Forge Verify middleware for LangGraph/LangChain — verify every tool call before execution
Project description
langchain-forge
Forge middleware for LangGraph & LangChain -- verify every tool call before execution.
Why Forge?
AI agents make autonomous decisions, but not every decision should execute unchecked. Forge sits between your agent's intent and the actual tool call, verifying each action against your security policies in real time. If the action violates a policy, it never executes -- the agent receives a denial message and can explain the restriction to the user, all without crashing or breaking the conversation flow.
Install
pip install langchain-forge
This installs langchain-forge along with its dependencies: the Forge Python SDK (veritera) and langchain-core.
For a complete agent setup, you will also need LangGraph and an LLM provider:
pip install langchain-forge langgraph langchain-openai
Quick Start
Add Forge verification to any LangGraph agent in three lines:
import os
from langgraph.prebuilt import create_react_agent, ToolNode
from langchain_core.tools import tool
from forge_langgraph import ForgeVerifyMiddleware
os.environ["VERITERA_API_KEY"] = "vt_live_..."
os.environ["OPENAI_API_KEY"] = "sk-..."
@tool
def send_payment(amount: float, recipient: str) -> str:
"""Send a payment to a recipient."""
return f"Sent ${amount} to {recipient}"
@tool
def check_balance(account_id: str) -> str:
"""Check account balance (read-only)."""
return f"Account {account_id}: $12,340.00"
# Three lines -- every tool call now goes through Forge
middleware = ForgeVerifyMiddleware(policy="finance-controls")
tools = [send_payment, check_balance]
tool_node = ToolNode(tools, wrap_tool_call=middleware.wrap_tool_call)
agent = create_react_agent(
model="gpt-4.1",
tools=tool_node,
)
# Forge verifies the tool call before it executes
result = agent.invoke({"messages": [("user", "Send $500 to vendor@acme.com")]})
print(result["messages"][-1].content)
If the send_payment call is approved by your policy, it executes normally. If denied, the agent receives a message like "Action 'send_payment' denied by Forge: Amount exceeds single-transaction limit" and relays the restriction to the user.
Tutorial: Building a Verified RAG Agent
This walkthrough builds a realistic LangGraph agent that retrieves documents, queries a database, and sends emails -- with Forge middleware catching any unauthorized operations along the way.
Step 1: Define Your Tools
from langchain_core.tools import tool
@tool
def search_documents(query: str) -> str:
"""Search the internal knowledge base for relevant documents."""
# In production, this calls your vector store (Pinecone, Weaviate, etc.)
return (
"Found 3 documents:\n"
"1. Q1 Revenue Report (confidential)\n"
"2. Product Roadmap 2026\n"
"3. Employee Handbook v4.2"
)
@tool
def query_database(sql: str) -> str:
"""Run a read-only SQL query against the analytics database."""
# In production, this connects to your database
return "| customer_id | total_spend |\n|-------------|-------------|\n| C-1001 | $45,200 |\n| C-1002 | $38,750 |"
@tool
def send_email(to: str, subject: str, body: str) -> str:
"""Send an email to a recipient."""
return f"Email sent to {to}: '{subject}'"
@tool
def delete_records(table: str, condition: str) -> str:
"""Delete records from a database table."""
return f"Deleted records from {table} where {condition}"
Step 2: Configure Forge Middleware
import os
from forge_langgraph import ForgeVerifyMiddleware
os.environ["VERITERA_API_KEY"] = "vt_live_..."
middleware = ForgeVerifyMiddleware(
policy="rag-agent-policy",
agent_id="rag-support-agent",
fail_closed=True, # block if Forge API is unreachable
skip_actions=["search_documents"], # read-only search is always allowed
on_blocked=lambda action, reason: print(f"BLOCKED: {action} -- {reason}"),
on_verified=lambda action, result: print(f"APPROVED: {action}"),
)
Step 3: Build the Agent
from langgraph.prebuilt import create_react_agent, ToolNode
tools = [search_documents, query_database, send_email, delete_records]
tool_node = ToolNode(tools, wrap_tool_call=middleware.wrap_tool_call)
agent = create_react_agent(
model="gpt-4.1",
tools=tool_node,
)
Step 4: Run It -- Approved Scenario
result = agent.invoke({
"messages": [("user", "What were our top customers by spend last quarter?")]
})
for msg in result["messages"]:
print(f"{msg.type}: {msg.content}")
Expected output:
human: What were our top customers by spend last quarter?
ai: [calls search_documents] # skipped (in skip_actions)
tool: Found 3 documents: ...
ai: [calls query_database] # APPROVED by Forge
APPROVED: query_database
tool: | customer_id | total_spend | ...
ai: Based on the analytics data, your top customers last quarter were
C-1001 ($45,200) and C-1002 ($38,750).
The search_documents call is skipped (configured as a read-only action). The query_database call is verified and approved by Forge.
Step 5: Run It -- Denied Scenario
result = agent.invoke({
"messages": [("user", "Delete all records from the customers table older than 2020")]
})
for msg in result["messages"]:
print(f"{msg.type}: {msg.content}")
Expected output:
human: Delete all records from the customers table older than 2020
ai: [calls delete_records] # DENIED by Forge
BLOCKED: delete_records -- Destructive database operations require manual approval
tool: Action 'delete_records' denied by Forge: Destructive database operations
require manual approval
ai: I'm unable to delete those records directly. Your organization's security
policy requires manual approval for destructive database operations.
Please submit a deletion request through your admin portal.
Forge intercepted the delete_records call, checked it against the rag-agent-policy, and returned a denial. The tool never executed. The agent received the denial as a ToolMessage and explained the restriction to the user naturally.
Step 6: Mixed Scenario -- Some Calls Approved, Some Denied
result = agent.invoke({
"messages": [(
"user",
"Find the Q1 revenue data and email a summary to external-partner@gmail.com"
)]
})
for msg in result["messages"]:
print(f"{msg.type}: {msg.content}")
Expected output:
human: Find the Q1 revenue data and email a summary to external-partner@gmail.com
ai: [calls search_documents] # skipped (read-only)
tool: Found 3 documents: ...
ai: [calls send_email] # DENIED by Forge
BLOCKED: send_email -- Cannot send confidential financial data to external addresses
tool: Action 'send_email' denied by Forge: Cannot send confidential financial
data to external addresses
ai: I found the Q1 Revenue Report, but I'm unable to email it to an external
address. Your security policy restricts sending confidential financial
documents outside the organization. You can share it through your
approved file-sharing platform instead.
The document search succeeded, but Forge caught the attempt to email confidential data to an external address. The agent handled both outcomes gracefully.
Integration Patterns
ForgeVerifyMiddleware -- Automatic Verification (Recommended)
The middleware intercepts every tool call automatically. No changes to your tools or agent logic required.
from forge_langgraph import ForgeVerifyMiddleware
from langgraph.prebuilt import ToolNode, create_react_agent
middleware = ForgeVerifyMiddleware(
policy="my-policy",
agent_id="my-agent",
)
tools = [tool_a, tool_b, tool_c]
tool_node = ToolNode(tools, wrap_tool_call=middleware.wrap_tool_call)
agent = create_react_agent(
model="gpt-4.1",
tools=tool_node,
)
When to use: Most cases. You want a security layer that works regardless of what the LLM decides to do.
forge_verify_tool() -- Explicit Verification
Creates a LangChain tool that the LLM calls explicitly to verify actions. The LLM decides when verification is needed.
from forge_langgraph import forge_verify_tool
verify = forge_verify_tool(
policy="my-policy",
agent_id="my-agent",
)
agent = create_react_agent(
model="gpt-4.1",
tools=[send_payment, read_balance, verify],
)
When the LLM calls forge_verify, it receives a structured response:
# Approved
APPROVED: compliant | proof_id: fp_abc123 | latency: 42ms
# Denied
DENIED: Amount exceeds policy limit | proof_id: fp_def456
When to use: When you want the LLM to reason about verification decisions, or when you need to verify actions that are not LangChain tools (e.g., API calls made inside a tool).
Configuration Reference
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
api_key |
str |
VERITERA_API_KEY env var |
Your Forge API key. Starts with vt_live_ (production) or vt_test_ (sandbox). |
base_url |
str |
https://veritera.ai |
Forge API endpoint. Override for self-hosted deployments. |
agent_id |
str |
"langgraph-agent" |
Identifier for this agent in Forge audit logs and dashboards. |
policy |
str |
None |
Policy name to evaluate actions against. When None, the default policy for your API key is used. |
fail_closed |
bool |
True |
When True, actions are denied if the Forge API is unreachable. When False, actions are allowed through on API failure. |
timeout |
float |
10.0 |
HTTP request timeout in seconds for the Forge API call. |
skip_actions |
list[str] |
[] |
Tool names that bypass verification entirely. Use for read-only or low-risk tools. |
on_verified |
Callable |
None |
Callback function (action: str, result) -> None called when an action is approved. |
on_blocked |
Callable |
None |
Callback function (action: str, reason: str) -> None called when an action is denied. |
How It Works
User message
|
v
LLM decides to call a tool
|
v
ForgeVerifyMiddleware.wrap_tool_call()
|
+---> Is tool in skip_actions?
| YES --> Execute tool normally
| NO --> Call Forge /v1/verify
| |
| +---> APPROVED
| | --> Execute tool normally
| | --> Call on_verified callback
| |
| +---> DENIED
| | --> Return ToolMessage with denial reason
| | --> Call on_blocked callback
| | --> Tool NEVER executes
| |
| +---> API ERROR
| --> fail_closed=True? --> Deny
| --> fail_closed=False? --> Execute tool
v
LLM receives tool result (or denial message)
|
v
LLM responds to user
Each verification call sends the following to Forge:
- action -- the tool name (e.g.,
"send_email") - agent_id -- which agent is making the call
- params -- the tool arguments as a dictionary
- policy -- which policy to evaluate against
Forge evaluates the action and returns a verdict with a proof_id for audit trail purposes.
Working with LangGraph StateGraph
If you are building a custom LangGraph StateGraph instead of using create_react_agent, you can add Forge verification directly into your graph nodes.
Basic StateGraph Integration
import os
from typing import Annotated, TypedDict
from langgraph.graph import StateGraph, START, END
from langgraph.graph.message import add_messages
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, AIMessage, ToolMessage
from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI
from langchain_core.tools import tool
from veritera import Forge
os.environ["VERITERA_API_KEY"] = "vt_live_..."
os.environ["OPENAI_API_KEY"] = "sk-..."
# --- State ---
class AgentState(TypedDict):
messages: Annotated[list, add_messages]
# --- Tools ---
@tool
def search_web(query: str) -> str:
"""Search the web for current information."""
return f"Results for '{query}': ..."
@tool
def send_slack_message(channel: str, text: str) -> str:
"""Post a message to a Slack channel."""
return f"Message posted to #{channel}"
tools = [search_web, send_slack_message]
tools_by_name = {t.name: t for t in tools}
# --- Forge client ---
forge = Forge(
api_key=os.environ["VERITERA_API_KEY"],
fail_closed=True,
)
# --- Nodes ---
llm = ChatOpenAI(model="gpt-4.1").bind_tools(tools)
def call_model(state: AgentState) -> dict:
response = llm.invoke(state["messages"])
return {"messages": [response]}
def call_tools(state: AgentState) -> dict:
"""Execute tool calls with Forge verification."""
outputs = []
for tool_call in state["messages"][-1].tool_calls:
name = tool_call["name"]
args = tool_call["args"]
# Verify through Forge before executing
try:
result = forge.verify_sync(
action=name,
agent_id="custom-graph-agent",
params=args,
policy="slack-bot-policy",
)
except Exception:
outputs.append(ToolMessage(
content=f"Action '{name}' blocked -- verification unavailable.",
tool_call_id=tool_call["id"],
))
continue
if result.verified:
# Approved -- execute the tool
tool_result = tools_by_name[name].invoke(args)
outputs.append(ToolMessage(
content=str(tool_result),
tool_call_id=tool_call["id"],
))
else:
# Denied -- return denial to the LLM
outputs.append(ToolMessage(
content=f"Action '{name}' denied by Forge: {result.reason}",
tool_call_id=tool_call["id"],
))
return {"messages": outputs}
def should_continue(state: AgentState) -> str:
last = state["messages"][-1]
if hasattr(last, "tool_calls") and last.tool_calls:
return "tools"
return END
# --- Graph ---
graph = StateGraph(AgentState)
graph.add_node("model", call_model)
graph.add_node("tools", call_tools)
graph.add_edge(START, "model")
graph.add_conditional_edges("model", should_continue, {"tools": "tools", END: END})
graph.add_edge("tools", "model")
app = graph.compile()
# --- Run ---
result = app.invoke({
"messages": [HumanMessage(content="Post our Q1 results to #general on Slack")]
})
Reusable Verification Helper
For larger graphs with multiple tool-calling nodes, extract Forge verification into a helper:
from veritera import Forge
from langchain_core.messages import ToolMessage
forge = Forge(api_key="vt_live_...", fail_closed=True)
def verify_and_execute(tool_call: dict, tools_map: dict, policy: str) -> ToolMessage:
"""Verify a tool call through Forge, then execute or deny."""
name = tool_call["name"]
args = tool_call["args"]
try:
result = forge.verify_sync(
action=name,
agent_id="my-agent",
params=args,
policy=policy,
)
except Exception:
return ToolMessage(
content=f"Action '{name}' blocked -- verification unavailable.",
tool_call_id=tool_call["id"],
)
if result.verified:
output = tools_map[name].invoke(args)
return ToolMessage(content=str(output), tool_call_id=tool_call["id"])
return ToolMessage(
content=f"Action '{name}' denied by Forge: {result.reason}",
tool_call_id=tool_call["id"],
)
Then use it in any node:
def call_tools(state: AgentState) -> dict:
outputs = [
verify_and_execute(tc, tools_by_name, policy="my-policy")
for tc in state["messages"][-1].tool_calls
]
return {"messages": outputs}
Error Handling
Forge API Unreachable
When the Forge API cannot be reached (network issues, timeouts), behavior depends on fail_closed:
# Fail closed (default) -- deny the action when Forge is unreachable
middleware = ForgeVerifyMiddleware(policy="my-policy", fail_closed=True)
# Fail open -- allow the action through when Forge is unreachable
middleware = ForgeVerifyMiddleware(policy="my-policy", fail_closed=False)
Recommendation: Use fail_closed=True for production. Use fail_closed=False only during development when you want to test agent behavior without Forge blocking calls.
Missing API Key
If no API key is provided and VERITERA_API_KEY is not set, ForgeVerifyMiddleware raises a ValueError at initialization -- not at runtime. This ensures misconfigured agents fail fast.
try:
middleware = ForgeVerifyMiddleware(policy="my-policy")
except ValueError as e:
print(e)
# "Forge API key required. Pass api_key= or set VERITERA_API_KEY env var."
Logging
The middleware logs all verification decisions. Enable debug logging to see approval/denial details:
import logging
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG)
logging.getLogger("forge_langgraph").setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
Log output:
DEBUG:forge_langgraph:Forge APPROVED: query_database (proof=fp_abc123)
WARNING:forge_langgraph:Forge DENIED: delete_records -- Destructive operations blocked
ERROR:forge_langgraph:Forge verify error for send_email: Connection timed out
Custom Callbacks for Monitoring
Use on_verified and on_blocked to integrate with your observability stack:
import json
def log_to_datadog(action: str, result) -> None:
# Send approved actions to your monitoring system
print(json.dumps({"action": action, "proof_id": result.proof_id, "status": "approved"}))
def alert_on_block(action: str, reason: str) -> None:
# Alert when actions are blocked
print(json.dumps({"action": action, "reason": reason, "status": "denied"}))
middleware = ForgeVerifyMiddleware(
policy="production-policy",
on_verified=log_to_datadog,
on_blocked=alert_on_block,
)
Environment Variables
| Variable | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
VERITERA_API_KEY |
Yes (unless passed directly) | Your Forge API key. Get one at veritera.ai/dashboard. |
OPENAI_API_KEY |
For OpenAI models | Required if using gpt-4.1 or other OpenAI models via langchain-openai. |
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
For Anthropic models | Required if using Claude models via langchain-anthropic. |
Other Forge Integrations
Forge provides middleware for all major agent frameworks:
| Package | Framework | PyPI |
|---|---|---|
| langchain-forge | LangGraph / LangChain | pip install langchain-forge |
| openai-forge | OpenAI Agents SDK | pip install openai-forge |
| crewai-forge | CrewAI | pip install crewai-forge |
| llamaindex-forge | LlamaIndex | pip install llamaindex-forge |
| veritera | Python SDK (core) | pip install veritera |
Links
License
MIT -- Forge by Veritera AI
Project details
Release history Release notifications | RSS feed
Download files
Download the file for your platform. If you're not sure which to choose, learn more about installing packages.
Source Distribution
Built Distribution
Filter files by name, interpreter, ABI, and platform.
If you're not sure about the file name format, learn more about wheel file names.
Copy a direct link to the current filters
File details
Details for the file langchain_forge-0.1.1.tar.gz.
File metadata
- Download URL: langchain_forge-0.1.1.tar.gz
- Upload date:
- Size: 15.6 kB
- Tags: Source
- Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? No
- Uploaded via: twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.13.1
File hashes
| Algorithm | Hash digest | |
|---|---|---|
| SHA256 |
da14d470369dc2fa14336a3285095333be967745ff5c3a828376916a721fb3fb
|
|
| MD5 |
fed040134166160fb487bccd0a227fea
|
|
| BLAKE2b-256 |
af527c268a521546326aa575e1912b55dbeb644bae2e164d1f6d5a603f5445a1
|
File details
Details for the file langchain_forge-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl.
File metadata
- Download URL: langchain_forge-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl
- Upload date:
- Size: 10.5 kB
- Tags: Python 3
- Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? No
- Uploaded via: twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.13.1
File hashes
| Algorithm | Hash digest | |
|---|---|---|
| SHA256 |
6edfbeb75e6a14debc32f2e97cf345acb4a9e154d746fa666feb0796ea13b413
|
|
| MD5 |
592486ee2de42da586ede8d05cda277c
|
|
| BLAKE2b-256 |
92a3680ceca725365ecdfbc576ef0eeda4d8f3f05614a9a0af22740776ac18dc
|