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ledgerchain

A hash-chained, tamper-evident decision ledger on SQLAlchemy. Append-only rows, a verifier that recomputes everything, Merkle checkpoints, and external anchoring to object storage as an independent witness.

Built for one job: recording the determinations an AI-assisted system makes, and the human approvals, verdicts, and corrections around them, in a form an auditor can check without trusting the application. Extracted from a production decision-integrity platform where this code records HITL approvals, signed attestations, guardrail verdicts, and correction dispatches.

No blockchain, no ledger database, no sidecar. Three tables in the PostgreSQL or SQLite you already run, and about 1,300 lines of Python you can read in an afternoon.

pip install ledgerchain          # core: sqlalchemy + rfc8785
pip install "ledgerchain[s3]"    # adds boto3 for checkpoint anchoring

What it guarantees

Threat Mechanism Detected by
A payload is edited in place payload_sha256 over RFC 8785 canonical JSON verify_chain names the seq
A row is deleted or reordered strictly contiguous seq, each entry_hash includes str(seq) verify_chain names the seq after the gap
The head pointer is forged ledger_head compared against the last recomputed hash verify_chain(head_valid=False)
A checkpoint row is rewritten Merkle root recomputed over the entries it covers verify_chain marks root_valid=False
The app role updates or deletes BEFORE UPDATE/DELETE triggers raise the write fails
A superuser rewrites the whole chain consistently checkpoint roots anchored under Object Lock verify_anchor compares the live row to the anchored copy

What it does not do: sign entries (the chain proves integrity and order, not authorship; sign payloads before appending if you need that), or trust the clock (timestamps are hashed as given). See SECURITY.md.

Quickstart

from sqlalchemy import create_engine
from sqlalchemy.orm import sessionmaker

import ledgerchain
from ledgerchain import LedgerWriter, verify_chain

engine = create_engine("sqlite:///ledger.db")
ledgerchain.create_all(engine)  # tables + append-only triggers
Session = sessionmaker(bind=engine)

with Session() as session:
    # Append inside the transaction that holds the state change the entry
    # documents. The writer flushes but never commits.
    entry = LedgerWriter.append(
        session,
        event_type="hitl.approval",
        payload={"claim_id": "c-17", "decision": "approve", "model_score": 0.91},
        actor={"kind": "human", "sub": "reviewer-42", "roles": ["approver"]},
        tenant_id="acme",
        subject_uri="/claims/c-17/decision",
    )
    session.commit()
    print(entry.seq, entry.entry_hash)  # 2 <64 hex chars>; seq 1 is genesis

with Session() as session:
    result = verify_chain(session)
    assert result.valid, result.reason

Tamper with it and the verifier tells you where:

$ sqlite3 ledger.db "DROP TRIGGER trg_decision_ledger_no_update;
                     UPDATE decision_ledger SET payload='{\"x\":1}' WHERE seq=2"
$ ledgerchain verify --database-url sqlite:///ledger.db
{
  "valid": false,
  "checked_entries": 2,
  "first_bad_seq": 2,
  "reason": "payload_sha256 mismatch: payload was modified",
  ...
}
$ echo $?
1

How the chain is built

payload_sha256 = sha256( RFC8785(payload) )
entry_hash     = sha256( prev_hash \n payload_sha256 \n seq \n event_type \n ts_rfc3339_utc \n tenant_id )
  • seq is assigned by the writer under a SELECT ... FOR UPDATE on the single ledger_head row, so it is known before insert and concurrent appends serialize. On SQLite this degrades to the file writer lock.
  • The genesis entry (seq=1, event_type="genesis") chains from "0" * 64. The writer creates it lazily on the first append.
  • Every digest is a full 64-hex string. Nothing is truncated anywhere.
  • event_type is yours to define. Only "genesis" is reserved; "checkpoint" is what build_checkpoint writes.

Checkpoints and anchoring

from ledgerchain import AnchorConfig, anchor_checkpoint, build_checkpoint, verify_anchor

with Session() as session:
    result = build_checkpoint(session)  # Merkle root over new entries
    cp = result.checkpoint  # None if nothing new; see skipped_reason

    config = AnchorConfig(bucket="ledger-anchors", endpoint_url="http://minio:9000")
    anchor_checkpoint(session, cp, config=config)  # never raises; failed => retried later
    assert cp.anchor_status == "anchored"

    report = verify_anchor(cp, config=config)  # reads the object back and compares
    assert report.ok

A checkpoint covers (last_checkpoint.to_seq, head.last_seq], is chained to the previous checkpoint via prev_checkpoint_root, and is itself appended to the ledger. Anchoring writes {from_seq, to_seq, merkle_root, ts, prev_checkpoint_root} to s3://<bucket>/<prefix><from>-<to>.json with Object Lock in COMPLIANCE mode by default. Run retry_failed_anchors from a periodic job; storage outages self-heal.

Configuration can also come from the environment via AnchorConfig.from_env(): LEDGER_ANCHOR_BUCKET, LEDGER_ANCHOR_PREFIX, LEDGER_ANCHOR_ENDPOINT_URL, LEDGER_ANCHOR_OBJECT_LOCK_MODE (set to an empty string to disable Object Lock on buckets without it).

The S3 client is injectable: anything with put_object(**kw) and get_object(Bucket=, Key=). The test suite uses an in-memory fake and never touches the network.

CLI

ledgerchain init-db    --database-url postgresql://...   # tables + triggers
ledgerchain verify     --database-url ... [--from-seq N --to-seq M] [--check-anchors]
ledgerchain checkpoint --database-url ... [--anchor]
ledgerchain anchor     --database-url ... [--limit 20]   # retry pending/failed

verify prints JSON and exits 1 on any failure, so it drops into cron or CI. --database-url falls back to LEDGER_DATABASE_URL, then DATABASE_URL. python -m ledgerchain works too.

Fitting it into an existing app

Schema. The models live on their own declarative base. In Alembic:

# env.py
import ledgerchain

target_metadata = [app_metadata, ledgerchain.metadata]

# in the migration that creates the tables
from ledgerchain import install_immutability


def upgrade():
    ...  # autogenerated create_table calls
    install_immutability(op.get_bind())

Table names are decision_ledger, ledger_head, ledger_checkpoint.

Writes. Call LedgerWriter.append inside the same session and transaction as the state change you are recording, then commit once. If the state lives in a different database, use a transactional outbox on that side and relay into the ledger; the outbox row is the evidence that a relay is pending.

Reads. Expose verify_chain(...).to_dict() behind whatever auth your auditors use, and page DecisionLedgerEntry by subject_uri or event_type for receipts. There is no write endpoint to expose.

Workers. Schedule build_checkpoint hourly and retry_failed_anchors every few minutes, or run the CLI from cron.

Design notes

  • Canonical JSON is delegated to the rfc8785 package. Number formatting and key ordering are easy to get subtly wrong and every hash depends on them.
  • The Merkle tree promotes an odd node unchanged rather than duplicating it, which avoids the second-preimage weakness of the duplicate-last-node variant.
  • anchor_checkpoint and verify_anchor never raise. Anchoring is eventually consistent on purpose; the chain is already tamper-evident without it.
  • Hashing cost is microseconds per entry. The head-row lock serializes appends, which is fine at back-office determination volumes. Shard the head per tenant if you ever need more.

Development

python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
ruff check . && mypy && pytest

The suite runs on in-memory and file-backed SQLite and needs no services. The PostgreSQL trigger SQL is the same text the origin application runs in CI against a real Postgres.

Releasing

  1. Bump version in pyproject.toml and add a CHANGELOG.md entry.
  2. Commit, then publish a GitHub release whose tag is vX.Y.Z (a bare X.Y.Z also works) targeting main, or push such a tag by hand. The release workflow checks the tag against the version, re-runs the suite, builds, and publishes to PyPI through trusted publishing (no stored token). A release saved as a draft creates no tag and runs nothing.

Provenance

Extracted from mpointer/rmfx-v2 (packages/ledgerchain), where the same code is consumed by the application that produced it. The history here is the git subtree split of that directory.

License

MIT.

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