roughly 40% of the time.

Verify it yourself

You are about to point a tool at your own repository. Here is everything you can check first, without taking anything here on trust.

Nothing to install, nothing to audit. pyproject.toml declares dependencies = [], and the test suite imports nothing outside the standard library either. There is no transitive dependency tree to review, because there is no dependency tree.

python -c "import pathlib,sys; sys.exit(0 if 'dependencies = []' in pathlib.Path('pyproject.toml').read_text() else 1)"
echo $?                  # 0        (bash / zsh)
echo $LASTEXITCODE       # 0        (PowerShell)

One line rather than a heredoc, because a heredoc is a bash construct and this line has to work in PowerShell too — a "verify it yourself" section that only verifies on Unix is half a claim.

It is small enough to actually read. 4,241 lines across 14 files in kibsu/, plus 2,077 lines of tests running 72 cases. That is an evening, not a quarter. Count it yourself rather than believing this paragraph:

python -c "import pathlib,sys; f=sorted(pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).glob('*.py')); print(len(f),'files',sum(len(p.read_text(encoding='utf-8').splitlines()) for p in f),'lines')" kibsu
python -m unittest discover -s tests   # prints the case count

An earlier revision published 3,679 here. That figure was not invented — it was measured, and then re-measured by a second reviewer who got the same answer. Both used PowerShell's Measure-Object -Line, which silently skips empty lines: 4,241 total minus 562 blank lines is exactly 3,679. Two counts agreed because they were not independent, which is the failure the second count existed to prevent. The commands above are printed so the next reader does not have to trust an instrument they cannot see.

git clone https://github.com/M-Bajalan/kibsu && cd kibsu
python -m unittest discover -s tests    # exit 0
python -m kibsu report .                # no install step, no config, no network

report exits 0 when every question came back ready and 3 when something is not ready or could not be checked. Both are successful runs — 3 is a finding, not a crash. (Pointed at this repository it returns 3, and the reason is stated in Honest limits.)

It does not write to your repository. This is the design constraint everything else bends around, and it is two commands to falsify:

python -m kibsu report /path/to/your/repo
git -C /path/to/your/repo status --porcelain

The second command prints nothing. If it ever prints something, that is a bug worth an issue. Note the ;-style separation rather than &&: chaining on && would skip the proof precisely when report returns 3, which is most of the time and is the case you most want proven.

The published package has verifiable provenance. Releases go to PyPI through GitHub's Trusted Publishing (OIDC), which generates PEP 740 attestations tying each artifact to the exact workflow run and commit that built it — visible on the PyPI project page. No API token exists for this project, in CI settings or anywhere else; release.yml explains why.

Two outside scanners look at this code, and their findings are public. CodeQL scans the Python and the workflow files on every push and weekly; results appear in the Security tab whether they are flattering or not. OpenSSF Scorecard rates the release path — branch protection, token permissions, pinned dependencies — and publishes the number to a public dataset recomputed by someone else's infrastructure. That is what makes the badge worth having; a badge served from this repository would be decoration.

What those two do not tell you: Scorecard measures process, not correctness. A good score means the release path is hard to tamper with. It says nothing about whether the numbers this tool reports are right — that is what the SHAs in evidence/ and the Honest Limits below are for. Confusing the two is precisely the error this project was built to name.

What you cannot verify from here: the provenance scrub described in PROVENANCE.md is not in this repository and will not be — the denylist it scans for is itself the sensitive artifact. What you can check is the absence it claims: search this tree for anything resembling a company, a market, a customer or an internal system. Finding none is a falsifiable result, and it does not require the tool.

The improvement experiment on the team skills is pre-registered — baseline, falsifiable predictions, and the standing rule that a rising doctrine score is disqualifying: PREREGISTRATION.md, committed before any skill was rewritten.

Contribution rules — including the four that are non-negotiable — are in CONTRIBUTING.md.

Honest limits

Read these before quoting anything above.

• obra/superpowers ships a separate eval harness that drives real agent CLIs and grades whether a skill was followed. Kibsu reads only documents, so it cannot see that. The real enforceability of that repo is higher than 19.8%. This is the strongest counter-example to the entire approach, and it belongs at the top of the limits rather than buried at the bottom.
• The metric is a heuristic. Biased generous by design. Ceilings, not measurements.
• Persona collections are not badly written, they are a different genre. Scoring them on checkability was the first mistake this tool made.
• Low checkability has not been shown to produce worse outcomes. Nobody has demonstrated that. The demonstrated finding is that nobody can tell either way — the weaker claim, the more defensible one, and the only one worth acting on.
• N is small for several repositories. Sample floors are enforced, not assumed.
• Genre auto-detection is weak. Declare it.
• This repository scores 0 of 5 on its own report, and the number is honest. Run python -m kibsu report . here and you get 0 of 5 ready. 3 could NOT be checked — worse than every collection in the survey table. The reason is that kibsu is a tool, not an instruction collection: there is no AGENTS.md, no skills/, and no index, so three of the five questions have nothing to measure and say so rather than scoring zero. That is the ? mark doing its job on its own author. It is also the strongest argument for the write-side work that is next on the roadmap — a tool that cannot yet furnish the artifacts it asks other repositories for. Anyone using this against the project is making a fair point, and it is written here first so they do not have to.
• The Scorecard badge above says 4.8, and one of the points it deducts is for a genre mismatch — which is this project's own argument, arriving inside its own badge. Dependency-Update-Tool: 0, because there is no Dependabot config for Python packages. There are no Python packages. dependencies = [] is the first hard rule in CONTRIBUTING.md, so the only possible score on a check for keeping dependencies updated is zero, permanently, by design. Scoring a repository on a dimension it deliberately does not have is exactly the mistake this tool made first and now reports in others: the metric is measuring the wrong genre. Adding a config block that can never fire, to move a number, would have been the Goodhart response. What made it interesting is that the check was also right about something it did not say. CI actions are dependencies too, and those were genuinely unwatched — so .github/dependabot.yml now exists for the github-actions ecosystem only, and every action in every workflow is pinned to an immutable commit SHA it keeps current. Wrong about the thing it named, right about a thing it pointed at. That is a better outcome than either obeying it or dismissing it, and it is the argument for reading a low score instead of chasing it. One more thing worth borrowing rather than criticising: two of Scorecard's checks return -1, meaning could not be checked — not zero. It reaches for the same three-state honesty this tool argues for with its ? mark, on the same kind of question. A rating system that distinguishes bad from unknown is doing something most do not.

The name

kibsu (𒆠𒍑, KI.UŠ) is Akkadian, derived from kabāsu, "to tread":

1. "tread, imprint" of a foot — kibsu redû, "to follow a track"; ša kibsi, "tracker" 2. "track, route"; transferred, "mode of life, behaviour, course of life" 3. mathematical: "way of calculation"

— A Concise Dictionary of Akkadian, Black, George & Postgate, Harrassowitz ²2000

The trace left behind, the course of conduct, and the method of reckoning. The tool is all three.

License

MIT. See LICENSE and PROVENANCE.md.