leap-oauth-sdk

Business-side SDK for services that accept access tokens issued by Leap Auth, an OAuth 2.1 authorization server. It verifies tokens locally against the server's JWKS and reports every failure as one of four error categories, so each service handles retries, re-login and permission errors the same way.

Status: alpha. This release contains access token verification, the server side of browser sign-in (code exchange, refresh, online session check, logout), encrypted cookie sessions, leap-sso.js (the matching browser module), principal lookup for admin pickers and admin member rules.

Install

uv add leap-oauth-sdk

Python 3.12 or newer.

Verify an access token

Create one verifier per process and reuse it, so the JWKS cache is shared by all requests.

from leap_oauth_sdk import AccessTokenVerifier, LeapAuthConfig, OAuthSDKError

verifier = AccessTokenVerifier(
    LeapAuthConfig(
        issuer="https://auth.example.com",  # must equal the token's iss claim exactly
        audience="example-service",         # this service's own audience
    )
)

async def current_subject(bearer_token: str) -> str:
    try:
        context = await verifier.verify_async(bearer_token)
    except OAuthSDKError as exc:
        # exc.status is the suggested local HTTP status; exc.code is stable for logs.
        raise HTTPException(status_code=exc.status, detail={"error": exc.code})
    return context.subject_id

verify() is the blocking variant. Both share the same cache.

The SDK does not read environment variables and has no default hosts. Load settings in your own configuration layer and pass them to LeapAuthConfig.

Verify registered claims for an existing token contract

Use verify() or verify_async() for the complete access-token contract above. Services that already accept a different metadata shape can instead use verify_claims() or verify_claims_async(). Both return VerifiedTokenClaims(raw_claims=...), with original claim types and no invented identity fields.

from leap_oauth_sdk import AccessTokenVerifier, LeapAuthConfig, RegisteredClaimsPolicy

verifier = AccessTokenVerifier(
    LeapAuthConfig(
        issuer="https://auth.example.com",
        audience="example-service",
        allowed_algorithms=("EdDSA", "RS256"),
        leeway_seconds=0,
        jwks_refresh_cooldown_seconds=30,
    )
)
verified = verifier.verify_claims(
    bearer_token,
    policy=RegisteredClaimsPolicy.PYJWT_COMPATIBLE,
)
claims = verified.raw_claims
# Apply the service's established version, purpose, status, revocation and authorization
# rules before using these claims as an authenticated application identity.

RegisteredClaimsPolicy has exactly two presets; arbitrary JWT options are not accepted:

Both presets always verify the signature, algorithm allowlist, issuer, audience and token timestamps. The compatible preset preserves the registered-claim and public-key selection behavior used with PyJWT 2.10.1, including numeric-string timestamps and the first matching signing key. It never retries a failed signature with another key. Private key material is rejected, and keys declaring an encryption or other non-signature use are excluded in both presets. No preset disables verification or changes the configured issuer or audience.

Raw verified claims are not a complete application identity. Neither raw-claims method validates application metadata such as status, ver, purpose, source or principal_type. Missing fields remain missing. The caller must enforce its own existing contract. The complete verify() and verify_async() methods always use STRICT, retain all metadata checks and return the unchanged AccessTokenContext type.

All four methods share one JWKS cache and one in-flight fetch, including mixed sync/async callers. Size and key-selection checks apply on every use, so compatible cache entries do not bypass strict checks. A failed refresh invalidates previously cached keys and enters the configured failure cooldown. Empty, malformed or unusable JWKS produce an InvalidResponse infrastructure error; transport failures produce Retryable. A usable JWKS with no matching key produces ReauthRequired. Services can map infrastructure errors to their established availability response without treating them as invalid tokens. HTTP redirects are not followed. Call blocking methods from a worker thread rather than an asynchronous event-loop thread.

Structurally broken entries in a mixed JWKS are infrastructure failures, rather than being skipped to accept a later key. Key-shape or construction errors that previously escaped as unhandled exceptions are reported as InvalidResponse.

Browser sign-in

One browser client is registered per service and environment. The browser runs authorization code + PKCE with a top-level redirect; your backend exchanges the code. Tokens never appear in URLs. Two ways to hold credentials:

• bearer: the page keeps the access and refresh token in sessionStorage and sends Authorization: Bearer. Your API verifies with check_session().
• cookie: the backend keeps both tokens in an encrypted HttpOnly cookie and the page never sees them. Use CookieSessionManager.

from leap_oauth_sdk import BrowserClientConfig, BrowserSSO, LeapAuthConfig, OAuthSDKError

sso = BrowserSSO(
    LeapAuthConfig(issuer="https://auth.example.com", audience="example-service"),
    BrowserClientConfig(
        client_id="web-example",
        redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/auth/callback",  # exact registered callback
        resource="https://app.example.com/",
    ),
)

Serve these routes under one base path (bearer mode shown). On OAuthSDKError every route responds with exc.status, exc.headers and the body exc.to_dict():

Protected API routes call sso.check_session(bearer_token) on every request and must not cache the result, so that signing out in one service takes effect everywhere on the next request; pass verified= when the same token was already verified locally. An already-ended sign-in counts as a successful logout.

Browser module

leap-sso.js ships inside the package; leap_oauth_sdk.static_dir() returns its directory.

<script src="/static/leap-sso.js"></script>
<script>
  const sso = LeapSSO.create({
    endpointBase: "/api/auth/browser",
    credentialMode: "bearer",          // or "cookie"
    storagePrefix: "example.admin",    // sessionStorage keys; storageKeys can keep old names
    defaultNext: "/admin",
    hooks: {
      onLoading: () => showSpinner(),
      onLogin: (message, retryable) => showSignIn(message, retryable),
      onForbidden: () => showNoAccess(),
    },
  });
  const state = await sso.boot();      // "ready" | "redirecting" | "login" | "forbidden" | "disabled"
  if (state === "ready") render(await (await sso.fetch("/api/me")).json());
  signInButton.onclick = () => sso.login();
  signOutButton.onclick = () => sso.logout().catch(showRetry);
</script>

• boot() finishes a callback, restores the deep link, or starts one automatic sign-in that only reuses an existing sign-in. Every page load makes at most one automatic attempt; a failed callback shows sign-in instead of looping.
• fetch() adds the bearer token and refreshes 60 seconds before expiry, one refresh at a time. A 401 drops local credentials and makes the one automatic attempt; 403 and other statuses are returned to you untouched. A late 401 for an older bearer token keeps any newer session: GET, HEAD and OPTIONS may retry once; other methods return the original readable 401 without replaying the request. A safe retry also keeps the newer session if its retry limit is reached. The method of a Request object is respected.
• A duplicated tab copies sessionStorage and with it a refresh token the other tab may already have spent. The server then answers refresh_rotation_in_progress; the module drops the copy and signs in again through SSO instead of replaying it. In cookie mode the same answer comes from two replicas refreshing at once, so safe methods are retried briefly. POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE and other non-safe methods return the original 503 response. Business writes are never automatically replayed; the application decides whether and how to ask the user to retry.
• logout() sends scope=browser, which ends the sign-in for every service in this browser. Credentials are cleared only when the backend confirms; the next page load shows sign-in once.
• Messages default to Chinese; pass messages to override.

Cookie sessions

from leap_oauth_sdk import CookieCipher, CookieSessionManager

cookies = CookieSessionManager(sso, CookieCipher(secret))  # secret: 32+ characters

# callback:    value = cookies.issue(sso.exchange_code(code, verifier), extra={"csrf": csrf})
# per request:
result = cookies.resolve(request.cookies.get("example_session"))
if result.cookie is not None:  # refreshed or migrated: write it back
    response.set_cookie(
        "example_session", result.cookie, max_age=cookies.max_age(result.session),
        httponly=True, secure=True, samesite="lax",
    )
# logout:      cookies.logout(value), then delete the cookie

resolve() refreshes shortly before expiry and checks the sign-in online. Requests carrying the same old cookie share one refresh within the process, and the result is reused for ten seconds so a late request never replays the spent refresh token. CookieCipher accepts previous_secrets for rotation and a context string; legacy_loader lets a service read its old cookie format once and rewrite it.

Principal lookup

Admin pages pick people through the authorization server instead of typing subject ids. PrincipalDirectory uses a service lookup credential, never the admin's own token.

from leap_oauth_sdk import PrincipalCandidate, PrincipalDirectory

directory = PrincipalDirectory(config, lookup_token=lookup_token)

result = directory.search("ann")           # principals plus directory users; < 2 chars → empty
rows = [c.to_dict() for c in result.candidates]   # send to the page; the page posts one back
picked = PrincipalCandidate.from_dict(posted)     # untrusted: only ids are kept
accepted = directory.canonicalize([picked, "usr_existing"])

• canonicalize() binds directory users to principals, follows aliases to the canonical subject and requires active principals of allowed_principal_types (default human). It is all or nothing: any rejected pick raises PrincipalSelectionError (422) whose rejected maps each pick to a reason, and nothing is accepted.
• validate() returns status and profile per subject in batches of 100, for listing.
• A rejected lookup credential is reported as InvalidResponse, not ReauthRequired: it is a configuration problem, and the admin must not be sent to sign in again.
• api_base_url points lookups at an internal address of the authorization server.

Admin members

MemberService applies the same rules in every service; storage stays in the service.

from leap_oauth_sdk import JsonFileMemberStore, MemberPolicy, MemberService

members = MemberService(
    MemberPolicy(owners=frozenset({owner_subject})),  # owners come only from configuration
    JsonFileMemberStore("/data/admins.json"),          # or your own MemberStore
    directory,                                         # None: list and remove only
)

members.role_for(subject)                  # "owner" | "member" | None, read on every call
snapshot = members.list()                  # profiles from validate(); degrades when it fails
version = members.add(actor, [picked], expected_version=snapshot.version)
members.remove(actor, subject, expected_version=version)

• Only owners add or remove members, owners cannot be removed, and owners in a selection are ignored. Every write carries the version the admin saw; a concurrent change raises MemberError member_version_conflict (409) instead of overwriting.
• MemberStore has two methods, load() and apply(change, expected_version=); apply must persist the change and its MemberChange audit record atomically. JsonFileMemberStore is a reference implementation for a single replica on a persistent volume.
• MemberError has the same to_dict() shape as the SDK errors. Messages are English; map code to your own wording.

Verification rules

• Signature algorithm must be in allowed_algorithms (default EdDSA only); the token must carry a kid that exists in the JWKS.
• Registered claims exp, iat, nbf, iss, sub, aud, jti are required; aud must be a single string equal to audience; iss must equal issuer.
• ver must equal token_version; status must be active; source.channel must be present; purpose must be in allowed_purposes (a token without purpose counts as access).
• The JWKS is cached for jwks_cache_seconds (300). An unknown kid forces at most one refetch per jwks_refresh_cooldown_seconds (10). A failed or malformed fetch is never cached, never falls back to expired keys and is not retried within the same cooldown. Redirects are not followed.

Business authorization (roles, resources, fields, actions) stays in your service. A verified token only proves who the caller is.

Error categories

All four inherit from OAuthSDKError and expose code, message, status and retryable; to_dict() and headers (Retry-After when retryable) build your error response. Messages never include tokens or upstream response bodies.

Development

uv sync --extra dev
bash scripts/check.sh   # also runs the browser module tests (Node 20+)

License

MIT